X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fln%2Ffunctional_tests.rs;h=5d34edd6ef70d61a6c8fd6f274881eb4a1ead5dd;hb=a8bd4c097f7ae6620eee66c1cb49144e38568439;hp=151626f94ab5134f9e7bf16c174f21f48d69b24d;hpb=b811cba74835c3e866354cb778714837ad488d28;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs index 151626f9..5d34edd6 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint; use crate::sign::{ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, OutputSpender, SignerProvider}; use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PathFailure, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason}; -use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash}; +use crate::ln::types::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash}; use crate::ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, COINBASE_MATURITY, ChannelPhase}; use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS, DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA}; use crate::ln::channel::{DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS, ChannelError}; @@ -42,9 +42,10 @@ use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime; use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, ScriptBuf}; use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes; use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash; -use bitcoin::network::constants::Network; -use bitcoin::{Sequence, Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, Witness}; +use bitcoin::network::Network; +use bitcoin::{Amount, Sequence, Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, Witness}; use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint; +use bitcoin::transaction::Version; use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1; use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey}; @@ -61,6 +62,38 @@ use crate::ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction; use super::channel::UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS; +#[test] +fn test_channel_resumption_fail_post_funding() { + // If we fail to exchange funding with a peer prior to it disconnecting we'll resume the + // channel open on reconnect, however if we do exchange funding we do not currently support + // replaying it and here test that the channel closes. + let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); + let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); + let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]); + let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); + + nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap(); + let open_chan = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan); + let accept_chan = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan); + + let (temp_chan_id, tx, funding_output) = + create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42); + let new_chan_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_output); + nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap(); + + nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + check_closed_events(&nodes[0], &[ExpectedCloseEvent::from_id_reason(new_chan_id, true, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer)]); + + // After ddf75afd16 we'd panic on reconnection if we exchanged funding info, so test that + // explicitly here. + nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { + features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None + }, true).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(), Vec::new()); +} + #[test] fn test_insane_channel_opens() { // Stand up a network of 2 nodes @@ -679,7 +712,7 @@ fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() { //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2); let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, &channel_type_features) / 1000; - let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value); + let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value.to_sat()); actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee; assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee); } @@ -1293,9 +1326,9 @@ fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() { assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() { - if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 { + if outp.value.to_sat() == 800_000 / 1000 { has_both_htlcs += 1; - } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 { + } else if outp.value.to_sat() == 900_000 / 1000 { has_both_htlcs += 1; } } @@ -1324,12 +1357,12 @@ fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() { assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1); assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx - assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800); + assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value.to_sat(), 800); assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input.len(), 1); assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx check_spends!(timeout_tx, remote_txn[0]); - assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900); + assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value.to_sat(), 900); let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 3); @@ -1401,8 +1434,9 @@ fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() { let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1; let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap(); + let recipient_onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret); let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], - 3460001, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap(); + 3460001, &recipient_onion_fields, cur_height, &None).unwrap(); let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap(); let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC { channel_id: chan.2, @@ -1598,8 +1632,9 @@ fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() { let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(); let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1; let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap(); + let recipient_onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret); let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], - 700_000, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap(); + 700_000, &recipient_onion_fields, cur_height, &None).unwrap(); let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap(); let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC { channel_id: chan.2, @@ -1777,8 +1812,9 @@ fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() { let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(); let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1; let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap(); + let recipient_onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(); let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads( - &route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), cur_height, &None).unwrap(); + &route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &recipient_onion_fields, cur_height, &None).unwrap(); let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1).unwrap(); let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC { channel_id: chan.2, @@ -2433,11 +2469,11 @@ fn channel_monitor_network_test() { #[test] fn test_justice_tx_htlc_timeout() { // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Timeout tx, against both sides - let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default(); + let mut alice_config = test_default_channel_config(); alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true; alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false; alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5; - let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default(); + let mut bob_config = test_default_channel_config(); bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true; bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false; bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3; @@ -2496,11 +2532,11 @@ fn test_justice_tx_htlc_timeout() { #[test] fn test_justice_tx_htlc_success() { // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides - let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default(); + let mut alice_config = test_default_channel_config(); alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true; alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false; alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5; - let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default(); + let mut bob_config = test_default_channel_config(); bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true; bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false; bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3; @@ -2643,8 +2679,8 @@ fn do_test_forming_justice_tx_from_monitor_updates(broadcast_initial_commitment: } }); // On the first commitment, node[1]'s balance was below dust so it didn't have an output - let node1_channel_balance = if broadcast_initial_commitment { 0 } else { revoked_commitment_tx.output[0].value }; - let expected_claimable_balance = node1_channel_balance + justice_tx.output[0].value; + let node1_channel_balance = if broadcast_initial_commitment { 0 } else { revoked_commitment_tx.output[0].value.to_sat() }; + let expected_claimable_balance = node1_channel_balance + justice_tx.output[0].value.to_sat(); assert_eq!(total_claimable_balance, expected_claimable_balance); } @@ -2864,8 +2900,8 @@ fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() { check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); - assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output - assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output + assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_p2wsh()); // revokeable output + assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_p2wsh()); // revokeable output assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO); assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO); @@ -2957,13 +2993,13 @@ fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() { if $htlc_offered { assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); - assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output - assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output + assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_p2wsh()); // revokeable output + assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_p2wsh()); // revokeable output } else { assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); - assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment - assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment + assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_p2wpkh()); // direct payment + assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_p2wpkh()); // direct payment } node_txn.clear(); } } @@ -3005,7 +3041,7 @@ fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() { assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time.to_consensus_u32(), nodes[1].best_block_info().1); - assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment + assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_p2wpkh()); // direct payment // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as // we already checked the same situation with A. @@ -3501,8 +3537,9 @@ fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() { let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(); let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1; + let recipient_onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret); let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads( - &route.paths[0], 50_000, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap(); + &route.paths[0], 50_000, &recipient_onion_fields, current_height, &None).unwrap(); let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap(); let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap(); @@ -3734,10 +3771,10 @@ fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() { nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); } - // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed` - // when the peers are disconnected and do not reconnect before the funding - // transaction is broadcasted. - check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, true + // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` and a + // `DiscardFunding` event when the peers are disconnected and do not reconnect before the + // funding transaction is broadcasted. + check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer, true , [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000); check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer, false , [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000); @@ -4907,7 +4944,7 @@ fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() { assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 1); check_spends!(c_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]); assert_eq!(c_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); - assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output + assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_p2wsh()); // revokeable output assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO); // Success tx // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor @@ -4968,7 +5005,7 @@ fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() { assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1); check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]); assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); - assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment + assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_p2wpkh()); // direct payment assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time.to_consensus_u32(), nodes[1].best_block_info().1); // Success tx check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true); @@ -5055,9 +5092,9 @@ fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() { // (with value 900 sats) will be claimed in the below `claim_funds` call. if node_txn.len() > 2 { assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); - htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[2].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[2].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() }; + htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[2].output[0].value.to_sat() < 900 { node_txn[2].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() }; } else { - htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[0].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[1].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() }; + htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[0].output[0].value.to_sat() < 900 { node_txn[1].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() }; } } @@ -6487,8 +6524,9 @@ fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() { let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(); let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1; let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap(); + let recipient_onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret); let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads( - &route.paths[0], send_amt, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap(); + &route.paths[0], send_amt, &recipient_onion_fields, cur_height, &None).unwrap(); let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash).unwrap(); let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC { @@ -7440,8 +7478,8 @@ fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() { let mut penalty_sum = 0; for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() { - if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() { - penalty_sum += outp.value; + if outp.script_pubkey.is_p2wsh() { + penalty_sum += outp.value.to_sat(); } } @@ -7462,7 +7500,7 @@ fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() { assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1); check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]); - let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value; + let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value.to_sat(); feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu(); penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid(); node_txn.clear(); @@ -7482,7 +7520,7 @@ fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() { penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid(); // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1); - let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value; + let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value.to_sat(); feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu(); // Verify 25% bump heuristic assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125); @@ -7505,7 +7543,7 @@ fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() { penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid(); // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2); - let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value; + let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value.to_sat(); feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu(); // Verify 25% bump heuristic assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125); @@ -7724,7 +7762,7 @@ fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() { preimage = node_txn[0].txid(); let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout; - let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value; + let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value.to_sat() - node_txn[0].output[0].value.to_sat(); feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu(); let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output { @@ -7739,7 +7777,7 @@ fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() { timeout = timeout_tx.txid(); let index = timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout; - let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - timeout_tx.output[0].value; + let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value.to_sat() - timeout_tx.output[0].value.to_sat(); feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / timeout_tx.weight().to_wu(); node_txn.clear(); @@ -7758,13 +7796,13 @@ fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() { check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]); let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout; - let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value; + let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value.to_sat() - preimage_bump.output[0].value.to_sat(); let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight().to_wu(); assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125); assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid()); let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout; - let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value; + let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value.to_sat() - node_txn[0].output[0].value.to_sat(); let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu(); assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125); assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid()); @@ -8222,8 +8260,9 @@ fn test_onion_value_mpp_set_calculation() { let height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1; let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv).unwrap(); let mut onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap(); + let recipient_onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret); let (mut onion_payloads, _, _) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 100_000, - RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), height + 1, &None).unwrap(); + &recipient_onion_fields, height + 1, &None).unwrap(); // Edit amt_to_forward to simulate the sender having set // the final amount and the routing node taking less fee if let msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Receive { @@ -9387,7 +9426,7 @@ fn test_invalid_funding_tx() { let wit_program_script: ScriptBuf = wit_program.into(); for output in tx.output.iter_mut() { // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey - output.script_pubkey = ScriptBuf::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash()); + output.script_pubkey = ScriptBuf::new_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash()); } nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap(); @@ -9425,7 +9464,7 @@ fn test_invalid_funding_tx() { // long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing // as its not 32 bytes long. let mut spend_tx = Transaction { - version: 2i32, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, + version: Version::TWO, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), @@ -9436,7 +9475,7 @@ fn test_invalid_funding_tx() { witness: Witness::from_slice(&channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness()) }).collect(), output: vec![TxOut { - value: 1000, + value: Amount::from_sat(1000), script_pubkey: ScriptBuf::new(), }] }; @@ -9872,7 +9911,7 @@ enum ExposureEvent { AtUpdateFeeOutbound, } -fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool, multiplier_dust_limit: bool) { +fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool, multiplier_dust_limit: bool, apply_excess_fee: bool) { // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat` // policy. // @@ -9887,12 +9926,33 @@ fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_e let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); let mut config = test_default_channel_config(); + + // We hard-code the feerate values here but they're re-calculated furter down and asserted. + // If the values ever change below these constants should simply be updated. + const AT_FEE_OUTBOUND_HTLCS: u64 = 20; + let nondust_htlc_count_in_limit = + if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound { + AT_FEE_OUTBOUND_HTLCS + } else { 0 }; + let initial_feerate = if apply_excess_fee { 253 * 2 } else { 253 }; + let expected_dust_buffer_feerate = initial_feerate + 2530; + let mut commitment_tx_cost = commit_tx_fee_msat(initial_feerate - 253, nondust_htlc_count_in_limit, &ChannelTypeFeatures::empty()); + commitment_tx_cost += + if on_holder_tx { + htlc_success_tx_weight(&ChannelTypeFeatures::empty()) + } else { + htlc_timeout_tx_weight(&ChannelTypeFeatures::empty()) + } * (initial_feerate as u64 - 253) / 1000 * nondust_htlc_count_in_limit; + { + let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap(); + *feerate_lock = initial_feerate; + } config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = if multiplier_dust_limit { // Default test fee estimator rate is 253 sat/kw, so we set the multiplier to 5_000_000 / 253 // to get roughly the same initial value as the default setting when this test was // originally written. - MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253) - } else { MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(5_000_000) }; // initial default setting value + MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier((5_000_000 + commitment_tx_cost) / 253) + } else { MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(5_000_000 + commitment_tx_cost) }; let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]); let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); @@ -9936,6 +9996,11 @@ fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_e let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready); update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update); + { + let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap(); + *feerate_lock = 253; + } + // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send. let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000); @@ -9945,8 +10010,9 @@ fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_e let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap(); let chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap(); (chan.context().get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64, - chan.context().get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator(nodes[0].fee_estimator))) + chan.context().get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(253)) }; + assert_eq!(dust_buffer_feerate, expected_dust_buffer_feerate as u64); let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 + open_channel.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000; let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat; @@ -9956,8 +10022,13 @@ fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_e let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 + open_channel.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis - if multiplier_dust_limit { 3 } else { 2 }) * 1000; let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat; + // This test was written with a fixed dust value here, which we retain, but assert that it is, + // indeed, dust on both transactions. let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 4; - let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx; + let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = 1_250_000; + let calcd_dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 + open_channel.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis - if multiplier_dust_limit { 3 } else { 2 }) * 1000; + assert!(dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat < dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat); + assert!(dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat < calcd_dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat); if on_holder_tx { if dust_outbound_balance { @@ -10027,7 +10098,7 @@ fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_e // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel", format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", - dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1) + dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 4, + dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + commitment_tx_cost + 4, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1); } } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound { @@ -10035,7 +10106,7 @@ fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_e // For the multiplier dust exposure limit, since it scales with feerate, // we need to add a lot of HTLCs that will become dust at the new feerate // to cross the threshold. - for _ in 0..20 { + for _ in 0..AT_FEE_OUTBOUND_HTLCS { let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash(&nodes[1], Some(1_000), None); nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap(); @@ -10054,27 +10125,123 @@ fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_e added_monitors.clear(); } -fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(multiplier_dust_limit: bool) { - do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true, multiplier_dust_limit); - do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true, multiplier_dust_limit); - do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true, multiplier_dust_limit); - do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false, multiplier_dust_limit); - do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false, multiplier_dust_limit); - do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false, multiplier_dust_limit); - do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true, multiplier_dust_limit); - do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false, multiplier_dust_limit); - do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true, multiplier_dust_limit); - do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false, multiplier_dust_limit); - do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false, multiplier_dust_limit); - do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true, multiplier_dust_limit); +fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(multiplier_dust_limit: bool, apply_excess_fee: bool) { + do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true, multiplier_dust_limit, apply_excess_fee); + do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true, multiplier_dust_limit, apply_excess_fee); + do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true, multiplier_dust_limit, apply_excess_fee); + do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false, multiplier_dust_limit, apply_excess_fee); + do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false, multiplier_dust_limit, apply_excess_fee); + do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false, multiplier_dust_limit, apply_excess_fee); + do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true, multiplier_dust_limit, apply_excess_fee); + do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false, multiplier_dust_limit, apply_excess_fee); + if !multiplier_dust_limit && !apply_excess_fee { + // Because non-dust HTLC transaction fees are included in the dust exposure, trying to + // increase the fee to hit a higher dust exposure with a + // `MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier` is no longer super practical, so we skip these + // in the `multiplier_dust_limit` case. + do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true, multiplier_dust_limit, apply_excess_fee); + do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false, multiplier_dust_limit, apply_excess_fee); + do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false, multiplier_dust_limit, apply_excess_fee); + do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true, multiplier_dust_limit, apply_excess_fee); + } } #[test] fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() { - do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(false); - do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(true); + do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(false, false); + do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(false, true); + do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(true, false); + do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(true, true); +} + +#[test] +fn test_nondust_htlc_fees_are_dust() { + // Test that the transaction fees paid in nondust HTLCs count towards our dust limit + let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3); + let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs); + + let mut config = test_default_channel_config(); + // Set the dust limit to the default value + config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = + MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(10_000); + // Make sure the HTLC limits don't get in the way + config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs = 400; + config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs = 400; + config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 1; + + let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), Some(config), Some(config)]); + let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); + + // Create a channel from 1 -> 0 but immediately push all of the funds towards 0 + let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0).2; + while nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat > 0 { + send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat); + } + + // First get the channel one HTLC_VALUE HTLC away from the dust limit by sending dust HTLCs + // repeatedly until we run out of space. + const HTLC_VALUE: u64 = 1_000_000; // Doesn't matter, tune until the test passes + let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], HTLC_VALUE).0; + + while nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { + route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], HTLC_VALUE); + } + assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, 0, + "We don't want to run out of ability to send because of some non-dust limit"); + assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].pending_outbound_htlcs.len() < 10, + "We should be able to fill our dust limit without too many HTLCs"); + + let dust_limit = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat; + claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage); + assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, 0, + "Make sure we are able to send once we clear one HTLC"); + + // At this point we have somewhere between dust_limit and dust_limit * 2 left in our dust + // exposure limit, and we want to max that out using non-dust HTLCs. + let commitment_tx_per_htlc_cost = + htlc_success_tx_weight(&ChannelTypeFeatures::empty()) * 253; + let max_htlcs_remaining = dust_limit * 2 / commitment_tx_per_htlc_cost; + assert!(max_htlcs_remaining < 30, + "We should be able to fill our dust limit without too many HTLCs"); + for i in 0..max_htlcs_remaining + 1 { + assert_ne!(i, max_htlcs_remaining); + if nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat < dust_limit { + // We found our limit, and it was less than max_htlcs_remaining! + // At this point we can only send dust HTLCs as any non-dust HTLCs will overuse our + // remaining dust exposure. + break; + } + route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], dust_limit * 2); + } + + // At this point non-dust HTLCs are no longer accepted from node 0 -> 1, we also check that + // such HTLCs can't be routed over the same channel either. + create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0); + let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = + get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[2], nodes[1], dust_limit * 2); + let onion = RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret); + nodes[2].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash, onion, PaymentId([0; 32])).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors(&nodes[2], 1); + let send = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[2]); + + nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &send.msgs[0]); + commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], send.commitment_msg, false, true); + + expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]); + check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1); + let node_id_1 = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(); + expect_htlc_handling_failed_destinations!( + nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(), + &[HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(node_id_1), channel_id: chan_id_1 }] + ); + + let fail = get_htlc_update_msgs(&nodes[0], &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail.update_fail_htlcs[0]); + commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], fail.commitment_signed, false); + expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[2], payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new()); } + #[test] fn test_non_final_funding_tx() { let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); @@ -10097,8 +10264,8 @@ fn test_non_final_funding_tx() { let mut tx = match events[0] { Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => { // Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 1. - Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: LockTime::from_height(best_height + 2).unwrap(), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut { - value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(), + Transaction { version: Version(chan_id as i32), lock_time: LockTime::from_height(best_height + 2).unwrap(), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut { + value: Amount::from_sat(*channel_value_satoshis), script_pubkey: output_script.clone(), }]} }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), @@ -10137,8 +10304,8 @@ fn test_non_final_funding_tx_within_headroom() { let mut tx = match events[0] { Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => { // Timelock the transaction within a +1 headroom from the best block. - Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: LockTime::from_consensus(best_height + 1), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut { - value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(), + Transaction { version: Version(chan_id as i32), lock_time: LockTime::from_consensus(best_height + 1), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut { + value: Amount::from_sat(*channel_value_satoshis), script_pubkey: output_script.clone(), }]} }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),