X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fln%2Ffunctional_tests.rs;h=5d34edd6ef70d61a6c8fd6f274881eb4a1ead5dd;hb=a8bd4c097f7ae6620eee66c1cb49144e38568439;hp=3f9e263fcf7c19a5bf460f7d7c12387b8407ec91;hpb=5d9f3b4fc212415c94c1b2cdff6298196ba1af51;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs index 3f9e263f..5d34edd6 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs @@ -42,9 +42,10 @@ use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime; use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, ScriptBuf}; use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes; use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash; -use bitcoin::network::constants::Network; -use bitcoin::{Sequence, Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, Witness}; +use bitcoin::network::Network; +use bitcoin::{Amount, Sequence, Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, Witness}; use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint; +use bitcoin::transaction::Version; use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1; use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey}; @@ -711,7 +712,7 @@ fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() { //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2); let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, &channel_type_features) / 1000; - let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value); + let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value.to_sat()); actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee; assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee); } @@ -1325,9 +1326,9 @@ fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() { assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() { - if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 { + if outp.value.to_sat() == 800_000 / 1000 { has_both_htlcs += 1; - } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 { + } else if outp.value.to_sat() == 900_000 / 1000 { has_both_htlcs += 1; } } @@ -1356,12 +1357,12 @@ fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() { assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1); assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx - assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800); + assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value.to_sat(), 800); assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input.len(), 1); assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx check_spends!(timeout_tx, remote_txn[0]); - assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900); + assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value.to_sat(), 900); let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 3); @@ -2678,8 +2679,8 @@ fn do_test_forming_justice_tx_from_monitor_updates(broadcast_initial_commitment: } }); // On the first commitment, node[1]'s balance was below dust so it didn't have an output - let node1_channel_balance = if broadcast_initial_commitment { 0 } else { revoked_commitment_tx.output[0].value }; - let expected_claimable_balance = node1_channel_balance + justice_tx.output[0].value; + let node1_channel_balance = if broadcast_initial_commitment { 0 } else { revoked_commitment_tx.output[0].value.to_sat() }; + let expected_claimable_balance = node1_channel_balance + justice_tx.output[0].value.to_sat(); assert_eq!(total_claimable_balance, expected_claimable_balance); } @@ -2899,8 +2900,8 @@ fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() { check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); - assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output - assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output + assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_p2wsh()); // revokeable output + assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_p2wsh()); // revokeable output assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO); assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO); @@ -2992,13 +2993,13 @@ fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() { if $htlc_offered { assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); - assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output - assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output + assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_p2wsh()); // revokeable output + assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_p2wsh()); // revokeable output } else { assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); - assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment - assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment + assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_p2wpkh()); // direct payment + assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_p2wpkh()); // direct payment } node_txn.clear(); } } @@ -3040,7 +3041,7 @@ fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() { assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time.to_consensus_u32(), nodes[1].best_block_info().1); - assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment + assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_p2wpkh()); // direct payment // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as // we already checked the same situation with A. @@ -4943,7 +4944,7 @@ fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() { assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 1); check_spends!(c_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]); assert_eq!(c_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); - assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output + assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_p2wsh()); // revokeable output assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO); // Success tx // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor @@ -5004,7 +5005,7 @@ fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() { assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1); check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]); assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); - assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment + assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_p2wpkh()); // direct payment assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time.to_consensus_u32(), nodes[1].best_block_info().1); // Success tx check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true); @@ -5091,9 +5092,9 @@ fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() { // (with value 900 sats) will be claimed in the below `claim_funds` call. if node_txn.len() > 2 { assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); - htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[2].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[2].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() }; + htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[2].output[0].value.to_sat() < 900 { node_txn[2].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() }; } else { - htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[0].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[1].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() }; + htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[0].output[0].value.to_sat() < 900 { node_txn[1].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() }; } } @@ -7477,8 +7478,8 @@ fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() { let mut penalty_sum = 0; for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() { - if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() { - penalty_sum += outp.value; + if outp.script_pubkey.is_p2wsh() { + penalty_sum += outp.value.to_sat(); } } @@ -7499,7 +7500,7 @@ fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() { assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1); check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]); - let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value; + let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value.to_sat(); feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu(); penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid(); node_txn.clear(); @@ -7519,7 +7520,7 @@ fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() { penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid(); // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1); - let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value; + let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value.to_sat(); feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu(); // Verify 25% bump heuristic assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125); @@ -7542,7 +7543,7 @@ fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() { penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid(); // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2); - let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value; + let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value.to_sat(); feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu(); // Verify 25% bump heuristic assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125); @@ -7761,7 +7762,7 @@ fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() { preimage = node_txn[0].txid(); let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout; - let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value; + let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value.to_sat() - node_txn[0].output[0].value.to_sat(); feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu(); let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output { @@ -7776,7 +7777,7 @@ fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() { timeout = timeout_tx.txid(); let index = timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout; - let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - timeout_tx.output[0].value; + let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value.to_sat() - timeout_tx.output[0].value.to_sat(); feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / timeout_tx.weight().to_wu(); node_txn.clear(); @@ -7795,13 +7796,13 @@ fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() { check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]); let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout; - let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value; + let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value.to_sat() - preimage_bump.output[0].value.to_sat(); let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight().to_wu(); assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125); assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid()); let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout; - let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value; + let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value.to_sat() - node_txn[0].output[0].value.to_sat(); let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu(); assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125); assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid()); @@ -9425,7 +9426,7 @@ fn test_invalid_funding_tx() { let wit_program_script: ScriptBuf = wit_program.into(); for output in tx.output.iter_mut() { // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey - output.script_pubkey = ScriptBuf::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash()); + output.script_pubkey = ScriptBuf::new_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash()); } nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap(); @@ -9463,7 +9464,7 @@ fn test_invalid_funding_tx() { // long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing // as its not 32 bytes long. let mut spend_tx = Transaction { - version: 2i32, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, + version: Version::TWO, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), @@ -9474,7 +9475,7 @@ fn test_invalid_funding_tx() { witness: Witness::from_slice(&channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness()) }).collect(), output: vec![TxOut { - value: 1000, + value: Amount::from_sat(1000), script_pubkey: ScriptBuf::new(), }] }; @@ -10263,8 +10264,8 @@ fn test_non_final_funding_tx() { let mut tx = match events[0] { Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => { // Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 1. - Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: LockTime::from_height(best_height + 2).unwrap(), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut { - value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(), + Transaction { version: Version(chan_id as i32), lock_time: LockTime::from_height(best_height + 2).unwrap(), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut { + value: Amount::from_sat(*channel_value_satoshis), script_pubkey: output_script.clone(), }]} }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), @@ -10303,8 +10304,8 @@ fn test_non_final_funding_tx_within_headroom() { let mut tx = match events[0] { Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => { // Timelock the transaction within a +1 headroom from the best block. - Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: LockTime::from_consensus(best_height + 1), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut { - value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(), + Transaction { version: Version(chan_id as i32), lock_time: LockTime::from_consensus(best_height + 1), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut { + value: Amount::from_sat(*channel_value_satoshis), script_pubkey: output_script.clone(), }]} }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),