X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fln%2Ffunctional_tests.rs;h=7cd0f376d2e431d1fe8fe56c5353d281dbf28e55;hb=1e580668684d4dbf11d69d75e5d4a5c4f8cc40bf;hp=6d5b2b4f1d63b7fd2ee8bd88dc032e591f21f747;hpb=7d2d04798daa9c78f183424f73f3fea6c8564573;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs index 6d5b2b4f..7cd0f376 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs @@ -42,9 +42,10 @@ use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime; use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, ScriptBuf}; use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes; use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash; -use bitcoin::network::constants::Network; -use bitcoin::{Sequence, Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, Witness}; +use bitcoin::network::Network; +use bitcoin::{Amount, Sequence, Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, Witness}; use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint; +use bitcoin::transaction::Version; use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1; use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey}; @@ -711,7 +712,7 @@ fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() { //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2); let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, &channel_type_features) / 1000; - let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value); + let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value.to_sat()); actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee; assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee); } @@ -1325,9 +1326,9 @@ fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() { assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() { - if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 { + if outp.value.to_sat() == 800_000 / 1000 { has_both_htlcs += 1; - } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 { + } else if outp.value.to_sat() == 900_000 / 1000 { has_both_htlcs += 1; } } @@ -1356,12 +1357,12 @@ fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() { assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1); assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx - assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800); + assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value.to_sat(), 800); assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input.len(), 1); assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx check_spends!(timeout_tx, remote_txn[0]); - assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900); + assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value.to_sat(), 900); let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 3); @@ -2302,7 +2303,8 @@ fn channel_monitor_network_test() { send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000); // Simple case with no pending HTLCs: - nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); + let error_message = "Channel force-closed"; + nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true); check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000); @@ -2328,7 +2330,8 @@ fn channel_monitor_network_test() { // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time). - nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); + let error_message = "Channel force-closed"; + nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap(); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); { @@ -2368,7 +2371,8 @@ fn channel_monitor_network_test() { // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2] // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces) - nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); + let error_message = "Channel force-closed"; + nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true); let node2_commitment_txid; @@ -2678,8 +2682,8 @@ fn do_test_forming_justice_tx_from_monitor_updates(broadcast_initial_commitment: } }); // On the first commitment, node[1]'s balance was below dust so it didn't have an output - let node1_channel_balance = if broadcast_initial_commitment { 0 } else { revoked_commitment_tx.output[0].value }; - let expected_claimable_balance = node1_channel_balance + justice_tx.output[0].value; + let node1_channel_balance = if broadcast_initial_commitment { 0 } else { revoked_commitment_tx.output[0].value.to_sat() }; + let expected_claimable_balance = node1_channel_balance + justice_tx.output[0].value.to_sat(); assert_eq!(total_claimable_balance, expected_claimable_balance); } @@ -2899,8 +2903,8 @@ fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() { check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); - assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output - assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output + assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_p2wsh()); // revokeable output + assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_p2wsh()); // revokeable output assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO); assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO); @@ -2992,13 +2996,13 @@ fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() { if $htlc_offered { assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); - assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output - assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output + assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_p2wsh()); // revokeable output + assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_p2wsh()); // revokeable output } else { assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); - assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment - assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment + assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_p2wpkh()); // direct payment + assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_p2wpkh()); // direct payment } node_txn.clear(); } } @@ -3040,7 +3044,7 @@ fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() { assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time.to_consensus_u32(), nodes[1].best_block_info().1); - assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment + assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_p2wpkh()); // direct payment // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as // we already checked the same situation with A. @@ -3595,9 +3599,9 @@ fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() { return; } let funding_tx = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).3; - + let error_message = "Channel force-closed"; route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000); - nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); + nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap(); connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); @@ -3660,8 +3664,8 @@ fn test_force_close_fail_back() { // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!). - - nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); + let error_message = "Channel force-closed"; + nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap(); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true); check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1); check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000); @@ -4542,7 +4546,8 @@ fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() { let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000); - nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); + let error_message = "Channel force-closed"; + nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap(); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000); @@ -4569,9 +4574,10 @@ fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() { let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]); let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); + let error_message = "Channel force-closed"; let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000); - nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); + nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap(); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000); @@ -4946,7 +4952,7 @@ fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() { assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 1); check_spends!(c_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]); assert_eq!(c_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); - assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output + assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_p2wsh()); // revokeable output assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO); // Success tx // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor @@ -5007,7 +5013,7 @@ fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() { assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1); check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]); assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); - assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment + assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_p2wpkh()); // direct payment assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time.to_consensus_u32(), nodes[1].best_block_info().1); // Success tx check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true); @@ -5094,9 +5100,9 @@ fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() { // (with value 900 sats) will be claimed in the below `claim_funds` call. if node_txn.len() > 2 { assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); - htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[2].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[2].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() }; + htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[2].output[0].value.to_sat() < 900 { node_txn[2].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() }; } else { - htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[0].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[1].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() }; + htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[0].output[0].value.to_sat() < 900 { node_txn[1].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() }; } } @@ -7480,8 +7486,8 @@ fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() { let mut penalty_sum = 0; for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() { - if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() { - penalty_sum += outp.value; + if outp.script_pubkey.is_p2wsh() { + penalty_sum += outp.value.to_sat(); } } @@ -7502,7 +7508,7 @@ fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() { assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1); check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]); - let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value; + let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value.to_sat(); feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu(); penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid(); node_txn.clear(); @@ -7522,7 +7528,7 @@ fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() { penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid(); // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1); - let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value; + let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value.to_sat(); feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu(); // Verify 25% bump heuristic assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125); @@ -7545,7 +7551,7 @@ fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() { penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid(); // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2); - let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value; + let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value.to_sat(); feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu(); // Verify 25% bump heuristic assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125); @@ -7764,7 +7770,7 @@ fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() { preimage = node_txn[0].txid(); let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout; - let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value; + let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value.to_sat() - node_txn[0].output[0].value.to_sat(); feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu(); let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output { @@ -7779,7 +7785,7 @@ fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() { timeout = timeout_tx.txid(); let index = timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout; - let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - timeout_tx.output[0].value; + let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value.to_sat() - timeout_tx.output[0].value.to_sat(); feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / timeout_tx.weight().to_wu(); node_txn.clear(); @@ -7798,13 +7804,13 @@ fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() { check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]); let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout; - let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value; + let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value.to_sat() - preimage_bump.output[0].value.to_sat(); let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight().to_wu(); assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125); assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid()); let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout; - let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value; + let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value.to_sat() - node_txn[0].output[0].value.to_sat(); let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu(); assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125); assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid()); @@ -8080,8 +8086,8 @@ fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() { } _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } - - nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); + let error_message = "Channel force-closed"; + nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap(); let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1); @@ -8112,11 +8118,11 @@ fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() { // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before // rejecting the inbound channel request. assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); - + let error_message = "Channel force-closed"; let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); match events[0] { Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => { - nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); + nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap(); } _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } @@ -8846,7 +8852,8 @@ fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain force_closing_node = 1; counterparty_node = 0; } - nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); + let error_message = "Channel force-closed"; + nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap(); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true); check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1); check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000); @@ -9434,7 +9441,7 @@ fn test_invalid_funding_tx() { let wit_program_script: ScriptBuf = wit_program.into(); for output in tx.output.iter_mut() { // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey - output.script_pubkey = ScriptBuf::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash()); + output.script_pubkey = ScriptBuf::new_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash()); } nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap(); @@ -9472,7 +9479,7 @@ fn test_invalid_funding_tx() { // long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing // as its not 32 bytes long. let mut spend_tx = Transaction { - version: 2i32, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, + version: Version::TWO, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), @@ -9483,7 +9490,7 @@ fn test_invalid_funding_tx() { witness: Witness::from_slice(&channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness()) }).collect(), output: vec![TxOut { - value: 1000, + value: Amount::from_sat(1000), script_pubkey: ScriptBuf::new(), }] }; @@ -9579,8 +9586,8 @@ fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_t let (_, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000); nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()); nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); - - nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); + let error_message = "Channel force-closed"; + nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap(); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true); check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); @@ -10274,8 +10281,8 @@ fn test_non_final_funding_tx() { let mut tx = match events[0] { Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => { // Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 1. - Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: LockTime::from_height(best_height + 2).unwrap(), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut { - value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(), + Transaction { version: Version(chan_id as i32), lock_time: LockTime::from_height(best_height + 2).unwrap(), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut { + value: Amount::from_sat(*channel_value_satoshis), script_pubkey: output_script.clone(), }]} }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), @@ -10314,8 +10321,8 @@ fn test_non_final_funding_tx_within_headroom() { let mut tx = match events[0] { Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => { // Timelock the transaction within a +1 headroom from the best block. - Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: LockTime::from_consensus(best_height + 1), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut { - value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(), + Transaction { version: Version(chan_id as i32), lock_time: LockTime::from_consensus(best_height + 1), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut { + value: Amount::from_sat(*channel_value_satoshis), script_pubkey: output_script.clone(), }]} }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), @@ -10965,8 +10972,8 @@ fn test_close_in_funding_batch() { let funding_txo_2 = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 1 }; let channel_id_1 = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo_1); let channel_id_2 = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo_2); - - nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id_1, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); + let error_message = "Channel force-closed"; + nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id_1, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap(); // The monitor should become closed. check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1); @@ -11054,7 +11061,8 @@ fn test_batch_funding_close_after_funding_signed() { let funding_txo_2 = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 1 }; let channel_id_1 = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo_1); let channel_id_2 = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo_2); - nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id_1, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); + let error_message = "Channel force-closed"; + nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id_1, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap(); check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 2); { let mut monitor_updates = nodes[0].chain_monitor.monitor_updates.lock().unwrap(); @@ -11123,12 +11131,12 @@ fn do_test_funding_and_commitment_tx_confirm_same_block(confirm_remote_commitmen } else { (&nodes[0], &nodes[1]) }; - - closing_node.node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &other_node.node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); + let error_message = "Channel force-closed"; + closing_node.node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &other_node.node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap(); let mut msg_events = closing_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1); match msg_events.pop().unwrap() { - MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, .. } => {}, + MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, .. } => {}, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } check_added_monitors(closing_node, 1);