X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fln%2Ffunctional_tests.rs;h=98b166285a3991ee13b1d131eee3fdda9916c297;hb=0f5580afd42c6604e8035738b20c28a9628eae72;hp=d243ab288ae476ff214e6ee89e2e556fa03ff0d6;hpb=a3e4f9c9671003cf7041096fe775d058bdb489b0;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs index d243ab28..98b16628 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs @@ -32,13 +32,12 @@ use util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs, Readable}; use util::config::UserConfig; use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash; -use bitcoin::hashes::HashEngine; -use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash}; +use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash}; use bitcoin::util::bip143; use bitcoin::util::address::Address; use bitcoin::util::bip32::{ChildNumber, ExtendedPubKey, ExtendedPrivKey}; use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader}; -use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, TxIn, SigHashType, OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint}; +use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, TxIn, SigHashType}; use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script}; use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes; use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block; @@ -59,7 +58,7 @@ use std::sync::atomic::Ordering; use std::mem; use ln::functional_test_utils::*; -use ln::chan_utils::PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys; +use ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction; #[test] fn test_insane_channel_opens() { @@ -1617,20 +1616,20 @@ fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() { // Get the EnforcingChannelKeys for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx. - let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_payment_point, local_secret, local_secret2) = { + let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, local_secret2) = { let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap(); let chan_keys = local_chan.get_keys(); let pubkeys = chan_keys.pubkeys(); - (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, pubkeys.payment_point, + (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, chan_keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER), chan_keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)) }; - let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_payment_point, remote_secret1) = { + let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_secret1) = { let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap(); let chan_keys = remote_chan.get_keys(); let pubkeys = chan_keys.pubkeys(); - (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, pubkeys.payment_point, + (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, chan_keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1)) }; @@ -1643,70 +1642,31 @@ fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() { // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the // signature for the commitment_signed message. let local_chan_balance = 1313; - let static_payment_pk = local_payment_point.serialize(); - let remote_commit_tx_output = TxOut { - script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0) - .push_slice(&WPubkeyHash::hash(&static_payment_pk)[..]) - .into_script(), - value: local_chan_balance as u64 - }; - - let local_commit_tx_output = TxOut { - script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&commit_tx_keys.revocation_key, - BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, - &commit_tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh(), - value: 95000, - }; let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment { offered: false, amount_msat: 3460001, cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv, - payment_hash: payment_hash, + payment_hash, transaction_output_index: Some(1), }; - let htlc_output = TxOut { - script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&accepted_htlc_info, &commit_tx_keys).to_v0_p2wsh(), - value: 3460001 / 1000 - }; + let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1; - let commit_tx_obscure_factor = { - let mut sha = Sha256::engine(); - let remote_payment_point = &remote_payment_point.serialize(); - sha.input(&local_payment_point.serialize()); - sha.input(remote_payment_point); - let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner(); - - ((res[26] as u64) << 5*8) | - ((res[27] as u64) << 4*8) | - ((res[28] as u64) << 3*8) | - ((res[29] as u64) << 2*8) | - ((res[30] as u64) << 1*8) | - ((res[31] as u64) << 0*8) - }; - let commitment_number = 1; - let obscured_commitment_transaction_number = commit_tx_obscure_factor ^ commitment_number; - let lock_time = ((0x20 as u32) << 8*3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number & 0xffffffu64) as u32); - let input = TxIn { - previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), vout: 0 }, - script_sig: Script::new(), - sequence: ((0x80 as u32) << 8*3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number >> 3*8) as u32), - witness: Vec::new(), - }; - - let commit_tx = Transaction { - version: 2, - lock_time, - input: vec![input], - output: vec![remote_commit_tx_output, htlc_output, local_commit_tx_output], - }; let res = { let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap(); let local_chan_keys = local_chan.get_keys(); - let pre_commit_tx_keys = PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys::new(commit_tx_keys); - local_chan_keys.sign_counterparty_commitment(feerate_per_kw, &commit_tx, &pre_commit_tx_keys, &[&accepted_htlc_info], &secp_ctx).unwrap() + let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data( + commitment_number, + 95000, + local_chan_balance, + commit_tx_keys.clone(), + feerate_per_kw, + &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())], + &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() + ); + local_chan_keys.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap() }; let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned { @@ -4319,7 +4279,7 @@ fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() { let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode(); let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new()); - nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.serialize_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap(); + nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap(); logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new(); fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }; @@ -4428,7 +4388,7 @@ fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_events() { // Start the de/seriailization process mid-channel creation to check that the channel manager will hold onto events that are serialized let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode(); let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new()); - nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.serialize_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap(); + nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap(); fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }; logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new(); @@ -4520,7 +4480,7 @@ fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() { let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode(); let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new()); - nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.serialize_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap(); + nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap(); logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new(); fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }; @@ -4579,7 +4539,7 @@ fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() { let mut node_0_stale_monitors_serialized = Vec::new(); for monitor in nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter() { let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new()); - monitor.1.serialize_for_disk(&mut writer).unwrap(); + monitor.1.write(&mut writer).unwrap(); node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0); } @@ -4598,7 +4558,7 @@ fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() { let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new(); for monitor in nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter() { let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new()); - monitor.1.serialize_for_disk(&mut writer).unwrap(); + monitor.1.write(&mut writer).unwrap(); node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0); } @@ -7432,7 +7392,7 @@ fn test_data_loss_protect() { // Cache node A state before any channel update let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode(); let mut previous_chain_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new()); - nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.serialize_for_disk(&mut previous_chain_monitor_state).unwrap(); + nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write(&mut previous_chain_monitor_state).unwrap(); send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000, 8_000_000); send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000, 8_000_000); @@ -8314,7 +8274,7 @@ fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() { let monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap(); let monitor = monitors.get(&outpoint).unwrap(); let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new()); - monitor.serialize_for_disk(&mut w).unwrap(); + monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap(); let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor)>::read( &mut ::std::io::Cursor::new(&w.0)).unwrap().1; assert!(new_monitor == *monitor); @@ -8373,7 +8333,7 @@ fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() { let monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap(); let monitor = monitors.get(&outpoint).unwrap(); let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new()); - monitor.serialize_for_disk(&mut w).unwrap(); + monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap(); let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor)>::read( &mut ::std::io::Cursor::new(&w.0)).unwrap().1; assert!(new_monitor == *monitor); @@ -8399,7 +8359,7 @@ fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() { let monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap(); let monitor = monitors.get(&outpoint).unwrap(); let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new()); - monitor.serialize_for_disk(&mut w).unwrap(); + monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap(); let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor)>::read( &mut ::std::io::Cursor::new(&w.0)).unwrap().1; assert!(new_monitor == *monitor); @@ -8457,6 +8417,43 @@ fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() { } } +#[test] +fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() { + // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't + // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed + // message). + // + // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor + // registration, violating our API guarantees. + // + // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel, + // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not + // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it + // before receiving funding_signed. + let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); + let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); + let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]); + let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); + + // Create an initial channel + nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap(); + let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg); + let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg); + + // Move the first channel through the funding flow... + let (temporary_channel_id, _tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42); + + nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0); + + let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + let channel_id = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id(); + nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() }); + assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty()); +} + #[test] fn test_htlc_no_detection() { // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had @@ -8503,3 +8500,327 @@ fn test_htlc_no_detection() { connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 201, true, header_201.block_hash()); expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true); } + +fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) { + // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been + // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob --> + // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.) + // + // Steps of the test: + // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob. + // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC. + // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes. + // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill. + // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present + // but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage. + // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain. + // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment. + let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3); + let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs); + let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]); + let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); + + // Create some initial channels + let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()); + create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()); + + // Steps (1) and (2): + // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back. + let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3_000_000); + + // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC. + let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2); + check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3); + assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2); + check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout + assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); + assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2); + + // Steps (3) and (4): + // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob + // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor. + let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes + if !broadcast_alice { force_closing_node = 1; } // Bob force-closes + nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_channel(&chan_ab.2); + check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], false); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1); + if go_onchain_before_fulfill { + let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice { + true => alice_txn.clone(), + false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2) + }; + let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42}; + connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]}, 1); + let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); + if broadcast_alice { + check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + } + assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1); + check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3); + } + + // Step (5): + // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the + // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions. + assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage, &None, 3_000_000)); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1); + let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none()); + assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1); + + nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]); + // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage. + if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice { + let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + match events[0] { + MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => { + assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + }; + } + nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed); + // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update + // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info. + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2); + + let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 2); + let bob_revocation = match events[0] { + MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => { + assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()); + (*msg).clone() + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + }; + let bob_updates = match events[1] { + MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => { + assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()); + (*updates).clone() + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + }; + + nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1); + nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1); + + let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + let carol_revocation = match events[0] { + MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => { + assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + (*msg).clone() + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + }; + nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + + // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill, + // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain. + let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone(); + if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); } + if !go_onchain_before_fulfill { + let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42}; + connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]}, 1); + // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier. + if broadcast_alice { + check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + } + let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); + if broadcast_alice { + // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a + // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update, + // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor + // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being + // broadcasted. + assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3); + check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3); + } else { + assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2); + check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3); + } + } + + // Step (6): + // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the + // broadcasted commitment transaction. + { + let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); + if go_onchain_before_fulfill { + // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction. + assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2); + } + let script_weight = match broadcast_alice { + true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, + false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT + }; + // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he + // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if + // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's + // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second. + if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill { + check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]); + assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight); + } else { + check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]); + assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight); + } + } +} + +#[test] +fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() { + do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true); + do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well + do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false); + do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false); +} + +#[test] +fn test_duplicate_chan_id() { + // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is + // already open we reject it and keep the old channel. + // + // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels + // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for + // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor + // updating logic for the existing channel. + let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); + let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); + let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]); + let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); + + // Create an initial channel + nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap(); + let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg); + nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())); + + // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check + // that it is rejected. + nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg); + { + let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + match events[0] { + MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => { + // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the + // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have + // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just + // move forward with it. + assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id); + assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + } + + // Move the first channel through the funding flow... + let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42); + + nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0); + + let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg); + { + let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output); + added_monitors.clear(); + } + let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + + let funding_outpoint = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }; + let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(); + + // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a + // temporary one). + + // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one. + // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason + // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues. + open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id; + nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg); + { + let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + match events[0] { + MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => { + // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both + // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it. + assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id); + assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + } + + // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output. + nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap(); + let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_2_msg); + nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())); + create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event + + let funding_created = { + let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get_mut(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap(); + let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new(); + as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap() + }; + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0); + nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created); + // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but + // still needs to be cleared here. + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + + // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel. + { + let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + match events[0] { + MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => { + // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both + // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it. + assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id); + assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + } + + // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure + // everything is functional. + nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg); + { + let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output); + added_monitors.clear(); + } + + let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1); + match events_4[0] { + Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => { + assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42); + assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + }; + + let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx); + let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked); + update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update); + send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000, 8_000_000); +}