X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fln%2Ffunctional_tests.rs;h=9ecbee739f1874eaa0b8cbfca4d19ff7658b5e90;hb=eb8bce0d161d5d6c135be5fd8c7ebe2699857ae0;hp=161e6af2d7830f0a633a710a841d653faa2c13c3;hpb=850ca13fbca5418c08c52313213acb675a73ad00;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs index 161e6af2..9ecbee73 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs @@ -37,10 +37,12 @@ use util::config::UserConfig; use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash; use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader}; -use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder; +use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script}; use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes; use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block; use bitcoin::network::constants::Network; +use bitcoin::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, Witness}; +use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint; use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1; use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey}; @@ -61,7 +63,7 @@ fn test_insane_channel_opens() { // Stand up a network of 2 nodes use ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; let mut cfg = UserConfig::default(); - cfg.peer_channel_config_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1; + cfg.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1; let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]); @@ -1790,7 +1792,7 @@ fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() { // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count. // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here. let mut config = test_default_channel_config(); - config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239; + config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239; let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]); let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()); @@ -2201,7 +2203,7 @@ fn channel_monitor_network_test() { send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000); // Simple case with no pending HTLCs: - nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); + nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true); { @@ -2222,7 +2224,7 @@ fn channel_monitor_network_test() { // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time). - nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); + nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); { @@ -2262,7 +2264,7 @@ fn channel_monitor_network_test() { // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2] // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces) - nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); + nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true); let node2_commitment_txid; @@ -2362,13 +2364,13 @@ fn channel_monitor_network_test() { fn test_justice_tx() { // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default(); - alice_config.own_channel_config.announced_channel = true; - alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false; - alice_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5; + alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true; + alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false; + alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5; let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default(); - bob_config.own_channel_config.announced_channel = true; - bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false; - bob_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3; + bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true; + bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false; + bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3; let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)]; let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true; @@ -2515,10 +2517,10 @@ fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() { let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()); // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions - send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000); + send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000); // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx - let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0; - let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000); + let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0; + let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000); // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0] let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2); @@ -2541,9 +2543,9 @@ fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() { check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed); connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); - expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true); + assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); - let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); + let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs @@ -2560,7 +2562,13 @@ fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() { // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state: assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1); - assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager + check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3); + + // Finally, mine the penalty transaction and check that we get an HTLC failure after + // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations. + mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]); + connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); + expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true); } get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1); assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0); @@ -2579,11 +2587,11 @@ fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() { let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()); // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions - send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000); + send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000); // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height - let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0; - let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000); + let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0; + let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000); // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0] let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2); @@ -2605,9 +2613,9 @@ fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() { } connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); - expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true); + assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); - let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); + let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); assert!(node_txn.len() == 9 || node_txn.len() == 10); // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration @@ -2635,6 +2643,14 @@ fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() { assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC + + // Finally, mine the penalty transactions and check that we get an HTLC failure after + // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations. + mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[2]); + mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[3]); + mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[4]); + connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); + expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true); } get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1); assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0); @@ -3387,7 +3403,7 @@ fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() { create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()); route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000); - nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); + nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); @@ -3450,7 +3466,7 @@ fn test_force_close_fail_back() { // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!). - nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); + nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true); check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1); check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed); @@ -4777,7 +4793,7 @@ fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() { let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()); - nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); + nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed); @@ -4806,7 +4822,7 @@ fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() { let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()); - nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); + nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed); @@ -5275,7 +5291,7 @@ fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() { // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count. // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here. let mut config = test_default_channel_config(); - config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196; + config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196; let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]); let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); @@ -5487,7 +5503,7 @@ fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, anno // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count. // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here. let mut config = test_default_channel_config(); - config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196; + config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196; let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]); let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); @@ -6369,7 +6385,7 @@ fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() { // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count. // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here. let mut config = test_default_channel_config(); - config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196; + config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196; let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]); let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()); @@ -7282,37 +7298,25 @@ fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) { check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed); assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0); + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires - timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone()); + timeout_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..) + .filter(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == bs_commitment_tx[0].txid()).collect(); + check_spends!(timeout_tx[0], bs_commitment_tx[0]); + // For both a revoked or non-revoked commitment transaction, after ANTI_REORG_DELAY the + // dust HTLC should have been failed. + expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true); + if !revoked { - expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true); assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); - // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout tx on remote commitment tx - mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]); - assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0); - connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); - expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true); } else { - // If revoked, both dust & non-dust HTLCs should have been failed after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confs of revoked - // commitment tx - let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); - assert_eq!(events.len(), 2); - let first; - match events[0] { - Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => { - if payment_hash == dust_hash { first = true; } - else { first = false; } - }, - _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), - } - match events[1] { - Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => { - if first { assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash); } - else { assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash); } - }, - _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), - } + assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time, 0); } + // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout/revocation-claim tx + mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]); + assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0); + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); + expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true); } } @@ -7328,9 +7332,9 @@ fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() { // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default(); - low_our_to_self_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6; + low_our_to_self_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6; let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default(); - high_their_to_self_config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100; + high_their_to_self_config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100; let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None]; let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); @@ -7395,14 +7399,11 @@ fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() { } else { assert!(false); } } -#[test] -fn test_data_loss_protect() { - // We want to be sure that : - // * we don't broadcast our Local Commitment Tx in case of fallen behind - // (but this is not quite true - we broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr) - // * we close channel in case of detecting other being fallen behind - // * we are able to claim our own outputs thanks to to_remote being static - // TODO: this test is incomplete and the data_loss_protect implementation is incomplete - see issue #775 +fn do_test_data_loss_protect(reconnect_panicing: bool) { + // When we get a data_loss_protect proving we're behind, we immediately panic as the + // chain::Watch API requirements have been violated (e.g. the user restored from a backup). The + // panic message informs the user they should force-close without broadcasting, which is tested + // if `reconnect_panicing` is not set. let persister; let logger; let fee_estimator; @@ -7460,53 +7461,53 @@ fn test_data_loss_protect() { check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); - nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None }); - nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None }); + if reconnect_panicing { + nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None }); + nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None }); - let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]); + let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]); - // Check we don't broadcast any transactions following learning of per_commitment_point from B - nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]); - check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind + // Check that we sent the warning message when we detected that A has fallen behind, + // and give the possibility for A to recover from the warning. + nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]); + let warn_msg = "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned(); + assert!(check_warn_msg!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), chan.2).contains(&warn_msg)); + + { + let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); + // The node B should not broadcast the transaction to force close the channel! + assert!(node_txn.is_empty()); + } + + let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]); + // Check A panics upon seeing proof it has fallen behind. + nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]); + return; // By this point we should have panic'ed! + } + nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed); { - let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); + let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0); } - let mut reestablish_1 = Vec::with_capacity(1); for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() { - if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg { - assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); - reestablish_1.push(msg.clone()); - } else if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg { + if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg { } else if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg { match action { &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => { - assert_eq!(msg.data, "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting"); + assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel force-closed"); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"), } } else { - panic!("Unexpected event") + panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", msg) } } - // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind - // Check that we sent the warning message when we detected that A has fallen behind, - // and give the possibility for A to recover from the warning. - nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]); - let warn_msg = "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned(); - assert!(check_warn_msg!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), chan.2).contains(&warn_msg)); - - // Check A is able to claim to_remote output - let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); - // The node B should not broadcast the transaction to force close the channel! - assert!(node_txn.is_empty()); - // B should now detect that there is something wrong and should force close the channel. - let exp_err = "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can\'t do any automated broadcasting"; - check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: exp_err.to_string() }); - // after the warning message sent by B, we should not able to // use the channel, or reconnect with success to the channel. assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().is_empty()); @@ -7537,6 +7538,17 @@ fn test_data_loss_protect() { check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false); } +#[test] +#[should_panic] +fn test_data_loss_protect_showing_stale_state_panics() { + do_test_data_loss_protect(true); +} + +#[test] +fn test_force_close_without_broadcast() { + do_test_data_loss_protect(false); +} + #[test] fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() { // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously @@ -8245,7 +8257,7 @@ fn test_override_channel_config() { // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config. let mut override_config = UserConfig::default(); - override_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 200; + override_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 200; nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap(); @@ -8258,7 +8270,7 @@ fn test_override_channel_config() { #[test] fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() { let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default(); - zero_config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0; + zero_config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0; let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]); @@ -8282,17 +8294,17 @@ fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() { // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer. let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default(); - config_30_percent.own_channel_config.announced_channel = true; - config_30_percent.own_channel_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30; + config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true; + config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30; let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default(); - config_50_percent.own_channel_config.announced_channel = true; - config_50_percent.own_channel_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50; + config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true; + config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50; let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default(); - config_95_percent.own_channel_config.announced_channel = true; - config_95_percent.own_channel_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95; + config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true; + config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95; let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default(); - config_100_percent.own_channel_config.announced_channel = true; - config_100_percent.own_channel_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100; + config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true; + config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100; let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4); let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs); @@ -8361,7 +8373,7 @@ fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() { _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } - nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); + nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1); @@ -8396,7 +8408,7 @@ fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() { let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); match events[0] { Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => { - nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); + nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); } _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } @@ -9049,7 +9061,7 @@ fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain force_closing_node = 1; counterparty_node = 0; } - nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_channel(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); + nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true); check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1); check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed); @@ -9412,6 +9424,10 @@ fn test_invalid_funding_tx() { // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had // un-released crashes in the sanitization process). + // + // Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd + // previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and + // gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction. let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]); @@ -9422,9 +9438,19 @@ fn test_invalid_funding_tx() { nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())); let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42); + + // Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is + // 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing + // a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking + // its length. + let mut wit_program: Vec = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program(); + assert!(chan_utils::HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(wit_program.len()).unwrap() == + chan_utils::HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC); + + let wit_program_script: Script = wit_program.clone().into(); for output in tx.output.iter_mut() { // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey - output.script_pubkey = bitcoin::Script::new(); + output.script_pubkey = Script::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash()); } nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap(); @@ -9454,6 +9480,28 @@ fn test_invalid_funding_tx() { } else { panic!(); } } else { panic!(); } assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0); + + // Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements + // long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing + // as its not 32 bytes long. + let mut spend_tx = Transaction { + version: 2i32, lock_time: 0, + input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn { + previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint { + txid: tx.txid(), + vout: idx as u32, + }, + script_sig: Script::new(), + sequence: 0xfffffffd, + witness: Witness::from_vec(channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness()) + }).collect(), + output: vec![TxOut { + value: 1000, + script_pubkey: Script::new(), + }] + }; + check_spends!(spend_tx, tx); + mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx); } fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) { @@ -9485,7 +9533,7 @@ fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_t nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false); nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false); - nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); + nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true); check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); @@ -9727,7 +9775,7 @@ fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) { nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]); commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false); - expect_payment_failed_conditions!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain()); + expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain()); claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage); } @@ -9832,7 +9880,7 @@ fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() { nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]); commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false); - expect_payment_failed_conditions!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain()); + expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain()); nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); @@ -9862,7 +9910,7 @@ fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() { }; let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0); let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(); - let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph.read_only(), None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap(); + let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap(); let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]); let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap(); @@ -9898,8 +9946,8 @@ fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() { let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0); let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(); let route = find_route( - &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph.read_only(), - Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::>()), nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes + &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::>()), + nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes ).unwrap(); let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]); @@ -10182,7 +10230,7 @@ fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_e let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); let mut config = test_default_channel_config(); - config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value + config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]); let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); @@ -10225,13 +10273,13 @@ fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_e chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64 }; let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000; - let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat; + let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat; let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000; - let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat; + let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat; let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25; - let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx; + let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx; if on_holder_tx { if dust_outbound_balance { @@ -10275,9 +10323,9 @@ fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_e if on_holder_tx { let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1); let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat; - unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat))); + unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat))); } else { - unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat))); + unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat))); } } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception { let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat }); @@ -10292,10 +10340,10 @@ fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_e // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1); let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat; - nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1); + nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1); } else { // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats - nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1); + nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1); } } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound { let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000); @@ -10329,3 +10377,45 @@ fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() { do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false); do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true); } + +#[test] +fn test_non_final_funding_tx() { + let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); + let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); + let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]); + let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); + + let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); + let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_message); + let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel_message); + + let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); + + let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow(); + let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::Script::new(), sequence: 0x1, witness: Witness::from_vec(vec!(vec!(1))) }; + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + let mut tx = match events[0] { + Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => { + // Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 2. + Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: best_height + 3, input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut { + value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(), + }]} + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + }; + // Transaction should fail as it's evaluated as non-final for propagation. + match nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()) { + Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => { + assert_eq!(format!("Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final"), err); + }, + _ => panic!() + } + + // However, transaction should be accepted if it's in a +2 headroom from best block. + tx.lock_time -= 1; + assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok()); + get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); +}