X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fln%2Ffunctional_tests.rs;h=be517ea4a7698de94cd9fca02f7b57157a17e99f;hb=28c9b56113ff1ebb1b505a2c979c55c1626aa06b;hp=8e7b3e8fbbd02b8a0697ca57cf29de87ab87100c;hpb=ac842ed9dd7a36a4a26eb6b856d80ab04eecf750;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs index 8e7b3e8f..be517ea4 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ use routing::gossip::NetworkGraph; use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route}; use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures}; use ln::msgs; -use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, OptionalField, ErrorAction}; +use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction}; use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner; use util::{byte_utils, test_utils}; use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination}; @@ -1060,26 +1060,6 @@ fn fake_network_test() { fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2); claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1); - // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4 - let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()); - - // Send some payments across both channels - let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0; - let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0; - let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0; - - - route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000); - let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); - assert_eq!(events.len(), 0); - nodes[0].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap(), 1); - - //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full - - claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3); - claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4); - claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5); - // Close down the channels... close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true); check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure); @@ -1093,9 +1073,6 @@ fn fake_network_test() { close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false); check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure); check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure); - close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false); - check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure); - check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure); } #[test] @@ -3423,7 +3400,7 @@ fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() { check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed); - let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); + let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]); @@ -4841,7 +4818,7 @@ fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() { check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed); - let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); + let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3); assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening @@ -5047,7 +5024,7 @@ fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() { check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed); connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires - let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); + let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2); check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3); assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1); @@ -7882,7 +7859,7 @@ fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() { check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed); connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above) - let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); + let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3); check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3); @@ -8143,22 +8120,26 @@ fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() { let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2; - let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer(); + let per_commitment_secret; + let next_per_commitment_point; + { + let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer(); - const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1; + const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1; - // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation - keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1; - let per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER); + // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation + keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1; + per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER); - // Must revoke without gaps - keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1; - keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1); + // Must revoke without gaps + keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1; + keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1); - keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1; - let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(), - &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap()); + keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1; + next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(), + &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap()); + } nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point }); @@ -8366,19 +8347,19 @@ fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() { // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`. - assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, OptionalField::Present(channel_value_50_percent_msat)); + assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_50_percent_msat); // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`. - assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, OptionalField::Present(channel_value_30_percent_msat)); + assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_30_percent_msat); // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the // `channel_value`. - assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, OptionalField::Present(channel_value_90_percent_msat)); + assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat); // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the // `channel_value`. - assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, OptionalField::Present(channel_value_90_percent_msat)); + assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat); } #[test] @@ -8500,12 +8481,12 @@ fn test_reject_funding_before_inbound_channel_accepted() { // `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` event. The message is passed to `nodes[0]` // `handle_accept_channel`, which is required in order for `create_funding_transaction` to // succeed when `nodes[0]` is passed to it. - { + let accept_chan_msg = { let mut lock; let channel = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], lock, temp_channel_id); - let accept_chan_msg = channel.get_accept_channel_message(); - nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg); - } + channel.get_accept_channel_message() + }; + nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg); let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);