X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fln%2Fmonitor_tests.rs;h=0ad392131acecf77e2174b0338721cd5db395325;hb=cb952f651ffbe79337f857940723ae5b2fcbc408;hp=8726c6a996204b99e0fa653c3240a348c2752fcf;hpb=4a0010d7393bb32305bdb3d859735b7b563462eb;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs index 8726c6a9..0ad39213 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs @@ -124,9 +124,8 @@ fn revoked_output_htlc_resolution_timing() { check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true); let bs_spend_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); - assert_eq!(bs_spend_txn.len(), 2); + assert_eq!(bs_spend_txn.len(), 1); check_spends!(bs_spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); - check_spends!(bs_spend_txn[1], chan.3); // After the commitment transaction confirms, we should still wait on the HTLC spend // transaction to confirm before resolving the HTLC. @@ -159,8 +158,8 @@ fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() { let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 }; assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id); - let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64; - let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id); + let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64; + let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id); assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 @@ -270,8 +269,8 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety - let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64; - let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id); + let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64; + let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id); let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id); // Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats @@ -364,21 +363,14 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]); let b_broadcast_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); - assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn.len(), if prev_commitment_tx { 4 } else { 5 }); - if prev_commitment_tx { - check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[3], b_broadcast_txn[2]); - } else { - assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0], b_broadcast_txn[3]); - assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1], b_broadcast_txn[4]); - } - // b_broadcast_txn[0] should spend the HTLC output of the commitment tx for 3_000 sats + assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn.len(), 2); + // b_broadcast_txn should spend the HTLCs output of the commitment tx for 3_000 and 4_000 sats check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]); assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1); assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1); assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000); assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000); - check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[2], funding_tx); assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty()); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true); @@ -482,21 +474,20 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { // When the HTLC timeout output is spendable in the next block, A should broadcast it connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1); let a_broadcast_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); - assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn.len(), 3); - check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[0], funding_tx); + assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn.len(), 2); + assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1); + check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1); check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]); - assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[2].input.len(), 1); - check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[2], remote_txn[0]); - assert_ne!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, - a_broadcast_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout); - // a_broadcast_txn [1] and [2] should spend the HTLC outputs of the commitment tx - assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000); - assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000); + assert_ne!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, + a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout); + // a_broadcast_txn [0] and [1] should spend the HTLC outputs of the commitment tx + assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000); + assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000); // Once the HTLC-Timeout transaction confirms, A will no longer consider the HTLC // "MaybeClaimable", but instead move it to "AwaitingConfirmations". - mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[2]); + mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1]); assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, @@ -510,7 +501,7 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], timeout_payment_hash, false); - test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[2]); + test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1]); // Node B will no longer consider the HTLC "contentious" after the HTLC claim transaction // confirms, and consider it simply "awaiting confirmations". Note that it has to wait for the @@ -558,7 +549,7 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { // Finally, mine the HTLC timeout transaction that A broadcasted (even though B should be able // to claim this HTLC with the preimage it knows!). It will remain listed as a claimable HTLC // until ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations on the spend. - mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &a_broadcast_txn[2]); + mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &a_broadcast_txn[1]); assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ContentiousClaimable { claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, @@ -633,8 +624,8 @@ fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() { check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000_000); - let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64; - let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id); + let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64; + let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id); // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transactions let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id); @@ -670,10 +661,8 @@ fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() { check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true); check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed); let bs_htlc_claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); - assert_eq!(bs_htlc_claim_txn.len(), 3); + assert_eq!(bs_htlc_claim_txn.len(), 1); check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[0], as_txn[0]); - check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[1], funding_tx); - check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[2], bs_htlc_claim_txn[1]); // Connect blocks until the HTLCs expire, allowing us to (validly) broadcast the HTLC-Timeout // transaction. @@ -787,8 +776,8 @@ fn test_no_preimage_inbound_htlc_balances() { let to_a_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 20_000_000).1; let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety - let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64; - let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id); + let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64; + let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id); // Both A and B will have an HTLC that's claimable on timeout and one that's claimable if they // receive the preimage. These will remain the same through the channel closure and until the @@ -1063,9 +1052,9 @@ fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(confirm_htlc_spend_first: bo // Get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id); - let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id); + let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id); - let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64; + let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64; let missing_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety let missing_htlc_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000).1; @@ -1299,8 +1288,8 @@ fn test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances() { claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage); - let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64; - let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id); + let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64; + let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id); // B will generate an HTLC-Success from its revoked commitment tx mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]); @@ -1309,11 +1298,10 @@ fn test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances() { check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed); let revoked_htlc_success_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); - assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success_txn.len(), 2); + assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success_txn.len(), 1); assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1); assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); check_spends!(revoked_htlc_success_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); - check_spends!(revoked_htlc_success_txn[1], funding_tx); connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); let revoked_htlc_timeout_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); @@ -1331,9 +1319,8 @@ fn test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances() { let to_remote_conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1; let as_commitment_claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); - assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn.len(), 2); + assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn.len(), 1); check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); - check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1], funding_tx); // The next two checks have the same balance set for A - even though we confirm a revoked HTLC // transaction our balance tracking doesn't use the on-chain value so the @@ -1521,8 +1508,8 @@ fn test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims() { check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[0], funding_tx); check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[1], as_revoked_txn[0]); // The HTLC-Claim transaction - let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id); - let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64; + let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id); + let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64; { let mut feerate = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();