X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fln%2Fmonitor_tests.rs;h=3bd50293ff24aa2bdf36f1935590d8341213cbca;hb=b0bf50fa2493e5364511eb781db9772a06e140f9;hp=4f36b9a88810aa5122c3347953028c6b31943a87;hpb=f0b818952bd4da666310bacfad9321a5da995c29;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs index 4f36b9a8..3bd50293 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs @@ -9,22 +9,48 @@ //! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations. -use chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, Balance}; -use chain::transaction::OutPoint; -use ln::channel; -use ln::channelmanager::BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT; -use ln::features::InitFeatures; -use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler; -use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination}; - +#[cfg(anchors)] +use crate::chain::keysinterface::{ChannelSigner, EcdsaChannelSigner}; +#[cfg(anchors)] +use crate::chain::channelmonitor::LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS; +use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, Balance}; +use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint; +use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator; +use crate::ln::channel; +#[cfg(anchors)] +use crate::ln::chan_utils; +#[cfg(anchors)] +use crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager; +use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, PaymentId}; +use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler; +#[cfg(anchors)] +use crate::util::config::UserConfig; +#[cfg(anchors)] +use crate::util::crypto::sign; +#[cfg(anchors)] +use crate::util::events::BumpTransactionEvent; +use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination}; +#[cfg(anchors)] +use crate::util::ser::Writeable; +#[cfg(anchors)] +use crate::util::test_utils; + +#[cfg(anchors)] +use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType; use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder; use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes; use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1; +#[cfg(anchors)] +use bitcoin::secp256k1::SecretKey; +#[cfg(anchors)] +use bitcoin::{Amount, PublicKey, Script, TxIn, TxOut, PackedLockTime, Witness}; use bitcoin::Transaction; +#[cfg(anchors)] +use bitcoin::util::sighash::SighashCache; -use prelude::*; +use crate::prelude::*; -use ln::functional_test_utils::*; +use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*; #[test] fn chanmon_fail_from_stale_commitment() { @@ -48,11 +74,11 @@ fn chanmon_fail_from_stale_commitment() { let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]); let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); - create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()); - let (update_a, _, chan_id_2, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()); + create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); + let (update_a, _, chan_id_2, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2); let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1_000_000); - nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap(); + nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let bs_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id_2); @@ -105,7 +131,7 @@ fn revoked_output_htlc_resolution_timing() { let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]); let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); - let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()); + let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000); let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1; @@ -124,9 +150,8 @@ fn revoked_output_htlc_resolution_timing() { check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true); let bs_spend_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); - assert_eq!(bs_spend_txn.len(), 2); + assert_eq!(bs_spend_txn.len(), 1); check_spends!(bs_spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); - check_spends!(bs_spend_txn[1], chan.3); // After the commitment transaction confirms, we should still wait on the HTLC spend // transaction to confirm before resolving the HTLC. @@ -140,7 +165,7 @@ fn revoked_output_htlc_resolution_timing() { assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); - expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, true); + expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, false); } #[test] @@ -155,12 +180,12 @@ fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() { let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = - create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()); + create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000); let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 }; assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id); - let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64; - let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id); + let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64; + let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id); assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 @@ -171,9 +196,9 @@ fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() { nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); - nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &node_0_shutdown); + nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown); let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); - nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &node_1_shutdown); + nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown); let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed); @@ -228,6 +253,17 @@ fn sorted_vec(mut v: Vec) -> Vec { v } +/// Asserts that `a` and `b` are close, but maybe off by up to 5. +/// This is useful when checking fees and weights on transactions as things may vary by a few based +/// on signature size and signature size estimation being non-exact. +fn fuzzy_assert_eq>(a: V, b: V) { + let a_u64 = a.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap(); + let b_u64 = b.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap(); + eprintln!("Checking {} and {} for fuzzy equality", a_u64, b_u64); + assert!(a_u64 >= b_u64 - 5); + assert!(b_u64 >= a_u64 - 5); +} + fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { // Tests `get_claimable_balances` with an HTLC across a force-close. // We build a channel with an HTLC pending, then force close the channel and check that the @@ -245,7 +281,7 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = - create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()); + create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000); let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 }; assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id); @@ -259,8 +295,8 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety - let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64; - let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id); + let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64; + let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id); let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id); // Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats @@ -268,18 +304,24 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate * (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, - }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { + }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000, claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, - }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { + }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, }]), sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); - assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { + assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000, - }], - nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + }, Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000, + expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }, Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, + expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }]), + sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); @@ -323,12 +365,12 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { chan_feerate * (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + if prev_commitment_tx { 1 } else { 2 } * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, - }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { + }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, }]; if !prev_commitment_tx { - a_expected_balances.push(Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { + a_expected_balances.push(Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000, claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, }); @@ -347,21 +389,14 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]); let b_broadcast_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); - assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn.len(), if prev_commitment_tx { 4 } else { 5 }); - if prev_commitment_tx { - check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[3], b_broadcast_txn[2]); - } else { - assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0], b_broadcast_txn[3]); - assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1], b_broadcast_txn[4]); - } - // b_broadcast_txn[0] should spend the HTLC output of the commitment tx for 3_000 sats + assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn.len(), 2); + // b_broadcast_txn should spend the HTLCs output of the commitment tx for 3_000 and 4_000 sats check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]); assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1); assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1); assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000); assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000); - check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[2], funding_tx); assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty()); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true); @@ -385,10 +420,10 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate * (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, - }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { + }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000, claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, - }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { + }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, }]), @@ -411,15 +446,15 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); - expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_payment_hash, true); + expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_payment_hash, false); connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will consider its balance fully spendable and generate a // `SpendableOutputs` event. However, B still has to wait for the CSV delay. - assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { + assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000, claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, - }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { + }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, }]), @@ -447,16 +482,16 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { } else { expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage); } - assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { + assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000, claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, - }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { + }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, }]), sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); - assert_eq!(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { + assert_eq!(vec![Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, }], @@ -465,21 +500,20 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { // When the HTLC timeout output is spendable in the next block, A should broadcast it connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1); let a_broadcast_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); - assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn.len(), 3); - check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[0], funding_tx); + assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn.len(), 2); + assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1); + check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1); check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]); - assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[2].input.len(), 1); - check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[2], remote_txn[0]); - assert_ne!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, - a_broadcast_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout); - // a_broadcast_txn [1] and [2] should spend the HTLC outputs of the commitment tx - assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000); - assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000); + assert_ne!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, + a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout); + // a_broadcast_txn [0] and [1] should spend the HTLC outputs of the commitment tx + assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000); + assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000); // Once the HTLC-Timeout transaction confirms, A will no longer consider the HTLC // "MaybeClaimable", but instead move it to "AwaitingConfirmations". - mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[2]); + mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1]); assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, @@ -491,9 +525,9 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); assert_eq!(Vec::::new(), nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); - expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], timeout_payment_hash, true); + expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], timeout_payment_hash, false); - test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[2]); + test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1]); // Node B will no longer consider the HTLC "contentious" after the HTLC claim transaction // confirms, and consider it simply "awaiting confirmations". Note that it has to wait for the @@ -541,7 +575,7 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { // Finally, mine the HTLC timeout transaction that A broadcasted (even though B should be able // to claim this HTLC with the preimage it knows!). It will remain listed as a claimable HTLC // until ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations on the spend. - mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &a_broadcast_txn[2]); + mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &a_broadcast_txn[1]); assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ContentiousClaimable { claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, @@ -550,6 +584,16 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); assert_eq!(Vec::::new(), nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + + // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're + // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new + // monitor events or claimable balances. + for node in nodes.iter() { + connect_blocks(node, 6); + connect_blocks(node, 6); + assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); + assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty()); + } } #[test] @@ -576,12 +620,12 @@ fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() { // Create a single channel with two pending HTLCs from nodes[0] to nodes[1], one which nodes[1] // knows the preimage for, one which it does not. - let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()); + let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0); let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 }; let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000_000); let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety - nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap(); + nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); @@ -589,10 +633,10 @@ fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() { commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false); expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]); - expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000_000); + expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000_000); let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 20_000_000); - nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap(); + nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); @@ -600,14 +644,14 @@ fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() { commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false); expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]); - expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 20_000_000); + expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 20_000_000); nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2); get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000_000); - let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64; - let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id); + let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64; + let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id); // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transactions let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id); @@ -628,10 +672,10 @@ fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() { claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate * (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable, - }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { + }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000, claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, - }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { + }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000, claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, }]), @@ -643,10 +687,8 @@ fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() { check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true); check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed); let bs_htlc_claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); - assert_eq!(bs_htlc_claim_txn.len(), 3); + assert_eq!(bs_htlc_claim_txn.len(), 1); check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[0], as_txn[0]); - check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[1], funding_tx); - check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[2], bs_htlc_claim_txn[1]); // Connect blocks until the HTLCs expire, allowing us to (validly) broadcast the HTLC-Timeout // transaction. @@ -655,15 +697,15 @@ fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() { claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate * (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable, - }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { + }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000, claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, - }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { + }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000, claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, }]), sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); - assert_eq!(as_txn[1].lock_time, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1); // as_txn[1] can be included in the next block + assert_eq!(as_txn[1].lock_time.0, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1); // as_txn[1] can be included in the next block // Now confirm nodes[0]'s HTLC-Timeout transaction, which changes the claimable balance to an // "awaiting confirmations" one. @@ -679,7 +721,7 @@ fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() { }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000, confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable, - }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { + }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000, claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, }]), @@ -696,7 +738,7 @@ fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() { }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000, confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable, - }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { + }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000, claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, }]), @@ -706,7 +748,7 @@ fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() { // panicked as described in the test introduction. This will remove the "maybe claimable" // spendable output as nodes[1] has fully claimed the second HTLC. connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); - expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true); + expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false); assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate * @@ -733,4 +775,1412 @@ fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() { connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_htlc_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1); assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty()); test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[1]); + + // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're + // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new + // monitor events or claimable balances. + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6); + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6); + assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); + assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty()); +} + +#[test] +fn test_no_preimage_inbound_htlc_balances() { + // Tests that MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC are generated for inbound HTLCs for which we do not + // have a preimage. + let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); + let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); + let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]); + let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); + + let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000); + let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 }; + + // Send two HTLCs, one from A to B, and one from B to A. + let to_b_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000).1; + let to_a_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 20_000_000).1; + let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety + + let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64; + let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id); + + // Both A and B will have an HTLC that's claimable on timeout and one that's claimable if they + // receive the preimage. These will remain the same through the channel closure and until the + // HTLC output is spent. + + assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate * + (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, + }, Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000, + expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000, + claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }]), + sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + + assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000, + }, Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000, + expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000, + claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }]), + sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + + // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transaction + let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id); + assert_eq!(as_txn.len(), 2); + check_spends!(as_txn[1], as_txn[0]); + check_spends!(as_txn[0], funding_tx); + + // Now close the channel by confirming A's commitment transaction on both nodes, checking the + // claimable balances remain the same except for the non-HTLC balance changing variant. + let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32; + let as_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate * + (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, + confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable, + }, Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000, + expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000, + claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }]); + + mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]); + nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true); + check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed); + + assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims, + sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + + mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true); + check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed); + + let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1; + let mut bs_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000, + confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable, + }, Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000, + expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000, + claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }]); + assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims, + sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + + // We'll broadcast the HTLC-Timeout transaction one block prior to the htlc's expiration (as it + // is confirmable in the next block), but will still include the same claimable balances as no + // HTLC has been spent, even after the HTLC expires. We'll also fail the inbound HTLC, but it + // won't do anything as the channel is already closed. + + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); + let as_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); + assert_eq!(as_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1); + check_spends!(as_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]); + expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[0], + [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash }]); + + assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims, + sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1); + assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims, + sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + + // For node B, we'll get the non-HTLC funds claimable after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations + connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); + test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]); + bs_pre_spend_claims.retain(|e| if let Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { .. } = e { false } else { true }); + + // The next few blocks for B look the same as for A, though for the opposite HTLC + nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear(); + connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - (ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) - 1); + expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[1], + [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash }]); + let bs_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); + assert_eq!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1); + check_spends!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]); + + assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims, + sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + + connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1); + assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims, + sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + + // Now confirm the two HTLC timeout transactions for A, checking that the inbound HTLC resolves + // after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations and the other takes BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT confirmations. + mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]); + let as_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + (BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32) - 1; + assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate * + (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, + confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable, + }, Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000, + expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000, + confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height, + }]), + sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + + mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]); + assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate * + (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, + confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable, + }, Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000, + expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000, + confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height, + }]), + sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + + // Once as_htlc_timeout_claim[0] reaches ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations, we should get a + // payment failure event. + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2); + expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], to_b_failed_payment_hash, false); + + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1); + assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate * + (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, + confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable, + }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000, + confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout), + }]), + sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1); + assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000, + confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout), + }], + nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]); + + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], as_timeout_claimable_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1); + assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty()); + test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]); + + // The process for B should be completely identical as well, noting that the non-HTLC-balance + // was already claimed. + mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]); + let bs_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1; + assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000, + expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000, + confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height, + }]), + sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + + mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]); + assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000, + expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000, + confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height, + }]), + sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + + connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2); + expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], to_a_failed_payment_hash, false); + + assert_eq!(vec![Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000, + expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }], + nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]); + + connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1); + assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty()); + + // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're + // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new + // monitor events or claimable balances. + connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6); + connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6); + assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); + assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty()); +} + +fn sorted_vec_with_additions(v_orig: &Vec, extra_ts: &[&T]) -> Vec { + let mut v = v_orig.clone(); + for t in extra_ts { + v.push((*t).clone()); + } + v.sort_unstable(); + v +} + +fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(confirm_htlc_spend_first: bool) { + // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions. + let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); + // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation + // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation + // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a + // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked. + chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true; + let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); + let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]); + let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); + + let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = + create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000); + let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 }; + assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id); + + // We create five HTLCs for B to claim against A's revoked commitment transaction: + // + // (1) one for which A is the originator and B knows the preimage + // (2) one for which B is the originator where the HTLC has since timed-out + // (3) one for which B is the originator but where the HTLC has not yet timed-out + // (4) one dust HTLC which is lost in the channel closure + // (5) one that actually isn't in the revoked commitment transaction at all, but was added in + // later commitment transaction updates + // + // Though they could all be claimed in a single claim transaction, due to CLTV timeouts they + // are all currently claimed in separate transactions, which helps us test as we can claim + // HTLCs individually. + + let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000); + let timeout_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1; + let dust_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000).1; + + let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety + + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 10); + connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 10); + + let live_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety + let live_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 5_000_000).1; + + // Get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it + let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id); + let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id); + + let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64; + + let missing_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety + let missing_htlc_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000).1; + + nodes[1].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage); + expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + let _b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10); + check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + + let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 6); + let mut failed_payments: HashSet<_> = + [timeout_payment_hash, dust_payment_hash, live_payment_hash, missing_htlc_payment_hash] + .iter().map(|a| *a).collect(); + events.retain(|ev| { + match ev { + Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id, channel_id }, .. } => { + assert_eq!(*channel_id, chan_id); + assert_eq!(*node_id, Some(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())); + false + }, + Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }, .. } => { + assert!(failed_payments.remove(payment_hash)); + false + }, + _ => true, + } + }); + assert!(failed_payments.is_empty()); + if let Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = events[0] {} else { panic!(); } + match &events[1] { + Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}, + _ => panic!(), + } + + connect_blocks(&nodes[1], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10); + check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed); + + // Prior to channel closure, B considers the preimage HTLC as its own, and otherwise only + // lists the two on-chain timeout-able HTLCs as claimable balances. + assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3 - 2_000 + 3_000, + }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 2_000, + claimable_height: missing_htlc_cltv_timeout, + }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, + claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 5_000, + claimable_height: live_htlc_cltv_timeout, + }]), + sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + + mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]); + let mut claim_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..).filter(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid())).collect(); + // Currently the revoked commitment is claimed in four transactions as the HTLCs all expire + // quite soon. + assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 4); + claim_txn.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::()); + + // The following constants were determined experimentally + const BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 483; + const OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 571; + const INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 578; + + // Check that the weight is close to the expected weight. Note that signature sizes vary + // somewhat so it may not always be exact. + fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[0].weight(), OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT); + fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[1].weight(), INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT); + fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[2].weight(), INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT); + fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[3].weight(), BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT); + + // The expected balance for the next three checks, with the largest-HTLC and to_self output + // claim balances separated out. + let expected_balance = vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment + claimable_amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3, + confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5, + }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000, + }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, + }]; + + let to_self_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate * + (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, + }; + let to_self_claimed_avail_height; + let largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 5_000, + }; + let largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height; + + // Once the channel has been closed by A, B now considers all of the commitment transactions' + // outputs as `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable`. + assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]), + sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + + if confirm_htlc_spend_first { + mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]); + largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5; + to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block + } else { + // Connect the to_self output claim, taking all of A's non-HTLC funds + mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]); + to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5; + largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block + } + + let largest_htlc_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 5_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000, + confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height, + }; + let to_self_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate * + (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 + - chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight() as u64 / 1000, + confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height, + }; + + if confirm_htlc_spend_first { + assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]), + sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + } else { + assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]), + sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + } + + if confirm_htlc_spend_first { + mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]); + } else { + mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]); + } + assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]), + sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + + // Finally, connect the last two remaining HTLC spends and check that they move to + // `ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations` + mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0]); + mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1]); + + assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment + claimable_amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3, + confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1, + }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate * + (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 + - chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight() as u64 / 1000, + confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height, + }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000 - chan_feerate * OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000, + confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 4, + }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000, + confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5, + }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 5_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000, + confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height, + }]), + sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + + connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1); + test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]); + + let mut payment_failed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[..2].to_vec(), + missing_htlc_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new()); + expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[2..].to_vec(), + dust_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new()); + + connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1); + test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 2 } else { 3 }]); + connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1); + test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 3 } else { 2 }]); + expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], live_payment_hash, false); + connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1); + test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0]); + connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1); + test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1]); + expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, false); + assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new()); + + // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're + // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new + // monitor events or claimable balances. + connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6); + connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6); + assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); + assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty()); +} + +#[test] +fn test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances() { + do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(true); + do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(false); +} + +#[test] +fn test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances() { + // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revocation spends of HTLC transactions. + let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); + chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true; + let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); + let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]); + let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); + + // Create some initial channels + let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = + create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 11_000_000); + let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 }; + assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id); + + let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0; + let failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1; + let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id); + assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid()); + + // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have two HTLCs and an output for both sides + assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 4); + + claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage); + + let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64; + let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id); + + // B will generate an HTLC-Success from its revoked commitment tx + mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]); + check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed); + let revoked_htlc_success_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); + + assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success_txn.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); + check_spends!(revoked_htlc_success_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); + + connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); + let revoked_htlc_timeout_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); + assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_timeout_txn.len(), 1); + check_spends!(revoked_htlc_timeout_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); + assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_timeout_txn[0].input[0].previous_output); + assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); + assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_timeout_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); + + // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx + mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]); + check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed); + let to_remote_conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1; + + let as_commitment_claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); + assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn.len(), 1); + check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); + + // The next two checks have the same balance set for A - even though we confirm a revoked HTLC + // transaction our balance tracking doesn't use the on-chain value so the + // `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable` entry doesn't change. + let as_balances = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment + claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 11_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate * + (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, + confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height, + }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { + // to_self output in B's revoked commitment + claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000, + }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1 + claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000, + }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2 + claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000, + }]); + assert_eq!(as_balances, + sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + + mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_success_txn[0]); + let as_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); + assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx.len(), 2); + check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_success_txn[0]); + check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]); // A has to generate a new claim for the remaining revoked + // outputs (which no longer includes the spent HTLC output) + + assert_eq!(as_balances, + sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + + assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output.len(), 1); + fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value, + 3_000 - chan_feerate * (revoked_htlc_success_txn[0].weight() + as_htlc_claim_tx[0].weight()) as u64 / 1000); + + mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0]); + assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment + claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 11_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate * + (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, + confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height, + }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { + // to_self output in B's revoked commitment + claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000, + }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2 + claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000, + }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value, + confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, + }]), + sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 3); + test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]); + assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { + // to_self output to B + claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000, + }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2 + claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000, + }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value, + confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 2, + }]), + sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2); + test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0]); + assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { + // to_self output in B's revoked commitment + claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000, + }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2 + claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000, + }]), + sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], revoked_htlc_timeout_txn[0].lock_time.0 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1); + expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(&nodes[0], + [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: failed_payment_hash }]); + // As time goes on A may split its revocation claim transaction into multiple. + let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); + for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() { + check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]); + } + + // Connect a number of additional blocks to ensure we don't forget the HTLC output needs + // claiming. + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); + let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); + for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() { + check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]); + } + + mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout_txn[0]); + let as_second_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); + assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx.len(), 2); + + check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_timeout_txn[0]); + check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]); + + // Connect blocks to finalize the HTLC resolution with the HTLC-Timeout transaction. In a + // previous iteration of the revoked balance handling this would result in us "forgetting" that + // the revoked HTLC output still needed to be claimed. + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); + assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { + // to_self output in B's revoked commitment + claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000, + }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2 + claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000, + }]), + sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + + mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0]); + assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { + // to_self output in B's revoked commitment + claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000, + }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value, + confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, + }]), + sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + + mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1]); + assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + // to_self output in B's revoked commitment + claimable_amount_satoshis: as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1].output[0].value, + confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, + }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value, + confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2, + }]), + sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2); + test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0]); + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1); + test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1]); + + assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new()); + + // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're + // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new + // monitor events or claimable balances. + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6); + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6); + assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); + assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty()); +} + +#[test] +fn test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims() { + // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions when + // claiming with an aggregated claim transaction. + let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); + // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation + // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation + // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a + // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked. + chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true; + let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); + let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]); + let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); + + let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = + create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000); + let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 }; + assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id); + + // We create two HTLCs, one which we will give A the preimage to to generate an HTLC-Success + // transaction, and one which we will not, allowing B to claim the HTLC output in an aggregated + // revocation-claim transaction. + + let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000); + let revoked_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1; + + let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety + + // Cheat by giving A's ChannelMonitor the preimage to the to-be-claimed HTLC so that we have an + // HTLC-claim transaction on the to-be-revoked state. + get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(&claimed_payment_hash, &claimed_payment_preimage, + &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger); + + // Now get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it + let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id); + + assert_eq!(as_revoked_txn.len(), 2); + check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[0], funding_tx); + check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[1], as_revoked_txn[0]); // The HTLC-Claim transaction + + let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id); + let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64; + + { + let mut feerate = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap(); + *feerate += 1; + } + nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + + let fee_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &fee_update.update_fee.unwrap()); + commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], fee_update.commitment_signed, false); + + nodes[0].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage); + expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + let _a_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + + assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000, + }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, + claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000, + claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }]), + sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + + mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]); + check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true); + check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + + let mut claim_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..).filter(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid())).collect(); + // Currently the revoked commitment outputs are all claimed in one aggregated transaction + assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 3); + check_spends!(claim_txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0]); + + let to_remote_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1; + + assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment + claimable_amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000, + confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity, + }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { + // to_self output in A's revoked commitment + claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate * + (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, + }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1 + claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, + }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2 + claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000, + }]), + sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + + // Confirm A's HTLC-Success tranasction which presumably raced B's claim, causing B to create a + // new claim. + mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[1]); + expect_payment_sent!(nodes[1], claimed_payment_preimage); + let mut claim_txn_2: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); + claim_txn_2.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| if tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid()) { 0 } else { 1 }); + // Once B sees the HTLC-Success transaction it splits its claim transaction into two, though in + // theory it could re-aggregate the claims as well. + assert_eq!(claim_txn_2.len(), 2); + assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input.len(), 2); + check_spends!(claim_txn_2[0], as_revoked_txn[0]); + assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input.len(), 1); + check_spends!(claim_txn_2[1], as_revoked_txn[1]); + + assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment + claimable_amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000, + confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity, + }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { + // to_self output in A's revoked commitment + claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate * + (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, + }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1 + claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, + }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2 + // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC + // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs + // anyway, so its not a big change. + claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000, + }]), + sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + + connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5); + test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]); + + assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { + // to_self output in A's revoked commitment + claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate * + (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, + }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1 + claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, + }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2 + // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC + // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs + // anyway, so its not a big change. + claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000, + }]), + sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + + mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1]); + let htlc_2_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1; + + assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { + // to_self output in A's revoked commitment + claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate * + (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, + }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1 + claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, + }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { // HTLC 2 + claimable_amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[1].output[0].value, + confirmation_height: htlc_2_claim_maturity, + }]), + sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + + connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5); + test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1]); + + assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { + // to_self output in A's revoked commitment + claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate * + (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, + }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1 + claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, + }]), + sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + + mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0]); + let rest_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1; + + assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[0].output[0].value, + confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity, + }], + nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + + assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); // We shouldn't fail the payment until we spend the output + + connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5); + expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], revoked_payment_hash, false); + test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0]); + assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty()); + + // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're + // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new + // monitor events or claimable balances. + connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6); + connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6); + assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); + assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty()); +} + +#[cfg(anchors)] +#[test] +fn test_yield_anchors_events() { + // Tests that two parties supporting anchor outputs can open a channel, route payments over + // it, and finalize its resolution uncooperatively. Once the HTLCs are locked in, one side will + // force close once the HTLCs expire. The force close should stem from an event emitted by LDK, + // allowing the consumer to provide additional fees to the commitment transaction to be + // broadcast. Once the commitment transaction confirms, events for the HTLC resolution should be + // emitted by LDK, such that the consumer can attach fees to the zero fee HTLC transactions. + let secp = Secp256k1::new(); + let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); + let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); + let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default(); + anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true; + anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true; + let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]); + let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); + + let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value( + &nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000 + ).2; + route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000); + let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000); + + assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); + + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1); + check_closed_broadcast!(&nodes[0], true); + assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty()); + + get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage( + &payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, + &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger + ); + + let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 1); + let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = match holder_events.pop().unwrap() { + Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { commitment_tx, anchor_descriptor, .. }) => { + assert_eq!(commitment_tx.input.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 6); + let mut anchor_tx = Transaction { + version: 2, + lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, + input: vec![ + TxIn { previous_output: anchor_descriptor.outpoint, ..Default::default() }, + TxIn { ..Default::default() }, + ], + output: vec![TxOut { + value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(), + script_pubkey: Script::new_op_return(&[]), + }], + }; + let signer = nodes[0].keys_manager.derive_channel_keys( + anchor_descriptor.channel_value_satoshis, &anchor_descriptor.channel_keys_id, + ); + let funding_sig = signer.sign_holder_anchor_input(&mut anchor_tx, 0, &secp).unwrap(); + anchor_tx.input[0].witness = chan_utils::build_anchor_input_witness( + &signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey, &funding_sig + ); + (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + }; + + mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + + let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the + // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified. + match *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow() { + ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks => { + assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3); + if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = holder_events.remove(0) {} + else { panic!("unexpected event"); } + + }, + _ => assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 2), + }; + let mut htlc_txs = Vec::with_capacity(2); + for event in holder_events { + match event { + Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { htlc_descriptors, .. }) => { + assert_eq!(htlc_descriptors.len(), 1); + let htlc_descriptor = &htlc_descriptors[0]; + let signer = nodes[0].keys_manager.derive_channel_keys( + htlc_descriptor.channel_value_satoshis, &htlc_descriptor.channel_keys_id + ); + let per_commitment_point = signer.get_per_commitment_point(htlc_descriptor.per_commitment_number, &secp); + let mut htlc_tx = Transaction { + version: 2, + lock_time: if htlc_descriptor.htlc.offered { + PackedLockTime(htlc_descriptor.htlc.cltv_expiry) + } else { + PackedLockTime::ZERO + }, + input: vec![ + htlc_descriptor.unsigned_tx_input(), // HTLC input + TxIn { ..Default::default() } // Fee input + ], + output: vec![ + htlc_descriptor.tx_output(&per_commitment_point, &secp), // HTLC output + TxOut { // Fee input change + value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(), + script_pubkey: Script::new_op_return(&[]), + } + ] + }; + let our_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_tx, 0, htlc_descriptor, &secp).unwrap(); + let witness_script = htlc_descriptor.witness_script(&per_commitment_point, &secp); + htlc_tx.input[0].witness = htlc_descriptor.tx_input_witness(&our_sig, &witness_script); + htlc_txs.push(htlc_tx); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + } + + mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&htlc_txs[0], &htlc_txs[1]]); + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); + + assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); + + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32); + + let holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3); + for event in holder_events { + match event { + Event::SpendableOutputs { .. } => {}, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + } + + // Clear the remaining events as they're not relevant to what we're testing. + nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); +} + +#[cfg(anchors)] +#[test] +fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() { + // Test that `ChannelMonitor`s can properly detect and claim funds from a counterparty claiming + // multiple HTLCs from multiple channels in a single transaction via the success path from a + // revoked commitment. + let secp = Secp256k1::new(); + let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); + // Required to sign a revoked commitment transaction + chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true; + let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); + let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default(); + anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true; + anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true; + let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]); + + let bob_persister: test_utils::TestPersister; + let bob_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor; + let bob_deserialized: ChannelManager< + &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, + &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, + &test_utils::TestRouter, &test_utils::TestLogger, + >; + + let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); + + let chan_a = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000); + let chan_b = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000); + + // Route two payments for each channel from Alice to Bob to lock in the HTLCs. + let payment_a = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000); + let payment_b = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000); + let payment_c = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000); + let payment_d = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000); + + // Serialize Bob with the HTLCs locked in. We'll restart Bob later on with the state at this + // point such that he broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction. + let bob_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode(); + let bob_serialized_monitor_a = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_a.2).encode(); + let bob_serialized_monitor_b = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_b.2).encode(); + + // Bob claims all the HTLCs... + claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_a.0); + claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_b.0); + claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_c.0); + claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_d.0); + + // ...and sends one back through each channel such that he has a motive to broadcast his + // revoked state. + send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000); + send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000); + + // Restart Bob with the revoked state and provide the HTLC preimages he claimed. + reload_node!( + nodes[1], anchors_config, bob_serialized, &[&bob_serialized_monitor_a, &bob_serialized_monitor_b], + bob_persister, bob_chain_monitor, bob_deserialized + ); + for chan_id in [chan_a.2, chan_b.2].iter() { + let monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id); + for payment in [payment_a, payment_b, payment_c, payment_d].iter() { + monitor.provide_payment_preimage( + &payment.1, &payment.0, &node_cfgs[1].tx_broadcaster, + &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger + ); + } + } + + // Bob force closes by broadcasting his revoked state for each channel. + nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_a.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1); + check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true); + check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed); + let revoked_commitment_a = { + let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); + assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1); + let revoked_commitment = txn.pop().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(revoked_commitment.output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs + check_spends!(revoked_commitment, chan_a.3); + revoked_commitment + }; + nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_b.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1); + check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true); + check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed); + let revoked_commitment_b = { + let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); + assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1); + let revoked_commitment = txn.pop().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(revoked_commitment.output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs + check_spends!(revoked_commitment, chan_b.3); + revoked_commitment + }; + + // Bob should now receive two events to bump his revoked commitment transaction fees. + assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); + let events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 2); + let anchor_tx = { + let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(); + let public_key = PublicKey::new(secret_key.public_key(&secp)); + let fee_utxo_script = Script::new_v0_p2wpkh(&public_key.wpubkey_hash().unwrap()); + let coinbase_tx = Transaction { + version: 2, + lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, + input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }], + output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx` + value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(), + script_pubkey: fee_utxo_script.clone(), + }], + }; + let mut anchor_tx = Transaction { + version: 2, + lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, + input: vec![ + TxIn { // Fee input + previous_output: bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, + ..Default::default() + }, + ], + output: vec![TxOut { // Fee input change + value: coinbase_tx.output[0].value / 2 , + script_pubkey: Script::new_op_return(&[]), + }], + }; + let mut signers = Vec::with_capacity(2); + for event in events { + match event { + Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { anchor_descriptor, .. }) => { + anchor_tx.input.push(TxIn { + previous_output: anchor_descriptor.outpoint, + ..Default::default() + }); + let signer = nodes[1].keys_manager.derive_channel_keys( + anchor_descriptor.channel_value_satoshis, &anchor_descriptor.channel_keys_id, + ); + signers.push(signer); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + } + for (i, signer) in signers.into_iter().enumerate() { + let anchor_idx = i + 1; + let funding_sig = signer.sign_holder_anchor_input(&mut anchor_tx, anchor_idx, &secp).unwrap(); + anchor_tx.input[anchor_idx].witness = chan_utils::build_anchor_input_witness( + &signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey, &funding_sig + ); + } + let fee_utxo_sig = { + let witness_script = Script::new_p2pkh(&public_key.pubkey_hash()); + let sighash = hash_to_message!(&SighashCache::new(&anchor_tx).segwit_signature_hash( + 0, &witness_script, coinbase_tx.output[0].value, EcdsaSighashType::All + ).unwrap()[..]); + let sig = sign(&secp, &sighash, &secret_key); + let mut sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec(); + sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8); + sig + }; + anchor_tx.input[0].witness = Witness::from_vec(vec![fee_utxo_sig, public_key.to_bytes()]); + check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b); + anchor_tx + }; + + for node in &nodes { + mine_transactions(node, &[&revoked_commitment_a, &revoked_commitment_b, &anchor_tx]); + } + check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 2); + check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 2, true); + check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed); + + // Alice should detect the confirmed revoked commitments, and attempt to claim all of the + // revoked outputs. + { + let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); + assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2); + + let (revoked_claim_a, revoked_claim_b) = if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_commitment_a.txid() { + (&txn[0], &txn[1]) + } else { + (&txn[1], &txn[0]) + }; + + // TODO: to_self claim must be separate from HTLC claims + assert_eq!(revoked_claim_a.input.len(), 3); // Spends both HTLC outputs and to_self output + assert_eq!(revoked_claim_a.output.len(), 1); + check_spends!(revoked_claim_a, revoked_commitment_a); + assert_eq!(revoked_claim_b.input.len(), 3); // Spends both HTLC outputs and to_self output + assert_eq!(revoked_claim_b.output.len(), 1); + check_spends!(revoked_claim_b, revoked_commitment_b); + } + + // Since Bob was able to confirm his revoked commitment, he'll now try to claim the HTLCs + // through the success path. + assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); + let mut events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the + // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified. + match *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() { + ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks => { + assert_eq!(events.len(), 4); + if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(0) {} + else { panic!("unexpected event"); } + if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(1) {} + else { panic!("unexpected event"); } + + }, + _ => assert_eq!(events.len(), 2), + }; + let htlc_tx = { + let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(); + let public_key = PublicKey::new(secret_key.public_key(&secp)); + let fee_utxo_script = Script::new_v0_p2wpkh(&public_key.wpubkey_hash().unwrap()); + let coinbase_tx = Transaction { + version: 2, + lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, + input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }], + output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx` + value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(), + script_pubkey: fee_utxo_script.clone(), + }], + }; + let mut htlc_tx = Transaction { + version: 2, + lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, + input: vec![TxIn { // Fee input + previous_output: bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, + ..Default::default() + }], + output: vec![TxOut { // Fee input change + value: coinbase_tx.output[0].value / 2 , + script_pubkey: Script::new_op_return(&[]), + }], + }; + let mut descriptors = Vec::with_capacity(4); + for event in events { + if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { mut htlc_descriptors, .. }) = event { + assert_eq!(htlc_descriptors.len(), 2); + for htlc_descriptor in &htlc_descriptors { + assert!(!htlc_descriptor.htlc.offered); + let signer = nodes[1].keys_manager.derive_channel_keys( + htlc_descriptor.channel_value_satoshis, &htlc_descriptor.channel_keys_id + ); + let per_commitment_point = signer.get_per_commitment_point(htlc_descriptor.per_commitment_number, &secp); + htlc_tx.input.push(htlc_descriptor.unsigned_tx_input()); + htlc_tx.output.push(htlc_descriptor.tx_output(&per_commitment_point, &secp)); + } + descriptors.append(&mut htlc_descriptors); + } else { + panic!("Unexpected event"); + } + } + for (idx, htlc_descriptor) in descriptors.into_iter().enumerate() { + let htlc_input_idx = idx + 1; + let signer = nodes[1].keys_manager.derive_channel_keys( + htlc_descriptor.channel_value_satoshis, &htlc_descriptor.channel_keys_id + ); + let our_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, htlc_input_idx, &htlc_descriptor, &secp).unwrap(); + let per_commitment_point = signer.get_per_commitment_point(htlc_descriptor.per_commitment_number, &secp); + let witness_script = htlc_descriptor.witness_script(&per_commitment_point, &secp); + htlc_tx.input[htlc_input_idx].witness = htlc_descriptor.tx_input_witness(&our_sig, &witness_script); + } + let fee_utxo_sig = { + let witness_script = Script::new_p2pkh(&public_key.pubkey_hash()); + let sighash = hash_to_message!(&SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash( + 0, &witness_script, coinbase_tx.output[0].value, EcdsaSighashType::All + ).unwrap()[..]); + let sig = sign(&secp, &sighash, &secret_key); + let mut sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec(); + sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8); + sig + }; + htlc_tx.input[0].witness = Witness::from_vec(vec![fee_utxo_sig, public_key.to_bytes()]); + check_spends!(htlc_tx, coinbase_tx, revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b); + htlc_tx + }; + + for node in &nodes { + mine_transaction(node, &htlc_tx); + } + + // Alice should see that Bob is trying to claim to HTLCs, so she should now try to claim them at + // the second level instead. + let revoked_claims = { + let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); + assert_eq!(txn.len(), 4); + + let revoked_to_self_claim_a = txn.iter().find(|tx| + tx.input.len() == 1 && + tx.output.len() == 1 && + tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_commitment_a.txid() + ).unwrap(); + check_spends!(revoked_to_self_claim_a, revoked_commitment_a); + + let revoked_to_self_claim_b = txn.iter().find(|tx| + tx.input.len() == 1 && + tx.output.len() == 1 && + tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_commitment_b.txid() + ).unwrap(); + check_spends!(revoked_to_self_claim_b, revoked_commitment_b); + + let revoked_htlc_claims = txn.iter().filter(|tx| + tx.input.len() == 2 && + tx.output.len() == 1 && + tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == htlc_tx.txid() + ).collect::>(); + assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claims.len(), 2); + for revoked_htlc_claim in revoked_htlc_claims { + check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim, htlc_tx); + } + + txn + }; + for node in &nodes { + mine_transactions(node, &revoked_claims.iter().collect::>()); + } + + + // Connect one block to make sure the HTLC events are not yielded while ANTI_REORG_DELAY has not + // been reached. + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1); + connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1); + + assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); + assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); + + // Connect the remaining blocks to reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY. + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2); + connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2); + + assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); + let spendable_output_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(spendable_output_events.len(), 4); + for (idx, event) in spendable_output_events.iter().enumerate() { + if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = event { + assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1); + let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs( + &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Script::new_op_return(&[]), 253, &Secp256k1::new(), + ).unwrap(); + check_spends!(spend_tx, revoked_claims[idx]); + } else { + panic!("unexpected event"); + } + } + + assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty()); + assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty()); + assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).is_empty()); + // TODO: From Bob's PoV, he still thinks he can claim the outputs from his revoked commitment. + // This needs to be fixed before we enable pruning `ChannelMonitor`s once they don't have any + // balances to claim. + // + // The 6 claimable balances correspond to his `to_self` outputs and the 2 HTLC outputs in each + // revoked commitment which Bob has the preimage for. + assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 6); }