X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fln%2Fmonitor_tests.rs;h=4f36b9a88810aa5122c3347953028c6b31943a87;hb=28c9b56113ff1ebb1b505a2c979c55c1626aa06b;hp=08cd2306de865970d70afa8bc72b85b4d0909ac6;hpb=6ce7f3e1cecb2b9393d89cac495776f82e975a36;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs index 08cd2306..4f36b9a8 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs @@ -11,20 +11,16 @@ use chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, Balance}; use chain::transaction::OutPoint; -use ln::{channel, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash}; +use ln::channel; use ln::channelmanager::BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT; use ln::features::InitFeatures; -use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, ErrorAction}; -use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason}; -use routing::network_graph::NetworkUpdate; -use routing::router::get_route; - -use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256; -use bitcoin::hashes::Hash; +use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler; +use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination}; use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder; use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes; use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1; +use bitcoin::Transaction; use prelude::*; @@ -78,7 +74,7 @@ fn chanmon_fail_from_stale_commitment() { assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); - expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]); + expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_id_2 }]); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); @@ -87,6 +83,66 @@ fn chanmon_fail_from_stale_commitment() { expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, update_a.contents.short_channel_id, true); } +fn test_spendable_output<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, spendable_tx: &Transaction) { + let mut spendable = node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(spendable.len(), 1); + if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = spendable.pop().unwrap() { + assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1); + let spend_tx = node.keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), + Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap(); + check_spends!(spend_tx, spendable_tx); + } else { panic!(); } +} + +#[test] +fn revoked_output_htlc_resolution_timing() { + // Tests that HTLCs which were present in a broadcasted remote revoked commitment transaction + // are resolved only after a spend of the HTLC output reaches six confirmations. Preivously + // they would resolve after the revoked commitment transaction itself reaches six + // confirmations. + let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); + let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); + let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]); + let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); + + let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()); + + let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1; + + // Get a commitment transaction which contains the HTLC we care about, but which we'll revoke + // before forwarding. + let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2); + assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); + + // Route a dust payment to revoke the above commitment transaction + route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000); + + // Confirm the revoked commitment transaction, closing the channel. + mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed); + check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true); + + let bs_spend_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); + assert_eq!(bs_spend_txn.len(), 2); + check_spends!(bs_spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); + check_spends!(bs_spend_txn[1], chan.3); + + // After the commitment transaction confirms, we should still wait on the HTLC spend + // transaction to confirm before resolving the HTLC. + connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); + assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); + assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); + + // Spend the HTLC output, generating a HTLC failure event after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations. + mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_spend_txn[0]); + assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); + assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); + + connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); + expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, true); +} + #[test] fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() { // Tests `get_claimable_balances` returns the correct values across a simple cooperative claim. @@ -104,15 +160,16 @@ fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() { assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id); let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64; + let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id); assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT / 1000 + claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 }], - nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000, }], - nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); - nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id).unwrap(); + nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &node_0_shutdown); let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); @@ -141,41 +198,27 @@ fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() { assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT / 1000, + claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000, confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, }], - nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { claimable_amount_satoshis: 1000, confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, }], - nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); assert_eq!(Vec::::new(), - nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); assert_eq!(Vec::::new(), - nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); - let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events(); - assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1); - if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() { - assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1); - let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), - Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap(); - check_spends!(spend_tx, shutdown_tx[0]); - } + test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]); + test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]); - let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events(); - assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1); - if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() { - assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1); - let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), - Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap(); - check_spends!(spend_tx, shutdown_tx[0]); - } check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure); check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure); } @@ -207,7 +250,7 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id); // This HTLC is immediately claimed, giving node B the preimage - let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0; + let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000); // This HTLC is allowed to time out, letting A claim it. However, in order to test claimable // balances more fully we also give B the preimage for this HTLC. let (timeout_payment_preimage, timeout_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 4_000_000); @@ -217,13 +260,14 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64; + let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id); let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id); // Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats // as claimable. A lists both its to-self balance and the (possibly-claimable) HTLCs. assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate * - (channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, + (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000, claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, @@ -231,26 +275,31 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, }]), - sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000, }], - nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000); + let b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); // We claim the dust payment here as well, but it won't impact our claimable balances as its // dust and thus doesn't appear on chain at all. nodes[1].node.claim_funds(dust_payment_preimage); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], dust_payment_hash, 3_000); + nodes[1].node.claim_funds(timeout_payment_preimage); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, 4_000_000); if prev_commitment_tx { // To build a previous commitment transaction, deliver one round of commitment messages. nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]); - expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage); + expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage); nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.commitment_signed); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let (as_raa, as_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); @@ -271,7 +320,7 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { 1_000 - // The push_msat value in satoshis 3 - // The dust HTLC value in satoshis // The commitment transaction fee with two HTLC outputs: - chan_feerate * (channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + + chan_feerate * (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + if prev_commitment_tx { 1 } else { 2 } * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { @@ -285,11 +334,11 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { }); } assert_eq!(sorted_vec(a_expected_balances), - sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000 + 3_000 + 4_000, }], - nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); // Broadcast the closing transaction (which has both pending HTLCs in it) and get B's // broadcasted HTLC claim transaction with preimage. @@ -334,7 +383,7 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate * - (channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, + (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000, @@ -343,7 +392,7 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, }]), - sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); // The main non-HTLC balance is just awaiting confirmations, but the claimable height is the // CSV delay, not ANTI_REORG_DELAY. assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { @@ -359,7 +408,7 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, }]), - sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_payment_hash, true); @@ -374,7 +423,7 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, }]), - sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000, confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable, @@ -385,23 +434,17 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, }]), - sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); - - let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events(); - assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1); - if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() { - assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1); - let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), - Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap(); - check_spends!(spend_tx, remote_txn[0]); - } + sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]); assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); // After broadcasting the HTLC claim transaction, node A will still consider the HTLC // possibly-claimable up to ANTI_REORG_DELAY, at which point it will drop it. mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &b_broadcast_txn[0]); - if !prev_commitment_tx { + if prev_commitment_tx { + expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]); + } else { expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage); } assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { @@ -411,13 +454,13 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, }]), - sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); assert_eq!(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, }], - nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); // When the HTLC timeout output is spendable in the next block, A should broadcast it connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1); @@ -442,22 +485,15 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, }], - nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will generate a SpendableOutputs event and drop the claimable // balance entry. connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); assert_eq!(Vec::::new(), - nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], timeout_payment_hash, true); - let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events(); - assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1); - if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() { - assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1); - let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), - Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap(); - check_spends!(spend_tx, a_broadcast_txn[2]); - } else { panic!(); } + test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[2]); // Node B will no longer consider the HTLC "contentious" after the HTLC claim transaction // confirms, and consider it simply "awaiting confirmations". Note that it has to wait for the @@ -475,20 +511,12 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, }]), - sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); // After reaching the commitment output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutputs event for it and have // only the HTLCs claimable on node B. connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_commitment_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1); - - let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events(); - assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1); - if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() { - assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1); - let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), - Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap(); - check_spends!(spend_tx, remote_txn[0]); - } + test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]); assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000, @@ -497,26 +525,18 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, }]), - sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); // After reaching the claimed HTLC output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutptus event for it and // have only one HTLC output left spendable. connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_htlc_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1); - - let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events(); - assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1); - if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() { - assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1); - let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), - Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap(); - check_spends!(spend_tx, b_broadcast_txn[0]); - } else { panic!(); } + test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]); assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ContentiousClaimable { claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, }], - nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); // Finally, mine the HTLC timeout transaction that A broadcasted (even though B should be able // to claim this HTLC with the preimage it knows!). It will remain listed as a claimable HTLC @@ -526,10 +546,10 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, }], - nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); assert_eq!(Vec::::new(), - nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); } #[test] @@ -537,3 +557,180 @@ fn test_claim_value_force_close() { do_test_claim_value_force_close(true); do_test_claim_value_force_close(false); } + +#[test] +fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() { + // Previously, when handling the broadcast of a local commitment transactions (with associated + // CSV delays prior to spendability), we incorrectly handled the CSV delays on HTLC + // transactions. This caused us to miss spendable outputs for HTLCs which were awaiting a CSV + // delay prior to spendability. + // + // Further, because of this, we could hit an assertion as `get_claimable_balances` asserted + // that HTLCs were resolved after the funding spend was resolved, which was not true if the + // HTLC did not have a CSV delay attached (due to the above bug or due to it being an HTLC + // claim by our counterparty). + let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); + let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); + let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]); + let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); + + // Create a single channel with two pending HTLCs from nodes[0] to nodes[1], one which nodes[1] + // knows the preimage for, one which it does not. + let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()); + let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 }; + + let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000_000); + let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety + nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + + let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]); + commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false); + + expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]); + expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000_000); + + let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 20_000_000); + nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + + let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]); + commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false); + + expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]); + expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 20_000_000); + nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2); + get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000_000); + + let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64; + let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id); + + // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transactions + let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id); + assert_eq!(as_txn.len(), 3); + check_spends!(as_txn[1], as_txn[0]); + check_spends!(as_txn[2], as_txn[0]); + check_spends!(as_txn[0], funding_tx); + + // First confirm the commitment transaction on nodes[0], which should leave us with three + // claimable balances. + let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32; + mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true); + check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed); + + assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate * + (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, + confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable, + }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000, + claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000, + claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }]), + sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + + // Get nodes[1]'s HTLC claim tx for the second HTLC + mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true); + check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed); + let bs_htlc_claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); + assert_eq!(bs_htlc_claim_txn.len(), 3); + check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[0], as_txn[0]); + check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[1], funding_tx); + check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[2], bs_htlc_claim_txn[1]); + + // Connect blocks until the HTLCs expire, allowing us to (validly) broadcast the HTLC-Timeout + // transaction. + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); + assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate * + (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, + confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable, + }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000, + claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000, + claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }]), + sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + assert_eq!(as_txn[1].lock_time, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1); // as_txn[1] can be included in the next block + + // Now confirm nodes[0]'s HTLC-Timeout transaction, which changes the claimable balance to an + // "awaiting confirmations" one. + let node_a_htlc_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32; + mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[1]); + // Note that prior to the fix in the commit which introduced this test, this (and the next + // balance) check failed. With this check removed, the code panicked in the `connect_blocks` + // call, as described, two hunks down. + assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate * + (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, + confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable, + }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000, + confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable, + }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000, + claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }]), + sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + + // Now confirm nodes[1]'s HTLC claim, giving nodes[0] the preimage. Note that the "maybe + // claimable" balance remains until we see ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks. + mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_claim_txn[0]); + expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2); + assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate * + (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, + confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable, + }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000, + confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable, + }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000, + claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }]), + sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + + // Finally make the HTLC transactions have ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks. This call previously + // panicked as described in the test introduction. This will remove the "maybe claimable" + // spendable output as nodes[1] has fully claimed the second HTLC. + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); + expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true); + + assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate * + (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, + confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable, + }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000, + confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable, + }]), + sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + + // Connect blocks until the commitment transaction's CSV expires, providing us the relevant + // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry. + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1); + assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000, + confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable, + }], + nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]); + + // Connect blocks until the HTLC-Timeout's CSV expires, providing us the relevant + // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry. + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_htlc_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1); + assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty()); + test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[1]); +}