X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fln%2Fmonitor_tests.rs;h=4f36b9a88810aa5122c3347953028c6b31943a87;hb=28c9b56113ff1ebb1b505a2c979c55c1626aa06b;hp=492a65537701750f7a97c56ac6cb287da395aac0;hpb=8e5cf757717398bb8a3dd83dd751c8065ac5aebe;p=rust-lightning

diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs
index 492a6553..4f36b9a8 100644
--- a/lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ use ln::channel;
 use ln::channelmanager::BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
-use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
+use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
 
 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ fn chanmon_fail_from_stale_commitment() {
 	assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 
 	connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
-	expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+	expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_id_2 }]);
 	check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 	let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 
@@ -94,6 +94,55 @@ fn test_spendable_output<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, spendable_t
 	} else { panic!(); }
 }
 
+#[test]
+fn revoked_output_htlc_resolution_timing() {
+	// Tests that HTLCs which were present in a broadcasted remote revoked commitment transaction
+	// are resolved only after a spend of the HTLC output reaches six confirmations. Preivously
+	// they would resolve after the revoked commitment transaction itself reaches six
+	// confirmations.
+	let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+	let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+	let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+	let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+	let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
+
+	let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
+
+	// Get a commitment transaction which contains the HTLC we care about, but which we'll revoke
+	// before forwarding.
+	let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
+	assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
+
+	// Route a dust payment to revoke the above commitment transaction
+	route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000);
+
+	// Confirm the revoked commitment transaction, closing the channel.
+	mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
+	check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+	check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
+	check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
+
+	let bs_spend_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+	assert_eq!(bs_spend_txn.len(), 2);
+	check_spends!(bs_spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
+	check_spends!(bs_spend_txn[1], chan.3);
+
+	// After the commitment transaction confirms, we should still wait on the HTLC spend
+	// transaction to confirm before resolving the HTLC.
+	connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+	assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+	assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+
+	// Spend the HTLC output, generating a HTLC failure event after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
+	mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_spend_txn[0]);
+	assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+	assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+
+	connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+	expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, true);
+}
+
 #[test]
 fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() {
 	// Tests `get_claimable_balances` returns the correct values across a simple cooperative claim.