X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fln%2Fmonitor_tests.rs;h=575d7d6b18e66d7a9aec6f47ec1b9eac2b372f2a;hb=c9de6503dd6e72d637f15237d4c7e821da672895;hp=80119b55787c7e75b67d791415e55dba9fb7a18d;hpb=c2bbfffb1eb249c2c422cf2e9ccac97a34275f7a;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs index 80119b55..575d7d6b 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs @@ -9,17 +9,17 @@ //! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations. -use crate::sign::{ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner, SpendableOutputDescriptor}; +use crate::sign::{ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner, OutputSpender, SpendableOutputDescriptor}; use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, Balance}; use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint; use crate::chain::chaininterface::{LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight}; use crate::events::bump_transaction::{BumpTransactionEvent, WalletSource}; use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination}; use crate::ln::channel; +use crate::ln::types::ChannelId; use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields}; use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler; -use crate::util::config::UserConfig; -use crate::util::crypto::sign; +use crate::crypto::utils::sign; use crate::util::ser::Writeable; use crate::util::scid_utils::block_from_scid; use crate::util::test_utils; @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes; use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex; use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, SecretKey}; use bitcoin::sighash::{SighashCache, EcdsaSighashType}; +use bitcoin::transaction::Version; use crate::prelude::*; @@ -158,6 +159,60 @@ fn revoked_output_htlc_resolution_timing() { expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, false); } +#[test] +fn archive_fully_resolved_monitors() { + // Test we can archive fully resolved channel monitor. + let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); + let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); + let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config(); + let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]); + let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); + + let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = + create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000); + + nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); + let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown); + let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown); + + let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed); + let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed); + let (_, node_0_2nd_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed.unwrap()); + let (_, _) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + + let shutdown_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); + + mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]); + mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]); + + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6); + connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6); + + check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000); + check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000); + + assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors().len(), 1); + // First archive should set balances_empty_height to current block height + nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.archive_fully_resolved_channel_monitors(); + assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors().len(), 1); + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4032); + // Second call after 4032 blocks, should archive the monitor + nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.archive_fully_resolved_channel_monitors(); + // Should have no monitors left + assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors().len(), 0); + // Remove the corresponding outputs and transactions the chain source is + // watching. This is to make sure the `Drop` function assertions pass. + nodes.get_mut(0).unwrap().chain_source.remove_watched_txn_and_outputs( + OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 }, + funding_tx.output[0].script_pubkey.clone() + ); +} + fn do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(anchors: bool) { // Tests `get_claimable_balances` returns the correct values across a simple cooperative claim. // Specifically, this tests that the channel non-HTLC balances show up in @@ -176,7 +231,7 @@ fn do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(anchors: bool) { let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000); let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 }; - assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id); + assert_eq!(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint), chan_id); let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64; let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id); @@ -209,8 +264,8 @@ fn do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(anchors: bool) { assert_eq!(shutdown_tx, nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0)); assert_eq!(shutdown_tx.len(), 1); - let shutdown_tx_conf_height_a = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0])); - let shutdown_tx_conf_height_b = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0])); + let shutdown_tx_conf_height_a = block_from_scid(mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0])); + let shutdown_tx_conf_height_b = block_from_scid(mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0])); assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty()); assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty()); @@ -257,8 +312,8 @@ fn do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(anchors: bool) { spendable_outputs_b ); - check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000); - check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000); + check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000); + check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000); } #[test] @@ -305,16 +360,16 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(anchors: bool, prev_commitment_tx: bool) { let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); let coinbase_tx = Transaction { - version: 2, + version: Version::TWO, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }], output: vec![ TxOut { - value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(), + value: Amount::ONE_BTC, script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(), }, TxOut { - value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(), + value: Amount::ONE_BTC, script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(), }, ], @@ -327,7 +382,7 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(anchors: bool, prev_commitment_tx: bool) { let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000); let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 }; - assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id); + assert_eq!(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint), chan_id); // This HTLC is immediately claimed, giving node B the preimage let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000); @@ -481,8 +536,8 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(anchors: bool, prev_commitment_tx: bool) { check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0], coinbase_tx); assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 }); assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 }); - assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000); - assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000); + assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value.to_sat(), 3_000); + assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value.to_sat(), 4_000); assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty()); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true); @@ -561,8 +616,8 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(anchors: bool, prev_commitment_tx: bool) { assert_ne!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout); // a_broadcast_txn [0] and [1] should spend the HTLC outputs of the commitment tx - assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000); - assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000); + assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value.to_sat(), 3_000); + assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value.to_sat(), 4_000); // Once the HTLC-Timeout transaction confirms, A will no longer consider the HTLC // "MaybeClaimable", but instead move it to "AwaitingConfirmations". @@ -666,16 +721,16 @@ fn do_test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs(anchors: bool) { let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); let coinbase_tx = Transaction { - version: 2, + version: Version::TWO, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }], output: vec![ TxOut { - value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(), + value: Amount::ONE_BTC, script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(), }, TxOut { - value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(), + value: Amount::ONE_BTC, script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(), }, ], @@ -736,8 +791,8 @@ fn do_test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs(anchors: bool) { check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx); commitment_tx }; - let commitment_tx_conf_height_a = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx)); - if anchors && nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { + let commitment_tx_conf_height_a = block_from_scid(mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx)); + if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast(); assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1); assert_eq!(txn[0].txid(), commitment_tx.txid()); @@ -1121,7 +1176,7 @@ fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(anchors: bool, confirm_htlc_ let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000); let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 }; - assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id); + assert_eq!(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint), chan_id); // We create five HTLCs for B to claim against A's revoked commitment transaction: // @@ -1188,14 +1243,14 @@ fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(anchors: bool, confirm_htlc_ assert!(failed_payments.is_empty()); if let Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = events[0] {} else { panic!(); } match &events[1] { - Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, .. } => {}, + Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut, .. } => {}, _ => panic!(), } connect_blocks(&nodes[1], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); - check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000); + check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000); // Prior to channel closure, B considers the preimage HTLC as its own, and otherwise only // lists the two on-chain timeout-able HTLCs as claimable balances. @@ -1221,7 +1276,7 @@ fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(anchors: bool, confirm_htlc_ // Currently the revoked commitment is claimed in four transactions as the HTLCs all expire // quite soon. assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 4); - claim_txn.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::()); + claim_txn.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value.to_sat()).sum::()); // The following constants were determined experimentally const BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: u64 = 483; @@ -1380,16 +1435,16 @@ fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances(anchors: bool) { let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); let coinbase_tx = Transaction { - version: 2, + version: Version::TWO, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }], output: vec![ TxOut { - value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(), + value: Amount::ONE_BTC, script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(), }, TxOut { - value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(), + value: Amount::ONE_BTC, script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(), }, ], @@ -1403,7 +1458,7 @@ fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances(anchors: bool) { let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 12_000_000); let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 }; - assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id); + assert_eq!(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint), chan_id); let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0; let failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1; @@ -1411,9 +1466,9 @@ fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances(anchors: bool) { assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1); assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid()); if anchors { - assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[4].value, 11000); // to_self output + assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[4].value.to_sat(), 11000); // to_self output } else { - assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[2].value, 11000); // to_self output + assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[2].value.to_sat(), 11000); // to_self output } // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have two HTLCs, an output for each side, and an @@ -1535,10 +1590,10 @@ fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances(anchors: bool) { if anchors { // With anchors, B can pay for revoked_htlc_success's fee with additional inputs, rather // than with the HTLC itself. - fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value, + fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value.to_sat(), 3_000 - as_revoked_htlc_success_claim_fee); } else { - fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value, + fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value.to_sat(), 3_000 - revoked_htlc_success_fee - as_revoked_htlc_success_claim_fee); } @@ -1553,7 +1608,7 @@ fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances(anchors: bool) { }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2 amount_satoshis: 1_000, }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { - amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value, + amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value.to_sat(), confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, }]), sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); @@ -1566,7 +1621,7 @@ fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances(anchors: bool) { }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2 amount_satoshis: 1_000, }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { - amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value, + amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value.to_sat(), confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 2, }]), sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); @@ -1635,7 +1690,7 @@ fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances(anchors: bool) { // to_self output in B's revoked commitment amount_satoshis: 11_000, }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { - amount_satoshis: revoked_htlc_timeout_claim.output[0].value, + amount_satoshis: revoked_htlc_timeout_claim.output[0].value.to_sat(), confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, }]), sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); @@ -1643,10 +1698,10 @@ fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances(anchors: bool) { mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_to_self_claim); assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { // to_self output in B's revoked commitment - amount_satoshis: revoked_to_self_claim.output[0].value, + amount_satoshis: revoked_to_self_claim.output[0].value.to_sat(), confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { - amount_satoshis: revoked_htlc_timeout_claim.output[0].value, + amount_satoshis: revoked_htlc_timeout_claim.output[0].value.to_sat(), confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2, }]), sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); @@ -1692,11 +1747,11 @@ fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims(anchors: bool) { let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); let coinbase_tx = Transaction { - version: 2, + version: Version::TWO, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }], output: vec![TxOut { - value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(), + value: Amount::ONE_BTC, script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(), }], }; @@ -1705,7 +1760,7 @@ fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims(anchors: bool) { let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000); let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 }; - assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id); + assert_eq!(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint), chan_id); // We create two HTLCs, one which we will give A the preimage to to generate an HTLC-Success // transaction, and one which we will not, allowing B to claim the HTLC output in an aggregated @@ -1889,7 +1944,7 @@ fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims(anchors: bool) { }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1 amount_satoshis: 4_000, }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { // HTLC 2 - amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[0].output[0].value, + amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[0].output[0].value.to_sat(), confirmation_height: htlc_2_claim_maturity, }]), sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); @@ -1914,16 +1969,16 @@ fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims(anchors: bool) { if anchors { assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { - amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[1].output[0].value, + amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[1].output[0].value.to_sat(), confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity, }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { - amount_satoshis: revoked_to_self_claim.as_ref().unwrap().output[0].value, + amount_satoshis: revoked_to_self_claim.as_ref().unwrap().output[0].value.to_sat(), confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity, }], nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); } else { assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { - amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[1].output[0].value, + amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[1].output[0].value.to_sat(), confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity, }], nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); @@ -1998,6 +2053,11 @@ fn do_test_restored_packages_retry(check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade: bool }; mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx); + if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { + let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast(); + assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(txn[0].txid(), commitment_tx.txid()); + } // Connect blocks until the HTLC's expiration is met, expecting a transaction broadcast. connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); @@ -2076,11 +2136,11 @@ fn do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(anchors: bool) { check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1); let coinbase_tx = Transaction { - version: 2, + version: Version::TWO, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }], output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx` on anchors - value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(), + value: Amount::ONE_BTC, script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(), }], }; @@ -2105,8 +2165,8 @@ fn do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(anchors: bool) { assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1); let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap(); check_spends!(&htlc_tx, &commitment_txn[0], &coinbase_tx); - let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT + coinbase_tx.output[0].value - - htlc_tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::(); + let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT + coinbase_tx.output[0].value.to_sat() - + htlc_tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value.to_sat()).sum::(); let htlc_tx_weight = htlc_tx.weight().to_wu(); (htlc_tx, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(htlc_tx_fee, htlc_tx_weight)) } @@ -2121,7 +2181,7 @@ fn do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(anchors: bool) { } let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap(); check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_txn[0]); - let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT - htlc_tx.output[0].value; + let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT - htlc_tx.output[0].value.to_sat(); let htlc_tx_weight = htlc_tx.weight().to_wu(); (htlc_tx, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(htlc_tx_fee, htlc_tx_weight)) }; @@ -2190,7 +2250,7 @@ fn test_yield_anchors_events() { // emitted by LDK, such that the consumer can attach fees to the zero fee HTLC transactions. let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); - let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default(); + let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config(); anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true; anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true; anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true; @@ -2232,11 +2292,11 @@ fn test_yield_anchors_events() { let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = match holder_events.pop().unwrap() { Event::BumpTransaction(event) => { let coinbase_tx = Transaction { - version: 2, + version: Version::TWO, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }], output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx` - value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(), + value: Amount::ONE_BTC, script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(), }], }; @@ -2253,8 +2313,8 @@ fn test_yield_anchors_events() { _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), }; - assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output[2].value, 1_000); // HTLC A -> B - assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output[3].value, 2_000); // HTLC B -> A + assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output[2].value.to_sat(), 1_000); // HTLC A -> B + assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output[3].value.to_sat(), 2_000); // HTLC B -> A mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); @@ -2341,7 +2401,7 @@ fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() { let bob_persister; let bob_chain_monitor; - let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default(); + let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config(); anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true; anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true; anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true; @@ -2401,31 +2461,17 @@ fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() { nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred(); check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 2); check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 2, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 1000000); - let (revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b) = { - let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast(); - assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2); - assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs - assert_eq!(txn[1].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs - if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == chan_a.3.txid() { - check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_a.3); - check_spends!(&txn[1], &chan_b.3); - (txn[0].clone(), txn[1].clone()) - } else { - check_spends!(&txn[1], &chan_a.3); - check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_b.3); - (txn[1].clone(), txn[0].clone()) - } - }; // Bob should now receive two events to bump his revoked commitment transaction fees. assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); let events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 2); + let mut revoked_commitment_txs = Vec::with_capacity(events.len()); let mut anchor_txs = Vec::with_capacity(events.len()); for (idx, event) in events.into_iter().enumerate() { - let utxo_value = Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat() * (idx + 1) as u64; + let utxo_value = Amount::ONE_BTC * (idx + 1) as u64; let coinbase_tx = Transaction { - version: 2, + version: Version::TWO, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }], output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx` @@ -2440,13 +2486,21 @@ fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() { }; let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast(); assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2); + assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs + if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == chan_a.3.txid() { + check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_a.3); + } else { + check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_b.3); + } let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = (&txn[0], &txn[1]); check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, commitment_tx); + + revoked_commitment_txs.push(commitment_tx.clone()); anchor_txs.push(anchor_tx.clone()); }; for node in &nodes { - mine_transactions(node, &[&revoked_commitment_a, &anchor_txs[0], &revoked_commitment_b, &anchor_txs[1]]); + mine_transactions(node, &[&revoked_commitment_txs[0], &anchor_txs[0], &revoked_commitment_txs[1], &anchor_txs[1]]); } check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 2); check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 2, true); @@ -2458,7 +2512,7 @@ fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() { let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); assert_eq!(txn.len(), 4); - let (revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_htlc_claim_b) = if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_commitment_a.txid() { + let (revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_htlc_claim_b) = if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_commitment_txs[0].txid() { (if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] }, if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] }) } else { (if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] }, if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] }) @@ -2466,10 +2520,10 @@ fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() { assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.output.len(), 1); - check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_commitment_a); + check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_commitment_txs[0]); assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.output.len(), 1); - check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_b, revoked_commitment_b); + check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_b, revoked_commitment_txs[1]); } // Since Bob was able to confirm his revoked commitment, he'll now try to claim the HTLCs @@ -2492,18 +2546,18 @@ fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() { let htlc_tx = { let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(); let public_key = PublicKey::new(secret_key.public_key(&secp)); - let fee_utxo_script = ScriptBuf::new_v0_p2wpkh(&public_key.wpubkey_hash().unwrap()); + let fee_utxo_script = ScriptBuf::new_p2wpkh(&public_key.wpubkey_hash().unwrap()); let coinbase_tx = Transaction { - version: 2, + version: Version::TWO, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }], output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx` - value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(), + value: Amount::ONE_BTC, script_pubkey: fee_utxo_script.clone(), }], }; let mut htlc_tx = Transaction { - version: 2, + version: Version::TWO, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: vec![TxIn { // Fee input previous_output: bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, @@ -2540,7 +2594,7 @@ fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() { } let fee_utxo_sig = { let witness_script = ScriptBuf::new_p2pkh(&public_key.pubkey_hash()); - let sighash = hash_to_message!(&SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash( + let sighash = hash_to_message!(&SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).p2wsh_signature_hash( 0, &witness_script, coinbase_tx.output[0].value, EcdsaSighashType::All ).unwrap()[..]); let sig = sign(&secp, &sighash, &secret_key); @@ -2549,7 +2603,7 @@ fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() { sig }; htlc_tx.input[0].witness = Witness::from_slice(&[fee_utxo_sig, public_key.to_bytes()]); - check_spends!(htlc_tx, coinbase_tx, revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b); + check_spends!(htlc_tx, coinbase_tx, revoked_commitment_txs[0], revoked_commitment_txs[1]); htlc_tx }; @@ -2573,7 +2627,7 @@ fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() { check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim, htlc_tx); } - let mut revoked_claim_transaction_map = HashMap::new(); + let mut revoked_claim_transaction_map = new_hash_map(); for current_tx in txn.into_iter() { revoked_claim_transaction_map.insert(current_tx.txid(), current_tx); } @@ -2608,7 +2662,7 @@ fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() { ).unwrap(); if let SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(_) = &outputs[0] { - check_spends!(spend_tx, &revoked_commitment_a, &revoked_commitment_b); + check_spends!(spend_tx, &revoked_commitment_txs[0], &revoked_commitment_txs[1]); } else { check_spends!(spend_tx, revoked_claim_transactions.get(&spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid).unwrap()); } @@ -2650,7 +2704,7 @@ fn do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(confirm_c let secp = Secp256k1::new(); let privkey = bitcoin::PrivateKey::from_slice(&[1; 32], bitcoin::Network::Testnet).unwrap(); let pubkey = bitcoin::PublicKey::from_private_key(&secp, &privkey); - let p2wpkh_script = ScriptBuf::new_v0_p2wpkh(&pubkey.wpubkey_hash().unwrap()); + let p2wpkh_script = ScriptBuf::new_p2wpkh(&pubkey.wpubkey_hash().unwrap()); get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).set_counterparty_payment_script(p2wpkh_script.clone()); assert_eq!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_counterparty_payment_script(), p2wpkh_script); @@ -2675,21 +2729,21 @@ fn do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(confirm_c // We should expect our round trip serialization check to fail as we're writing the monitor // with the incorrect P2WPKH script but reading it with the correct P2WSH script. *nodes[1].chain_monitor.expect_monitor_round_trip_fail.lock().unwrap() = Some(chan_id); - let commitment_tx_conf_height = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx)); + let commitment_tx_conf_height = block_from_scid(mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx)); let serialized_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).encode(); reload_node!(nodes[1], user_config, &nodes[1].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, chain_monitor, node_deserialized); commitment_tx_conf_height } else { let serialized_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).encode(); reload_node!(nodes[1], user_config, &nodes[1].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, chain_monitor, node_deserialized); - let commitment_tx_conf_height = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx)); + let commitment_tx_conf_height = block_from_scid(mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx)); check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1); check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true); commitment_tx_conf_height }; check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000); - assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_counterparty_payment_script().is_v0_p2wsh()); + assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_counterparty_payment_script().is_p2wsh()); connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); @@ -2732,12 +2786,12 @@ fn do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(anchors: bool, confirm_counterp let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); let coinbase_tx = Transaction { - version: 2, + version: Version::TWO, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }], output: vec![ TxOut { - value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(), + value: Amount::ONE_BTC, script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(), }, ], @@ -2756,7 +2810,9 @@ fn do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(anchors: bool, confirm_counterp (&nodes[0], &nodes[1]) }; - closing_node.node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &other_node.node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); + get_monitor!(closing_node, chan_id).broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn( + &closing_node.tx_broadcaster, &closing_node.fee_estimator, &closing_node.logger + ); // The commitment transaction comes first. let commitment_tx = { @@ -2769,7 +2825,7 @@ fn do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(anchors: bool, confirm_counterp mine_transaction(closing_node, &commitment_tx); check_added_monitors!(closing_node, 1); check_closed_broadcast!(closing_node, true); - check_closed_event!(closing_node, 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [other_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000); + check_closed_event!(closing_node, 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [other_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000); mine_transaction(other_node, &commitment_tx); check_added_monitors!(other_node, 1); @@ -2778,7 +2834,7 @@ fn do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(anchors: bool, confirm_counterp // If we update the best block to the new height before providing the confirmed transactions, // we'll see another broadcast of the commitment transaction. - if anchors && !confirm_counterparty_commitment && nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { + if !confirm_counterparty_commitment && nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { let _ = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast(); } @@ -2796,11 +2852,7 @@ fn do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(anchors: bool, confirm_counterp let htlc_timeout_tx = { let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast(); assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1); - let tx = if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == commitment_tx.txid() { - txn[0].clone() - } else { - txn[1].clone() - }; + let tx = txn.pop().unwrap(); check_spends!(tx, commitment_tx, coinbase_tx); tx }; @@ -2826,3 +2878,42 @@ fn test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures() { do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(true, false); do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(true, true); } + +#[test] +fn test_event_replay_causing_monitor_replay() { + // In LDK 0.0.121 there was a bug where if a `PaymentSent` event caused an RAA + // `ChannelMonitorUpdate` hold and then the node was restarted after the `PaymentSent` event + // and `ChannelMonitorUpdate` both completed but without persisting the `ChannelManager` we'd + // replay the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` on restart (which is fine, but triggered a safety panic). + let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); + let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); + let persister; + let new_chain_monitor; + let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]); + let node_deserialized; + let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); + + let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000); + + let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000).0; + + do_claim_payment_along_route( + ClaimAlongRouteArgs::new(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1]]], payment_preimage) + ); + + // At this point the `PaymentSent` event has not been processed but the full commitment signed + // dance has completed. + let serialized_channel_manager = nodes[0].node.encode(); + + // Now process the `PaymentSent` to get the final RAA `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, checking that it + // resulted in a `ChannelManager` persistence request. + nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_needs_persistence(); + expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, true, true /* expected post-event monitor update*/); + assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_needs_persistence()); + + let serialized_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).encode(); + reload_node!(nodes[0], &serialized_channel_manager, &[&serialized_monitor], persister, new_chain_monitor, node_deserialized); + + // Expect the `PaymentSent` to get replayed, this time without the duplicate monitor update + expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false /* expected post-event monitor update*/); +}