X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fln%2Fmonitor_tests.rs;h=6fa0aab9d311fb2ed5f9dff09ac3b487b2298051;hb=996d3d8058f2342b9e23d53f9dd81ae472822120;hp=8fdf28e578b835342c498ba39d4132ec5ab9bd0b;hpb=d4b6f58ba67a40d49a58722a104d2d3ea53a0410;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs index 8fdf28e5..6fa0aab9 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs @@ -9,15 +9,17 @@ //! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations. -use chain::channelmonitor::ANTI_REORG_DELAY; -use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash}; +use chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, Balance}; +use chain::transaction::OutPoint; +use ln::channel; +use ln::channelmanager::BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT; use ln::features::InitFeatures; -use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, HTLCFailChannelUpdate, ErrorAction}; -use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider}; -use routing::router::get_route; +use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler; +use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason}; -use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256; -use bitcoin::hashes::Hash; +use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder; +use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes; +use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1; use prelude::*; @@ -67,6 +69,7 @@ fn chanmon_fail_from_stale_commitment() { mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_txn[0]); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true); + check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed); assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); @@ -76,6 +79,650 @@ fn chanmon_fail_from_stale_commitment() { nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]); commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true); - expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false); - expect_payment_failure_chan_update!(nodes[0], update_a.contents.short_channel_id, true); + expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, update_a.contents.short_channel_id, true); +} + +#[test] +fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() { + // Tests `get_claimable_balances` returns the correct values across a simple cooperative claim. + // Specifically, this tests that the channel non-HTLC balances show up in + // `get_claimable_balances` until the cooperative claims have confirmed and generated a + // `SpendableOutputs` event, and no longer. + let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); + let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); + let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]); + let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); + + let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = + create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()); + let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 }; + assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id); + + let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64; + let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id); + + assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + }], + nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000, }], + nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + + nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id).unwrap(); + let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &node_0_shutdown); + let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &node_1_shutdown); + + let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed); + let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed); + let (_, node_0_2nd_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed.unwrap()); + let (_, node_1_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + assert!(node_1_none.is_none()); + + let shutdown_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); + assert_eq!(shutdown_tx, nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0)); + assert_eq!(shutdown_tx.len(), 1); + + mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]); + mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]); + + assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty()); + assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty()); + + assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); + assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); + + assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000, + confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, + }], + nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 1000, + confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, + }], + nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); + connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); + + assert_eq!(Vec::::new(), + nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + assert_eq!(Vec::::new(), + nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + + let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1); + if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() { + assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1); + let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), + Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap(); + check_spends!(spend_tx, shutdown_tx[0]); + } + + let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1); + if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() { + assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1); + let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), + Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap(); + check_spends!(spend_tx, shutdown_tx[0]); + } + check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure); + check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure); +} + +fn sorted_vec(mut v: Vec) -> Vec { + v.sort_unstable(); + v +} + +fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { + // Tests `get_claimable_balances` with an HTLC across a force-close. + // We build a channel with an HTLC pending, then force close the channel and check that the + // `get_claimable_balances` return value is correct as transactions confirm on-chain. + let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); + if prev_commitment_tx { + // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation + // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation + // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a + // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked. + chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true; + } + let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); + let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]); + let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); + + let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = + create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()); + let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 }; + assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id); + + // This HTLC is immediately claimed, giving node B the preimage + let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0; + // This HTLC is allowed to time out, letting A claim it. However, in order to test claimable + // balances more fully we also give B the preimage for this HTLC. + let (timeout_payment_preimage, timeout_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 4_000_000); + // This HTLC will be dust, and not be claimable at all: + let (dust_payment_preimage, dust_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000); + + let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety + + let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64; + let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id); + + let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id); + // Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats + // as claimable. A lists both its to-self balance and the (possibly-claimable) HTLCs. + assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate * + (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, + }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000, + claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, + claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }]), + sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000, + }], + nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + + nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + let b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + // We claim the dust payment here as well, but it won't impact our claimable balances as its + // dust and thus doesn't appear on chain at all. + nodes[1].node.claim_funds(dust_payment_preimage); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + nodes[1].node.claim_funds(timeout_payment_preimage); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + + if prev_commitment_tx { + // To build a previous commitment transaction, deliver one round of commitment messages. + nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]); + expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage); + nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.commitment_signed); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + let (as_raa, as_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa); + let _htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs); + let _bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + } + + // Once B has received the payment preimage, it includes the value of the HTLC in its + // "claimable if you were to close the channel" balance. + let mut a_expected_balances = vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - // Channel funding value in satoshis + 4_000 - // The to-be-failed HTLC value in satoshis + 3_000 - // The claimed HTLC value in satoshis + 1_000 - // The push_msat value in satoshis + 3 - // The dust HTLC value in satoshis + // The commitment transaction fee with two HTLC outputs: + chan_feerate * (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + + if prev_commitment_tx { 1 } else { 2 } * + channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, + }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, + claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }]; + if !prev_commitment_tx { + a_expected_balances.push(Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000, + claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }); + } + assert_eq!(sorted_vec(a_expected_balances), + sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000 + 3_000 + 4_000, + }], + nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + + // Broadcast the closing transaction (which has both pending HTLCs in it) and get B's + // broadcasted HTLC claim transaction with preimage. + let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32; + mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]); + mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]); + + let b_broadcast_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); + assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn.len(), if prev_commitment_tx { 4 } else { 5 }); + if prev_commitment_tx { + check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[3], b_broadcast_txn[2]); + } else { + assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0], b_broadcast_txn[3]); + assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1], b_broadcast_txn[4]); + } + // b_broadcast_txn[0] should spend the HTLC output of the commitment tx for 3_000 sats + check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); + check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]); + assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000); + assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000); + check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[2], funding_tx); + + assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty()); + check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed); + assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty()); + check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed); + assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); + assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); + + // Once the commitment transaction confirms, we will wait until ANTI_REORG_DELAY until we + // generate any `SpendableOutputs` events. Thus, the same balances will still be listed + // available in `get_claimable_balances`. However, both will swap from `ClaimableOnClose` to + // other Balance variants, as close has already happened. + assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); + assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); + + assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate * + (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, + confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, + }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000, + claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, + claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }]), + sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + // The main non-HTLC balance is just awaiting confirmations, but the claimable height is the + // CSV delay, not ANTI_REORG_DELAY. + assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000, + confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable, + }, + // Both HTLC balances are "contentious" as our counterparty could claim them if we wait too + // long. + Balance::ContentiousClaimable { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000, + timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, + timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }]), + sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); + expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_payment_hash, true); + connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); + + // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will consider its balance fully spendable and generate a + // `SpendableOutputs` event. However, B still has to wait for the CSV delay. + assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000, + claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, + claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }]), + sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000, + confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable, + }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000, + timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, + timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }]), + sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + + let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1); + if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() { + assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1); + let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), + Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap(); + check_spends!(spend_tx, remote_txn[0]); + } + + assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); + + // After broadcasting the HTLC claim transaction, node A will still consider the HTLC + // possibly-claimable up to ANTI_REORG_DELAY, at which point it will drop it. + mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &b_broadcast_txn[0]); + if prev_commitment_tx { + expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]); + } else { + expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage); + } + assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000, + claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, + claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }]), + sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); + assert_eq!(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, + claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }], + nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + + // When the HTLC timeout output is spendable in the next block, A should broadcast it + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1); + let a_broadcast_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); + assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn.len(), 3); + check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[0], funding_tx); + assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1); + check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]); + assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[2].input.len(), 1); + check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[2], remote_txn[0]); + assert_ne!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, + a_broadcast_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout); + // a_broadcast_txn [1] and [2] should spend the HTLC outputs of the commitment tx + assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000); + assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000); + + // Once the HTLC-Timeout transaction confirms, A will no longer consider the HTLC + // "MaybeClaimable", but instead move it to "AwaitingConfirmations". + mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[2]); + assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); + assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, + confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, + }], + nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will generate a SpendableOutputs event and drop the claimable + // balance entry. + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); + assert_eq!(Vec::::new(), + nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], timeout_payment_hash, true); + + let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1); + if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() { + assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1); + let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), + Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap(); + check_spends!(spend_tx, a_broadcast_txn[2]); + } else { panic!(); } + + // Node B will no longer consider the HTLC "contentious" after the HTLC claim transaction + // confirms, and consider it simply "awaiting confirmations". Note that it has to wait for the + // standard revocable transaction CSV delay before receiving a `SpendableOutputs`. + let node_b_htlc_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32; + mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]); + + assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000, + confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable, + }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000, + confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable, + }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, + timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }]), + sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + + // After reaching the commitment output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutputs event for it and have + // only the HTLCs claimable on node B. + connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_commitment_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1); + + let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1); + if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() { + assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1); + let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), + Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap(); + check_spends!(spend_tx, remote_txn[0]); + } + + assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000, + confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable, + }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, + timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }]), + sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + + // After reaching the claimed HTLC output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutptus event for it and + // have only one HTLC output left spendable. + connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_htlc_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1); + + let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1); + if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() { + assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1); + let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), + Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap(); + check_spends!(spend_tx, b_broadcast_txn[0]); + } else { panic!(); } + + assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ContentiousClaimable { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, + timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }], + nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + + // Finally, mine the HTLC timeout transaction that A broadcasted (even though B should be able + // to claim this HTLC with the preimage it knows!). It will remain listed as a claimable HTLC + // until ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations on the spend. + mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &a_broadcast_txn[2]); + assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ContentiousClaimable { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, + timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }], + nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); + assert_eq!(Vec::::new(), + nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); +} + +#[test] +fn test_claim_value_force_close() { + do_test_claim_value_force_close(true); + do_test_claim_value_force_close(false); +} + +#[test] +fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() { + // Previously, when handling the broadcast of a local commitment transactions (with associated + // CSV delays prior to spendability), we incorrectly handled the CSV delays on HTLC + // transactions. This caused us to miss spendable outputs for HTLCs which were awaiting a CSV + // delay prior to spendability. + // + // Further, because of this, we could hit an assertion as `get_claimable_balances` asserted + // that HTLCs were resolved after the funding spend was resolved, which was not true if the + // HTLC did not have a CSV delay attached (due to the above bug or due to it being an HTLC + // claim by our counterparty). + let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); + let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); + let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]); + let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); + + // Create a single channel with two pending HTLCs from nodes[0] to nodes[1], one which nodes[1] + // knows the preimage for, one which it does not. + let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()); + let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 }; + + let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000_000); + let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety + nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + + let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]); + commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false); + + expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]); + expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000_000); + + let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 20_000_000); + nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + + let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]); + commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false); + + expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]); + expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 20_000_000); + assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2)); + get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + + let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64; + let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id); + + // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transactions + let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id); + assert_eq!(as_txn.len(), 3); + check_spends!(as_txn[1], as_txn[0]); + check_spends!(as_txn[2], as_txn[0]); + check_spends!(as_txn[0], funding_tx); + + // First confirm the commitment transaction on nodes[0], which should leave us with three + // claimable balances. + let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32; + mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true); + check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed); + + assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate * + (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, + confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable, + }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000, + claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000, + claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }]), + sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + + // Get nodes[1]'s HTLC claim tx for the second HTLC + mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true); + check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed); + let bs_htlc_claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); + assert_eq!(bs_htlc_claim_txn.len(), 3); + check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[0], as_txn[0]); + check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[1], funding_tx); + check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[2], bs_htlc_claim_txn[1]); + + // Connect blocks until the HTLCs expire, allowing us to (validly) broadcast the HTLC-Timeout + // transaction. + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); + assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate * + (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, + confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable, + }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000, + claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000, + claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }]), + sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + assert_eq!(as_txn[1].lock_time, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1); // as_txn[1] can be included in the next block + + // Now confirm nodes[0]'s HTLC-Timeout transaction, which changes the claimable balance to an + // "awaiting confirmations" one. + let node_a_htlc_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32; + mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[1]); + // Note that prior to the fix in the commit which introduced this test, this (and the next + // balance) check failed. With this check removed, the code panicked in the `connect_blocks` + // call, as described, two hunks down. + assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate * + (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, + confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable, + }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000, + confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable, + }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000, + claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }]), + sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + + // Now confirm nodes[1]'s HTLC claim, giving nodes[0] the preimage. Note that the "maybe + // claimable" balance remains until we see ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks. + mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_claim_txn[0]); + expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2); + assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate * + (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, + confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable, + }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000, + confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable, + }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000, + claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }]), + sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + + // Finally make the HTLC transactions have ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks. This call previously + // panicked as described in the test introduction. This will remove the "maybe claimable" + // spendable output as nodes[1] has fully claimed the second HTLC. + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); + expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true); + + assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate * + (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, + confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable, + }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000, + confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable, + }]), + sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + + // Connect blocks until the commitment transaction's CSV expires, providing us the relevant + // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry. + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1); + assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000, + confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable, + }], + nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1); + if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() { + assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1); + let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), + Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap(); + check_spends!(spend_tx, as_txn[0]); + } + + // Connect blocks until the HTLC-Timeout's CSV expires, providing us the relevant + // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry. + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_htlc_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1); + assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty()); + let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1); + if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() { + assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1); + let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), + Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap(); + check_spends!(spend_tx, as_txn[1]); + } }