X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fln%2Fmonitor_tests.rs;h=6fa0aab9d311fb2ed5f9dff09ac3b487b2298051;hb=c47acd76e8e60b65335a1bd1b9bbb53ddd43e496;hp=08cd2306de865970d70afa8bc72b85b4d0909ac6;hpb=5af0cb28878f7207c7e8f68aaebbcb81559b4660;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs index 08cd2306..6fa0aab9 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs @@ -11,16 +11,11 @@ use chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, Balance}; use chain::transaction::OutPoint; -use ln::{channel, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash}; +use ln::channel; use ln::channelmanager::BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT; use ln::features::InitFeatures; -use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, ErrorAction}; +use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler; use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason}; -use routing::network_graph::NetworkUpdate; -use routing::router::get_route; - -use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256; -use bitcoin::hashes::Hash; use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder; use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes; @@ -104,13 +99,14 @@ fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() { assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id); let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64; + let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id); assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT / 1000 + claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 }], - nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000, }], - nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id).unwrap(); let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); @@ -141,23 +137,23 @@ fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() { assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT / 1000, + claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000, confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, }], - nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { claimable_amount_satoshis: 1000, confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, }], - nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); assert_eq!(Vec::::new(), - nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); assert_eq!(Vec::::new(), - nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1); @@ -217,13 +213,14 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64; + let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id); let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id); // Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats // as claimable. A lists both its to-self balance and the (possibly-claimable) HTLCs. assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate * - (channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, + (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000, claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, @@ -231,11 +228,11 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, }]), - sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000, }], - nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); @@ -250,7 +247,7 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { if prev_commitment_tx { // To build a previous commitment transaction, deliver one round of commitment messages. nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]); - expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage); + expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage); nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.commitment_signed); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let (as_raa, as_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); @@ -271,7 +268,7 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { 1_000 - // The push_msat value in satoshis 3 - // The dust HTLC value in satoshis // The commitment transaction fee with two HTLC outputs: - chan_feerate * (channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + + chan_feerate * (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + if prev_commitment_tx { 1 } else { 2 } * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { @@ -285,11 +282,11 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { }); } assert_eq!(sorted_vec(a_expected_balances), - sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000 + 3_000 + 4_000, }], - nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); // Broadcast the closing transaction (which has both pending HTLCs in it) and get B's // broadcasted HTLC claim transaction with preimage. @@ -334,7 +331,7 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate * - (channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, + (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000, @@ -343,7 +340,7 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, }]), - sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); // The main non-HTLC balance is just awaiting confirmations, but the claimable height is the // CSV delay, not ANTI_REORG_DELAY. assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { @@ -359,7 +356,7 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, }]), - sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_payment_hash, true); @@ -374,7 +371,7 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, }]), - sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000, confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable, @@ -385,7 +382,7 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, }]), - sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1); @@ -401,7 +398,9 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { // After broadcasting the HTLC claim transaction, node A will still consider the HTLC // possibly-claimable up to ANTI_REORG_DELAY, at which point it will drop it. mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &b_broadcast_txn[0]); - if !prev_commitment_tx { + if prev_commitment_tx { + expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]); + } else { expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage); } assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { @@ -411,13 +410,13 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, }]), - sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); assert_eq!(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, }], - nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); // When the HTLC timeout output is spendable in the next block, A should broadcast it connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1); @@ -442,12 +441,12 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, }], - nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will generate a SpendableOutputs event and drop the claimable // balance entry. connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); assert_eq!(Vec::::new(), - nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], timeout_payment_hash, true); let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events(); @@ -475,7 +474,7 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, }]), - sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); // After reaching the commitment output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutputs event for it and have // only the HTLCs claimable on node B. @@ -497,7 +496,7 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, }]), - sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); // After reaching the claimed HTLC output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutptus event for it and // have only one HTLC output left spendable. @@ -516,7 +515,7 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, }], - nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); // Finally, mine the HTLC timeout transaction that A broadcasted (even though B should be able // to claim this HTLC with the preimage it knows!). It will remain listed as a claimable HTLC @@ -526,10 +525,10 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, }], - nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); assert_eq!(Vec::::new(), - nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); } #[test] @@ -537,3 +536,193 @@ fn test_claim_value_force_close() { do_test_claim_value_force_close(true); do_test_claim_value_force_close(false); } + +#[test] +fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() { + // Previously, when handling the broadcast of a local commitment transactions (with associated + // CSV delays prior to spendability), we incorrectly handled the CSV delays on HTLC + // transactions. This caused us to miss spendable outputs for HTLCs which were awaiting a CSV + // delay prior to spendability. + // + // Further, because of this, we could hit an assertion as `get_claimable_balances` asserted + // that HTLCs were resolved after the funding spend was resolved, which was not true if the + // HTLC did not have a CSV delay attached (due to the above bug or due to it being an HTLC + // claim by our counterparty). + let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); + let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); + let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]); + let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); + + // Create a single channel with two pending HTLCs from nodes[0] to nodes[1], one which nodes[1] + // knows the preimage for, one which it does not. + let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()); + let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 }; + + let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000_000); + let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety + nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + + let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]); + commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false); + + expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]); + expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000_000); + + let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 20_000_000); + nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + + let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]); + commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false); + + expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]); + expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 20_000_000); + assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2)); + get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + + let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64; + let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id); + + // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transactions + let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id); + assert_eq!(as_txn.len(), 3); + check_spends!(as_txn[1], as_txn[0]); + check_spends!(as_txn[2], as_txn[0]); + check_spends!(as_txn[0], funding_tx); + + // First confirm the commitment transaction on nodes[0], which should leave us with three + // claimable balances. + let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32; + mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true); + check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed); + + assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate * + (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, + confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable, + }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000, + claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000, + claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }]), + sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + + // Get nodes[1]'s HTLC claim tx for the second HTLC + mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true); + check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed); + let bs_htlc_claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); + assert_eq!(bs_htlc_claim_txn.len(), 3); + check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[0], as_txn[0]); + check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[1], funding_tx); + check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[2], bs_htlc_claim_txn[1]); + + // Connect blocks until the HTLCs expire, allowing us to (validly) broadcast the HTLC-Timeout + // transaction. + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); + assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate * + (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, + confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable, + }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000, + claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000, + claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }]), + sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + assert_eq!(as_txn[1].lock_time, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1); // as_txn[1] can be included in the next block + + // Now confirm nodes[0]'s HTLC-Timeout transaction, which changes the claimable balance to an + // "awaiting confirmations" one. + let node_a_htlc_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32; + mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[1]); + // Note that prior to the fix in the commit which introduced this test, this (and the next + // balance) check failed. With this check removed, the code panicked in the `connect_blocks` + // call, as described, two hunks down. + assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate * + (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, + confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable, + }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000, + confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable, + }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000, + claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }]), + sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + + // Now confirm nodes[1]'s HTLC claim, giving nodes[0] the preimage. Note that the "maybe + // claimable" balance remains until we see ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks. + mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_claim_txn[0]); + expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2); + assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate * + (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, + confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable, + }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000, + confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable, + }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000, + claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + }]), + sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + + // Finally make the HTLC transactions have ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks. This call previously + // panicked as described in the test introduction. This will remove the "maybe claimable" + // spendable output as nodes[1] has fully claimed the second HTLC. + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); + expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true); + + assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate * + (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, + confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable, + }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000, + confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable, + }]), + sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); + + // Connect blocks until the commitment transaction's CSV expires, providing us the relevant + // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry. + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1); + assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000, + confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable, + }], + nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1); + if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() { + assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1); + let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), + Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap(); + check_spends!(spend_tx, as_txn[0]); + } + + // Connect blocks until the HTLC-Timeout's CSV expires, providing us the relevant + // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry. + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_htlc_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1); + assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty()); + let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1); + if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() { + assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1); + let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), + Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap(); + check_spends!(spend_tx, as_txn[1]); + } +}