X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fln%2Fmonitor_tests.rs;h=c4435b470ca8c6deb8618fada682e9cd063fcc17;hb=8d686d83cb0feeff4b8b0a53613f0e592738fbd8;hp=8726c6a996204b99e0fa653c3240a348c2752fcf;hpb=de2acc0ee0166e9d6cbd3a89459e08ee4ac6a4d5;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs index 8726c6a9..c4435b47 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs @@ -9,17 +9,29 @@ //! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations. +#[cfg(anchors)] +use crate::chain::keysinterface::BaseSign; +#[cfg(anchors)] +use crate::chain::channelmonitor::LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS; use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, Balance}; use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint; use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator; use crate::ln::channel; -use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, PaymentId}; +#[cfg(anchors)] +use crate::ln::chan_utils; +use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, PaymentId}; use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler; +#[cfg(anchors)] +use crate::util::config::UserConfig; +#[cfg(anchors)] +use crate::util::events::BumpTransactionEvent; use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination}; use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder; use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes; use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1; +#[cfg(anchors)] +use bitcoin::{Amount, Script, TxIn, TxOut, PackedLockTime}; use bitcoin::Transaction; use crate::prelude::*; @@ -48,8 +60,8 @@ fn chanmon_fail_from_stale_commitment() { let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]); let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); - create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()); - let (update_a, _, chan_id_2, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()); + create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); + let (update_a, _, chan_id_2, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2); let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1_000_000); nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap(); @@ -105,7 +117,7 @@ fn revoked_output_htlc_resolution_timing() { let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]); let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); - let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()); + let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000); let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1; @@ -124,9 +136,8 @@ fn revoked_output_htlc_resolution_timing() { check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true); let bs_spend_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); - assert_eq!(bs_spend_txn.len(), 2); + assert_eq!(bs_spend_txn.len(), 1); check_spends!(bs_spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); - check_spends!(bs_spend_txn[1], chan.3); // After the commitment transaction confirms, we should still wait on the HTLC spend // transaction to confirm before resolving the HTLC. @@ -155,12 +166,12 @@ fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() { let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = - create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()); + create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000); let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 }; assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id); - let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64; - let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id); + let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64; + let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id); assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 @@ -171,9 +182,9 @@ fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() { nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); - nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &node_0_shutdown); + nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown); let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); - nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &node_1_shutdown); + nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown); let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed); @@ -256,7 +267,7 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = - create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()); + create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000); let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 }; assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id); @@ -270,8 +281,8 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety - let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64; - let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id); + let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64; + let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id); let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id); // Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats @@ -364,21 +375,14 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]); let b_broadcast_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); - assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn.len(), if prev_commitment_tx { 4 } else { 5 }); - if prev_commitment_tx { - check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[3], b_broadcast_txn[2]); - } else { - assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0], b_broadcast_txn[3]); - assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1], b_broadcast_txn[4]); - } - // b_broadcast_txn[0] should spend the HTLC output of the commitment tx for 3_000 sats + assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn.len(), 2); + // b_broadcast_txn should spend the HTLCs output of the commitment tx for 3_000 and 4_000 sats check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]); assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1); assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1); assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000); assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000); - check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[2], funding_tx); assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty()); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true); @@ -482,21 +486,20 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { // When the HTLC timeout output is spendable in the next block, A should broadcast it connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1); let a_broadcast_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); - assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn.len(), 3); - check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[0], funding_tx); + assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn.len(), 2); + assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1); + check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1); check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]); - assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[2].input.len(), 1); - check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[2], remote_txn[0]); - assert_ne!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, - a_broadcast_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout); - // a_broadcast_txn [1] and [2] should spend the HTLC outputs of the commitment tx - assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000); - assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000); + assert_ne!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, + a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout); + // a_broadcast_txn [0] and [1] should spend the HTLC outputs of the commitment tx + assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000); + assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000); // Once the HTLC-Timeout transaction confirms, A will no longer consider the HTLC // "MaybeClaimable", but instead move it to "AwaitingConfirmations". - mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[2]); + mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1]); assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, @@ -510,7 +513,7 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], timeout_payment_hash, false); - test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[2]); + test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1]); // Node B will no longer consider the HTLC "contentious" after the HTLC claim transaction // confirms, and consider it simply "awaiting confirmations". Note that it has to wait for the @@ -558,7 +561,7 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { // Finally, mine the HTLC timeout transaction that A broadcasted (even though B should be able // to claim this HTLC with the preimage it knows!). It will remain listed as a claimable HTLC // until ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations on the spend. - mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &a_broadcast_txn[2]); + mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &a_broadcast_txn[1]); assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ContentiousClaimable { claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, @@ -603,7 +606,7 @@ fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() { // Create a single channel with two pending HTLCs from nodes[0] to nodes[1], one which nodes[1] // knows the preimage for, one which it does not. - let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()); + let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0); let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 }; let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000_000); @@ -633,8 +636,8 @@ fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() { check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000_000); - let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64; - let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id); + let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64; + let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id); // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transactions let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id); @@ -670,10 +673,8 @@ fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() { check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true); check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed); let bs_htlc_claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); - assert_eq!(bs_htlc_claim_txn.len(), 3); + assert_eq!(bs_htlc_claim_txn.len(), 1); check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[0], as_txn[0]); - check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[1], funding_tx); - check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[2], bs_htlc_claim_txn[1]); // Connect blocks until the HTLCs expire, allowing us to (validly) broadcast the HTLC-Timeout // transaction. @@ -779,7 +780,7 @@ fn test_no_preimage_inbound_htlc_balances() { let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]); let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); - let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()); + let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000); let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 }; // Send two HTLCs, one from A to B, and one from B to A. @@ -787,8 +788,8 @@ fn test_no_preimage_inbound_htlc_balances() { let to_a_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 20_000_000).1; let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety - let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64; - let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id); + let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64; + let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id); // Both A and B will have an HTLC that's claimable on timeout and one that's claimable if they // receive the preimage. These will remain the same through the channel closure and until the @@ -1032,7 +1033,7 @@ fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(confirm_htlc_spend_first: bo let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = - create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()); + create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000); let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 }; assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id); @@ -1063,9 +1064,9 @@ fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(confirm_htlc_spend_first: bo // Get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id); - let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id); + let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id); - let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64; + let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64; let missing_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety let missing_htlc_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000).1; @@ -1240,11 +1241,10 @@ fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(confirm_htlc_spend_first: bo test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]); let mut payment_failed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); - expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(&nodes[1], payment_failed_events.pop().unwrap(), - dust_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new()); - expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(&nodes[1], payment_failed_events.pop().unwrap(), + expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[..2].to_vec(), missing_htlc_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new()); - assert!(payment_failed_events.is_empty()); + expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[2..].to_vec(), + dust_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new()); connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1); test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 2 } else { 3 }]); @@ -1284,7 +1284,7 @@ fn test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances() { // Create some initial channels let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = - create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 11_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()); + create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 11_000_000); let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 }; assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id); @@ -1299,8 +1299,8 @@ fn test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances() { claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage); - let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64; - let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id); + let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64; + let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id); // B will generate an HTLC-Success from its revoked commitment tx mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]); @@ -1309,11 +1309,10 @@ fn test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances() { check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed); let revoked_htlc_success_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); - assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success_txn.len(), 2); + assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success_txn.len(), 1); assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1); assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); check_spends!(revoked_htlc_success_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); - check_spends!(revoked_htlc_success_txn[1], funding_tx); connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); let revoked_htlc_timeout_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); @@ -1331,9 +1330,8 @@ fn test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances() { let to_remote_conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1; let as_commitment_claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); - assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn.len(), 2); + assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn.len(), 1); check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); - check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1], funding_tx); // The next two checks have the same balance set for A - even though we confirm a revoked HTLC // transaction our balance tracking doesn't use the on-chain value so the @@ -1496,7 +1494,7 @@ fn test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims() { let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = - create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()); + create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000); let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 }; assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id); @@ -1521,8 +1519,8 @@ fn test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims() { check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[0], funding_tx); check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[1], as_revoked_txn[0]); // The HTLC-Claim transaction - let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id); - let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64; + let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id); + let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64; { let mut feerate = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap(); @@ -1679,3 +1677,141 @@ fn test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims() { assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty()); } + +#[cfg(anchors)] +#[test] +fn test_yield_anchors_events() { + // Tests that two parties supporting anchor outputs can open a channel, route payments over + // it, and finalize its resolution uncooperatively. Once the HTLCs are locked in, one side will + // force close once the HTLCs expire. The force close should stem from an event emitted by LDK, + // allowing the consumer to provide additional fees to the commitment transaction to be + // broadcast. Once the commitment transaction confirms, events for the HTLC resolution should be + // emitted by LDK, such that the consumer can attach fees to the zero fee HTLC transactions. + let secp = Secp256k1::new(); + let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); + let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); + let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default(); + anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true; + anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true; + let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]); + let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); + + let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value( + &nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000 + ).2; + route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000); + let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000); + + assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); + + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1); + check_closed_broadcast!(&nodes[0], true); + assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty()); + + get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage( + &payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, + &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger + ); + + let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 1); + let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = match holder_events.pop().unwrap() { + Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { commitment_tx, anchor_descriptor, .. }) => { + assert_eq!(commitment_tx.input.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 6); + let mut anchor_tx = Transaction { + version: 2, + lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, + input: vec![ + TxIn { previous_output: anchor_descriptor.outpoint, ..Default::default() }, + TxIn { ..Default::default() }, + ], + output: vec![TxOut { + value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(), + script_pubkey: Script::new_op_return(&[]), + }], + }; + let signer = nodes[0].keys_manager.derive_channel_keys( + anchor_descriptor.channel_value_satoshis, &anchor_descriptor.channel_keys_id, + ); + let funding_sig = signer.sign_holder_anchor_input(&mut anchor_tx, 0, &secp).unwrap(); + anchor_tx.input[0].witness = chan_utils::build_anchor_input_witness( + &signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey, &funding_sig + ); + (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + }; + + mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + + let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the + // best block is being updated prior to the confirmed transactions. + match *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow() { + ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks => { + assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3); + if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = holder_events.remove(0) {} + else { panic!("unexpected event"); } + + }, + _ => assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 2), + }; + let mut htlc_txs = Vec::with_capacity(2); + for event in holder_events { + match event { + Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { htlc_descriptors, .. }) => { + assert_eq!(htlc_descriptors.len(), 1); + let htlc_descriptor = &htlc_descriptors[0]; + let signer = nodes[0].keys_manager.derive_channel_keys( + htlc_descriptor.channel_value_satoshis, &htlc_descriptor.channel_keys_id + ); + let per_commitment_point = signer.get_per_commitment_point(htlc_descriptor.per_commitment_number, &secp); + let mut htlc_tx = Transaction { + version: 2, + lock_time: if htlc_descriptor.htlc.offered { + PackedLockTime(htlc_descriptor.htlc.cltv_expiry) + } else { + PackedLockTime::ZERO + }, + input: vec![ + htlc_descriptor.unsigned_tx_input(), // HTLC input + TxIn { ..Default::default() } // Fee input + ], + output: vec![ + htlc_descriptor.tx_output(&per_commitment_point, &secp), // HTLC output + TxOut { // Fee input change + value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(), + script_pubkey: Script::new_op_return(&[]), + } + ] + }; + let our_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_tx, 0, htlc_descriptor, &secp).unwrap(); + let witness_script = htlc_descriptor.witness_script(&per_commitment_point, &secp); + htlc_tx.input[0].witness = htlc_descriptor.tx_input_witness(&our_sig, &witness_script); + htlc_txs.push(htlc_tx); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + } + + mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&htlc_txs[0], &htlc_txs[1]]); + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); + + assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); + + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32); + + let holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3); + for event in holder_events { + match event { + Event::SpendableOutputs { .. } => {}, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + } + + // Clear the remaining events as they're not relevant to what we're testing. + nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); +}