X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fln%2Fmonitor_tests.rs;h=cb78cda714f83d4edec2b64f44364fc88f55864d;hb=a37a16a3ce25023fe9ff3c45dcba7e6b942f2de8;hp=af79464801b883a86f0409cc5fe05ed06c0845c4;hpb=4a4163fcf4842d7531e8730a6327764277aadf99;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs index af794648..cb78cda7 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ use crate::chain::chaininterface::{LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, compute_feerate_sat use crate::events::bump_transaction::{BumpTransactionEvent, WalletSource}; use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination}; use crate::ln::channel; -use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelManager, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields}; +use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields}; use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler; use crate::util::config::UserConfig; use crate::util::crypto::sign; @@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ fn chanmon_fail_from_stale_commitment() { fn test_spendable_output<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, spendable_tx: &Transaction) { let mut spendable = node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(spendable.len(), 1); - if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = spendable.pop().unwrap() { + if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, .. } = spendable.pop().unwrap() { assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1); let spend_tx = node.keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap(); @@ -269,12 +269,12 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id); // This HTLC is immediately claimed, giving node B the preimage - let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000); + let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000); // This HTLC is allowed to time out, letting A claim it. However, in order to test claimable // balances more fully we also give B the preimage for this HTLC. - let (timeout_payment_preimage, timeout_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 4_000_000); + let (timeout_payment_preimage, timeout_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 4_000_000); // This HTLC will be dust, and not be claimable at all: - let (dust_payment_preimage, dust_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000); + let (dust_payment_preimage, dust_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000); let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety @@ -345,7 +345,7 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { if prev_commitment_tx { // To build a previous commitment transaction, deliver one round of commitment messages. nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]); - expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage); + expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false); nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.commitment_signed); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let (as_raa, as_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); @@ -454,7 +454,7 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { if prev_commitment_tx { expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]); } else { - expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage); + expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, true, false); } assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]), sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); @@ -681,7 +681,7 @@ fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() { // Now confirm nodes[1]'s HTLC claim, giving nodes[0] the preimage. Note that the "maybe // claimable" balance remains until we see ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks. mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_claim_txn[0]); - expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2); + expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage_2, None, true, false); assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate * (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, @@ -1046,14 +1046,14 @@ fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(confirm_htlc_spend_first: bo assert!(failed_payments.is_empty()); if let Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = events[0] {} else { panic!(); } match &events[1] { - Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}, + Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, .. } => {}, _ => panic!(), } connect_blocks(&nodes[1], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); - check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000); + check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000); // Prior to channel closure, B considers the preimage HTLC as its own, and otherwise only // lists the two on-chain timeout-able HTLCs as claimable balances. @@ -1538,7 +1538,7 @@ fn test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims() { // Confirm A's HTLC-Success tranasction which presumably raced B's claim, causing B to create a // new claim. mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[1]); - expect_payment_sent!(nodes[1], claimed_payment_preimage); + expect_payment_sent(&nodes[1], claimed_payment_preimage, None, true, false); let mut claim_txn_2: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); claim_txn_2.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| if tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid()) { 0 } else { 1 }); // Once B sees the HTLC-Success transaction it splits its claim transaction into two, though in @@ -1638,13 +1638,14 @@ fn test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims() { fn do_test_restored_packages_retry(check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade: bool) { // Tests that we'll retry packages that were previously timelocked after we've restored them. + let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); + let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); let persister; let new_chain_monitor; - let node_deserialized; - let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); - let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]); + let node_deserialized; + let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); // Open a channel, lock in an HTLC, and immediately broadcast the commitment transaction. This @@ -1870,7 +1871,7 @@ fn test_yield_anchors_events() { &nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000 ).2; route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000); - let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000); + let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000); assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); @@ -1969,19 +1970,15 @@ fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() { // Required to sign a revoked commitment transaction chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true; let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); + let bob_persister; + let bob_chain_monitor; + let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default(); anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true; anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true; anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true; let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]); - - let bob_persister: test_utils::TestPersister; - let bob_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor; - let bob_deserialized: ChannelManager< - &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, - &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, - &test_utils::TestRouter, &test_utils::TestLogger, - >; + let bob_deserialized; let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); @@ -2194,7 +2191,7 @@ fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() { // Alice should see that Bob is trying to claim to HTLCs, so she should now try to claim them at // the second level instead. - let revoked_claims = { + let revoked_claim_transactions = { let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2); @@ -2208,10 +2205,14 @@ fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() { check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim, htlc_tx); } - txn + let mut revoked_claim_transaction_map = HashMap::new(); + for current_tx in txn.into_iter() { + revoked_claim_transaction_map.insert(current_tx.txid(), current_tx); + } + revoked_claim_transaction_map }; for node in &nodes { - mine_transactions(node, &revoked_claims.iter().collect::>()); + mine_transactions(node, &revoked_claim_transactions.values().collect::>()); } @@ -2230,13 +2231,15 @@ fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() { assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); let spendable_output_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(spendable_output_events.len(), 2); - for (idx, event) in spendable_output_events.iter().enumerate() { - if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = event { + for event in spendable_output_events.iter() { + if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, channel_id } = event { assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1); + assert!(vec![chan_b.2, chan_a.2].contains(&channel_id.unwrap())); let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs( &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Script::new_op_return(&[]), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new(), ).unwrap(); - check_spends!(spend_tx, revoked_claims[idx]); + + check_spends!(spend_tx, revoked_claim_transactions.get(&spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid).unwrap()); } else { panic!("unexpected event"); }