X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fln%2Fmonitor_tests.rs;h=d5f0dc153fc1a1ba9c544c4cfeb552708f860e04;hb=f3db18487613b24ee8bdde25a0b753aebcdd3be6;hp=b20a2e57526b6f3a50596477a5097496172f57a9;hpb=c1825672ed27839e95bb42bf8e75c9068da585d8;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs index b20a2e57..d5f0dc15 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs @@ -9,42 +9,28 @@ //! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations. -#[cfg(anchors)] -use crate::chain::keysinterface::{ChannelSigner, EcdsaChannelSigner}; -#[cfg(anchors)] -use crate::chain::channelmonitor::LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS; -use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, Balance}; +use crate::sign::{ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner, SpendableOutputDescriptor}; +use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, Balance}; use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint; -use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator; -#[cfg(anchors)] -use crate::events::bump_transaction::BumpTransactionEvent; +use crate::chain::chaininterface::{LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight}; +use crate::events::bump_transaction::{BumpTransactionEvent, WalletSource}; use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination}; -use crate::ln::channel; -#[cfg(anchors)] -use crate::ln::chan_utils; -#[cfg(anchors)] -use crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager; +use crate::ln::{channel, ChannelId}; use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields}; use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler; -#[cfg(anchors)] use crate::util::config::UserConfig; -#[cfg(anchors)] -use crate::util::crypto::sign; +use crate::crypto::utils::sign; use crate::util::ser::Writeable; +use crate::util::scid_utils::block_from_scid; use crate::util::test_utils; -#[cfg(anchors)] -use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType; +use bitcoin::{Amount, PublicKey, ScriptBuf, Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, Witness}; +use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime; use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder; use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes; -use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1; -#[cfg(anchors)] -use bitcoin::secp256k1::SecretKey; -#[cfg(anchors)] -use bitcoin::{Amount, PublicKey, Script, TxIn, TxOut, PackedLockTime, Witness}; -use bitcoin::Transaction; -#[cfg(anchors)] -use bitcoin::util::sighash::SighashCache; +use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex; +use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, SecretKey}; +use bitcoin::sighash::{SighashCache, EcdsaSighashType}; use crate::prelude::*; @@ -95,7 +81,7 @@ fn chanmon_fail_from_stale_commitment() { mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_txn[0]); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true); - check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed); + check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000); assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); @@ -108,14 +94,19 @@ fn chanmon_fail_from_stale_commitment() { expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, update_a.contents.short_channel_id, true); } -fn test_spendable_output<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, spendable_tx: &Transaction) { +fn test_spendable_output<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, spendable_tx: &Transaction, has_anchors_htlc_event: bool) -> Vec { let mut spendable = node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events(); - assert_eq!(spendable.len(), 1); - if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = spendable.pop().unwrap() { + assert_eq!(spendable.len(), if has_anchors_htlc_event { 2 } else { 1 }); + if has_anchors_htlc_event { + if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { .. }) = spendable.pop().unwrap() {} + else { panic!(); } + } + if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, .. } = spendable.pop().unwrap() { assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1); let spend_tx = node.keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), - Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap(); + Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap(); check_spends!(spend_tx, spendable_tx); + outputs } else { panic!(); } } @@ -145,7 +136,7 @@ fn revoked_output_htlc_resolution_timing() { // Confirm the revoked commitment transaction, closing the channel. mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); - check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed); + check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true); let bs_spend_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); @@ -167,30 +158,36 @@ fn revoked_output_htlc_resolution_timing() { expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, false); } -#[test] -fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() { +fn do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(anchors: bool) { // Tests `get_claimable_balances` returns the correct values across a simple cooperative claim. // Specifically, this tests that the channel non-HTLC balances show up in // `get_claimable_balances` until the cooperative claims have confirmed and generated a // `SpendableOutputs` event, and no longer. let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); - let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]); + let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config(); + if anchors { + user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true; + user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true; + } + let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]); let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000); let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 }; - assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id); + assert_eq!(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint), chan_id); let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64; - let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id); + let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id); + let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000; + let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 }; assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value }], nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); - assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000, }], + assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { amount_satoshis: 1_000, }], nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); @@ -212,8 +209,8 @@ fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() { assert_eq!(shutdown_tx, nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0)); assert_eq!(shutdown_tx.len(), 1); - mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]); - mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]); + let shutdown_tx_conf_height_a = block_from_scid(mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0])); + let shutdown_tx_conf_height_b = block_from_scid(mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0])); assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty()); assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty()); @@ -222,29 +219,52 @@ fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() { assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000, + amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value, confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, }], nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 1000, + amount_satoshis: 1000, confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, }], nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); - connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); - connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2); + connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2); + + assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id) + .get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_a).is_empty()); + assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id) + .get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_b).is_empty()); + + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1); + connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1); assert_eq!(Vec::::new(), nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); assert_eq!(Vec::::new(), nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); - test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]); - test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]); + let spendable_outputs_a = test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0], false); + assert_eq!( + get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_a), + spendable_outputs_a + ); + + let spendable_outputs_b = test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0], false); + assert_eq!( + get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_b), + spendable_outputs_b + ); - check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure); - check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure); + check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000); + check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000); +} + +#[test] +fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() { + do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(false); + do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(true); } fn sorted_vec(mut v: Vec) -> Vec { @@ -263,7 +283,7 @@ fn fuzzy_assert_eq>(a: V, b: V) { assert!(b_u64 >= a_u64 - 5); } -fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { +fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(anchors: bool, prev_commitment_tx: bool) { // Tests `get_claimable_balances` with an HTLC across a force-close. // We build a channel with an HTLC pending, then force close the channel and check that the // `get_claimable_balances` return value is correct as transactions confirm on-chain. @@ -276,50 +296,98 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true; } let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); - let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]); + let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config(); + if anchors { + user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true; + user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true; + } + let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]); let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); + let coinbase_tx = Transaction { + version: 2, + lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, + input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }], + output: vec![ + TxOut { + value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(), + script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(), + }, + TxOut { + value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(), + script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(), + }, + ], + }; + if anchors { + nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value); + nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 1 }, coinbase_tx.output[1].value); + } + let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000); let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 }; - assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id); + assert_eq!(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint), chan_id); // This HTLC is immediately claimed, giving node B the preimage - let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000); + let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000); // This HTLC is allowed to time out, letting A claim it. However, in order to test claimable // balances more fully we also give B the preimage for this HTLC. - let (timeout_payment_preimage, timeout_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 4_000_000); + let (timeout_payment_preimage, timeout_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 4_000_000); // This HTLC will be dust, and not be claimable at all: - let (dust_payment_preimage, dust_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000); + let (dust_payment_preimage, dust_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000); let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety - let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64; - let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id); + let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id); + let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id); let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id); + let sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { + amount_satoshis: 3_000, + claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + payment_hash, + }; + let sent_htlc_timeout_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { + amount_satoshis: 4_000, + claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash, + }; + let received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC { + amount_satoshis: 3_000, + expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + payment_hash, + }; + let received_htlc_timeout_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC { + amount_satoshis: 4_000, + expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash, + }; + let received_htlc_claiming_balance = Balance::ContentiousClaimable { + amount_satoshis: 3_000, + timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + payment_hash, + payment_preimage, + }; + let received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance = Balance::ContentiousClaimable { + amount_satoshis: 4_000, + timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash, + payment_preimage: timeout_payment_preimage, + }; + // Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats // as claimable. A lists both its to-self balance and the (possibly-claimable) HTLCs. + let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate as u64 * + (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000; + let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { 2 * channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI } else { 0 }; assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate * - (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, - }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000, - claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, - }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, - claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, - }]), + amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value, + }, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]), sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000, - }, Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000, - expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, - }, Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, - expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, - }]), + amount_satoshis: 1_000, + }, received_htlc_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]), sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage); @@ -340,7 +408,7 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { if prev_commitment_tx { // To build a previous commitment transaction, deliver one round of commitment messages. nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]); - expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage); + expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false); nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.commitment_signed); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let (as_raa, as_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); @@ -354,30 +422,25 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { // Once B has received the payment preimage, it includes the value of the HTLC in its // "claimable if you were to close the channel" balance. + let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate as u64 * + (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + + if prev_commitment_tx { 1 } else { 2 } * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000; let mut a_expected_balances = vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - // Channel funding value in satoshis + amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - // Channel funding value in satoshis 4_000 - // The to-be-failed HTLC value in satoshis 3_000 - // The claimed HTLC value in satoshis 1_000 - // The push_msat value in satoshis 3 - // The dust HTLC value in satoshis - // The commitment transaction fee with two HTLC outputs: - chan_feerate * (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + - if prev_commitment_tx { 1 } else { 2 } * - channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, - }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, - claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, - }]; + commitment_tx_fee - // The commitment transaction fee with two HTLC outputs + anchor_outputs_value, // The anchor outputs value in satoshis + }, sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]; if !prev_commitment_tx { - a_expected_balances.push(Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000, - claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, - }); + a_expected_balances.push(sent_htlc_balance.clone()); } assert_eq!(sorted_vec(a_expected_balances), sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000 + 3_000 + 4_000, + amount_satoshis: 1_000 + 3_000 + 4_000, }], nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); @@ -387,24 +450,48 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]); mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]); - let b_broadcast_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); + if anchors { + let mut events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + match events.pop().unwrap() { + Event::BumpTransaction(bump_event) => { + let mut first_htlc_event = bump_event.clone(); + if let BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { ref mut htlc_descriptors, .. } = &mut first_htlc_event { + htlc_descriptors.remove(1); + } else { + panic!("Unexpected event"); + } + let mut second_htlc_event = bump_event; + if let BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { ref mut htlc_descriptors, .. } = &mut second_htlc_event { + htlc_descriptors.remove(0); + } else { + panic!("Unexpected event"); + } + nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&first_htlc_event); + nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&second_htlc_event); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + } + + let b_broadcast_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast(); assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn.len(), 2); // b_broadcast_txn should spend the HTLCs output of the commitment tx for 3_000 and 4_000 sats - check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); - check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]); - assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1); - assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1); + check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0], coinbase_tx); + check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0], coinbase_tx); + assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 }); + assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 }); assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000); assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000); assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty()); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); - check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed); + check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000); assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty()); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); - check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed); + check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000); assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); @@ -414,34 +501,22 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { // other Balance variants, as close has already happened. assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); - + let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate as u64 * + (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000; assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate * - (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, + amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value, confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, - }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000, - claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, - }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, - claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, - }]), + }, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]), sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); // The main non-HTLC balance is just awaiting confirmations, but the claimable height is the // CSV delay, not ANTI_REORG_DELAY. assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000, + amount_satoshis: 1_000, confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable, }, // Both HTLC balances are "contentious" as our counterparty could claim them if we wait too // long. - Balance::ContentiousClaimable { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000, - timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, - }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, - timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, - }]), + received_htlc_claiming_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]), sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); @@ -450,27 +525,15 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will consider its balance fully spendable and generate a // `SpendableOutputs` event. However, B still has to wait for the CSV delay. - assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000, - claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, - }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, - claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, - }]), + assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]), sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000, + amount_satoshis: 1_000, confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable, - }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000, - timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, - }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, - timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, - }]), + }, received_htlc_claiming_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]), sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); - test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]); + test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0], false); assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); // After broadcasting the HTLC claim transaction, node A will still consider the HTLC @@ -479,21 +542,12 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { if prev_commitment_tx { expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]); } else { - expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage); + expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, true, false); } - assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000, - claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, - }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, - claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, - }]), + assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]), sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); - assert_eq!(vec![Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, - claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, - }], + assert_eq!(vec![sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()], nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); // When the HTLC timeout output is spendable in the next block, A should broadcast it @@ -515,7 +569,7 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1]); assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, + amount_satoshis: 4_000, confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, }], nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); @@ -526,7 +580,7 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], timeout_payment_hash, false); - test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1]); + test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1], false); // Node B will no longer consider the HTLC "contentious" after the HTLC claim transaction // confirms, and consider it simply "awaiting confirmations". Note that it has to wait for the @@ -535,50 +589,38 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]); assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000, + amount_satoshis: 1_000, confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable, }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000, + amount_satoshis: 3_000, confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable, - }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, - timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, - }]), + }, received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]), sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); // After reaching the commitment output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutputs event for it and have // only the HTLCs claimable on node B. connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_commitment_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1); - test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]); + test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0], anchors); assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000, + amount_satoshis: 3_000, confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable, - }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, - timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, - }]), + }, received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]), sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); // After reaching the claimed HTLC output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutptus event for it and // have only one HTLC output left spendable. connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_htlc_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1); - test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]); + test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0], anchors); - assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ContentiousClaimable { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, - timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, - }], + assert_eq!(vec![received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()], nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); // Finally, mine the HTLC timeout transaction that A broadcasted (even though B should be able // to claim this HTLC with the preimage it knows!). It will remain listed as a claimable HTLC // until ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations on the spend. mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &a_broadcast_txn[1]); - assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ContentiousClaimable { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, - timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, - }], + assert_eq!(vec![received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()], nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); assert_eq!(Vec::::new(), @@ -597,12 +639,13 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { #[test] fn test_claim_value_force_close() { - do_test_claim_value_force_close(true); - do_test_claim_value_force_close(false); + do_test_claim_value_force_close(false, true); + do_test_claim_value_force_close(false, false); + do_test_claim_value_force_close(true, true); + do_test_claim_value_force_close(true, false); } -#[test] -fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() { +fn do_test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs(anchors: bool) { // Previously, when handling the broadcast of a local commitment transactions (with associated // CSV delays prior to spendability), we incorrectly handled the CSV delays on HTLC // transactions. This caused us to miss spendable outputs for HTLCs which were awaiting a CSV @@ -614,9 +657,34 @@ fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() { // claim by our counterparty). let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); - let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]); + let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config(); + if anchors { + user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true; + user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true; + } + let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]); let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); + let coinbase_tx = Transaction { + version: 2, + lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, + input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }], + output: vec![ + TxOut { + value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(), + script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(), + }, + TxOut { + value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(), + script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(), + }, + ], + }; + if anchors { + nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value); + nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 1 }, coinbase_tx.output[1].value); + } + // Create a single channel with two pending HTLCs from nodes[0] to nodes[1], one which nodes[1] // knows the preimage for, one which it does not. let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0); @@ -652,97 +720,101 @@ fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() { expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000_000); let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64; - let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id); - - // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transactions - let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id); - assert_eq!(as_txn.len(), 3); - check_spends!(as_txn[1], as_txn[0]); - check_spends!(as_txn[2], as_txn[0]); - check_spends!(as_txn[0], funding_tx); + let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id); // First confirm the commitment transaction on nodes[0], which should leave us with three // claimable balances. let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32; - mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]); + nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true); - check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed); + check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000); + let commitment_tx = { + let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast(); + assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1); + let commitment_tx = txn.pop().unwrap(); + check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx); + commitment_tx + }; + let commitment_tx_conf_height_a = block_from_scid(mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx)); + if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { + let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast(); + assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(txn[0].txid(), commitment_tx.txid()); + } + + let htlc_balance_known_preimage = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { + amount_satoshis: 10_000, + claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + payment_hash, + }; + let htlc_balance_unknown_preimage = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { + amount_satoshis: 20_000, + claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + payment_hash: payment_hash_2, + }; + let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate * + (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000; + let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { 2 * channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI } else { 0 }; assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate * - (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, + amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value, confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable, - }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000, - claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, - }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000, - claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, - }]), + }, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]), sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); // Get nodes[1]'s HTLC claim tx for the second HTLC - mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]); + mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true); - check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed); + check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000); let bs_htlc_claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); assert_eq!(bs_htlc_claim_txn.len(), 1); - check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[0], as_txn[0]); + check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[0], commitment_tx); // Connect blocks until the HTLCs expire, allowing us to (validly) broadcast the HTLC-Timeout // transaction. - connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate * - (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, + amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value, confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable, - }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000, - claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, - }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000, - claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, - }]), + }, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]), sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); - assert_eq!(as_txn[1].lock_time.0, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1); // as_txn[1] can be included in the next block + if anchors { + handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 2); + } + let timeout_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast(); + assert_eq!(timeout_htlc_txn.len(), 2); + check_spends!(timeout_htlc_txn[0], commitment_tx, coinbase_tx); + check_spends!(timeout_htlc_txn[1], commitment_tx, coinbase_tx); // Now confirm nodes[0]'s HTLC-Timeout transaction, which changes the claimable balance to an // "awaiting confirmations" one. let node_a_htlc_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32; - mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[1]); + mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_htlc_txn[0]); // Note that prior to the fix in the commit which introduced this test, this (and the next // balance) check failed. With this check removed, the code panicked in the `connect_blocks` // call, as described, two hunks down. assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate * - (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, + amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value, confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable, }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000, + amount_satoshis: 10_000, confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable, - }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000, - claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, - }]), + }, htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]), sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); // Now confirm nodes[1]'s HTLC claim, giving nodes[0] the preimage. Note that the "maybe // claimable" balance remains until we see ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks. mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_claim_txn[0]); - expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2); + expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage_2, None, true, false); assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate * - (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, + amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value, confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable, }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000, + amount_satoshis: 10_000, confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable, - }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000, - claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, - }]), + }, htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]), sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); // Finally make the HTLC transactions have ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks. This call previously @@ -752,30 +824,36 @@ fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() { expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false); assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate * - (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, + amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value, confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable, }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000, + amount_satoshis: 10_000, confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable, }]), sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); // Connect blocks until the commitment transaction's CSV expires, providing us the relevant // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry. - connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1); + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1); + assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id) + .get_spendable_outputs(&commitment_tx, commitment_tx_conf_height_a).is_empty()); + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1); assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000, + amount_satoshis: 10_000, confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable, }], nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); - test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]); + let to_self_spendable_output = test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx, false); + assert_eq!( + get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&commitment_tx, commitment_tx_conf_height_a), + to_self_spendable_output + ); // Connect blocks until the HTLC-Timeout's CSV expires, providing us the relevant // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry. connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_htlc_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1); assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty()); - test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[1]); + test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &timeout_htlc_txn[0], false); // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new @@ -786,6 +864,12 @@ fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() { assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty()); } +#[test] +fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() { + do_test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs(false); + do_test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs(true); +} + #[test] fn test_no_preimage_inbound_htlc_balances() { // Tests that MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC are generated for inbound HTLCs for which we do not @@ -804,33 +888,42 @@ fn test_no_preimage_inbound_htlc_balances() { let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64; - let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id); + let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id); + + let a_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { + amount_satoshis: 10_000, + claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash, + }; + let a_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC { + amount_satoshis: 20_000, + expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash, + }; + let b_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC { + amount_satoshis: 10_000, + expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash, + }; + let b_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { + amount_satoshis: 20_000, + claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash, + }; // Both A and B will have an HTLC that's claimable on timeout and one that's claimable if they // receive the preimage. These will remain the same through the channel closure and until the // HTLC output is spent. assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate * - (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, - }, Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000, - expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, - }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000, - claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, - }]), + amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate * + (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, + }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]), sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000, - }, Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000, - expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, - }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000, - claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, - }]), + amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000, + }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]), sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transaction @@ -843,22 +936,16 @@ fn test_no_preimage_inbound_htlc_balances() { // claimable balances remain the same except for the non-HTLC balance changing variant. let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32; let as_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate * - (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, + amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate * + (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable, - }, Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000, - expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, - }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000, - claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, - }]); + }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]); mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]); nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true); - check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed); + check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000); assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims, sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); @@ -866,19 +953,13 @@ fn test_no_preimage_inbound_htlc_balances() { mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true); - check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed); + check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000); let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1; let mut bs_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000, + amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000, confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable, - }, Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000, - expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, - }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000, - claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, - }]); + }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]); assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims, sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); @@ -903,7 +984,7 @@ fn test_no_preimage_inbound_htlc_balances() { // For node B, we'll get the non-HTLC funds claimable after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); - test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]); + test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0], false); bs_pre_spend_claims.retain(|e| if let Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { .. } = e { false } else { true }); // The next few blocks for B look the same as for A, though for the opposite HTLC @@ -927,28 +1008,22 @@ fn test_no_preimage_inbound_htlc_balances() { mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]); let as_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + (BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32) - 1; assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate * - (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, + amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate * + (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable, - }, Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000, - expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, - }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000, + }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + amount_satoshis: 10_000, confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height, }]), sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]); assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate * - (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, + amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate * + (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable, - }, Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000, - expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, - }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000, + }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + amount_satoshis: 10_000, confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height, }]), sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); @@ -960,46 +1035,40 @@ fn test_no_preimage_inbound_htlc_balances() { connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1); assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate * - (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, + amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate * + (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable, }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000, + amount_satoshis: 10_000, confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout), }]), sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1); assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000, + amount_satoshis: 10_000, confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout), }], nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); - test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]); + test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0], false); connect_blocks(&nodes[0], as_timeout_claimable_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1); assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty()); - test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]); + test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0], false); // The process for B should be completely identical as well, noting that the non-HTLC-balance // was already claimed. mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]); let bs_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1; - assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000, - expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, - }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000, + assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + amount_satoshis: 20_000, confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height, }]), sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]); - assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000, - expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, - }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000, + assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + amount_satoshis: 20_000, confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height, }]), sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); @@ -1007,12 +1076,9 @@ fn test_no_preimage_inbound_htlc_balances() { connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2); expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], to_a_failed_payment_hash, false); - assert_eq!(vec![Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000, - expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, - }], + assert_eq!(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone()], nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); - test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]); + test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0], false); connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1); assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty()); @@ -1035,7 +1101,7 @@ fn sorted_vec_with_additions(v_orig: &Vec, extra_ts: &[&T]) - v } -fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(confirm_htlc_spend_first: bool) { +fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(anchors: bool, confirm_htlc_spend_first: bool) { // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions. let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation @@ -1044,13 +1110,18 @@ fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(confirm_htlc_spend_first: bo // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked. chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true; let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); - let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]); + let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config(); + if anchors { + user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true; + user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true; + } + let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]); let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000); let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 }; - assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id); + assert_eq!(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint), chan_id); // We create five HTLCs for B to claim against A's revoked commitment transaction: // @@ -1079,7 +1150,7 @@ fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(confirm_htlc_spend_first: bo // Get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id); - let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id); + let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id); let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64; @@ -1117,28 +1188,31 @@ fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(confirm_htlc_spend_first: bo assert!(failed_payments.is_empty()); if let Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = events[0] {} else { panic!(); } match &events[1] { - Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}, + Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut, .. } => {}, _ => panic!(), } connect_blocks(&nodes[1], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); - check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed); + check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000); // Prior to channel closure, B considers the preimage HTLC as its own, and otherwise only // lists the two on-chain timeout-able HTLCs as claimable balances. assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3 - 2_000 + 3_000, + amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3 - 2_000 + 3_000, }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 2_000, + amount_satoshis: 2_000, claimable_height: missing_htlc_cltv_timeout, + payment_hash: missing_htlc_payment_hash, }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, + amount_satoshis: 4_000, claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash, }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 5_000, + amount_satoshis: 5_000, claimable_height: live_htlc_cltv_timeout, + payment_hash: live_payment_hash, }]), sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); @@ -1150,36 +1224,42 @@ fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(confirm_htlc_spend_first: bo claim_txn.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::()); // The following constants were determined experimentally - const BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 483; - const OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 571; - const INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 578; + const BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: u64 = 483; + let outbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight: u64 = if anchors { 574 } else { 571 }; + let inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight: u64 = if anchors { 582 } else { 578 }; // Check that the weight is close to the expected weight. Note that signature sizes vary // somewhat so it may not always be exact. - fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[0].weight(), OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT); - fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[1].weight(), INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT); - fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[2].weight(), INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT); - fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[3].weight(), BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT); + fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[0].weight().to_wu(), outbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight); + fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[1].weight().to_wu(), inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight); + fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[2].weight().to_wu(), inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight); + fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[3].weight().to_wu(), BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT); + + let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate * + (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000; + let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 }; + let inbound_htlc_claim_fee = chan_feerate * inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight / 1000; + let outbound_htlc_claim_fee = chan_feerate * outbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight / 1000; + let to_self_claim_fee = chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight().to_wu() / 1000; // The expected balance for the next three checks, with the largest-HTLC and to_self output // claim balances separated out. let expected_balance = vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment - claimable_amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3, + amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3, confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5, }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000, + amount_satoshis: 3_000, }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, + amount_satoshis: 4_000, }]; let to_self_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate * - (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, + amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value, }; let to_self_claimed_avail_height; let largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 5_000, + amount_satoshis: 5_000, }; let largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height; @@ -1200,13 +1280,11 @@ fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(confirm_htlc_spend_first: bo } let largest_htlc_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 5_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000, + amount_satoshis: 5_000 - inbound_htlc_claim_fee, confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height, }; let to_self_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate * - (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 - - chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight() as u64 / 1000, + amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value - to_self_claim_fee, confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height, }; @@ -1233,27 +1311,25 @@ fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(confirm_htlc_spend_first: bo assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment - claimable_amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3, + amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3, confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1, }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate * - (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 - - chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight() as u64 / 1000, + amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value - to_self_claim_fee, confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height, }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000 - chan_feerate * OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000, + amount_satoshis: 3_000 - outbound_htlc_claim_fee, confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 4, }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000, + amount_satoshis: 4_000 - inbound_htlc_claim_fee, confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5, }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 5_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000, + amount_satoshis: 5_000 - inbound_htlc_claim_fee, confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height, }]), sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1); - test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]); + test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0], false); let mut payment_failed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[..2].to_vec(), @@ -1262,14 +1338,14 @@ fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(confirm_htlc_spend_first: bo dust_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new()); connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1); - test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 2 } else { 3 }]); + test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 2 } else { 3 }], false); connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1); - test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 3 } else { 2 }]); + test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 3 } else { 2 }], false); expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], live_payment_hash, false); connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1); - test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0]); + test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0], false); connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1); - test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1]); + test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1], false); expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, false); assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new()); @@ -1284,54 +1360,95 @@ fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(confirm_htlc_spend_first: bo #[test] fn test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances() { - do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(true); - do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(false); + do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(false, true); + do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(false, false); + do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(true, true); + do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(true, false); } -#[test] -fn test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances() { +fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances(anchors: bool) { // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revocation spends of HTLC transactions. let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true; let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); - let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]); + let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config(); + if anchors { + user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true; + user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true; + } + let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]); let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); + let coinbase_tx = Transaction { + version: 2, + lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, + input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }], + output: vec![ + TxOut { + value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(), + script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(), + }, + TxOut { + value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(), + script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(), + }, + ], + }; + if anchors { + nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value); + nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 1 }, coinbase_tx.output[1].value); + } + // Create some initial channels let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = - create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 11_000_000); + create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 12_000_000); let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 }; - assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id); + assert_eq!(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint), chan_id); let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0; let failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1; let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id); assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1); assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid()); + if anchors { + assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[4].value, 11000); // to_self output + } else { + assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[2].value, 11000); // to_self output + } - // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have two HTLCs and an output for both sides - assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 4); + // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have two HTLCs, an output for each side, and an + // anchor output for each side if enabled. + assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if anchors { 6 } else { 4 }); claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage); let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64; - let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id); + let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id); // B will generate an HTLC-Success from its revoked commitment tx mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); - check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed); + check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000); + if anchors { + handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[1], 1); + } let revoked_htlc_success = { let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast(); assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1); - assert_eq!(txn[0].input.len(), 1); - assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); - check_spends!(txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); + assert_eq!(txn[0].input.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 }); + assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, if anchors { 3 } else { 1 }); + assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), + if anchors { ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT_ANCHORS } else { ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT }); + check_spends!(txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], coinbase_tx); txn.pop().unwrap() }; + let revoked_htlc_success_fee = chan_feerate * revoked_htlc_success.weight().to_wu() / 1000; connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); + if anchors { + handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[1], 2); + } let revoked_htlc_timeout = { let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast(); assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2); @@ -1341,37 +1458,57 @@ fn test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances() { txn.remove(0) } }; - check_spends!(revoked_htlc_timeout, revoked_local_txn[0]); + check_spends!(revoked_htlc_timeout, revoked_local_txn[0], coinbase_tx); assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_timeout.input[0].previous_output); - assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success.lock_time.0, 0); - assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time.0, 0); + assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success.lock_time, LockTime::ZERO); + assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time, LockTime::ZERO); // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); - check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed); + check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000); let to_remote_conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1; - let as_commitment_claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); - assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn.len(), 1); - check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); + let revoked_to_self_claim = { + let mut as_commitment_claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast(); + assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 }); + if anchors { + assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 4); // Separate to_remote claim + check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); + assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1].input.len(), 2); + assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2); + assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 3); + check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]); + Some(as_commitment_claim_txn.remove(0)) + } else { + assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input.len(), 3); + assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2); + assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.vout, 0); + assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[2].previous_output.vout, 1); + check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); + None + } + }; // The next two checks have the same balance set for A - even though we confirm a revoked HTLC // transaction our balance tracking doesn't use the on-chain value so the // `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable` entry doesn't change. + let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate * + (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000; + let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 }; let as_balances = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment - claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 11_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate * - (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, + amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 12_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value, confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height, }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // to_self output in B's revoked commitment - claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000, + amount_satoshis: 11_000, }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1 - claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000, + amount_satoshis: 3_000, }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2 - claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000, + amount_satoshis: 1_000, }]); assert_eq!(as_balances, sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); @@ -1379,58 +1516,72 @@ fn test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances() { mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_success); let as_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx.len(), 2); + assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].input.len(), 1); check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_success); - check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]); // A has to generate a new claim for the remaining revoked - // outputs (which no longer includes the spent HTLC output) + // A has to generate a new claim for the remaining revoked outputs (which no longer includes the + // spent HTLC output) + assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1].input.len(), if anchors { 1 } else { 2 }); + assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2); + if !anchors { + assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 0); + } + check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]); assert_eq!(as_balances, sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output.len(), 1); - fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value, - 3_000 - chan_feerate * (revoked_htlc_success.weight() + as_htlc_claim_tx[0].weight()) as u64 / 1000); + let as_revoked_htlc_success_claim_fee = chan_feerate * as_htlc_claim_tx[0].weight().to_wu() / 1000; + if anchors { + // With anchors, B can pay for revoked_htlc_success's fee with additional inputs, rather + // than with the HTLC itself. + fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value, + 3_000 - as_revoked_htlc_success_claim_fee); + } else { + fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value, + 3_000 - revoked_htlc_success_fee - as_revoked_htlc_success_claim_fee); + } mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0]); assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment - claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 11_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate * - (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, + amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 12_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value, confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height, }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // to_self output in B's revoked commitment - claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000, + amount_satoshis: 11_000, }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2 - claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000, + amount_satoshis: 1_000, }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { - claimable_amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value, + amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value, confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, }]), sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 3); - test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]); + test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], false); assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // to_self output to B - claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000, + amount_satoshis: 11_000, }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2 - claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000, + amount_satoshis: 1_000, }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { - claimable_amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value, + amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value, confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 2, }]), sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2); - test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0]); + test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0], false); assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // to_self output in B's revoked commitment - claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000, + amount_satoshis: 11_000, }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2 - claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000, + amount_satoshis: 1_000, }]), sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); - connect_blocks(&nodes[0], revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time.0 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1); + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() - nodes[0].best_block_info().1); expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(&nodes[0], [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: failed_payment_hash }]); // As time goes on A may split its revocation claim transaction into multiple. @@ -1448,11 +1599,24 @@ fn test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances() { } mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout); - let as_second_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); - assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx.len(), 2); - - check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_timeout); - check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]); + let (revoked_htlc_timeout_claim, revoked_to_self_claim) = { + let mut as_second_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast(); + assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx.len(), if anchors { 1 } else { 2 }); + if anchors { + assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0); + check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_timeout); + (as_second_htlc_claim_tx.remove(0), revoked_to_self_claim.unwrap()) + } else { + assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0); + check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_timeout); + assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1].input.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2); + check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]); + (as_second_htlc_claim_tx.remove(0), as_second_htlc_claim_tx.remove(0)) + } + }; // Connect blocks to finalize the HTLC resolution with the HTLC-Timeout transaction. In a // previous iteration of the revoked balance handling this would result in us "forgetting" that @@ -1460,37 +1624,37 @@ fn test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances() { connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // to_self output in B's revoked commitment - claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000, + amount_satoshis: 11_000, }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2 - claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000, + amount_satoshis: 1_000, }]), sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); - mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0]); + mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout_claim); assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // to_self output in B's revoked commitment - claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000, + amount_satoshis: 11_000, }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { - claimable_amount_satoshis: as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value, + amount_satoshis: revoked_htlc_timeout_claim.output[0].value, confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, }]), sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); - mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1]); + mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_to_self_claim); assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { // to_self output in B's revoked commitment - claimable_amount_satoshis: as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1].output[0].value, + amount_satoshis: revoked_to_self_claim.output[0].value, confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { - claimable_amount_satoshis: as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value, + amount_satoshis: revoked_htlc_timeout_claim.output[0].value, confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2, }]), sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2); - test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0]); + test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout_claim, false); connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1); - test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1]); + test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_to_self_claim, false); assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new()); @@ -1504,7 +1668,12 @@ fn test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances() { } #[test] -fn test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims() { +fn test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances() { + do_test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances(false); + do_test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances(true); +} + +fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims(anchors: bool) { // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions when // claiming with an aggregated claim transaction. let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); @@ -1512,15 +1681,31 @@ fn test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims() { // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked. - chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true; + chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true; let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); - let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]); + let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config(); + if anchors { + user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true; + user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true; + } + let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]); let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); + let coinbase_tx = Transaction { + version: 2, + lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, + input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }], + output: vec![TxOut { + value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(), + script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(), + }], + }; + nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value); + let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000); let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 }; - assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id); + assert_eq!(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint), chan_id); // We create two HTLCs, one which we will give A the preimage to to generate an HTLC-Success // transaction, and one which we will not, allowing B to claim the HTLC output in an aggregated @@ -1539,11 +1724,13 @@ fn test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims() { // Now get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id); - assert_eq!(as_revoked_txn.len(), 2); + assert_eq!(as_revoked_txn.len(), if anchors { 1 } else { 2 }); check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[0], funding_tx); - check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[1], as_revoked_txn[0]); // The HTLC-Claim transaction + if !anchors { + check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[1], as_revoked_txn[0]); // The HTLC-Claim transaction + } - let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id); + let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id); let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64; { @@ -1563,134 +1750,205 @@ fn test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims() { let _a_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000, + amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000, }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, + amount_satoshis: 4_000, claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + payment_hash: revoked_payment_hash, }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { - claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000, + amount_satoshis: 3_000, claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout, + payment_hash: claimed_payment_hash, }]), sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true); - check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed); + check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); - let mut claim_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..).filter(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid())).collect(); - // Currently the revoked commitment outputs are all claimed in one aggregated transaction - assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 1); - assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 3); - check_spends!(claim_txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0]); + let mut claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast(); + assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 }); + let revoked_to_self_claim = if anchors { + assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 5); // Separate to_remote claim + check_spends!(claim_txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0]); + assert_eq!(claim_txn[1].input.len(), 2); + assert_eq!(claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2); + assert_eq!(claim_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 3); + check_spends!(claim_txn[1], as_revoked_txn[0]); + Some(claim_txn.remove(0)) + } else { + assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 3); + assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 3); + assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.vout, 0); + assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[2].previous_output.vout, 1); + check_spends!(claim_txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0]); + None + }; let to_remote_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1; + let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate * + (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000; + let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 }; assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment - claimable_amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000, + amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000, confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity, }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // to_self output in A's revoked commitment - claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate * - (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, + amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value, }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1 - claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, + amount_satoshis: 4_000, }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2 - claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000, + amount_satoshis: 3_000, }]), sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); - // Confirm A's HTLC-Success tranasction which presumably raced B's claim, causing B to create a + // Confirm A's HTLC-Success transaction which presumably raced B's claim, causing B to create a // new claim. - mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[1]); - expect_payment_sent!(nodes[1], claimed_payment_preimage); - let mut claim_txn_2: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); - claim_txn_2.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| if tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid()) { 0 } else { 1 }); + if anchors { + mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_revoked_txn[0]); + check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true); + check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1); + check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000); + handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 1); + } + let htlc_success_claim = if anchors { + let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast(); + assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1); + check_spends!(txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0], coinbase_tx); + txn.pop().unwrap() + } else { + as_revoked_txn[1].clone() + }; + mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_claim); + expect_payment_sent(&nodes[1], claimed_payment_preimage, None, true, false); + + let mut claim_txn_2 = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast(); // Once B sees the HTLC-Success transaction it splits its claim transaction into two, though in // theory it could re-aggregate the claims as well. assert_eq!(claim_txn_2.len(), 2); - assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input.len(), 2); - check_spends!(claim_txn_2[0], as_revoked_txn[0]); - assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input.len(), 1); - check_spends!(claim_txn_2[1], as_revoked_txn[1]); + if anchors { + assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0); + check_spends!(claim_txn_2[0], &htlc_success_claim); + assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 3); + check_spends!(claim_txn_2[1], as_revoked_txn[0]); + } else { + assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0); + check_spends!(claim_txn_2[0], as_revoked_txn[1]); + assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input.len(), 2); + assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 3); + assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 1); + check_spends!(claim_txn_2[1], as_revoked_txn[0]); + } assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment - claimable_amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000, + amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000, confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity, }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // to_self output in A's revoked commitment - claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate * - (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, + amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value, }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1 - claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, + amount_satoshis: 4_000, }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2 // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs // anyway, so its not a big change. - claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000, + amount_satoshis: 3_000, }]), sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5); - test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]); + test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0], false); assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // to_self output in A's revoked commitment - claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate * - (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, + amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value, }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1 - claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, + amount_satoshis: 4_000, }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2 // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs // anyway, so its not a big change. - claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000, + amount_satoshis: 3_000, }]), sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); - mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1]); + mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0]); let htlc_2_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1; assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // to_self output in A's revoked commitment - claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate * - (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, + amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value, }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1 - claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, + amount_satoshis: 4_000, }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { // HTLC 2 - claimable_amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[1].output[0].value, + amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[0].output[0].value, confirmation_height: htlc_2_claim_maturity, }]), sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5); - test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1]); + test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0], false); assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // to_self output in A's revoked commitment - claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate * - (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000, + amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value, }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1 - claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000, + amount_satoshis: 4_000, }]), sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances())); - mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0]); + if anchors { + mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[&claim_txn_2[1], revoked_to_self_claim.as_ref().unwrap()]); + } else { + mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1]); + } let rest_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1; - assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { - claimable_amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[0].output[0].value, - confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity, - }], - nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + if anchors { + assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[1].output[0].value, + confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity, + }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + amount_satoshis: revoked_to_self_claim.as_ref().unwrap().output[0].value, + confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity, + }], + nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + } else { + assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { + amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[1].output[0].value, + confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity, + }], + nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()); + } assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); // We shouldn't fail the payment until we spend the output connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5); expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], revoked_payment_hash, false); - test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0]); + if anchors { + let events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 2); + for (i, event) in events.into_iter().enumerate() { + if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, .. } = event { + assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1); + let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs( + &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), + 253, None, &Secp256k1::new() + ).unwrap(); + check_spends!(spend_tx, if i == 0 { &claim_txn_2[1] } else { revoked_to_self_claim.as_ref().unwrap() }); + } else { panic!(); } + } + } else { + test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1], false); + } assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty()); // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're @@ -1702,15 +1960,22 @@ fn test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims() { assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty()); } +#[test] +fn test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims() { + do_test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims(false); + do_test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims(true); +} + fn do_test_restored_packages_retry(check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade: bool) { // Tests that we'll retry packages that were previously timelocked after we've restored them. + let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); + let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); let persister; let new_chain_monitor; - let node_deserialized; - let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); - let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]); + let node_deserialized; + let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); // Open a channel, lock in an HTLC, and immediately broadcast the commitment transaction. This @@ -1721,7 +1986,8 @@ fn do_test_restored_packages_retry(check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade: bool nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1); check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true); - check_closed_event(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false); + check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, + [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000); let commitment_tx = { let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast(); @@ -1732,6 +1998,11 @@ fn do_test_restored_packages_retry(check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade: bool }; mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx); + if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { + let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast(); + assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(txn[0].txid(), commitment_tx.txid()); + } // Connect blocks until the HTLC's expiration is met, expecting a transaction broadcast. connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); @@ -1745,8 +2016,8 @@ fn do_test_restored_packages_retry(check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade: bool // Check that we can still rebroadcast these packages/transactions if we're upgrading from an // old `ChannelMonitor` that did not exercise said rebroadcasting logic. if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade { - let serialized_monitor = hex::decode( - 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+ let serialized_monitor = >::from_hex( + 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).unwrap(); reload_node!(nodes[0], &nodes[0].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, new_chain_monitor, node_deserialized); } @@ -1781,16 +2052,12 @@ fn test_restored_packages_retry() { fn do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(anchors: bool) { // Test that we will retry broadcasting pending claims for a force-closed channel on every // `ChainMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims` call. - if anchors { - assert!(cfg!(anchors)); - } let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); let mut config = test_default_channel_config(); if anchors { - #[cfg(anchors)] { - config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true; - } + config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true; + config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true; } let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), Some(config)]); let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); @@ -1809,9 +2076,21 @@ fn do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(anchors: bool) { check_spends!(&commitment_txn[0], &funding_tx); mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_txn[0]); check_closed_broadcast!(&nodes[0], true); - check_closed_event(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false); + check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, + false, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000); check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1); + let coinbase_tx = Transaction { + version: 2, + lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, + input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }], + output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx` on anchors + value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(), + script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(), + }], + }; + nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value); + // Set up a helper closure we'll use throughout our test. We should only expect retries without // bumps if fees have not increased after a block has been connected (assuming the height timer // re-evaluates at every block) or after `ChainMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims` is called. @@ -1819,49 +2098,25 @@ fn do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(anchors: bool) { let mut check_htlc_retry = |should_retry: bool, should_bump: bool| -> Option { let (htlc_tx, htlc_tx_feerate) = if anchors { assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().is_empty()); - let mut events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + let events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), if should_retry { 1 } else { 0 }); if !should_retry { return None; } - #[allow(unused_assignments)] - let mut tx = Transaction { - version: 2, - lock_time: bitcoin::PackedLockTime::ZERO, - input: vec![], - output: vec![], - }; - #[allow(unused_assignments)] - let mut feerate = 0; - #[cfg(anchors)] { - feerate = if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { - target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, mut htlc_descriptors, tx_lock_time, - }) = events.pop().unwrap() { - let secp = Secp256k1::new(); - assert_eq!(htlc_descriptors.len(), 1); - let descriptor = htlc_descriptors.pop().unwrap(); - assert_eq!(descriptor.commitment_txid, commitment_txn[0].txid()); - let htlc_output_idx = descriptor.htlc.transaction_output_index.unwrap() as usize; - assert!(htlc_output_idx < commitment_txn[0].output.len()); - tx.lock_time = tx_lock_time; - // Note that we don't care about actually making the HTLC transaction meet the - // feerate for the test, we just want to make sure the feerates we receive from - // the events never decrease. - tx.input.push(descriptor.unsigned_tx_input()); - let signer = nodes[0].keys_manager.derive_channel_keys( - descriptor.channel_value_satoshis, &descriptor.channel_keys_id, - ); - let per_commitment_point = signer.get_per_commitment_point( - descriptor.per_commitment_number, &secp - ); - tx.output.push(descriptor.tx_output(&per_commitment_point, &secp)); - let our_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&mut tx, 0, &descriptor, &secp).unwrap(); - let witness_script = descriptor.witness_script(&per_commitment_point, &secp); - tx.input[0].witness = descriptor.tx_input_witness(&our_sig, &witness_script); - target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight as u64 - } else { panic!("unexpected event"); }; + match &events[0] { + Event::BumpTransaction(event) => { + nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event); + let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast(); + assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1); + let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap(); + check_spends!(&htlc_tx, &commitment_txn[0], &coinbase_tx); + let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT + coinbase_tx.output[0].value - + htlc_tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::(); + let htlc_tx_weight = htlc_tx.weight().to_wu(); + (htlc_tx, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(htlc_tx_fee, htlc_tx_weight)) + } + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } - (tx, feerate) } else { assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast(); @@ -1872,8 +2127,8 @@ fn do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(anchors: bool) { let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap(); check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_txn[0]); let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT - htlc_tx.output[0].value; - let htlc_tx_feerate = htlc_tx_fee * 1000 / htlc_tx.weight() as u64; - (htlc_tx, htlc_tx_feerate) + let htlc_tx_weight = htlc_tx.weight().to_wu(); + (htlc_tx, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(htlc_tx_fee, htlc_tx_weight)) }; if should_bump { assert!(htlc_tx_feerate > prev_htlc_tx_feerate.take().unwrap()); @@ -1913,9 +2168,11 @@ fn do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(anchors: bool) { // Mine the HTLC transaction to ensure we don't retry claims while they're confirmed. mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_tx); - // If we have a `ConnectStyle` that advertises the new block first without the transasctions, + // If we have a `ConnectStyle` that advertises the new block first without the transactions, // we'll receive an extra bumped claim. if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { + nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value); + nodes[0].wallet_source.remove_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 1 }); check_htlc_retry(true, anchors); } nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims(); @@ -1925,11 +2182,9 @@ fn do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(anchors: bool) { #[test] fn test_monitor_timer_based_claim() { do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(false); - #[cfg(anchors)] do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(true); } -#[cfg(anchors)] #[test] fn test_yield_anchors_events() { // Tests that two parties supporting anchor outputs can open a channel, route payments over @@ -1938,105 +2193,117 @@ fn test_yield_anchors_events() { // allowing the consumer to provide additional fees to the commitment transaction to be // broadcast. Once the commitment transaction confirms, events for the HTLC resolution should be // emitted by LDK, such that the consumer can attach fees to the zero fee HTLC transactions. - let secp = Secp256k1::new(); let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default(); anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true; anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true; + anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true; let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]); let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); - let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value( + let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value( &nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000 - ).2; - route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000); - let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000); + ); + let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000); + let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000); assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); + assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); + + *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2; connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1); - check_closed_broadcast!(&nodes[0], true); - assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty()); + assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().is_empty()); + + connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1); + { + let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast(); + assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1); + check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx); + } get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage( - &payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, + &payment_hash_2, &payment_preimage_2, &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger ); + get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage( + &payment_hash_1, &payment_preimage_1, &node_cfgs[1].tx_broadcaster, + &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger + ); let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 1); let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = match holder_events.pop().unwrap() { - Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { commitment_tx, anchor_descriptor, .. }) => { - assert_eq!(commitment_tx.input.len(), 1); - assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 6); - let mut anchor_tx = Transaction { + Event::BumpTransaction(event) => { + let coinbase_tx = Transaction { version: 2, - lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, - input: vec![ - TxIn { previous_output: anchor_descriptor.outpoint, ..Default::default() }, - TxIn { ..Default::default() }, - ], - output: vec![TxOut { + lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, + input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }], + output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx` value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(), - script_pubkey: Script::new_op_return(&[]), + script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(), }], }; - let signer = nodes[0].keys_manager.derive_channel_keys( - anchor_descriptor.channel_value_satoshis, &anchor_descriptor.channel_keys_id, - ); - let funding_sig = signer.sign_holder_anchor_input(&mut anchor_tx, 0, &secp).unwrap(); - anchor_tx.input[0].witness = chan_utils::build_anchor_input_witness( - &signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey, &funding_sig - ); + nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value); + nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event); + let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast(); + assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2); + let anchor_tx = txn.pop().unwrap(); + let commitment_tx = txn.pop().unwrap(); + check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx); + check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, commitment_tx); (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), }; + assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output[2].value, 1_000); // HTLC A -> B + assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output[3].value, 2_000); // HTLC B -> A + mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + + { + let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast(); + assert_eq!(txn.len(), if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { 3 } else { 2 }); + + let htlc_preimage_tx = txn.pop().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(htlc_preimage_tx.input.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(htlc_preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, 3); + check_spends!(htlc_preimage_tx, commitment_tx); + + let htlc_timeout_tx = txn.pop().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_tx.input.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, 2); + check_spends!(htlc_timeout_tx, commitment_tx); + + if let Some(commitment_tx) = txn.pop() { + check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx); + } + } let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events(); // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified. - match *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow() { - ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks => { - assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3); - if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = holder_events.remove(0) {} - else { panic!("unexpected event"); } - - }, - _ => assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 2), - }; + if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { + assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3); + if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = holder_events.remove(0) {} + else { panic!("unexpected event"); } + } else { + assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 2); + } let mut htlc_txs = Vec::with_capacity(2); for event in holder_events { match event { - Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { htlc_descriptors, tx_lock_time, .. }) => { - assert_eq!(htlc_descriptors.len(), 1); - let htlc_descriptor = &htlc_descriptors[0]; - let signer = nodes[0].keys_manager.derive_channel_keys( - htlc_descriptor.channel_value_satoshis, &htlc_descriptor.channel_keys_id - ); - let per_commitment_point = signer.get_per_commitment_point(htlc_descriptor.per_commitment_number, &secp); - let mut htlc_tx = Transaction { - version: 2, - lock_time: tx_lock_time, - input: vec![ - htlc_descriptor.unsigned_tx_input(), // HTLC input - TxIn { ..Default::default() } // Fee input - ], - output: vec![ - htlc_descriptor.tx_output(&per_commitment_point, &secp), // HTLC output - TxOut { // Fee input change - value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(), - script_pubkey: Script::new_op_return(&[]), - } - ] - }; - let our_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_tx, 0, htlc_descriptor, &secp).unwrap(); - let witness_script = htlc_descriptor.witness_script(&per_commitment_point, &secp); - htlc_tx.input[0].witness = htlc_descriptor.tx_input_witness(&our_sig, &witness_script); + Event::BumpTransaction(event) => { + nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event); + let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast(); + assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1); + let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap(); + check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_tx, anchor_tx); htlc_txs.push(htlc_tx); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), @@ -2061,9 +2328,11 @@ fn test_yield_anchors_events() { // Clear the remaining events as they're not relevant to what we're testing. nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); } -#[cfg(anchors)] #[test] fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() { // Test that `ChannelMonitor`s can properly detect and claim funds from a counterparty claiming @@ -2074,18 +2343,15 @@ fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() { // Required to sign a revoked commitment transaction chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true; let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); + let bob_persister; + let bob_chain_monitor; + let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default(); anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true; anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true; + anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true; let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]); - - let bob_persister: test_utils::TestPersister; - let bob_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor; - let bob_deserialized: ChannelManager< - &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, - &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, - &test_utils::TestRouter, &test_utils::TestLogger, - >; + let bob_deserialized; let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); @@ -2136,120 +2402,73 @@ fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() { // Bob force closes by restarting with the outdated state, prompting the ChannelMonitors to // broadcast the latest commitment transaction known to them, which in our case is the one with // the HTLCs still pending. + *nodes[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2; nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred(); check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 2); - check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 2, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager); - let (revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b) = { - let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); - assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2); - assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs - assert_eq!(txn[1].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs - if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == chan_a.3.txid() { - check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_a.3); - check_spends!(&txn[1], &chan_b.3); - (txn[0].clone(), txn[1].clone()) - } else { - check_spends!(&txn[1], &chan_a.3); - check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_b.3); - (txn[1].clone(), txn[0].clone()) - } - }; + check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 2, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 1000000); // Bob should now receive two events to bump his revoked commitment transaction fees. assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); let events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 2); - let anchor_tx = { - let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(); - let public_key = PublicKey::new(secret_key.public_key(&secp)); - let fee_utxo_script = Script::new_v0_p2wpkh(&public_key.wpubkey_hash().unwrap()); + let mut revoked_commitment_txs = Vec::with_capacity(events.len()); + let mut anchor_txs = Vec::with_capacity(events.len()); + for (idx, event) in events.into_iter().enumerate() { + let utxo_value = Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat() * (idx + 1) as u64; let coinbase_tx = Transaction { version: 2, - lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, + lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }], output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx` - value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(), - script_pubkey: fee_utxo_script.clone(), + value: utxo_value, + script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(), }], }; - let mut anchor_tx = Transaction { - version: 2, - lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, - input: vec![ - TxIn { // Fee input - previous_output: bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, - ..Default::default() - }, - ], - output: vec![TxOut { // Fee input change - value: coinbase_tx.output[0].value / 2 , - script_pubkey: Script::new_op_return(&[]), - }], + nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, utxo_value); + match event { + Event::BumpTransaction(event) => nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event), + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), }; - let mut signers = Vec::with_capacity(2); - for event in events { - match event { - Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { anchor_descriptor, .. }) => { - anchor_tx.input.push(TxIn { - previous_output: anchor_descriptor.outpoint, - ..Default::default() - }); - let signer = nodes[1].keys_manager.derive_channel_keys( - anchor_descriptor.channel_value_satoshis, &anchor_descriptor.channel_keys_id, - ); - signers.push(signer); - }, - _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), - } - } - for (i, signer) in signers.into_iter().enumerate() { - let anchor_idx = i + 1; - let funding_sig = signer.sign_holder_anchor_input(&mut anchor_tx, anchor_idx, &secp).unwrap(); - anchor_tx.input[anchor_idx].witness = chan_utils::build_anchor_input_witness( - &signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey, &funding_sig - ); + let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast(); + assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2); + assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs + if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == chan_a.3.txid() { + check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_a.3); + } else { + check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_b.3); } - let fee_utxo_sig = { - let witness_script = Script::new_p2pkh(&public_key.pubkey_hash()); - let sighash = hash_to_message!(&SighashCache::new(&anchor_tx).segwit_signature_hash( - 0, &witness_script, coinbase_tx.output[0].value, EcdsaSighashType::All - ).unwrap()[..]); - let sig = sign(&secp, &sighash, &secret_key); - let mut sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec(); - sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8); - sig - }; - anchor_tx.input[0].witness = Witness::from_vec(vec![fee_utxo_sig, public_key.to_bytes()]); - check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b); - anchor_tx + let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = (&txn[0], &txn[1]); + check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, commitment_tx); + + revoked_commitment_txs.push(commitment_tx.clone()); + anchor_txs.push(anchor_tx.clone()); }; for node in &nodes { - mine_transactions(node, &[&revoked_commitment_a, &revoked_commitment_b, &anchor_tx]); + mine_transactions(node, &[&revoked_commitment_txs[0], &anchor_txs[0], &revoked_commitment_txs[1], &anchor_txs[1]]); } check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 2); check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 2, true); - check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed); + check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 1000000); // Alice should detect the confirmed revoked commitments, and attempt to claim all of the // revoked outputs. { let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); - assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2); + assert_eq!(txn.len(), 4); - let (revoked_claim_a, revoked_claim_b) = if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_commitment_a.txid() { - (&txn[0], &txn[1]) + let (revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_htlc_claim_b) = if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_commitment_txs[0].txid() { + (if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] }, if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] }) } else { - (&txn[1], &txn[0]) + (if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] }, if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] }) }; - // TODO: to_self claim must be separate from HTLC claims - assert_eq!(revoked_claim_a.input.len(), 3); // Spends both HTLC outputs and to_self output - assert_eq!(revoked_claim_a.output.len(), 1); - check_spends!(revoked_claim_a, revoked_commitment_a); - assert_eq!(revoked_claim_b.input.len(), 3); // Spends both HTLC outputs and to_self output - assert_eq!(revoked_claim_b.output.len(), 1); - check_spends!(revoked_claim_b, revoked_commitment_b); + assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs + assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.output.len(), 1); + check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_commitment_txs[0]); + assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs + assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.output.len(), 1); + check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_b, revoked_commitment_txs[1]); } // Since Bob was able to confirm his revoked commitment, he'll now try to claim the HTLCs @@ -2272,10 +2491,10 @@ fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() { let htlc_tx = { let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(); let public_key = PublicKey::new(secret_key.public_key(&secp)); - let fee_utxo_script = Script::new_v0_p2wpkh(&public_key.wpubkey_hash().unwrap()); + let fee_utxo_script = ScriptBuf::new_v0_p2wpkh(&public_key.wpubkey_hash().unwrap()); let coinbase_tx = Transaction { version: 2, - lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, + lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }], output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx` value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(), @@ -2284,28 +2503,26 @@ fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() { }; let mut htlc_tx = Transaction { version: 2, - lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, + lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: vec![TxIn { // Fee input previous_output: bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, ..Default::default() }], output: vec![TxOut { // Fee input change value: coinbase_tx.output[0].value / 2 , - script_pubkey: Script::new_op_return(&[]), + script_pubkey: ScriptBuf::new_op_return(&[]), }], }; let mut descriptors = Vec::with_capacity(4); for event in events { + // We don't use the `BumpTransactionEventHandler` here because it does not support + // creating one transaction from multiple `HTLCResolution` events. if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { mut htlc_descriptors, tx_lock_time, .. }) = event { assert_eq!(htlc_descriptors.len(), 2); for htlc_descriptor in &htlc_descriptors { assert!(!htlc_descriptor.htlc.offered); - let signer = nodes[1].keys_manager.derive_channel_keys( - htlc_descriptor.channel_value_satoshis, &htlc_descriptor.channel_keys_id - ); - let per_commitment_point = signer.get_per_commitment_point(htlc_descriptor.per_commitment_number, &secp); htlc_tx.input.push(htlc_descriptor.unsigned_tx_input()); - htlc_tx.output.push(htlc_descriptor.tx_output(&per_commitment_point, &secp)); + htlc_tx.output.push(htlc_descriptor.tx_output(&secp)); } descriptors.append(&mut htlc_descriptors); htlc_tx.lock_time = tx_lock_time; @@ -2315,16 +2532,13 @@ fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() { } for (idx, htlc_descriptor) in descriptors.into_iter().enumerate() { let htlc_input_idx = idx + 1; - let signer = nodes[1].keys_manager.derive_channel_keys( - htlc_descriptor.channel_value_satoshis, &htlc_descriptor.channel_keys_id - ); + let signer = htlc_descriptor.derive_channel_signer(&nodes[1].keys_manager); let our_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, htlc_input_idx, &htlc_descriptor, &secp).unwrap(); - let per_commitment_point = signer.get_per_commitment_point(htlc_descriptor.per_commitment_number, &secp); - let witness_script = htlc_descriptor.witness_script(&per_commitment_point, &secp); + let witness_script = htlc_descriptor.witness_script(&secp); htlc_tx.input[htlc_input_idx].witness = htlc_descriptor.tx_input_witness(&our_sig, &witness_script); } let fee_utxo_sig = { - let witness_script = Script::new_p2pkh(&public_key.pubkey_hash()); + let witness_script = ScriptBuf::new_p2pkh(&public_key.pubkey_hash()); let sighash = hash_to_message!(&SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash( 0, &witness_script, coinbase_tx.output[0].value, EcdsaSighashType::All ).unwrap()[..]); @@ -2333,8 +2547,8 @@ fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() { sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8); sig }; - htlc_tx.input[0].witness = Witness::from_vec(vec![fee_utxo_sig, public_key.to_bytes()]); - check_spends!(htlc_tx, coinbase_tx, revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b); + htlc_tx.input[0].witness = Witness::from_slice(&[fee_utxo_sig, public_key.to_bytes()]); + check_spends!(htlc_tx, coinbase_tx, revoked_commitment_txs[0], revoked_commitment_txs[1]); htlc_tx }; @@ -2344,23 +2558,9 @@ fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() { // Alice should see that Bob is trying to claim to HTLCs, so she should now try to claim them at // the second level instead. - let revoked_claims = { + let revoked_claim_transactions = { let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); - assert_eq!(txn.len(), 4); - - let revoked_to_self_claim_a = txn.iter().find(|tx| - tx.input.len() == 1 && - tx.output.len() == 1 && - tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_commitment_a.txid() - ).unwrap(); - check_spends!(revoked_to_self_claim_a, revoked_commitment_a); - - let revoked_to_self_claim_b = txn.iter().find(|tx| - tx.input.len() == 1 && - tx.output.len() == 1 && - tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_commitment_b.txid() - ).unwrap(); - check_spends!(revoked_to_self_claim_b, revoked_commitment_b); + assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2); let revoked_htlc_claims = txn.iter().filter(|tx| tx.input.len() == 2 && @@ -2372,10 +2572,14 @@ fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() { check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim, htlc_tx); } - txn + let mut revoked_claim_transaction_map = new_hash_map(); + for current_tx in txn.into_iter() { + revoked_claim_transaction_map.insert(current_tx.txid(), current_tx); + } + revoked_claim_transaction_map }; for node in &nodes { - mine_transactions(node, &revoked_claims.iter().collect::>()); + mine_transactions(node, &revoked_claim_transactions.values().collect::>()); } @@ -2394,13 +2598,19 @@ fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() { assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); let spendable_output_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(spendable_output_events.len(), 4); - for (idx, event) in spendable_output_events.iter().enumerate() { - if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = event { + for event in spendable_output_events { + if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, channel_id } = event { assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1); + assert!(vec![chan_b.2, chan_a.2].contains(&channel_id.unwrap())); let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs( - &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Script::new_op_return(&[]), 253, &Secp256k1::new(), + &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), ScriptBuf::new_op_return(&[]), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new(), ).unwrap(); - check_spends!(spend_tx, revoked_claims[idx]); + + if let SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(_) = &outputs[0] { + check_spends!(spend_tx, &revoked_commitment_txs[0], &revoked_commitment_txs[1]); + } else { + check_spends!(spend_tx, revoked_claim_transactions.get(&spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid).unwrap()); + } } else { panic!("unexpected event"); } @@ -2408,7 +2618,8 @@ fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() { assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty()); assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty()); - assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).is_empty()); + // On the Alice side, the individual to_self_claim are still pending confirmation. + assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 2); // TODO: From Bob's PoV, he still thinks he can claim the outputs from his revoked commitment. // This needs to be fixed before we enable pruning `ChannelMonitor`s once they don't have any // balances to claim. @@ -2417,3 +2628,198 @@ fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() { // revoked commitment which Bob has the preimage for. assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 6); } + +fn do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(confirm_commitment_before_reload: bool) { + // Tests that we'll fix a ChannelMonitor's `counterparty_payment_script` for an anchor outputs + // channel upon deserialization. + let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); + let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); + let persister; + let chain_monitor; + let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config(); + user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true; + user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true; + let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]); + let node_deserialized; + let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); + + let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 50_000_000); + + // Set the monitor's `counterparty_payment_script` to a dummy P2WPKH script. + let secp = Secp256k1::new(); + let privkey = bitcoin::PrivateKey::from_slice(&[1; 32], bitcoin::Network::Testnet).unwrap(); + let pubkey = bitcoin::PublicKey::from_private_key(&secp, &privkey); + let p2wpkh_script = ScriptBuf::new_v0_p2wpkh(&pubkey.wpubkey_hash().unwrap()); + get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).set_counterparty_payment_script(p2wpkh_script.clone()); + assert_eq!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_counterparty_payment_script(), p2wpkh_script); + + // Confirm the counterparty's commitment and reload the monitor (either before or after) such + // that we arrive at the correct `counterparty_payment_script` after the reload. + nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1); + check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true); + check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, + [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000); + + let commitment_tx = { + let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast(); + assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 4); + check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx); + txn.pop().unwrap() + }; + + mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx); + let commitment_tx_conf_height = if confirm_commitment_before_reload { + // We should expect our round trip serialization check to fail as we're writing the monitor + // with the incorrect P2WPKH script but reading it with the correct P2WSH script. + *nodes[1].chain_monitor.expect_monitor_round_trip_fail.lock().unwrap() = Some(chan_id); + let commitment_tx_conf_height = block_from_scid(mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx)); + let serialized_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).encode(); + reload_node!(nodes[1], user_config, &nodes[1].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, chain_monitor, node_deserialized); + commitment_tx_conf_height + } else { + let serialized_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).encode(); + reload_node!(nodes[1], user_config, &nodes[1].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, chain_monitor, node_deserialized); + let commitment_tx_conf_height = block_from_scid(mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx)); + check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1); + check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true); + commitment_tx_conf_height + }; + check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false, + [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000); + assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_counterparty_payment_script().is_v0_p2wsh()); + + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); + connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); + + if confirm_commitment_before_reload { + // If we saw the commitment before our `counterparty_payment_script` was fixed, we'll never + // get the spendable output event for the `to_remote` output, so we'll need to get it + // manually via `get_spendable_outputs`. + check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1); + let outputs = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&commitment_tx, commitment_tx_conf_height); + assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1); + let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs( + &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), + 253, None, &secp + ).unwrap(); + check_spends!(spend_tx, &commitment_tx); + } else { + test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx, false); + } +} + +#[test] +fn test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload() { + do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(false); + do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(true); +} + +#[cfg(not(feature = "_test_vectors"))] +fn do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(anchors: bool, confirm_counterparty_commitment: bool) { + // Tests that our monitor claims will always use fresh random signatures (ensuring a unique + // wtxid) to prevent certain classes of transaction replacement at the bitcoin P2P layer. + let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); + let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); + let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config(); + if anchors { + user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true; + user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true; + } + let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]); + let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); + + let coinbase_tx = Transaction { + version: 2, + lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, + input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }], + output: vec![ + TxOut { + value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(), + script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(), + }, + ], + }; + if anchors { + nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value); + } + + // Open a channel and route a payment. We'll let it timeout to claim it. + let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0); + route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000); + + let (closing_node, other_node) = if confirm_counterparty_commitment { + (&nodes[1], &nodes[0]) + } else { + (&nodes[0], &nodes[1]) + }; + + get_monitor!(closing_node, chan_id).broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn( + &closing_node.tx_broadcaster, &closing_node.fee_estimator, &closing_node.logger + ); + + // The commitment transaction comes first. + let commitment_tx = { + let mut txn = closing_node.tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast(); + assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1); + check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx); + txn.pop().unwrap() + }; + + mine_transaction(closing_node, &commitment_tx); + check_added_monitors!(closing_node, 1); + check_closed_broadcast!(closing_node, true); + check_closed_event!(closing_node, 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [other_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000); + + mine_transaction(other_node, &commitment_tx); + check_added_monitors!(other_node, 1); + check_closed_broadcast!(other_node, true); + check_closed_event!(other_node, 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [closing_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000); + + // If we update the best block to the new height before providing the confirmed transactions, + // we'll see another broadcast of the commitment transaction. + if !confirm_counterparty_commitment && nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { + let _ = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast(); + } + + // Then comes the HTLC timeout transaction. + if confirm_counterparty_commitment { + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 5); + test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx, false); + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5); + } else { + connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); + } + if anchors && !confirm_counterparty_commitment { + handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 1); + } + let htlc_timeout_tx = { + let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast(); + assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1); + let tx = txn.pop().unwrap(); + check_spends!(tx, commitment_tx, coinbase_tx); + tx + }; + + // Check we rebroadcast it with a different wtxid. + nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims(); + if anchors && !confirm_counterparty_commitment { + handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 1); + } + { + let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast(); + assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(txn[0].txid(), htlc_timeout_tx.txid()); + assert_ne!(txn[0].wtxid(), htlc_timeout_tx.wtxid()); + } +} + +#[cfg(not(feature = "_test_vectors"))] +#[test] +fn test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures() { + do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(false, false); + do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(false, true); + do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(true, false); + do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(true, true); +}