X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fln%2Fonion_utils.rs;h=34be2843812bc0c8a8c6e6c8e3003745ea15217d;hb=e61f3a238a70cbac87209e223b7c396108a49b97;hp=145eb8acbaed74c3b10f8fc26bf9af608d2b7329;hpb=bf007ea7632b7b95c280440bc50713e55784e315;p=rust-lightning

diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/onion_utils.rs b/lightning/src/ln/onion_utils.rs
index 145eb8ac..34be2843 100644
--- a/lightning/src/ln/onion_utils.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/ln/onion_utils.rs
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
 
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey, Scalar};
 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ pub(super) fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
 	Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner()
 }
 
-pub(crate) fn next_hop_packet_pubkey<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, mut packet_pubkey: PublicKey, packet_shared_secret: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error> {
+pub(crate) fn next_hop_packet_pubkey<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, packet_pubkey: PublicKey, packet_shared_secret: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error> {
 	let blinding_factor = {
 		let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 		sha.input(&packet_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ pub(crate) fn next_hop_packet_pubkey<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verifica
 		Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
 	};
 
-	packet_pubkey.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]).map(|_| packet_pubkey)
+	packet_pubkey.mul_tweak(secp_ctx, &Scalar::from_be_bytes(blinding_factor).unwrap())
 }
 
 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ pub(super) fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(
 
 		let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
 
-		blinded_priv.mul_assign(&blinding_factor)?;
+		blinded_priv = blinded_priv.mul_tweak(&Scalar::from_be_bytes(blinding_factor).unwrap())?;
 		blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
 
 		callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop, idx);
@@ -425,6 +425,7 @@ pub(super) fn process_onion_failure<T: secp256k1::Signing, L: Deref>(secp_ctx: &
 
 				if fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &err_packet.hmac) {
 					if let Some(error_code_slice) = err_packet.failuremsg.get(0..2) {
+						const BADONION: u16 = 0x8000;
 						const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
 						const NODE: u16 = 0x2000;
 						const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
@@ -445,12 +446,24 @@ pub(super) fn process_onion_failure<T: secp256k1::Signing, L: Deref>(secp_ctx: &
 						let mut network_update = None;
 						let mut short_channel_id = None;
 
-						if error_code & NODE == NODE {
+						if error_code & BADONION == BADONION {
+							// If the error code has the BADONION bit set, always blame the channel
+							// from the node "originating" the error to its next hop. The
+							// "originator" is ultimately actually claiming that its counterparty
+							// is the one who is failing the HTLC.
+							// If the "originator" here isn't lying we should really mark the
+							// next-hop node as failed entirely, but we can't be confident in that,
+							// as it would allow any node to get us to completely ban one of its
+							// counterparties. Instead, we simply remove the channel in question.
+							network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
+								short_channel_id: failing_route_hop.short_channel_id,
+								is_permanent: true,
+							});
+						} else if error_code & NODE == NODE {
 							let is_permanent = error_code & PERM == PERM;
 							network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure { node_id: route_hop.pubkey, is_permanent });
 							short_channel_id = Some(route_hop.short_channel_id);
-						}
-						else if error_code & PERM == PERM {
+						} else if error_code & PERM == PERM {
 							if !payment_failed {
 								network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
 									short_channel_id: failing_route_hop.short_channel_id,
@@ -458,8 +471,7 @@ pub(super) fn process_onion_failure<T: secp256k1::Signing, L: Deref>(secp_ctx: &
 								});
 								short_channel_id = Some(failing_route_hop.short_channel_id);
 							}
-						}
-						else if error_code & UPDATE == UPDATE {
+						} else if error_code & UPDATE == UPDATE {
 							if let Some(update_len_slice) = err_packet.failuremsg.get(debug_field_size+2..debug_field_size+4) {
 								let update_len = u16::from_be_bytes(update_len_slice.try_into().expect("len is 2")) as usize;
 								if let Some(mut update_slice) = err_packet.failuremsg.get(debug_field_size + 4..debug_field_size + 4 + update_len) {
@@ -545,9 +557,6 @@ pub(super) fn process_onion_failure<T: secp256k1::Signing, L: Deref>(secp_ctx: &
 							short_channel_id = Some(route_hop.short_channel_id);
 						}
 
-						// TODO: Here (and a few other places) we assume that BADONION errors
-						// are always "sourced" from the node previous to the one which failed
-						// to decode the onion.
 						res = Some((network_update, short_channel_id, !(error_code & PERM == PERM && is_from_final_node)));
 
 						let (description, title) = errors::get_onion_error_description(error_code);
@@ -725,7 +734,8 @@ pub(crate) fn decode_next_hop<D: DecodeInput, R: ReadableArgs<D::Arg>, N: NextPa
 				return Ok((msg, None)); // We are the final destination for this packet
 			} else {
 				let mut new_packet_bytes = N::new(hop_data.len());
-				let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(new_packet_bytes.as_mut()).unwrap();
+				let read_pos = hop_data.len() - chacha_stream.read.position() as usize;
+				chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut new_packet_bytes.as_mut()[..read_pos]).unwrap();
 				#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 				{
 					// Check two things: