X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fln%2Fonion_utils.rs;h=9af3de07ff4e7356ac65fe2069b3ff209761156a;hb=ce7463486ee1ae61e9af439c3d34d00244248ee9;hp=52eb7bcb54298a7cc8e8fc418f77d4de66babd69;hpb=c383f06538ac664fe3312daf765595ba106d5b98;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/onion_utils.rs b/lightning/src/ln/onion_utils.rs index 52eb7bcb..9af3de07 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/onion_utils.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/onion_utils.rs @@ -12,7 +12,8 @@ use crate::ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, RecipientOnionFields}; use crate::ln::msgs; use crate::ln::wire::Encode; use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkUpdate; -use crate::routing::router::{Path, RouteHop}; +use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, Path, RouteHop}; +use crate::sign::NodeSigner; use crate::util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader}; use crate::util::errors::{self, APIError}; use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, LengthCalculatingWriter}; @@ -91,25 +92,39 @@ pub(super) fn gen_pad_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] { Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner() } -pub(crate) fn next_hop_packet_pubkey(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, packet_pubkey: PublicKey, packet_shared_secret: &[u8; 32]) -> Result { +/// Calculates a pubkey for the next hop, such as the next hop's packet pubkey or blinding point. +pub(crate) fn next_hop_pubkey( + secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, curr_pubkey: PublicKey, shared_secret: &[u8] +) -> Result { let blinding_factor = { let mut sha = Sha256::engine(); - sha.input(&packet_pubkey.serialize()[..]); - sha.input(packet_shared_secret); + sha.input(&curr_pubkey.serialize()[..]); + sha.input(shared_secret); Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner() }; - packet_pubkey.mul_tweak(secp_ctx, &Scalar::from_be_bytes(blinding_factor).unwrap()) + curr_pubkey.mul_tweak(secp_ctx, &Scalar::from_be_bytes(blinding_factor).unwrap()) } // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid #[inline] -pub(super) fn construct_onion_keys_callback (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, path: &Vec, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> { +pub(super) fn construct_onion_keys_callback( + secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, path: &Path, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType +) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> +where + T: secp256k1::Signing, + FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, Option<&RouteHop>, usize) +{ let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone(); let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv); - for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() { - let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv); + let unblinded_hops_iter = path.hops.iter().map(|h| (&h.pubkey, Some(h))); + let blinded_pks_iter = path.blinded_tail.as_ref() + .map(|t| t.hops.iter()).unwrap_or([].iter()) + .skip(1) // Skip the intro node because it's included in the unblinded hops + .map(|h| (&h.blinded_node_id, None)); + for (idx, (pubkey, route_hop_opt)) in unblinded_hops_iter.chain(blinded_pks_iter).enumerate() { + let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(pubkey, &blinded_priv); let mut sha = Sha256::engine(); sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]); @@ -121,7 +136,7 @@ pub(super) fn construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, path: &Path, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result, secp256k1::Error> { let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(path.hops.len()); - construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, &path.hops, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _, _| { + construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, &path, session_priv, + |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _, _| + { let (rho, mu) = gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret.as_ref()); res.push(OnionKeys { @@ -149,11 +166,13 @@ pub(super) fn construct_onion_keys(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) -> Result<(Vec, u64, u32), APIError> { +pub(super) fn build_onion_payloads(path: &Path, total_msat: u64, mut recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, starting_htlc_offset: u32, keysend_preimage: &Option) -> Result<(Vec, u64, u32), APIError> { let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64; let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset; let mut last_short_channel_id = 0; - let mut res: Vec = Vec::with_capacity(path.hops.len()); + let mut res: Vec = Vec::with_capacity( + path.hops.len() + path.blinded_tail.as_ref().map_or(0, |t| t.hops.len()) + ); for (idx, hop) in path.hops.iter().rev().enumerate() { // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is @@ -161,9 +180,31 @@ pub(super) fn build_onion_payloads(path: &Path, total_msat: u64, mut recipient_o // the intended recipient). let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat }; let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv }; - res.insert(0, msgs::OnionHopData { - format: if idx == 0 { - msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { + if idx == 0 { + if let Some(BlindedTail { + blinding_point, hops, final_value_msat, excess_final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. + }) = &path.blinded_tail { + let mut blinding_point = Some(*blinding_point); + for (i, blinded_hop) in hops.iter().enumerate() { + if i == hops.len() - 1 { + cur_value_msat += final_value_msat; + cur_cltv += excess_final_cltv_expiry_delta; + res.push(msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { + amt_msat: *final_value_msat, + total_msat, + outgoing_cltv_value: cltv, + encrypted_tlvs: blinded_hop.encrypted_payload.clone(), + intro_node_blinding_point: blinding_point.take(), + }); + } else { + res.push(msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::BlindedForward { + encrypted_tlvs: blinded_hop.encrypted_payload.clone(), + intro_node_blinding_point: blinding_point.take(), + }); + } + } + } else { + res.push(msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Receive { payment_data: if let Some(secret) = recipient_onion.payment_secret.take() { Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData { payment_secret: secret, @@ -172,15 +213,18 @@ pub(super) fn build_onion_payloads(path: &Path, total_msat: u64, mut recipient_o } else { None }, payment_metadata: recipient_onion.payment_metadata.take(), keysend_preimage: *keysend_preimage, - } - } else { - msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { - short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id, - } - }, - amt_to_forward: value_msat, - outgoing_cltv_value: cltv, - }); + custom_tlvs: recipient_onion.custom_tlvs.clone(), + amt_msat: value_msat, + outgoing_cltv_value: cltv, + }); + } + } else { + res.insert(0, msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Forward { + short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id, + amt_to_forward: value_msat, + outgoing_cltv_value: cltv, + }); + } cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat; if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 { return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Channel fees overflowed?".to_owned()}); @@ -208,7 +252,10 @@ fn shift_slice_right(arr: &mut [u8], amt: usize) { } } -pub(super) fn construct_onion_packet(payloads: Vec, onion_keys: Vec, prng_seed: [u8; 32], associated_data: &PaymentHash) -> Result { +pub(super) fn construct_onion_packet( + payloads: Vec, onion_keys: Vec, prng_seed: [u8; 32], + associated_data: &PaymentHash +) -> Result { let mut packet_data = [0; ONION_DATA_LEN]; let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&prng_seed, &[0; 8]); @@ -376,229 +423,302 @@ pub(super) fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], failure_type: encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..]) } +pub(crate) struct DecodedOnionFailure { + pub(crate) network_update: Option, + pub(crate) short_channel_id: Option, + pub(crate) payment_failed_permanently: bool, + #[cfg(test)] + pub(crate) onion_error_code: Option, + #[cfg(test)] + pub(crate) onion_error_data: Option>, +} + /// Process failure we got back from upstream on a payment we sent (implying htlc_source is an /// OutboundRoute). -/// Returns update, a boolean indicating that the payment itself failed, the short channel id of -/// the responsible channel, and the error code. #[inline] -pub(super) fn process_onion_failure(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, logger: &L, htlc_source: &HTLCSource, mut packet_decrypted: Vec) -> (Option, Option, bool, Option, Option>) where L::Target: Logger { - if let &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = htlc_source { - let mut res = None; - let mut htlc_msat = *first_hop_htlc_msat; - let mut error_code_ret = None; - let mut error_packet_ret = None; - let mut is_from_final_node = false; - - // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler - construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, &path.hops, session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop, route_hop_idx| { - if res.is_some() { return; } - - let amt_to_forward = htlc_msat - route_hop.fee_msat; - htlc_msat = amt_to_forward; - - let ammag = gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret.as_ref()); - - let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len()); - decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0); - let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]); - chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]); - packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp; - - // The failing hop includes either the inbound channel to the recipient or the outbound - // channel from the current hop (i.e., the next hop's inbound channel). - is_from_final_node = route_hop_idx + 1 == path.hops.len(); - let failing_route_hop = if is_from_final_node { route_hop } else { &path.hops[route_hop_idx + 1] }; - - if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) { - let um = gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret.as_ref()); - let mut hmac = HmacEngine::::new(&um); - hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]); - - if fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &err_packet.hmac) { - if let Some(error_code_slice) = err_packet.failuremsg.get(0..2) { - const BADONION: u16 = 0x8000; - const PERM: u16 = 0x4000; - const NODE: u16 = 0x2000; - const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000; - - let error_code = u16::from_be_bytes(error_code_slice.try_into().expect("len is 2")); - error_code_ret = Some(error_code); - error_packet_ret = Some(err_packet.failuremsg[2..].to_vec()); - - let (debug_field, debug_field_size) = errors::get_onion_debug_field(error_code); - - // indicate that payment parameter has failed and no need to - // update Route object - let payment_failed = match error_code & 0xff { - 15|16|17|18|19|23 => true, - _ => false, - } && is_from_final_node; // PERM bit observed below even if this error is from the intermediate nodes - - let mut network_update = None; - let mut short_channel_id = None; - - if error_code & BADONION == BADONION { - // If the error code has the BADONION bit set, always blame the channel - // from the node "originating" the error to its next hop. The - // "originator" is ultimately actually claiming that its counterparty - // is the one who is failing the HTLC. - // If the "originator" here isn't lying we should really mark the - // next-hop node as failed entirely, but we can't be confident in that, - // as it would allow any node to get us to completely ban one of its - // counterparties. Instead, we simply remove the channel in question. +pub(super) fn process_onion_failure( + secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, logger: &L, htlc_source: &HTLCSource, mut packet_decrypted: Vec +) -> DecodedOnionFailure where L::Target: Logger { + let (path, session_priv, first_hop_htlc_msat) = if let &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { + ref path, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, .. + } = htlc_source { + (path, session_priv, first_hop_htlc_msat) + } else { unreachable!() }; + + // Learnings from the HTLC failure to inform future payment retries and scoring. + struct FailureLearnings { + network_update: Option, + short_channel_id: Option, + payment_failed_permanently: bool, + } + let mut res: Option = None; + let mut htlc_msat = *first_hop_htlc_msat; + let mut error_code_ret = None; + let mut error_packet_ret = None; + let mut is_from_final_node = false; + + const BADONION: u16 = 0x8000; + const PERM: u16 = 0x4000; + const NODE: u16 = 0x2000; + const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000; + + // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler + construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, &path, session_priv, + |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop_opt, route_hop_idx| + { + if res.is_some() { return; } + + let route_hop = match route_hop_opt { + Some(hop) => hop, + None => { + // Got an error from within a blinded route. + error_code_ret = Some(BADONION | PERM | 24); // invalid_onion_blinding + error_packet_ret = Some(vec![0; 32]); + res = Some(FailureLearnings { + network_update: None, short_channel_id: None, payment_failed_permanently: false + }); + return + }, + }; + + // The failing hop includes either the inbound channel to the recipient or the outbound channel + // from the current hop (i.e., the next hop's inbound channel). + let num_blinded_hops = path.blinded_tail.as_ref().map_or(0, |bt| bt.hops.len()); + // For 1-hop blinded paths, the final `path.hops` entry is the recipient. + is_from_final_node = route_hop_idx + 1 == path.hops.len() && num_blinded_hops <= 1; + let failing_route_hop = if is_from_final_node { route_hop } else { + match path.hops.get(route_hop_idx + 1) { + Some(hop) => hop, + None => { + // The failing hop is within a multi-hop blinded path. + error_code_ret = Some(BADONION | PERM | 24); // invalid_onion_blinding + error_packet_ret = Some(vec![0; 32]); + res = Some(FailureLearnings { + network_update: None, short_channel_id: None, payment_failed_permanently: false + }); + return + } + } + }; + + let amt_to_forward = htlc_msat - route_hop.fee_msat; + htlc_msat = amt_to_forward; + + let ammag = gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret.as_ref()); + + let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len()); + decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0); + let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]); + chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]); + packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp; + + let err_packet = match msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) { + Ok(p) => p, + Err(_) => return + }; + let um = gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret.as_ref()); + let mut hmac = HmacEngine::::new(&um); + hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]); + + if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &err_packet.hmac) { return } + let error_code_slice = match err_packet.failuremsg.get(0..2) { + Some(s) => s, + None => { + // Useless packet that we can't use but it passed HMAC, so it definitely came from the peer + // in question + let network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure { + node_id: route_hop.pubkey, + is_permanent: true, + }); + let short_channel_id = Some(route_hop.short_channel_id); + res = Some(FailureLearnings { + network_update, short_channel_id, payment_failed_permanently: is_from_final_node + }); + return + } + }; + + let error_code = u16::from_be_bytes(error_code_slice.try_into().expect("len is 2")); + error_code_ret = Some(error_code); + error_packet_ret = Some(err_packet.failuremsg[2..].to_vec()); + + let (debug_field, debug_field_size) = errors::get_onion_debug_field(error_code); + + // indicate that payment parameter has failed and no need to update Route object + let payment_failed = match error_code & 0xff { + 15|16|17|18|19|23 => true, + _ => false, + } && is_from_final_node; // PERM bit observed below even if this error is from the intermediate nodes + + let mut network_update = None; + let mut short_channel_id = None; + + if error_code & BADONION == BADONION { + // If the error code has the BADONION bit set, always blame the channel from the node + // "originating" the error to its next hop. The "originator" is ultimately actually claiming + // that its counterparty is the one who is failing the HTLC. + // If the "originator" here isn't lying we should really mark the next-hop node as failed + // entirely, but we can't be confident in that, as it would allow any node to get us to + // completely ban one of its counterparties. Instead, we simply remove the channel in + // question. + network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { + short_channel_id: failing_route_hop.short_channel_id, + is_permanent: true, + }); + } else if error_code & NODE == NODE { + let is_permanent = error_code & PERM == PERM; + network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure { node_id: route_hop.pubkey, is_permanent }); + short_channel_id = Some(route_hop.short_channel_id); + } else if error_code & PERM == PERM { + if !payment_failed { + network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { + short_channel_id: failing_route_hop.short_channel_id, + is_permanent: true, + }); + short_channel_id = Some(failing_route_hop.short_channel_id); + } + } else if error_code & UPDATE == UPDATE { + if let Some(update_len_slice) = err_packet.failuremsg.get(debug_field_size+2..debug_field_size+4) { + let update_len = u16::from_be_bytes(update_len_slice.try_into().expect("len is 2")) as usize; + if let Some(mut update_slice) = err_packet.failuremsg.get(debug_field_size + 4..debug_field_size + 4 + update_len) { + // Historically, the BOLTs were unclear if the message type + // bytes should be included here or not. The BOLTs have now + // been updated to indicate that they *are* included, but many + // nodes still send messages without the type bytes, so we + // support both here. + // TODO: Switch to hard require the type prefix, as the current + // permissiveness introduces the (although small) possibility + // that we fail to decode legitimate channel updates that + // happen to start with ChannelUpdate::TYPE, i.e., [0x01, 0x02]. + if update_slice.len() > 2 && update_slice[0..2] == msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.to_be_bytes() { + update_slice = &update_slice[2..]; + } else { + log_trace!(logger, "Failure provided features a channel update without type prefix. Deprecated, but allowing for now."); + } + let update_opt = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&update_slice)); + if update_opt.is_ok() || update_slice.is_empty() { + // if channel_update should NOT have caused the failure: + // MAY treat the channel_update as invalid. + let is_chan_update_invalid = match error_code & 0xff { + 7 => false, + 11 => update_opt.is_ok() && + amt_to_forward > + update_opt.as_ref().unwrap().contents.htlc_minimum_msat, + 12 => update_opt.is_ok() && amt_to_forward + .checked_mul(update_opt.as_ref().unwrap() + .contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64) + .map(|prop_fee| prop_fee / 1_000_000) + .and_then(|prop_fee| prop_fee.checked_add( + update_opt.as_ref().unwrap().contents.fee_base_msat as u64)) + .map(|fee_msats| route_hop.fee_msat >= fee_msats) + .unwrap_or(false), + 13 => update_opt.is_ok() && + route_hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u16 >= + update_opt.as_ref().unwrap().contents.cltv_expiry_delta, + 14 => false, // expiry_too_soon; always valid? + 20 => update_opt.as_ref().unwrap().contents.flags & 2 == 0, + _ => false, // unknown error code; take channel_update as valid + }; + if is_chan_update_invalid { + // This probably indicates the node which forwarded + // to the node in question corrupted something. network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { - short_channel_id: failing_route_hop.short_channel_id, + short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true, }); - } else if error_code & NODE == NODE { - let is_permanent = error_code & PERM == PERM; - network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure { node_id: route_hop.pubkey, is_permanent }); - short_channel_id = Some(route_hop.short_channel_id); - } else if error_code & PERM == PERM { - if !payment_failed { + } else { + if let Ok(chan_update) = update_opt { + // Make sure the ChannelUpdate contains the expected + // short channel id. + if failing_route_hop.short_channel_id == chan_update.contents.short_channel_id { + short_channel_id = Some(failing_route_hop.short_channel_id); + } else { + log_info!(logger, "Node provided a channel_update for which it was not authoritative, ignoring."); + } + network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { + msg: chan_update, + }) + } else { + // The node in question intentionally encoded a 0-length channel update. This is + // likely due to https://github.com/ElementsProject/lightning/issues/6200. + short_channel_id = Some(failing_route_hop.short_channel_id); network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id: failing_route_hop.short_channel_id, - is_permanent: true, - }); - short_channel_id = Some(failing_route_hop.short_channel_id); - } - } else if error_code & UPDATE == UPDATE { - if let Some(update_len_slice) = err_packet.failuremsg.get(debug_field_size+2..debug_field_size+4) { - let update_len = u16::from_be_bytes(update_len_slice.try_into().expect("len is 2")) as usize; - if let Some(mut update_slice) = err_packet.failuremsg.get(debug_field_size + 4..debug_field_size + 4 + update_len) { - // Historically, the BOLTs were unclear if the message type - // bytes should be included here or not. The BOLTs have now - // been updated to indicate that they *are* included, but many - // nodes still send messages without the type bytes, so we - // support both here. - // TODO: Switch to hard require the type prefix, as the current - // permissiveness introduces the (although small) possibility - // that we fail to decode legitimate channel updates that - // happen to start with ChannelUpdate::TYPE, i.e., [0x01, 0x02]. - if update_slice.len() > 2 && update_slice[0..2] == msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.to_be_bytes() { - update_slice = &update_slice[2..]; - } else { - log_trace!(logger, "Failure provided features a channel update without type prefix. Deprecated, but allowing for now."); - } - let update_opt = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&update_slice)); - if update_opt.is_ok() || update_slice.is_empty() { - // if channel_update should NOT have caused the failure: - // MAY treat the channel_update as invalid. - let is_chan_update_invalid = match error_code & 0xff { - 7 => false, - 11 => update_opt.is_ok() && - amt_to_forward > - update_opt.as_ref().unwrap().contents.htlc_minimum_msat, - 12 => update_opt.is_ok() && amt_to_forward - .checked_mul(update_opt.as_ref().unwrap() - .contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64) - .map(|prop_fee| prop_fee / 1_000_000) - .and_then(|prop_fee| prop_fee.checked_add( - update_opt.as_ref().unwrap().contents.fee_base_msat as u64)) - .map(|fee_msats| route_hop.fee_msat >= fee_msats) - .unwrap_or(false), - 13 => update_opt.is_ok() && - route_hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u16 >= - update_opt.as_ref().unwrap().contents.cltv_expiry_delta, - 14 => false, // expiry_too_soon; always valid? - 20 => update_opt.as_ref().unwrap().contents.flags & 2 == 0, - _ => false, // unknown error code; take channel_update as valid - }; - if is_chan_update_invalid { - // This probably indicates the node which forwarded - // to the node in question corrupted something. - network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { - short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id, - is_permanent: true, - }); - } else { - if let Ok(chan_update) = update_opt { - // Make sure the ChannelUpdate contains the expected - // short channel id. - if failing_route_hop.short_channel_id == chan_update.contents.short_channel_id { - short_channel_id = Some(failing_route_hop.short_channel_id); - } else { - log_info!(logger, "Node provided a channel_update for which it was not authoritative, ignoring."); - } - network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { - msg: chan_update, - }) - } else { - network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { - short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id, - is_permanent: false, - }); - } - }; - } else { - // If the channel_update had a non-zero length (i.e. was - // present) but we couldn't read it, treat it as a total - // node failure. - log_info!(logger, - "Failed to read a channel_update of len {} in an onion", - update_slice.len()); - } - } - } - if network_update.is_none() { - // They provided an UPDATE which was obviously bogus, not worth - // trying to relay through them anymore. - network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure { - node_id: route_hop.pubkey, - is_permanent: true, + is_permanent: false, }); } - if short_channel_id.is_none() { - short_channel_id = Some(route_hop.short_channel_id); - } - } else if payment_failed { - // Only blame the hop when a value in the HTLC doesn't match the - // corresponding value in the onion. - short_channel_id = match error_code & 0xff { - 18|19 => Some(route_hop.short_channel_id), - _ => None, - }; - } else { - // We can't understand their error messages and they failed to - // forward...they probably can't understand our forwards so its - // really not worth trying any further. - network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure { - node_id: route_hop.pubkey, - is_permanent: true, - }); - short_channel_id = Some(route_hop.short_channel_id); - } - - res = Some((network_update, short_channel_id, !(error_code & PERM == PERM && is_from_final_node))); - - let (description, title) = errors::get_onion_error_description(error_code); - if debug_field_size > 0 && err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 + debug_field_size { - log_info!(logger, "Onion Error[from {}: {}({:#x}) {}({})] {}", route_hop.pubkey, title, error_code, debug_field, log_bytes!(&err_packet.failuremsg[4..4+debug_field_size]), description); - } - else { - log_info!(logger, "Onion Error[from {}: {}({:#x})] {}", route_hop.pubkey, title, error_code, description); - } + }; } else { - // Useless packet that we can't use but it passed HMAC, so it - // definitely came from the peer in question - let network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure { - node_id: route_hop.pubkey, - is_permanent: true, - }); - let short_channel_id = Some(route_hop.short_channel_id); - res = Some((network_update, short_channel_id, !is_from_final_node)); + // If the channel_update had a non-zero length (i.e. was + // present) but we couldn't read it, treat it as a total + // node failure. + log_info!(logger, + "Failed to read a channel_update of len {} in an onion", + update_slice.len()); } } } - }).expect("Route that we sent via spontaneously grew invalid keys in the middle of it?"); - if let Some((channel_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable)) = res { - (channel_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, error_code_ret, error_packet_ret) + if network_update.is_none() { + // They provided an UPDATE which was obviously bogus, not worth + // trying to relay through them anymore. + network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure { + node_id: route_hop.pubkey, + is_permanent: true, + }); + } + if short_channel_id.is_none() { + short_channel_id = Some(route_hop.short_channel_id); + } + } else if payment_failed { + // Only blame the hop when a value in the HTLC doesn't match the corresponding value in the + // onion. + short_channel_id = match error_code & 0xff { + 18|19 => Some(route_hop.short_channel_id), + _ => None, + }; } else { - // only not set either packet unparseable or hmac does not match with any - // payment not retryable only when garbage is from the final node - (None, None, !is_from_final_node, None, None) + // We can't understand their error messages and they failed to forward...they probably can't + // understand our forwards so it's really not worth trying any further. + network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure { + node_id: route_hop.pubkey, + is_permanent: true, + }); + short_channel_id = Some(route_hop.short_channel_id); } - } else { unreachable!(); } + + res = Some(FailureLearnings { + network_update, short_channel_id, + payment_failed_permanently: error_code & PERM == PERM && is_from_final_node + }); + + let (description, title) = errors::get_onion_error_description(error_code); + if debug_field_size > 0 && err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 + debug_field_size { + log_info!(logger, "Onion Error[from {}: {}({:#x}) {}({})] {}", route_hop.pubkey, title, error_code, debug_field, log_bytes!(&err_packet.failuremsg[4..4+debug_field_size]), description); + } else { + log_info!(logger, "Onion Error[from {}: {}({:#x})] {}", route_hop.pubkey, title, error_code, description); + } + }).expect("Route that we sent via spontaneously grew invalid keys in the middle of it?"); + if let Some(FailureLearnings { + network_update, short_channel_id, payment_failed_permanently + }) = res { + DecodedOnionFailure { + network_update, short_channel_id, payment_failed_permanently, + #[cfg(test)] + onion_error_code: error_code_ret, + #[cfg(test)] + onion_error_data: error_packet_ret + } + } else { + // only not set either packet unparseable or hmac does not match with any + // payment not retryable only when garbage is from the final node + DecodedOnionFailure { + network_update: None, short_channel_id: None, payment_failed_permanently: is_from_final_node, + #[cfg(test)] + onion_error_code: None, + #[cfg(test)] + onion_error_data: None + } + } } #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug @@ -721,12 +841,12 @@ impl HTLCFailReason { pub(super) fn decode_onion_failure( &self, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, logger: &L, htlc_source: &HTLCSource - ) -> (Option, Option, bool, Option, Option>) - where L::Target: Logger { + ) -> DecodedOnionFailure where L::Target: Logger { match self.0 { HTLCFailReasonRepr::LightningError { ref err } => { process_onion_failure(secp_ctx, logger, &htlc_source, err.data.clone()) }, + #[allow(unused)] HTLCFailReasonRepr::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data, .. } => { // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary @@ -734,7 +854,15 @@ impl HTLCFailReason { // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via // ChannelDetails. if let &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, .. } = htlc_source { - (None, Some(path.hops[0].short_channel_id), true, Some(*failure_code), Some(data.clone())) + DecodedOnionFailure { + network_update: None, + payment_failed_permanently: false, + short_channel_id: Some(path.hops[0].short_channel_id), + #[cfg(test)] + onion_error_code: Some(*failure_code), + #[cfg(test)] + onion_error_data: Some(data.clone()), + } } else { unreachable!(); } } } @@ -763,11 +891,11 @@ impl NextPacketBytes for Vec { pub(crate) enum Hop { /// This onion payload was for us, not for forwarding to a next-hop. Contains information for /// verifying the incoming payment. - Receive(msgs::OnionHopData), + Receive(msgs::InboundOnionPayload), /// This onion payload needs to be forwarded to a next-hop. Forward { /// Onion payload data used in forwarding the payment. - next_hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, + next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, /// HMAC of the next hop's onion packet. next_hop_hmac: [u8; 32], /// Bytes of the onion packet we're forwarding. @@ -790,8 +918,11 @@ pub(crate) enum OnionDecodeErr { }, } -pub(crate) fn decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret: [u8; 32], hop_data: &[u8], hmac_bytes: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash) -> Result { - match decode_next_hop(shared_secret, hop_data, hmac_bytes, Some(payment_hash), ()) { +pub(crate) fn decode_next_payment_hop( + shared_secret: [u8; 32], hop_data: &[u8], hmac_bytes: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash, + node_signer: &NS, +) -> Result where NS::Target: NodeSigner { + match decode_next_hop(shared_secret, hop_data, hmac_bytes, Some(payment_hash), node_signer) { Ok((next_hop_data, None)) => Ok(Hop::Receive(next_hop_data)), Ok((next_hop_data, Some((next_hop_hmac, FixedSizeOnionPacket(new_packet_bytes))))) => { Ok(Hop::Forward { @@ -915,30 +1046,30 @@ mod tests { RouteHop { pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(), node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(), - short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // We fill in the payloads manually instead of generating them from RouteHops. + short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0, maybe_announced_channel: true, // We fill in the payloads manually instead of generating them from RouteHops. }, RouteHop { pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(), node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(), - short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // We fill in the payloads manually instead of generating them from RouteHops. + short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0, maybe_announced_channel: true, // We fill in the payloads manually instead of generating them from RouteHops. }, RouteHop { pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(), node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(), - short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // We fill in the payloads manually instead of generating them from RouteHops. + short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0, maybe_announced_channel: true, // We fill in the payloads manually instead of generating them from RouteHops. }, RouteHop { pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(), node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(), - short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // We fill in the payloads manually instead of generating them from RouteHops. + short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0, maybe_announced_channel: true, // We fill in the payloads manually instead of generating them from RouteHops. }, RouteHop { pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(), node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(), - short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // We fill in the payloads manually instead of generating them from RouteHops. + short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0, maybe_announced_channel: true, // We fill in the payloads manually instead of generating them from RouteHops. }, ], blinded_tail: None }], - payment_params: None, + route_params: None, }; let onion_keys = super::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &get_test_session_key()).unwrap(); @@ -988,10 +1119,8 @@ mod tests { // with raw hex instead of our in-memory enums, as the payloads contains custom types, and // we have no way of representing that with our enums. let payloads = vec!( - RawOnionHopData::new(msgs::OnionHopData { - format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { - short_channel_id: 1, - }, + RawOnionHopData::new(msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Forward { + short_channel_id: 1, amt_to_forward: 15000, outgoing_cltv_value: 1500, }), @@ -1013,17 +1142,13 @@ mod tests { RawOnionHopData { data: hex::decode("52020236b00402057806080000000000000002fd02013c0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f").unwrap(), }, - RawOnionHopData::new(msgs::OnionHopData { - format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { - short_channel_id: 3, - }, + RawOnionHopData::new(msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Forward { + short_channel_id: 3, amt_to_forward: 12500, outgoing_cltv_value: 1250, }), - RawOnionHopData::new(msgs::OnionHopData { - format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { - short_channel_id: 4, - }, + RawOnionHopData::new(msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Forward { + short_channel_id: 4, amt_to_forward: 10000, outgoing_cltv_value: 1000, }), @@ -1101,7 +1226,7 @@ mod tests { data: Vec } impl RawOnionHopData { - fn new(orig: msgs::OnionHopData) -> Self { + fn new(orig: msgs::OutboundOnionPayload) -> Self { Self { data: orig.encode() } } }