X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fonion_message%2Fmessenger.rs;h=37de550453283e4a383051ace821cabb44f95ff1;hb=9bac73b4f3c922b790d1ec844413c4567149f4ca;hp=f2bb685f8bb2c1297443f57808a3ce7b284db412;hpb=a0917e50e88d849302ec2651c4255789ad5c940c;p=rust-lightning

diff --git a/lightning/src/onion_message/messenger.rs b/lightning/src/onion_message/messenger.rs
index f2bb685f..37de5504 100644
--- a/lightning/src/onion_message/messenger.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/onion_message/messenger.rs
@@ -358,16 +358,28 @@ where
 		const MIN_PEER_CHANNELS: usize = 3;
 
 		let network_graph = self.network_graph.deref().read_only();
-		let paths = peers.iter()
+		let is_recipient_announced =
+			network_graph.nodes().contains_key(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&recipient));
+
+		let mut peer_info = peers.iter()
 			// Limit to peers with announced channels
-			.filter(|pubkey|
+			.filter_map(|pubkey|
 				network_graph
 					.node(&NodeId::from_pubkey(pubkey))
-					.map(|info| &info.channels[..])
-					.map(|channels| channels.len() >= MIN_PEER_CHANNELS)
-					.unwrap_or(false)
+					.filter(|info| info.channels.len() >= MIN_PEER_CHANNELS)
+					.map(|info| (*pubkey, info.is_tor_only(), info.channels.len()))
 			)
-			.map(|pubkey| vec![*pubkey, recipient])
+			// Exclude Tor-only nodes when the recipient is announced.
+			.filter(|(_, is_tor_only, _)| !(*is_tor_only && is_recipient_announced))
+			.collect::<Vec<_>>();
+
+		// Prefer using non-Tor nodes with the most channels as the introduction node.
+		peer_info.sort_unstable_by(|(_, a_tor_only, a_channels), (_, b_tor_only, b_channels)| {
+			a_tor_only.cmp(b_tor_only).then(a_channels.cmp(b_channels).reverse())
+		});
+
+		let paths = peer_info.into_iter()
+			.map(|(pubkey, _, _)| vec![pubkey, recipient])
 			.map(|node_pks| BlindedPath::new_for_message(&node_pks, &*self.entropy_source, secp_ctx))
 			.take(MAX_PATHS)
 			.collect::<Result<Vec<_>, _>>();
@@ -375,7 +387,7 @@ where
 		match paths {
 			Ok(paths) if !paths.is_empty() => Ok(paths),
 			_ => {
-				if network_graph.nodes().contains_key(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&recipient)) {
+				if is_recipient_announced {
 					BlindedPath::one_hop_for_message(recipient, &*self.entropy_source, secp_ctx)
 						.map(|path| vec![path])
 				} else {
@@ -413,7 +425,7 @@ impl OnionMessagePath {
 }
 
 /// The destination of an onion message.
-#[derive(Clone)]
+#[derive(Clone, Hash, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
 pub enum Destination {
 	/// We're sending this onion message to a node.
 	Node(PublicKey),
@@ -440,7 +452,7 @@ impl Destination {
 /// Result of successfully [sending an onion message].
 ///
 /// [sending an onion message]: OnionMessenger::send_onion_message
-#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Hash, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
 pub enum SendSuccess {
 	/// The message was buffered and will be sent once it is processed by
 	/// [`OnionMessageHandler::next_onion_message_for_peer`].
@@ -453,7 +465,7 @@ pub enum SendSuccess {
 /// Errors that may occur when [sending an onion message].
 ///
 /// [sending an onion message]: OnionMessenger::send_onion_message
-#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Hash, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
 pub enum SendError {
 	/// Errored computing onion message packet keys.
 	Secp256k1(secp256k1::Error),
@@ -523,6 +535,7 @@ pub trait CustomOnionMessageHandler {
 
 /// A processed incoming onion message, containing either a Forward (another onion message)
 /// or a Receive payload with decrypted contents.
+#[derive(Debug)]
 pub enum PeeledOnion<T: OnionMessageContents> {
 	/// Forwarded onion, with the next node id and a new onion
 	Forward(PublicKey, OnionMessage),