X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fonion_message%2Fmessenger.rs;h=c6b925704967b67773a2ef06c2ad2c21f2517e25;hb=98340dc25371eeae2854bebf6ac0f4faba0d2830;hp=1c37fc3d71e7c4e309e043b27e5fe0dd51138f27;hpb=f70c113fd813cff4d31481a9200e5f7121224a81;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/lightning/src/onion_message/messenger.rs b/lightning/src/onion_message/messenger.rs index 1c37fc3d..c6b92570 100644 --- a/lightning/src/onion_message/messenger.rs +++ b/lightning/src/onion_message/messenger.rs @@ -96,8 +96,8 @@ pub(super) const MAX_TIMER_TICKS: usize = 2; /// # first_node_addresses: None, /// # }) /// # } -/// # fn create_blinded_paths( -/// # &self, _recipient: PublicKey, _peers: Vec, _entropy_source: &ES, _secp_ctx: &Secp256k1 +/// # fn create_blinded_paths( +/// # &self, _recipient: PublicKey, _peers: Vec, _secp_ctx: &Secp256k1 /// # ) -> Result, ()> { /// # unreachable!() /// # } @@ -285,34 +285,37 @@ pub trait MessageRouter { /// Creates [`BlindedPath`]s to the `recipient` node. The nodes in `peers` are assumed to be /// direct peers with the `recipient`. fn create_blinded_paths< - ES: EntropySource + ?Sized, T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification + T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification >( - &self, recipient: PublicKey, peers: Vec, entropy_source: &ES, - secp_ctx: &Secp256k1 + &self, recipient: PublicKey, peers: Vec, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, ) -> Result, ()>; } /// A [`MessageRouter`] that can only route to a directly connected [`Destination`]. -pub struct DefaultMessageRouter>, L: Deref> +pub struct DefaultMessageRouter>, L: Deref, ES: Deref> where L::Target: Logger, + ES::Target: EntropySource, { network_graph: G, + entropy_source: ES, } -impl>, L: Deref> DefaultMessageRouter +impl>, L: Deref, ES: Deref> DefaultMessageRouter where L::Target: Logger, + ES::Target: EntropySource, { /// Creates a [`DefaultMessageRouter`] using the given [`NetworkGraph`]. - pub fn new(network_graph: G) -> Self { - Self { network_graph } + pub fn new(network_graph: G, entropy_source: ES) -> Self { + Self { network_graph, entropy_source } } } -impl>, L: Deref> MessageRouter for DefaultMessageRouter +impl>, L: Deref, ES: Deref> MessageRouter for DefaultMessageRouter where L::Target: Logger, + ES::Target: EntropySource, { fn find_path( &self, _sender: PublicKey, peers: Vec, destination: Destination @@ -343,10 +346,9 @@ where } fn create_blinded_paths< - ES: EntropySource + ?Sized, T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification + T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification >( - &self, recipient: PublicKey, peers: Vec, entropy_source: &ES, - secp_ctx: &Secp256k1 + &self, recipient: PublicKey, peers: Vec, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, ) -> Result, ()> { // Limit the number of blinded paths that are computed. const MAX_PATHS: usize = 3; @@ -356,25 +358,37 @@ where const MIN_PEER_CHANNELS: usize = 3; let network_graph = self.network_graph.deref().read_only(); - let paths = peers.iter() + let is_recipient_announced = + network_graph.nodes().contains_key(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&recipient)); + + let mut peer_info = peers.iter() // Limit to peers with announced channels - .filter(|pubkey| + .filter_map(|pubkey| network_graph .node(&NodeId::from_pubkey(pubkey)) - .map(|info| &info.channels[..]) - .map(|channels| channels.len() >= MIN_PEER_CHANNELS) - .unwrap_or(false) + .filter(|info| info.channels.len() >= MIN_PEER_CHANNELS) + .map(|info| (*pubkey, info.is_tor_only(), info.channels.len())) ) - .map(|pubkey| vec![*pubkey, recipient]) - .map(|node_pks| BlindedPath::new_for_message(&node_pks, entropy_source, secp_ctx)) + // Exclude Tor-only nodes when the recipient is announced. + .filter(|(_, is_tor_only, _)| !(*is_tor_only && is_recipient_announced)) + .collect::>(); + + // Prefer using non-Tor nodes with the most channels as the introduction node. + peer_info.sort_unstable_by(|(_, a_tor_only, a_channels), (_, b_tor_only, b_channels)| { + a_tor_only.cmp(b_tor_only).then(a_channels.cmp(b_channels).reverse()) + }); + + let paths = peer_info.into_iter() + .map(|(pubkey, _, _)| vec![pubkey, recipient]) + .map(|node_pks| BlindedPath::new_for_message(&node_pks, &*self.entropy_source, secp_ctx)) .take(MAX_PATHS) .collect::, _>>(); match paths { Ok(paths) if !paths.is_empty() => Ok(paths), _ => { - if network_graph.nodes().contains_key(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&recipient)) { - BlindedPath::one_hop_for_message(recipient, entropy_source, secp_ctx) + if is_recipient_announced { + BlindedPath::one_hop_for_message(recipient, &*self.entropy_source, secp_ctx) .map(|path| vec![path]) } else { Err(()) @@ -411,7 +425,7 @@ impl OnionMessagePath { } /// The destination of an onion message. -#[derive(Clone)] +#[derive(Clone, Hash, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)] pub enum Destination { /// We're sending this onion message to a node. Node(PublicKey), @@ -438,7 +452,7 @@ impl Destination { /// Result of successfully [sending an onion message]. /// /// [sending an onion message]: OnionMessenger::send_onion_message -#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq)] +#[derive(Clone, Hash, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)] pub enum SendSuccess { /// The message was buffered and will be sent once it is processed by /// [`OnionMessageHandler::next_onion_message_for_peer`]. @@ -451,7 +465,7 @@ pub enum SendSuccess { /// Errors that may occur when [sending an onion message]. /// /// [sending an onion message]: OnionMessenger::send_onion_message -#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq)] +#[derive(Clone, Hash, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)] pub enum SendError { /// Errored computing onion message packet keys. Secp256k1(secp256k1::Error), @@ -521,6 +535,7 @@ pub trait CustomOnionMessageHandler { /// A processed incoming onion message, containing either a Forward (another onion message) /// or a Receive payload with decrypted contents. +#[derive(Debug)] pub enum PeeledOnion { /// Forwarded onion, with the next node id and a new onion Forward(PublicKey, OnionMessage), @@ -704,7 +719,7 @@ where OnionMessenger { entropy_source, node_signer, - message_recipients: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()), + message_recipients: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()), secp_ctx, logger, message_router, @@ -751,7 +766,7 @@ where }, Ok(SendSuccess::BufferedAwaitingConnection(node_id)) => { log_trace!( - self.logger, "Buffered onion message waiting on peer connection {}: {:?}", + self.logger, "Buffered onion message waiting on peer connection {}: {}", log_suffix, node_id ); }, @@ -846,7 +861,7 @@ where #[cfg(test)] pub(super) fn release_pending_msgs(&self) -> HashMap> { let mut message_recipients = self.message_recipients.lock().unwrap(); - let mut msgs = HashMap::new(); + let mut msgs = new_hash_map(); // We don't want to disconnect the peers by removing them entirely from the original map, so we // release the pending message buffers individually. for (node_id, recipient) in &mut *message_recipients { @@ -942,7 +957,7 @@ where Ok(PeeledOnion::Forward(next_node_id, onion_message)) => { let mut message_recipients = self.message_recipients.lock().unwrap(); if outbound_buffer_full(&next_node_id, &message_recipients) { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Dropping forwarded onion message to peer {:?}: outbound buffer full", next_node_id); + log_trace!(self.logger, "Dropping forwarded onion message to peer {}: outbound buffer full", next_node_id); return } @@ -959,7 +974,7 @@ where log_trace!(self.logger, "Forwarding an onion message to peer {}", next_node_id); }, _ => { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Dropping forwarded onion message to disconnected peer {:?}", next_node_id); + log_trace!(self.logger, "Dropping forwarded onion message to disconnected peer {}", next_node_id); return }, } @@ -1069,7 +1084,7 @@ pub type SimpleArcOnionMessenger = OnionMessenger< Arc, Arc, Arc, - Arc>>, Arc>>, + Arc>>, Arc, Arc>>, Arc>, IgnoringMessageHandler >; @@ -1088,7 +1103,7 @@ pub type SimpleRefOnionMessenger< &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'b L, - &'i DefaultMessageRouter<&'g NetworkGraph<&'b L>, &'b L>, + &'i DefaultMessageRouter<&'g NetworkGraph<&'b L>, &'b L, &'a KeysManager>, &'j SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L>, IgnoringMessageHandler >;