X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Frouting%2Fnetwork_graph.rs;h=26719cc279061f180f5617f204846922271f3f3b;hb=a534a5e7af4923122a359005a99f01cfb33b451c;hp=a5e497bb1cf0f279137fd3f5e923e8972317181d;hpb=b1cd5a74348ad305ce9cacd30749322651811635;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/lightning/src/routing/network_graph.rs b/lightning/src/routing/network_graph.rs index a5e497bb..26719cc2 100644 --- a/lightning/src/routing/network_graph.rs +++ b/lightning/src/routing/network_graph.rs @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ //! The top-level network map tracking logic lives here. use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE; -use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::PublicKey; +use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey; use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1; use bitcoin::secp256k1; @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ use chain; use chain::Access; use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures}; use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, ErrorAction, Init, LightningError, RoutingMessageHandler, NetAddress, MAX_VALUE_MSAT}; -use ln::msgs::{ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, NodeAnnouncement, OptionalField}; +use ln::msgs::{ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, NodeAnnouncement, OptionalField, GossipTimestampFilter}; use ln::msgs::{QueryChannelRange, ReplyChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd}; use ln::msgs; use util::ser::{Writeable, Readable, Writer}; @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ impl NodeId { pub fn from_pubkey(pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Self { NodeId(pubkey.serialize()) } - + /// Get the public key slice from this NodeId pub fn as_slice(&self) -> &[u8] { &self.0 @@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ pub struct ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'a> { /// Update to the [`NetworkGraph`] based on payment failure information conveyed via the Onion /// return packet by a node along the route. See [BOLT #4] for details. /// -/// [BOLT #4]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md +/// [BOLT #4]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)] pub enum NetworkUpdate { /// An error indicating a `channel_update` messages should be applied via @@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger macro_rules! secp_verify_sig { ( $secp_ctx: expr, $msg: expr, $sig: expr, $pubkey: expr, $msg_type: expr ) => { - match $secp_ctx.verify($msg, $sig, $pubkey) { + match $secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa($msg, $sig, $pubkey) { Ok(_) => {}, Err(_) => { return Err(LightningError { @@ -395,74 +395,97 @@ where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger /// to request gossip messages for each channel. The sync is considered complete /// when the final reply_scids_end message is received, though we are not /// tracking this directly. - fn sync_routing_table(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &Init) { - + fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &Init) { // We will only perform a sync with peers that support gossip_queries. if !init_msg.features.supports_gossip_queries() { return (); } - // Check if we need to perform a full synchronization with this peer - if !self.should_request_full_sync(&their_node_id) { - return (); + // The lightning network's gossip sync system is completely broken in numerous ways. + // + // Given no broadly-available set-reconciliation protocol, the only reasonable approach is + // to do a full sync from the first few peers we connect to, and then receive gossip + // updates from all our peers normally. + // + // Originally, we could simply tell a peer to dump us the entire gossip table on startup, + // wasting lots of bandwidth but ensuring we have the full network graph. After the initial + // dump peers would always send gossip and we'd stay up-to-date with whatever our peer has + // seen. + // + // In order to reduce the bandwidth waste, "gossip queries" were introduced, allowing you + // to ask for the SCIDs of all channels in your peer's routing graph, and then only request + // channel data which you are missing. Except there was no way at all to identify which + // `channel_update`s you were missing, so you still had to request everything, just in a + // very complicated way with some queries instead of just getting the dump. + // + // Later, an option was added to fetch the latest timestamps of the `channel_update`s to + // make efficient sync possible, however it has yet to be implemented in lnd, which makes + // relying on it useless. + // + // After gossip queries were introduced, support for receiving a full gossip table dump on + // connection was removed from several nodes, making it impossible to get a full sync + // without using the "gossip queries" messages. + // + // Once you opt into "gossip queries" the only way to receive any gossip updates that a + // peer receives after you connect, you must send a `gossip_timestamp_filter` message. This + // message, as the name implies, tells the peer to not forward any gossip messages with a + // timestamp older than a given value (not the time the peer received the filter, but the + // timestamp in the update message, which is often hours behind when the peer received the + // message). + // + // Obnoxiously, `gossip_timestamp_filter` isn't *just* a filter, but its also a request for + // your peer to send you the full routing graph (subject to the filter). Thus, in order to + // tell a peer to send you any updates as it sees them, you have to also ask for the full + // routing graph to be synced. If you set a timestamp filter near the current time, peers + // will simply not forward any new updates they see to you which were generated some time + // ago (which is not uncommon). If you instead set a timestamp filter near 0 (or two weeks + // ago), you will always get the full routing graph from all your peers. + // + // Most lightning nodes today opt to simply turn off receiving gossip data which only + // propagated some time after it was generated, and, worse, often disable gossiping with + // several peers after their first connection. The second behavior can cause gossip to not + // propagate fully if there are cuts in the gossiping subgraph. + // + // In an attempt to cut a middle ground between always fetching the full graph from all of + // our peers and never receiving gossip from peers at all, we send all of our peers a + // `gossip_timestamp_filter`, with the filter time set either two weeks ago or an hour ago. + // + // For no-std builds, we bury our head in the sand and do a full sync on each connection. + let should_request_full_sync = self.should_request_full_sync(&their_node_id); + #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)] + let mut gossip_start_time = 0; + #[cfg(feature = "std")] + { + gossip_start_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs(); + if should_request_full_sync { + gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60 * 24 * 7 * 2; // 2 weeks ago + } else { + gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60; // an hour ago + } } - let first_blocknum = 0; - let number_of_blocks = 0xffffffff; - log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending query_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), first_blocknum, number_of_blocks); let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); - pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { + pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { node_id: their_node_id.clone(), - msg: QueryChannelRange { + msg: GossipTimestampFilter { chain_hash: self.network_graph.genesis_hash, - first_blocknum, - number_of_blocks, + first_timestamp: gossip_start_time as u32, // 2106 issue! + timestamp_range: u32::max_value(), }, }); } - /// Statelessly processes a reply to a channel range query by immediately - /// sending an SCID query with SCIDs in the reply. To keep this handler - /// stateless, it does not validate the sequencing of replies for multi- - /// reply ranges. It does not validate whether the reply(ies) cover the - /// queried range. It also does not filter SCIDs to only those in the - /// original query range. We also do not validate that the chain_hash - /// matches the chain_hash of the NetworkGraph. Any chan_ann message that - /// does not match our chain_hash will be rejected when the announcement is - /// processed. - fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> { - log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling reply_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}, sync_complete={}, scids={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.first_blocknum, msg.number_of_blocks, msg.sync_complete, msg.short_channel_ids.len(),); - - log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending query_short_channel_ids peer={}, batch_size={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.short_channel_ids.len()); - let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); - pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { - node_id: their_node_id.clone(), - msg: QueryShortChannelIds { - chain_hash: msg.chain_hash, - short_channel_ids: msg.short_channel_ids, - } - }); - + fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> { + // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set + // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert + // this code to its state pre-0.0.106. Ok(()) } - /// When an SCID query is initiated the remote peer will begin streaming - /// gossip messages. In the event of a failure, we may have received - /// some channel information. Before trying with another peer, the - /// caller should update its set of SCIDs that need to be queried. - fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError> { - log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling reply_short_channel_ids_end peer={}, full_information={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.full_information); - - // If the remote node does not have up-to-date information for the - // chain_hash they will set full_information=false. We can fail - // the result and try again with a different peer. - if !msg.full_information { - return Err(LightningError { - err: String::from("Received reply_short_channel_ids_end with no information"), - action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError - }); - } - + fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError> { + // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set + // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert + // this code to its state pre-0.0.106. Ok(()) } @@ -672,7 +695,7 @@ impl ChannelInfo { return None; } }; - Some((DirectedChannelInfo { channel: self, direction }, source)) + Some((DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, direction), source)) } /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed from the given `source` to a @@ -687,7 +710,17 @@ impl ChannelInfo { return None; } }; - Some((DirectedChannelInfo { channel: self, direction }, target)) + Some((DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, direction), target)) + } + + /// Returns a [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] based on the direction implied by the channel_flag. + pub fn get_directional_info(&self, channel_flags: u8) -> Option<&ChannelUpdateInfo> { + let direction = channel_flags & 1u8; + if direction == 0 { + self.one_to_two.as_ref() + } else { + self.two_to_one.as_ref() + } } } @@ -716,35 +749,53 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelInfo, { pub struct DirectedChannelInfo<'a> { channel: &'a ChannelInfo, direction: Option<&'a ChannelUpdateInfo>, + htlc_maximum_msat: u64, + effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity, } impl<'a> DirectedChannelInfo<'a> { + #[inline] + fn new(channel: &'a ChannelInfo, direction: Option<&'a ChannelUpdateInfo>) -> Self { + let htlc_maximum_msat = direction.and_then(|direction| direction.htlc_maximum_msat); + let capacity_msat = channel.capacity_sats.map(|capacity_sats| capacity_sats * 1000); + + let (htlc_maximum_msat, effective_capacity) = match (htlc_maximum_msat, capacity_msat) { + (Some(amount_msat), Some(capacity_msat)) => { + let htlc_maximum_msat = cmp::min(amount_msat, capacity_msat); + (htlc_maximum_msat, EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat }) + }, + (Some(amount_msat), None) => { + (amount_msat, EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat }) + }, + (None, Some(capacity_msat)) => { + (capacity_msat, EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat }) + }, + (None, None) => (EffectiveCapacity::Unknown.as_msat(), EffectiveCapacity::Unknown), + }; + + Self { + channel, direction, htlc_maximum_msat, effective_capacity + } + } + /// Returns information for the channel. pub fn channel(&self) -> &'a ChannelInfo { self.channel } /// Returns information for the direction. pub fn direction(&self) -> Option<&'a ChannelUpdateInfo> { self.direction } + /// Returns the maximum HTLC amount allowed over the channel in the direction. + pub fn htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> u64 { + self.htlc_maximum_msat + } + /// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction. /// /// This is either the total capacity from the funding transaction, if known, or the /// `htlc_maximum_msat` for the direction as advertised by the gossip network, if known, - /// whichever is smaller. + /// otherwise. pub fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity { - let capacity_msat = self.channel.capacity_sats.map(|capacity_sats| capacity_sats * 1000); - self.direction - .and_then(|direction| direction.htlc_maximum_msat) - .map(|max_htlc_msat| { - let capacity_msat = capacity_msat.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()); - if max_htlc_msat < capacity_msat { - EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat: max_htlc_msat } - } else { - EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat } - } - }) - .or_else(|| capacity_msat.map(|capacity_msat| - EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat })) - .unwrap_or(EffectiveCapacity::Unknown) + self.effective_capacity } /// Returns `Some` if [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] is available in the direction. @@ -782,6 +833,10 @@ impl<'a> DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a> { /// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction. #[inline] pub(super) fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity { self.inner.effective_capacity() } + + /// Returns the maximum HTLC amount allowed over the channel in the direction. + #[inline] + pub(super) fn htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> u64 { self.inner.htlc_maximum_msat() } } impl<'a> fmt::Debug for DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a> { @@ -794,6 +849,7 @@ impl<'a> fmt::Debug for DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a> { /// /// While this may be smaller than the actual channel capacity, amounts greater than /// [`Self::as_msat`] should not be routed through the channel. +#[derive(Clone, Copy)] pub enum EffectiveCapacity { /// The available liquidity in the channel known from being a channel counterparty, and thus a /// direct hop. @@ -1010,6 +1066,15 @@ impl NetworkGraph { } } + /// Clears the `NodeAnnouncementInfo` field for all nodes in the `NetworkGraph` for testing + /// purposes. + #[cfg(test)] + pub fn clear_nodes_announcement_info(&self) { + for node in self.nodes.write().unwrap().iter_mut() { + node.1.announcement_info = None; + } + } + /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a /// given node announcement. /// @@ -1100,6 +1165,83 @@ impl NetworkGraph { self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(msg, None, chain_access) } + /// Update channel from partial announcement data received via rapid gossip sync + /// + /// `timestamp: u64`: Timestamp emulating the backdated original announcement receipt (by the + /// rapid gossip sync server) + /// + /// All other parameters as used in [`msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement`] fields. + pub fn add_channel_from_partial_announcement(&self, short_channel_id: u64, timestamp: u64, features: ChannelFeatures, node_id_1: PublicKey, node_id_2: PublicKey) -> Result<(), LightningError> { + if node_id_1 == node_id_2 { + return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}); + }; + + let node_1 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_1); + let node_2 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_2); + let channel_info = ChannelInfo { + features, + node_one: node_1.clone(), + one_to_two: None, + node_two: node_2.clone(), + two_to_one: None, + capacity_sats: None, + announcement_message: None, + announcement_received_time: timestamp, + }; + + self.add_channel_between_nodes(short_channel_id, channel_info, None) + } + + fn add_channel_between_nodes(&self, short_channel_id: u64, channel_info: ChannelInfo, utxo_value: Option) -> Result<(), LightningError> { + let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap(); + let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap(); + + let node_id_a = channel_info.node_one.clone(); + let node_id_b = channel_info.node_two.clone(); + + match channels.entry(short_channel_id) { + BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) => { + //TODO: because asking the blockchain if short_channel_id is valid is only optional + //in the blockchain API, we need to handle it smartly here, though it's unclear + //exactly how... + if utxo_value.is_some() { + // Either our UTXO provider is busted, there was a reorg, or the UTXO provider + // only sometimes returns results. In any case remove the previous entry. Note + // that the spec expects us to "blacklist" the node_ids involved, but we can't + // do that because + // a) we don't *require* a UTXO provider that always returns results. + // b) we don't track UTXOs of channels we know about and remove them if they + // get reorg'd out. + // c) it's unclear how to do so without exposing ourselves to massive DoS risk. + Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &entry.get(), short_channel_id); + *entry.get_mut() = channel_info; + } else { + return Err(LightningError{err: "Already have knowledge of channel".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip}); + } + }, + BtreeEntry::Vacant(entry) => { + entry.insert(channel_info); + } + }; + + for current_node_id in [node_id_a, node_id_b].iter() { + match nodes.entry(current_node_id.clone()) { + BtreeEntry::Occupied(node_entry) => { + node_entry.into_mut().channels.push(short_channel_id); + }, + BtreeEntry::Vacant(node_entry) => { + node_entry.insert(NodeInfo { + channels: vec!(short_channel_id), + lowest_inbound_channel_fees: None, + announcement_info: None, + }); + } + }; + }; + + Ok(()) + } + fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern( &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelAnnouncement>, chain_access: &Option ) -> Result<(), LightningError> @@ -1148,65 +1290,18 @@ impl NetworkGraph { } let chan_info = ChannelInfo { - features: msg.features.clone(), - node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_1), - one_to_two: None, - node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_2), - two_to_one: None, - capacity_sats: utxo_value, - announcement_message: if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY - { full_msg.cloned() } else { None }, - announcement_received_time, - }; - - let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap(); - let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap(); - match channels.entry(msg.short_channel_id) { - BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) => { - //TODO: because asking the blockchain if short_channel_id is valid is only optional - //in the blockchain API, we need to handle it smartly here, though it's unclear - //exactly how... - if utxo_value.is_some() { - // Either our UTXO provider is busted, there was a reorg, or the UTXO provider - // only sometimes returns results. In any case remove the previous entry. Note - // that the spec expects us to "blacklist" the node_ids involved, but we can't - // do that because - // a) we don't *require* a UTXO provider that always returns results. - // b) we don't track UTXOs of channels we know about and remove them if they - // get reorg'd out. - // c) it's unclear how to do so without exposing ourselves to massive DoS risk. - Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &entry.get(), msg.short_channel_id); - *entry.get_mut() = chan_info; - } else { - return Err(LightningError{err: "Already have knowledge of channel".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip}); - } - }, - BtreeEntry::Vacant(entry) => { - entry.insert(chan_info); - } + features: msg.features.clone(), + node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_1), + one_to_two: None, + node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_2), + two_to_one: None, + capacity_sats: utxo_value, + announcement_message: if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + { full_msg.cloned() } else { None }, + announcement_received_time, }; - macro_rules! add_channel_to_node { - ( $node_id: expr ) => { - match nodes.entry($node_id) { - BtreeEntry::Occupied(node_entry) => { - node_entry.into_mut().channels.push(msg.short_channel_id); - }, - BtreeEntry::Vacant(node_entry) => { - node_entry.insert(NodeInfo { - channels: vec!(msg.short_channel_id), - lowest_inbound_channel_fees: None, - announcement_info: None, - }); - } - } - }; - } - - add_channel_to_node!(NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_1)); - add_channel_to_node!(NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_2)); - - Ok(()) + self.add_channel_between_nodes(msg.short_channel_id, chan_info, utxo_value) } /// Close a channel if a corresponding HTLC fail was sent. @@ -1324,10 +1419,10 @@ impl NetworkGraph { /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or /// materially in the future will be rejected. pub fn update_channel_unsigned(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> { - self.update_channel_intern(msg, None, None::<(&secp256k1::Signature, &Secp256k1)>) + self.update_channel_intern(msg, None, None::<(&secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature, &Secp256k1)>) } - fn update_channel_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelUpdate>, sig_info: Option<(&secp256k1::Signature, &Secp256k1)>) -> Result<(), LightningError> { + fn update_channel_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelUpdate>, sig_info: Option<(&secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature, &Secp256k1)>) -> Result<(), LightningError> { let dest_node_id; let chan_enabled = msg.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1); let chan_was_enabled; @@ -1362,8 +1457,8 @@ impl NetworkGraph { } } } - macro_rules! maybe_update_channel_info { - ( $target: expr, $src_node: expr) => { + macro_rules! check_update_latest { + ($target: expr) => { if let Some(existing_chan_info) = $target.as_ref() { // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to // order updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only @@ -1380,7 +1475,11 @@ impl NetworkGraph { } else { chan_was_enabled = false; } + } + } + macro_rules! get_new_channel_info { + () => { { let last_update_message = if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY { full_msg.cloned() } else { None }; @@ -1396,29 +1495,31 @@ impl NetworkGraph { }, last_update_message }; - $target = Some(updated_channel_update_info); - } + Some(updated_channel_update_info) + } } } let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]); if msg.flags & 1 == 1 { dest_node_id = channel.node_one.clone(); + check_update_latest!(channel.two_to_one); if let Some((sig, ctx)) = sig_info { secp_verify_sig!(ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_two.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{ err: "Couldn't parse source node pubkey".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug) })?, "channel_update"); } - maybe_update_channel_info!(channel.two_to_one, channel.node_two); + channel.two_to_one = get_new_channel_info!(); } else { dest_node_id = channel.node_two.clone(); + check_update_latest!(channel.one_to_two); if let Some((sig, ctx)) = sig_info { secp_verify_sig!(ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_one.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{ err: "Couldn't parse destination node pubkey".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug) })?, "channel_update"); } - maybe_update_channel_info!(channel.one_to_two, channel.node_one); + channel.one_to_two = get_new_channel_info!(); } } } @@ -1520,8 +1621,8 @@ mod tests { use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures}; use routing::network_graph::{NetGraphMsgHandler, NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate, MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY}; use ln::msgs::{Init, OptionalField, RoutingMessageHandler, UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, NodeAnnouncement, - UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelAnnouncement, UnsignedChannelUpdate, ChannelUpdate, - ReplyChannelRange, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd, QueryChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, MAX_VALUE_MSAT}; + UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelAnnouncement, UnsignedChannelUpdate, ChannelUpdate, + ReplyChannelRange, QueryChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, MAX_VALUE_MSAT}; use util::test_utils; use util::logger::Logger; use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable}; @@ -1540,10 +1641,11 @@ mod tests { use hex; - use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey, SecretKey}; + use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey}; use bitcoin::secp256k1::{All, Secp256k1}; use io; + use bitcoin::secp256k1; use prelude::*; use sync::Arc; @@ -1590,7 +1692,7 @@ mod tests { f(&mut unsigned_announcement); let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]); NodeAnnouncement { - signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_key), + signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key), contents: unsigned_announcement } } @@ -1614,10 +1716,10 @@ mod tests { f(&mut unsigned_announcement); let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]); ChannelAnnouncement { - node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_key), - node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_key), - bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey), - bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey), + node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_key), + node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_key), + bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_btckey), + bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_btckey), contents: unsigned_announcement, } } @@ -1649,7 +1751,7 @@ mod tests { f(&mut unsigned_channel_update); let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]); ChannelUpdate { - signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_key), + signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key), contents: unsigned_channel_update } } @@ -1686,7 +1788,7 @@ mod tests { let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash); match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement( &NodeAnnouncement { - signature: secp_ctx.sign(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey), + signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey), contents: valid_announcement.contents.clone() }) { Ok(_) => panic!(), @@ -1925,7 +2027,7 @@ mod tests { }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx); let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]); let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash); - invalid_sig_channel_update.signature = secp_ctx.sign(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey); + invalid_sig_channel_update.signature = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey); match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&invalid_sig_channel_update) { Ok(_) => panic!(), Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_update message") @@ -2258,140 +2360,43 @@ mod tests { } #[test] + #[cfg(feature = "std")] fn calling_sync_routing_table() { + use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH}; + let network_graph = create_network_graph(); let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph); let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(); let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1); let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(); - let first_blocknum = 0; - let number_of_blocks = 0xffff_ffff; // It should ignore if gossip_queries feature is not enabled { - let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known().clear_gossip_queries() }; - net_graph_msg_handler.sync_routing_table(&node_id_1, &init_msg); + let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known().clear_gossip_queries(), remote_network_address: None }; + net_graph_msg_handler.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg); let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 0); } - // It should send a query_channel_message with the correct information + // It should send a gossip_timestamp_filter with the correct information { - let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known() }; - net_graph_msg_handler.sync_routing_table(&node_id_1, &init_msg); + let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None }; + net_graph_msg_handler.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg); let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); match &events[0] { - MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery{ node_id, msg } => { + MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter{ node_id, msg } => { assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1); assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash); - assert_eq!(msg.first_blocknum, first_blocknum); - assert_eq!(msg.number_of_blocks, number_of_blocks); + let expected_timestamp = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs(); + assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) >= expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2); + assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) < expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2 + 10); + assert_eq!(msg.timestamp_range, u32::max_value()); }, _ => panic!("Expected MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery") }; } - - // It should not enqueue a query when should_request_full_sync return false. - // The initial implementation allows syncing with the first 5 peers after - // which should_request_full_sync will return false - { - let network_graph = create_network_graph(); - let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph); - let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known() }; - for n in 1..7 { - let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[n; 32]).unwrap(); - let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey); - net_graph_msg_handler.sync_routing_table(&node_id, &init_msg); - let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); - if n <= 5 { - assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); - } else { - assert_eq!(events.len(), 0); - } - - } - } - } - - #[test] - fn handling_reply_channel_range() { - let network_graph = create_network_graph(); - let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph); - let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(); - let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1); - - let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(); - - // Test receipt of a single reply that should enqueue an SCID query - // matching the SCIDs in the reply - { - let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_reply_channel_range(&node_id_1, ReplyChannelRange { - chain_hash, - sync_complete: true, - first_blocknum: 0, - number_of_blocks: 2000, - short_channel_ids: vec![ - 0x0003e0_000000_0000, // 992x0x0 - 0x0003e8_000000_0000, // 1000x0x0 - 0x0003e9_000000_0000, // 1001x0x0 - 0x0003f0_000000_0000, // 1008x0x0 - 0x00044c_000000_0000, // 1100x0x0 - 0x0006e0_000000_0000, // 1760x0x0 - ], - }); - assert!(result.is_ok()); - - // We expect to emit a query_short_channel_ids message with the received scids - let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); - assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); - match &events[0] { - MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { node_id, msg } => { - assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1); - assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash); - assert_eq!(msg.short_channel_ids, vec![ - 0x0003e0_000000_0000, // 992x0x0 - 0x0003e8_000000_0000, // 1000x0x0 - 0x0003e9_000000_0000, // 1001x0x0 - 0x0003f0_000000_0000, // 1008x0x0 - 0x00044c_000000_0000, // 1100x0x0 - 0x0006e0_000000_0000, // 1760x0x0 - ]); - }, - _ => panic!("expected MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery"), - } - } - } - - #[test] - fn handling_reply_short_channel_ids() { - let network_graph = create_network_graph(); - let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph); - let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(); - let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey); - - let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(); - - // Test receipt of a successful reply - { - let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&node_id, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd { - chain_hash, - full_information: true, - }); - assert!(result.is_ok()); - } - - // Test receipt of a reply that indicates the peer does not maintain up-to-date information - // for the chain_hash requested in the query. - { - let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&node_id, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd { - chain_hash, - full_information: false, - }); - assert!(result.is_err()); - assert_eq!(result.err().unwrap().err, "Received reply_short_channel_ids_end with no information"); - } } #[test]