X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Frouting%2Fnetwork_graph.rs;h=e7c8271bf35226cc96f02365d39c9f5d54c07638;hb=74b9c1aa4e99c7dd26309829b156aea176fb76cc;hp=0b09b74aa9a484db8912587accd83e9f2ff7434a;hpb=b62b244c3c826523a81631037cd060bafef8e402;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/lightning/src/routing/network_graph.rs b/lightning/src/routing/network_graph.rs index 0b09b74a..e7c8271b 100644 --- a/lightning/src/routing/network_graph.rs +++ b/lightning/src/routing/network_graph.rs @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ use chain; use chain::Access; use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures}; use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, ErrorAction, Init, LightningError, RoutingMessageHandler, NetAddress, MAX_VALUE_MSAT}; -use ln::msgs::{ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, NodeAnnouncement, OptionalField}; +use ln::msgs::{ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, NodeAnnouncement, OptionalField, GossipTimestampFilter}; use ln::msgs::{QueryChannelRange, ReplyChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd}; use ln::msgs; use util::ser::{Writeable, Readable, Writer}; @@ -294,10 +294,21 @@ where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger } macro_rules! secp_verify_sig { - ( $secp_ctx: expr, $msg: expr, $sig: expr, $pubkey: expr ) => { + ( $secp_ctx: expr, $msg: expr, $sig: expr, $pubkey: expr, $msg_type: expr ) => { match $secp_ctx.verify($msg, $sig, $pubkey) { Ok(_) => {}, - Err(_) => return Err(LightningError{err: "Invalid signature from remote node".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}), + Err(_) => { + return Err(LightningError { + err: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type), + action: ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage { + msg: msgs::WarningMessage { + channel_id: [0; 32], + data: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type), + }, + log_level: Level::Trace, + }, + }); + }, } }; } @@ -384,13 +395,28 @@ where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger /// to request gossip messages for each channel. The sync is considered complete /// when the final reply_scids_end message is received, though we are not /// tracking this directly. - fn sync_routing_table(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &Init) { - + fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &Init) { // We will only perform a sync with peers that support gossip_queries. if !init_msg.features.supports_gossip_queries() { return (); } + // Send a gossip_timestamp_filter to enable gossip message receipt. Note that we have to + // use a "all timestamps" filter as sending the current timestamp would result in missing + // gossip messages that are simply sent late. We could calculate the intended filter time + // by looking at the current time and subtracting two weeks (before which we'll reject + // messages), but there's not a lot of reason to bother - our peers should be discarding + // the same messages. + let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); + pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { + node_id: their_node_id.clone(), + msg: GossipTimestampFilter { + chain_hash: self.network_graph.genesis_hash, + first_timestamp: 0, + timestamp_range: u32::max_value(), + }, + }); + // Check if we need to perform a full synchronization with this peer if !self.should_request_full_sync(&their_node_id) { return (); @@ -399,7 +425,6 @@ where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger let first_blocknum = 0; let number_of_blocks = 0xffffffff; log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending query_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), first_blocknum, number_of_blocks); - let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { node_id: their_node_id.clone(), msg: QueryChannelRange { @@ -582,9 +607,8 @@ where } #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)] -/// Details about one direction of a channel. Received -/// within a channel update. -pub struct DirectionalChannelInfo { +/// Details about one direction of a channel as received within a [`ChannelUpdate`]. +pub struct ChannelUpdateInfo { /// When the last update to the channel direction was issued. /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement. pub last_update: u32, @@ -605,14 +629,14 @@ pub struct DirectionalChannelInfo { pub last_update_message: Option, } -impl fmt::Display for DirectionalChannelInfo { +impl fmt::Display for ChannelUpdateInfo { fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> { write!(f, "last_update {}, enabled {}, cltv_expiry_delta {}, htlc_minimum_msat {}, fees {:?}", self.last_update, self.enabled, self.cltv_expiry_delta, self.htlc_minimum_msat, self.fees)?; Ok(()) } } -impl_writeable_tlv_based!(DirectionalChannelInfo, { +impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelUpdateInfo, { (0, last_update, required), (2, enabled, required), (4, cltv_expiry_delta, required), @@ -631,11 +655,11 @@ pub struct ChannelInfo { /// Source node of the first direction of a channel pub node_one: NodeId, /// Details about the first direction of a channel - pub one_to_two: Option, + pub one_to_two: Option, /// Source node of the second direction of a channel pub node_two: NodeId, /// Details about the second direction of a channel - pub two_to_one: Option, + pub two_to_one: Option, /// The channel capacity as seen on-chain, if chain lookup is available. pub capacity_sats: Option, /// An initial announcement of the channel @@ -649,6 +673,38 @@ pub struct ChannelInfo { announcement_received_time: u64, } +impl ChannelInfo { + /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed to the given `target` from a + /// returned `source`, or `None` if `target` is not one of the channel's counterparties. + pub fn as_directed_to(&self, target: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> { + let (direction, source) = { + if target == &self.node_one { + (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_two) + } else if target == &self.node_two { + (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_one) + } else { + return None; + } + }; + Some((DirectedChannelInfo { channel: self, direction }, source)) + } + + /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed from the given `source` to a + /// returned `target`, or `None` if `source` is not one of the channel's counterparties. + pub fn as_directed_from(&self, source: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> { + let (direction, target) = { + if source == &self.node_one { + (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_two) + } else if source == &self.node_two { + (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_one) + } else { + return None; + } + }; + Some((DirectedChannelInfo { channel: self, direction }, target)) + } +} + impl fmt::Display for ChannelInfo { fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> { write!(f, "features: {}, node_one: {}, one_to_two: {:?}, node_two: {}, two_to_one: {:?}", @@ -668,6 +724,132 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelInfo, { (12, announcement_message, required), }); +/// A wrapper around [`ChannelInfo`] representing information about the channel as directed from a +/// source node to a target node. +#[derive(Clone)] +pub struct DirectedChannelInfo<'a> { + channel: &'a ChannelInfo, + direction: Option<&'a ChannelUpdateInfo>, +} + +impl<'a> DirectedChannelInfo<'a> { + /// Returns information for the channel. + pub fn channel(&self) -> &'a ChannelInfo { self.channel } + + /// Returns information for the direction. + pub fn direction(&self) -> Option<&'a ChannelUpdateInfo> { self.direction } + + /// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction. + /// + /// This is either the total capacity from the funding transaction, if known, or the + /// `htlc_maximum_msat` for the direction as advertised by the gossip network, if known, + /// whichever is smaller. + pub fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity { + let capacity_msat = self.channel.capacity_sats.map(|capacity_sats| capacity_sats * 1000); + self.direction + .and_then(|direction| direction.htlc_maximum_msat) + .map(|max_htlc_msat| { + let capacity_msat = capacity_msat.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()); + if max_htlc_msat < capacity_msat { + EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat: max_htlc_msat } + } else { + EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat } + } + }) + .or_else(|| capacity_msat.map(|capacity_msat| + EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat })) + .unwrap_or(EffectiveCapacity::Unknown) + } + + /// Returns `Some` if [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] is available in the direction. + pub(super) fn with_update(self) -> Option> { + match self.direction { + Some(_) => Some(DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate { inner: self }), + None => None, + } + } +} + +impl<'a> fmt::Debug for DirectedChannelInfo<'a> { + fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> { + f.debug_struct("DirectedChannelInfo") + .field("channel", &self.channel) + .finish() + } +} + +/// A [`DirectedChannelInfo`] with [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] available in its direction. +#[derive(Clone)] +pub(super) struct DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a> { + inner: DirectedChannelInfo<'a>, +} + +impl<'a> DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a> { + /// Returns information for the channel. + #[inline] + pub(super) fn channel(&self) -> &'a ChannelInfo { &self.inner.channel } + + /// Returns information for the direction. + #[inline] + pub(super) fn direction(&self) -> &'a ChannelUpdateInfo { self.inner.direction.unwrap() } + + /// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction. + #[inline] + pub(super) fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity { self.inner.effective_capacity() } +} + +impl<'a> fmt::Debug for DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a> { + fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> { + self.inner.fmt(f) + } +} + +/// The effective capacity of a channel for routing purposes. +/// +/// While this may be smaller than the actual channel capacity, amounts greater than +/// [`Self::as_msat`] should not be routed through the channel. +pub enum EffectiveCapacity { + /// The available liquidity in the channel known from being a channel counterparty, and thus a + /// direct hop. + ExactLiquidity { + /// Either the inbound or outbound liquidity depending on the direction, denominated in + /// millisatoshi. + liquidity_msat: u64, + }, + /// The maximum HTLC amount in one direction as advertised on the gossip network. + MaximumHTLC { + /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi. + amount_msat: u64, + }, + /// The total capacity of the channel as determined by the funding transaction. + Total { + /// The funding amount denominated in millisatoshi. + capacity_msat: u64, + }, + /// A capacity sufficient to route any payment, typically used for private channels provided by + /// an invoice. + Infinite, + /// A capacity that is unknown possibly because either the chain state is unavailable to know + /// the total capacity or the `htlc_maximum_msat` was not advertised on the gossip network. + Unknown, +} + +/// The presumed channel capacity denominated in millisatoshi for [`EffectiveCapacity::Unknown`] to +/// use when making routing decisions. +pub const UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT: u64 = 250_000 * 1000; + +impl EffectiveCapacity { + /// Returns the effective capacity denominated in millisatoshi. + pub fn as_msat(&self) -> u64 { + match self { + EffectiveCapacity::ExactLiquidity { liquidity_msat } => *liquidity_msat, + EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat } => *amount_msat, + EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat } => *capacity_msat, + EffectiveCapacity::Infinite => u64::max_value(), + EffectiveCapacity::Unknown => UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT, + } + } +} /// Fees for routing via a given channel or a node #[derive(Eq, PartialEq, Copy, Clone, Debug, Hash)] @@ -850,7 +1032,7 @@ impl NetworkGraph { /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol. pub fn update_node_from_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) -> Result<(), LightningError> { let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]); - secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &msg.contents.node_id); + secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &msg.contents.node_id, "node_announcement"); self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg)) } @@ -910,10 +1092,10 @@ impl NetworkGraph { C::Target: chain::Access, { let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]); - secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &msg.contents.node_id_1); - secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &msg.contents.node_id_2); - secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1); - secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2); + secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &msg.contents.node_id_1, "channel_announcement"); + secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &msg.contents.node_id_2, "channel_announcement"); + secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1, "channel_announcement"); + secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2, "channel_announcement"); self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(msg), chain_access) } @@ -1216,7 +1398,7 @@ impl NetworkGraph { let last_update_message = if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY { full_msg.cloned() } else { None }; - let updated_channel_dir_info = DirectionalChannelInfo { + let updated_channel_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo { enabled: chan_enabled, last_update: msg.timestamp, cltv_expiry_delta: msg.cltv_expiry_delta, @@ -1228,7 +1410,7 @@ impl NetworkGraph { }, last_update_message }; - $target = Some(updated_channel_dir_info); + $target = Some(updated_channel_update_info); } } @@ -1239,7 +1421,7 @@ impl NetworkGraph { secp_verify_sig!(ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_two.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{ err: "Couldn't parse source node pubkey".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug) - })?); + })?, "channel_update"); } maybe_update_channel_info!(channel.two_to_one, channel.node_two); } else { @@ -1248,7 +1430,7 @@ impl NetworkGraph { secp_verify_sig!(ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_one.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{ err: "Couldn't parse destination node pubkey".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug) - })?); + })?, "channel_update"); } maybe_update_channel_info!(channel.one_to_two, channel.node_one); } @@ -1522,7 +1704,7 @@ mod tests { contents: valid_announcement.contents.clone() }) { Ok(_) => panic!(), - Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature from remote node") + Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on node_announcement message") }; let announcement_with_data = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| { @@ -1651,7 +1833,7 @@ mod tests { invalid_sig_announcement.contents.excess_data = Vec::new(); match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&invalid_sig_announcement) { Ok(_) => panic!(), - Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature from remote node") + Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_announcement message") }; let channel_to_itself_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx); @@ -1760,7 +1942,7 @@ mod tests { invalid_sig_channel_update.signature = secp_ctx.sign(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey); match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&invalid_sig_channel_update) { Ok(_) => panic!(), - Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature from remote node") + Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_update message") }; } @@ -2103,7 +2285,7 @@ mod tests { // It should ignore if gossip_queries feature is not enabled { let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known().clear_gossip_queries() }; - net_graph_msg_handler.sync_routing_table(&node_id_1, &init_msg); + net_graph_msg_handler.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg); let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 0); } @@ -2111,10 +2293,19 @@ mod tests { // It should send a query_channel_message with the correct information { let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known() }; - net_graph_msg_handler.sync_routing_table(&node_id_1, &init_msg); + net_graph_msg_handler.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg); let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); - assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 2); match &events[0] { + MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter{ node_id, msg } => { + assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1); + assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash); + assert_eq!(msg.first_timestamp, 0); + assert_eq!(msg.timestamp_range, u32::max_value()); + }, + _ => panic!("Expected MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery") + }; + match &events[1] { MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery{ node_id, msg } => { assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1); assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash); @@ -2135,12 +2326,14 @@ mod tests { for n in 1..7 { let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[n; 32]).unwrap(); let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey); - net_graph_msg_handler.sync_routing_table(&node_id, &init_msg); + net_graph_msg_handler.peer_connected(&node_id, &init_msg); let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); if n <= 5 { - assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 2); } else { - assert_eq!(events.len(), 0); + // Even after the we stop sending the explicit query, we should still send a + // gossip_timestamp_filter on each new connection. + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); } } @@ -2534,7 +2727,7 @@ mod tests { } } -#[cfg(all(test, feature = "unstable"))] +#[cfg(all(test, feature = "_bench_unstable"))] mod benches { use super::*;