X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Futil%2Fconfig.rs;h=bdd222e31c58f0ab921ae2f3f057d8264b68b560;hb=ab20284e2673e946ebdffcd5be7388de917a168f;hp=3868d29aab49f66789c49c970a662cba19000e2e;hpb=72e9f53be7b9b44ce8fb1a817a3af6a98db79755;p=rust-lightning

diff --git a/lightning/src/util/config.rs b/lightning/src/util/config.rs
index 3868d29a..bdd222e3 100644
--- a/lightning/src/util/config.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/util/config.rs
@@ -22,7 +22,15 @@ pub struct ChannelHandshakeConfig {
 	/// Applied only for inbound channels (see ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth for the
 	/// equivalent limit applied to outbound channels).
 	///
+	/// A lower-bound of 1 is applied, requiring all channels to have a confirmed commitment
+	/// transaction before operation. If you wish to accept channels with zero confirmations, see
+	/// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] and
+	/// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf`].
+	///
 	/// Default value: 6.
+	///
+	/// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
+	/// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf
 	pub minimum_depth: u32,
 	/// Set to the number of blocks we require our counterparty to wait to claim their money (ie
 	/// the number of blocks we have to punish our counterparty if they broadcast a revoked
@@ -159,6 +167,24 @@ pub struct ChannelHandshakeLimits {
 	///
 	/// Default value: 144, or roughly one day and only applies to outbound channels.
 	pub max_minimum_depth: u32,
+	/// Whether we implicitly trust funding transactions generated by us for our own outbound
+	/// channels to not be double-spent.
+	///
+	/// If this is set, we assume that our own funding transactions are *never* double-spent, and
+	/// thus we can trust them without any confirmations. This is generally a reasonable
+	/// assumption, given we're the only ones who could ever double-spend it (assuming we have sole
+	/// control of the signing keys).
+	///
+	/// You may wish to un-set this if you allow the user to (or do in an automated fashion)
+	/// double-spend the funding transaction to RBF with an alternative channel open.
+	///
+	/// This only applies if our counterparty set their confirmations-required value to 0, and we
+	/// always trust our own funding transaction at 1 confirmation irrespective of this value.
+	/// Thus, this effectively acts as a `min_minimum_depth`, with the only possible values being
+	/// `true` (0) and `false` (1).
+	///
+	/// Default value: true
+	pub trust_own_funding_0conf: bool,
 	/// Set to force an incoming channel to match our announced channel preference in
 	/// [`ChannelConfig::announced_channel`].
 	///
@@ -187,6 +213,7 @@ impl Default for ChannelHandshakeLimits {
 			min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
 			max_channel_reserve_satoshis: <u64>::max_value(),
 			min_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
+			trust_own_funding_0conf: true,
 			max_minimum_depth: 144,
 			force_announced_channel_preference: true,
 			their_to_self_delay: MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT,