X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Futil%2Fconfig.rs;h=bdd222e31c58f0ab921ae2f3f057d8264b68b560;hb=ffaf9bc145608b20cc34be845c5d2e6600a74d34;hp=0f625098f79f9030ae25ddc1979cc6b5fcba30ae;hpb=9bdce47f0e0516e37c89c09f1975dfc06b5870b1;p=rust-lightning

diff --git a/lightning/src/util/config.rs b/lightning/src/util/config.rs
index 0f625098..bdd222e3 100644
--- a/lightning/src/util/config.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/util/config.rs
@@ -22,7 +22,15 @@ pub struct ChannelHandshakeConfig {
 	/// Applied only for inbound channels (see ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth for the
 	/// equivalent limit applied to outbound channels).
 	///
+	/// A lower-bound of 1 is applied, requiring all channels to have a confirmed commitment
+	/// transaction before operation. If you wish to accept channels with zero confirmations, see
+	/// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] and
+	/// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf`].
+	///
 	/// Default value: 6.
+	///
+	/// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
+	/// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf
 	pub minimum_depth: u32,
 	/// Set to the number of blocks we require our counterparty to wait to claim their money (ie
 	/// the number of blocks we have to punish our counterparty if they broadcast a revoked
@@ -48,6 +56,30 @@ pub struct ChannelHandshakeConfig {
 	/// Default value: 1. If the value is less than 1, it is ignored and set to 1, as is required
 	/// by the protocol.
 	pub our_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
+	/// Sets the percentage of the channel value we will cap the total value of outstanding inbound
+	/// HTLCs to.
+	///
+	/// This can be set to a value between 1-100, where the value corresponds to the percent of the
+	/// channel value in whole percentages.
+	///
+	/// Note that:
+	/// * If configured to another value than the default value 10, any new channels created with
+	/// the non default value will cause versions of LDK prior to 0.0.104 to refuse to read the
+	/// `ChannelManager`.
+	///
+	/// * This caps the total value for inbound HTLCs in-flight only, and there's currently
+	/// no way to configure the cap for the total value of outbound HTLCs in-flight.
+	///
+	/// * The requirements for your node being online to ensure the safety of HTLC-encumbered funds
+	/// are different from the non-HTLC-encumbered funds. This makes this an important knob to
+	/// restrict exposure to loss due to being offline for too long.
+	/// See [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`] and [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
+	/// for more information.
+	///
+	/// Default value: 10.
+	/// Minimum value: 1, any values less than 1 will be treated as 1 instead.
+	/// Maximum value: 100, any values larger than 100 will be treated as 100 instead.
+	pub max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel: u8,
 	/// If set, we attempt to negotiate the `scid_privacy` (referred to as `scid_alias` in the
 	/// BOLTs) option for outbound private channels. This provides better privacy by not including
 	/// our real on-chain channel UTXO in each invoice and requiring that our counterparty only
@@ -78,6 +110,7 @@ impl Default for ChannelHandshakeConfig {
 			minimum_depth: 6,
 			our_to_self_delay: BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT,
 			our_htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
+			max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel: 10,
 			negotiate_scid_privacy: false,
 		}
 	}
@@ -134,6 +167,24 @@ pub struct ChannelHandshakeLimits {
 	///
 	/// Default value: 144, or roughly one day and only applies to outbound channels.
 	pub max_minimum_depth: u32,
+	/// Whether we implicitly trust funding transactions generated by us for our own outbound
+	/// channels to not be double-spent.
+	///
+	/// If this is set, we assume that our own funding transactions are *never* double-spent, and
+	/// thus we can trust them without any confirmations. This is generally a reasonable
+	/// assumption, given we're the only ones who could ever double-spend it (assuming we have sole
+	/// control of the signing keys).
+	///
+	/// You may wish to un-set this if you allow the user to (or do in an automated fashion)
+	/// double-spend the funding transaction to RBF with an alternative channel open.
+	///
+	/// This only applies if our counterparty set their confirmations-required value to 0, and we
+	/// always trust our own funding transaction at 1 confirmation irrespective of this value.
+	/// Thus, this effectively acts as a `min_minimum_depth`, with the only possible values being
+	/// `true` (0) and `false` (1).
+	///
+	/// Default value: true
+	pub trust_own_funding_0conf: bool,
 	/// Set to force an incoming channel to match our announced channel preference in
 	/// [`ChannelConfig::announced_channel`].
 	///
@@ -162,6 +213,7 @@ impl Default for ChannelHandshakeLimits {
 			min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
 			max_channel_reserve_satoshis: <u64>::max_value(),
 			min_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
+			trust_own_funding_0conf: true,
 			max_minimum_depth: 144,
 			force_announced_channel_preference: true,
 			their_to_self_delay: MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT,