X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Futil%2Fconfig.rs;h=de83f227b2365af938539a62c5688d25d7d7be37;hb=47cb2939c8d618bfced370e5c9103eac4ee6ce9e;hp=19c4562105bff3aa15b1d6f88099a8da42a33669;hpb=8799a2a0440603bb10b7cf121f60e41f0ef1a6fa;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/lightning/src/util/config.rs b/lightning/src/util/config.rs index 19c45621..de83f227 100644 --- a/lightning/src/util/config.rs +++ b/lightning/src/util/config.rs @@ -23,18 +23,21 @@ pub struct ChannelHandshakeConfig { /// /// Default value: 6. pub minimum_depth: u32, - /// Set to the amount of time we require our counterparty to wait to claim their money. + /// Set to the number of blocks we require our counterparty to wait to claim their money (ie + /// the number of blocks we have to punish our counterparty if they broadcast a revoked + /// transaction). /// - /// It's one of the main parameter of our security model. We (or one of our watchtowers) MUST - /// be online to check for peer having broadcast a revoked transaction to steal our funds - /// at least once every our_to_self_delay blocks. + /// This is one of the main parameters of our security model. We (or one of our watchtowers) MUST + /// be online to check for revoked transactions on-chain at least once every our_to_self_delay + /// blocks (minus some margin to allow us enough time to broadcast and confirm a transaction, + /// possibly with time in between to RBF the spending transaction). /// /// Meanwhile, asking for a too high delay, we bother peer to freeze funds for nothing in /// case of an honest unilateral channel close, which implicitly decrease the economic value of /// our channel. /// - /// Default value: BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT (currently 144), we enforce it as a minimum at channel - /// opening so you can tweak config to ask for more security, not less. + /// Default value: [`BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT`], we enforce it as a minimum at channel opening so you + /// can tweak config to ask for more security, not less. pub our_to_self_delay: u16, /// Set to the smallest value HTLC we will accept to process. /// @@ -161,6 +164,26 @@ pub struct ChannelConfig { /// /// Default value: 0. pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32, + /// The difference in the CLTV value between incoming HTLCs and an outbound HTLC forwarded over + /// the channel this config applies to. + /// + /// This is analogous to [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`] but applies to in-flight + /// HTLC balance when a channel appears on-chain whereas + /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`] applies to the remaining + /// (non-HTLC-encumbered) balance. + /// + /// Thus, for HTLC-encumbered balances to be enforced on-chain when a channel is force-closed, + /// we (or one of our watchtowers) MUST be online to check for broadcast of the current + /// commitment transaction at least once per this many blocks (minus some margin to allow us + /// enough time to broadcast and confirm a transaction, possibly with time in between to RBF + /// the spending transaction). + /// + /// Default value: 72 (12 hours at an average of 6 blocks/hour). + /// Minimum value: [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`], any values less than this will be treated as + /// [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`] instead. + /// + /// [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA + pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16, /// Set to announce the channel publicly and notify all nodes that they can route via this /// channel. /// @@ -192,6 +215,7 @@ impl Default for ChannelConfig { fn default() -> Self { ChannelConfig { fee_proportional_millionths: 0, + cltv_expiry_delta: 6 * 12, // 6 blocks/hour * 12 hours announced_channel: false, commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: true, } @@ -199,8 +223,9 @@ impl Default for ChannelConfig { } //Add write and readable traits to channelconfig -impl_writeable!(ChannelConfig, 8+1+1, { +impl_writeable!(ChannelConfig, 4+2+1+1, { fee_proportional_millionths, + cltv_expiry_delta, announced_channel, commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey });