X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=src%2Fln%2Fchannel.rs;h=3d883cd76260b899a9d43ecc71e663829f68def6;hb=d990f72f9a4cf4bc6f7f32f8b3dc9dd616c5bd33;hp=bb17b51975460e24cbc78dc9f4a35adcf251fc48;hpb=658e558fd0e61719cfd89c076cdbe0888117ec62;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/src/ln/channel.rs b/src/ln/channel.rs index bb17b519..3d883cd7 100644 --- a/src/ln/channel.rs +++ b/src/ln/channel.rs @@ -2,13 +2,14 @@ use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader; use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder}; use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn, TxOut, Transaction, SigHashType}; use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes; -use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash, Sha256dHash}; +use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash; use bitcoin::util::bip143; use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{self, Encodable, Decodable}; use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine}; use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256; use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160; +use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash; use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey}; use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature}; @@ -25,7 +26,7 @@ use chain::transaction::OutPoint; use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface}; use util::transaction_utils; use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, WriterWriteAdaptor}; -use util::logger::Logger; +use util::logger::{Logger, LogHolder}; use util::errors::APIError; use util::config::{UserConfig,ChannelConfig}; @@ -93,14 +94,14 @@ enum OutboundHTLCState { /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we - /// revoke, but we dont really care about that: + /// revoke, but we don't really care about that: /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on) - /// money back (though we wont), and, + /// money back (though we won't), and, /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement - /// doesn't matter to us and its up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but + /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but /// we'll never get out of sync). - /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as its rather large and we don't want to blow up + /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit LocalAnnounced(Box), Committed, @@ -292,7 +293,7 @@ pub(super) struct Channel { last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, u64)>, // (feerate, fee) /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction reached our CONF_TARGET. We use this - /// to detect unconfirmation after a serialize-unserialize roudtrip where we may not see a full + /// to detect unconfirmation after a serialize-unserialize roundtrip where we may not see a full /// series of block_connected/block_disconnected calls. Obviously this is not a guarantee as we /// could miss the funding_tx_confirmed_in block as well, but it serves as a useful fallback. funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option, @@ -551,7 +552,7 @@ impl Channel { return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus; channel reserve is less than dust limit")); } if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 { - return Err(ChannelError::Close("Miminum htlc value is full channel value")); + return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is full channel value")); } Channel::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?; @@ -783,6 +784,8 @@ impl Channel { let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0; let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0; + log_trace!(self, "Building commitment transaction number {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...", commitment_number, if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw); + macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment { ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => { HTLCOutputInCommitment { @@ -796,25 +799,29 @@ impl Channel { } macro_rules! add_htlc_output { - ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr) => { + ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => { if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output" let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true); if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) { + log_trace!(self, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat); txouts.push((TxOut { script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc_in_tx, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh(), value: $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 }, Some((htlc_in_tx, $source)))); } else { + log_trace!(self, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat); included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source)); } } else { let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false); if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) { + log_trace!(self, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat); txouts.push((TxOut { // "received HTLC output" script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc_in_tx, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh(), value: $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 }, Some((htlc_in_tx, $source)))); } else { + log_trace!(self, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat); included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source)); } } @@ -822,18 +829,19 @@ impl Channel { } for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() { - let include = match htlc.state { - InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => !generated_by_local, - InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => !generated_by_local, - InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => true, - InboundHTLCState::Committed => true, - InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => !generated_by_local, + let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state { + InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"), + InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"), + InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"), + InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"), + InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"), }; if include { - add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None); + add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name); remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat; } else { + log_trace!(self, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name); match &htlc.state { &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => { if generated_by_local { @@ -848,18 +856,19 @@ impl Channel { } for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() { - let include = match htlc.state { - OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => generated_by_local, - OutboundHTLCState::Committed => true, - OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved => generated_by_local, - OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove => generated_by_local, - OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke => false, + let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state { + OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"), + OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"), + OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"), + OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"), + OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"), }; if include { - add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source)); + add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name); local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat; } else { + log_trace!(self, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name); match htlc.state { OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke => { if htlc.fail_reason.is_none() { @@ -925,7 +934,19 @@ impl Channel { }, None)); } - transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts); + transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |a, b| { + if let &Some(ref a_htlc) = a { + if let &Some(ref b_htlc) = b { + a_htlc.0.cltv_expiry.cmp(&b_htlc.0.cltv_expiry) + // Note that due to hash collisions, we have to have a fallback comparison + // here for fuzztarget mode (otherwise at least chanmon_fail_consistency + // may fail)! + .then(a_htlc.0.payment_hash.0.cmp(&b_htlc.0.payment_hash.0)) + // For non-HTLC outputs, if they're copying our SPK we don't really care if we + // close the channel due to mismatches - they're doing something dumb: + } else { cmp::Ordering::Equal } + } else { cmp::Ordering::Equal } + }); let mut outputs: Vec = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len()); let mut htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len() + included_dust_htlcs.len()); @@ -1001,7 +1022,7 @@ impl Channel { }, ())); } - transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts); + transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |_, _| { cmp::Ordering::Equal }); // Ordering doesnt matter if they used our pubkey... let mut outputs: Vec = Vec::new(); for out in txouts.drain(..) { @@ -1113,7 +1134,7 @@ impl Channel { } /// Signs a transaction created by build_htlc_transaction. If the transaction is an - /// HTLC-Success transaction (ie htlc.offered is false), preimate must be set! + /// HTLC-Success transaction (ie htlc.offered is false), preimage must be set! fn sign_htlc_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, their_sig: &Signature, preimage: &Option, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Result { if tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("Tried to sign HTLC transaction that had input count != 1!"); @@ -1151,7 +1172,7 @@ impl Channel { /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return an IgnoreError. Thus, will always return /// Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on and preconditions are met. fn get_update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(Option, Option), ChannelError> { - // Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it wont bet unset) or there is no way any + // Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us, // either. @@ -1217,6 +1238,7 @@ impl Channel { _ => {} } } + log_trace!(self, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell! Current state: {}", self.channel_state); self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg, }); @@ -1230,6 +1252,7 @@ impl Channel { debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to"); return Ok((None, Some(self.channel_monitor.clone()))); } + log_trace!(self, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0)); htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone())); } @@ -1274,7 +1297,7 @@ impl Channel { }, _ => { debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to"); - return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matchd the given HTLC ID")); + return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID")); } } pending_idx = idx; @@ -1352,10 +1375,10 @@ impl Channel { return Err(ChannelError::Close("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period")); } if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 { - return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accpted_htlcs makes for a useless channel")); + return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel")); } if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > 483 { - return Err(ChannelError::Close("max_accpted_htlcs > 483")); + return Err(ChannelError::Close("max_accepted_htlcs > 483")); } // Now check against optional parameters as set by config... @@ -1433,7 +1456,7 @@ impl Channel { } if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) { // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT - // remember the channel, so its safe to just send an error_message here and drop the + // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the // channel. return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!")); } @@ -1543,14 +1566,23 @@ impl Channel { (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32, htlc_inbound_value_msat) } - /// Returns (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) + /// Returns (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) *including* pending adds in our + /// holding cell. fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) { let mut htlc_outbound_value_msat = 0; for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() { htlc_outbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat; } - (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32, htlc_outbound_value_msat) + let mut htlc_outbound_count = self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len(); + for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() { + if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update { + htlc_outbound_count += 1; + htlc_outbound_value_msat += amount_msat; + } + } + + (htlc_outbound_count as u32, htlc_outbound_value_msat) } pub fn update_add_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, pending_forward_state: PendingHTLCStatus) -> Result<(), ChannelError> { @@ -1703,6 +1735,7 @@ impl Channel { }; let local_commitment_txid = local_commitment_tx.0.txid(); let local_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_commitment_tx.0).sighash_all(&local_commitment_tx.0.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]); + log_trace!(self, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&local_commitment_tx.0), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script)); secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid commitment tx signature from peer"); //If channel fee was updated by funder confirm funder can afford the new fee rate when applied to the current local commitment transaction @@ -1728,6 +1761,7 @@ impl Channel { if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index { let mut htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&local_commitment_txid, &htlc, true, &local_keys, feerate_per_kw); let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &local_keys); + log_trace!(self, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(local_keys.b_htlc_key.serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript)); let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]); secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &local_keys.b_htlc_key), "Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer"); let htlc_sig = if htlc.offered { @@ -1842,8 +1876,8 @@ impl Channel { for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) { // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over - // the limit. In case its less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit - // handling this case better and maybe fufilling some of the HTLCs while attempting + // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit + // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting // to rebalance channels. if err.is_some() { // We're back to AwaitingRemoteRevoke (or are about to fail the channel) self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(htlc_update); @@ -1853,6 +1887,14 @@ impl Channel { match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone()) { Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()), Err(e) => { + match e { + ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => { + log_info!(self, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg); + }, + _ => { + log_info!(self, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} resulting in a channel closure during holding_cell freeing", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0)); + }, + } err = Some(e); } } @@ -1882,11 +1924,16 @@ impl Channel { } if err.is_some() { self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(htlc_update); + if let Some(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) = err { + // If we failed to add the HTLC, but got an Ignore error, we should + // still send the new commitment_signed, so reset the err to None. + err = None; + } } } } - //TODO: Need to examine the type of err - if its a fee issue or similar we may want to - //fail it back the route, if its a temporary issue we can ignore it... + //TODO: Need to examine the type of err - if it's a fee issue or similar we may want to + //fail it back the route, if it's a temporary issue we can ignore it... match err { None => { if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() { @@ -1960,74 +2007,89 @@ impl Channel { self.monitor_pending_order = None; } + log_trace!(self, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA..."); let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new(); let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new(); let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new(); let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new(); let mut require_commitment = false; let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0; - // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug) - self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| { - if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state { - if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason { - value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64; - } - false - } else { true } - }); - self.pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| { - if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke = htlc.state { - if let Some(reason) = htlc.fail_reason.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :( - revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason)); - } else { - // They fulfilled, so we sent them money - value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64; - } - false - } else { true } - }); - for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() { - let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state { - true - } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state { - true - } else { false }; - if swap { - let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed; - mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state); - - if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state { - htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info); - require_commitment = true; - } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state { - match forward_info { - PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => { - require_commitment = true; - match fail_msg { - HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => { - htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone())); - update_fail_htlcs.push(msg) - }, - HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => { - htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code))); - update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg) - }, + + { + // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self. + let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs; + let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs; + let logger = LogHolder { logger: &self.logger }; + + // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug) + pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| { + if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state { + log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0)); + if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason { + value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64; + } + false + } else { true } + }); + pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| { + if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke = htlc.state { + log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0)); + if let Some(reason) = htlc.fail_reason.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :( + revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason)); + } else { + // They fulfilled, so we sent them money + value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64; + } + false + } else { true } + }); + for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() { + let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state { + log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0)); + true + } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state { + log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0)); + true + } else { false }; + if swap { + let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed; + mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state); + + if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state { + htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info); + require_commitment = true; + } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state { + match forward_info { + PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => { + require_commitment = true; + match fail_msg { + HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => { + htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone())); + update_fail_htlcs.push(msg) + }, + HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => { + htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code))); + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg) + }, + } + }, + PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => { + to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id)); + htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed; } - }, - PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => { - to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id)); - htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed; } } } } - } - for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() { - if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state { - htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed; - } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove = htlc.state { - htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke; - require_commitment = true; + for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() { + if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state { + log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0)); + htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed; + } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove = htlc.state { + log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0)); + htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke; + require_commitment = true; + } } } self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64; @@ -2038,7 +2100,7 @@ impl Channel { } } else { if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee { - // Because a node cannot send two commitment_signed's in a row without getting a + // Because a node cannot send two commitment_signeds in a row without getting a // revoke_and_ack from us (as it would otherwise not know the per_commitment_point // it should use to create keys with) and because a node can't send a // commitment_signed without changes, checking if the feerate is equal to the @@ -2324,6 +2386,8 @@ impl Channel { } } + log_trace!(self, "Regenerated latest commitment update with {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds", + update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len()); msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee: None, //TODO: We need to support re-generating any update_fees in the last commitment_signed! @@ -2496,7 +2560,7 @@ impl Channel { assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0); // BOLT 2 says we must only send a scriptpubkey of certain standard forms, which are up to - // 34 bytes in length, so dont let the remote peer feed us some super fee-heavy script. + // 34 bytes in length, so don't let the remote peer feed us some super fee-heavy script. if self.channel_outbound && msg.scriptpubkey.len() > 34 { return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown_scriptpubkey of absurd length from remote peer")); } @@ -3092,7 +3156,7 @@ impl Channel { excess_data: Vec::new(), }; - let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&msg.encode()[..])[..]); + let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]); let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.local_keys.funding_key); Ok((msg, sig)) @@ -3136,7 +3200,7 @@ impl Channel { /// waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack during which time we cannot add new /// HTLCs on the wire or we wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed. /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel - /// If an Err is returned, its a ChannelError::Ignore! + /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore! pub fn send_htlc(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result, ChannelError> { if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) { return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down")); @@ -3166,30 +3230,19 @@ impl Channel { //TODO: Spec is unclear if this is per-direction or in total (I assume per direction): // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat if htlc_outbound_value_msat + amount_msat > self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat { - return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight")); - } - - let mut holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat = 0; - for holding_htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() { - match holding_htlc { - &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } => { - holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat += *amount_msat; - } - _ => {} - } + return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight")); } // Check self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as // reserve for them to have something to claim if we misbehave) - if self.value_to_self_msat < self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 + amount_msat + holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat + htlc_outbound_value_msat { - return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value")); + if self.value_to_self_msat < self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 + amount_msat + htlc_outbound_value_msat { + return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put us over the reserve value")); } //TODO: Check cltv_expiry? Do this in channel manager? // Now update local state: if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) { - //TODO: Check the limits *including* other pending holding cell HTLCs! self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat: amount_msat, payment_hash: payment_hash, @@ -3309,6 +3362,7 @@ impl Channel { let remote_commitment_txid = remote_commitment_tx.0.txid(); let remote_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&remote_commitment_tx.0).sighash_all(&remote_commitment_tx.0.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]); let our_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key); + log_trace!(self, "Signing remote commitment tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {}", encode::serialize_hex(&remote_commitment_tx.0), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key).serialize()), log_bytes!(our_sig.serialize_compact()[..])); let mut htlc_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(remote_commitment_tx.1); for &(ref htlc, _) in remote_commitment_tx.2.iter() { @@ -3318,6 +3372,7 @@ impl Channel { let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]); let our_htlc_key = secp_check!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &remote_keys.per_commitment_point, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key), "Derived invalid key, peer is maliciously selecting parameters"); htlc_sigs.push(self.secp_ctx.sign(&htlc_sighash, &our_htlc_key)); + log_trace!(self, "Signing remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {}", encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &our_htlc_key).serialize()), log_bytes!(htlc_sigs.last().unwrap().serialize_compact()[..])); } } @@ -3393,7 +3448,7 @@ impl Channel { }, dropped_outbound_htlcs)) } - /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependant transactions for relay (forcing + /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters). /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards @@ -3912,12 +3967,12 @@ impl ReadableArgs> for Channel { #[cfg(test)] mod tests { - use bitcoin::util::hash::{Sha256dHash, Hash160}; use bitcoin::util::bip143; use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize; use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder}; use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction; use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes; + use bitcoin_hashes::hex::FromHex; use hex; use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash}; use ln::channel::{Channel,ChannelKeys,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,TxCreationKeys}; @@ -3932,6 +3987,8 @@ mod tests { use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature}; use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey}; use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256; + use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash; + use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160; use bitcoin_hashes::Hash; use std::sync::Arc; @@ -3947,7 +4004,7 @@ mod tests { #[test] fn test_max_funding_satoshis() { assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS <= 21_000_000 * 100_000_000, - "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS is greater than all satoshis on existence"); + "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS is greater than all satoshis in existence"); } struct Keys { @@ -3958,7 +4015,7 @@ mod tests { fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script { let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only(); let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(); - let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = Hash160::from_data(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize()); + let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = Hash160::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize()); Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script() }