X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=src%2Fln%2Fchannel.rs;h=906d1ffff0e36f09caccd5009966cc19000c1620;hb=832fc4fd4435fa236f15d3e737bebf64619ff60e;hp=614c13b442d76d9826875178879da20c6ef0d226;hpb=cfc3fe3148b6d4bcf5b8b8eb974376a939e2edbb;p=rust-lightning

diff --git a/src/ln/channel.rs b/src/ln/channel.rs
index 614c13b4..1e5c38b4 100644
--- a/src/ln/channel.rs
+++ b/src/ln/channel.rs
@@ -2,103 +2,93 @@ use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn, TxOut, Transaction, SigHashType};
 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
-use bitcoin::util::hash::{Sha256dHash, Hash160};
+use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash, Sha256dHash, Hash160};
 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
-use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
+use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{self, Encodable, Decodable};
 
 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
 use secp256k1;
 
 use crypto::digest::Digest;
-use crypto::hkdf::{hkdf_extract,hkdf_expand};
 
 use ln::msgs;
-use ln::msgs::{ErrorAction, HandleError, MsgEncodable};
+use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
 use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
-use ln::channelmanager::{PendingForwardHTLCInfo, HTLCFailReason};
+use ln::channelmanager::{PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingForwardHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
 use ln::chan_utils::{TxCreationKeys,HTLCOutputInCommitment,HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT,HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT};
 use ln::chan_utils;
 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
+use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface};
 use util::{transaction_utils,rng};
+use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, WriterWriteAdaptor};
 use util::sha2::Sha256;
+use util::logger::Logger;
+use util::errors::APIError;
+use util::config::{UserConfig,ChannelConfig};
 
 use std;
 use std::default::Default;
 use std::{cmp,mem};
 use std::time::Instant;
+use std::sync::{Arc};
 
-pub struct ChannelKeys {
-	pub funding_key: SecretKey,
-	pub revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
-	pub payment_base_key: SecretKey,
-	pub delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey,
-	pub htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
-	pub channel_close_key: SecretKey,
-	pub channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey,
-	pub commitment_seed: [u8; 32],
+#[cfg(test)]
+pub struct ChannelValueStat {
+	pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
+	pub channel_value_msat: u64,
+	pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
+	pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
+	pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
+	pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
+	pub their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
 }
 
-impl ChannelKeys {
-	pub fn new_from_seed(seed: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<ChannelKeys, secp256k1::Error> {
-		let mut prk = [0; 32];
-		hkdf_extract(Sha256::new(), b"rust-lightning key gen salt", seed, &mut prk);
-		let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::without_caps();
-
-		let mut okm = [0; 32];
-		hkdf_expand(Sha256::new(), &prk, b"rust-lightning funding key info", &mut okm);
-		let funding_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &okm)?;
-
-		hkdf_expand(Sha256::new(), &prk, b"rust-lightning revocation base key info", &mut okm);
-		let revocation_base_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &okm)?;
-
-		hkdf_expand(Sha256::new(), &prk, b"rust-lightning payment base key info", &mut okm);
-		let payment_base_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &okm)?;
-
-		hkdf_expand(Sha256::new(), &prk, b"rust-lightning delayed payment base key info", &mut okm);
-		let delayed_payment_base_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &okm)?;
-
-		hkdf_expand(Sha256::new(), &prk, b"rust-lightning htlc base key info", &mut okm);
-		let htlc_base_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &okm)?;
-
-		hkdf_expand(Sha256::new(), &prk, b"rust-lightning channel close key info", &mut okm);
-		let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &okm)?;
-
-		hkdf_expand(Sha256::new(), &prk, b"rust-lightning channel monitor claim key info", &mut okm);
-		let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &okm)?;
-
-		hkdf_expand(Sha256::new(), &prk, b"rust-lightning local commitment seed info", &mut okm);
-
-		Ok(ChannelKeys {
-			funding_key: funding_key,
-			revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key,
-			payment_base_key: payment_base_key,
-			delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key,
-			htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key,
-			channel_close_key: channel_close_key,
-			channel_monitor_claim_key: channel_monitor_claim_key,
-			commitment_seed: okm
-		})
-	}
+enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
+	FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
+	FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
+	Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
 }
 
-#[derive(PartialEq)]
-enum HTLCState {
+enum InboundHTLCState {
 	/// Added by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx.
-	RemoteAnnounced,
+	RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
 	/// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
 	/// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
 	/// accept this HTLC. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 	/// We also have not yet included this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on
 	/// a remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
-	AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
+	AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
 	/// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
 	/// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
 	/// accept this HTLC. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 	/// We have included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
 	/// revoke_and_ack.
-	AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke,
+	AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
+	Committed,
+	/// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
+	/// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
+	/// we'll drop it.
+	/// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
+	/// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
+	/// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
+	/// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
+	/// ChannelMonitor::would_broadcast_at_height) so we actually remove the HTLC from our own
+	/// local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
+	/// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info will not include this HTLC.
+	LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
+}
+
+struct InboundHTLCOutput {
+	htlc_id: u64,
+	amount_msat: u64,
+	cltv_expiry: u32,
+	payment_hash: PaymentHash,
+	state: InboundHTLCState,
+}
+
+enum OutboundHTLCState {
 	/// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
 	/// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
 	/// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
@@ -109,7 +99,9 @@ enum HTLCState {
 	///    allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
 	///    doesn't matter to us and its up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
 	///    we'll never get out of sync).
-	LocalAnnounced,
+	/// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as its rather large and we don't want to blow up
+	/// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
+	LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
 	Committed,
 	/// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
 	/// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
@@ -126,42 +118,26 @@ enum HTLCState {
 	/// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
 	/// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
 	AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke,
-	/// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
-	/// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
-	/// we'll promote to LocalRemovedAwaitingCommitment if we fulfilled, otherwise we'll drop at
-	/// that point.
-	/// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
-	/// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
-	/// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
-	/// anyway).
-	LocalRemoved,
-	/// Removed by us, sent a new commitment_signed and got a revoke_and_ack. Just waiting on an
-	/// updated local commitment transaction. Implies local_removed_fulfilled.
-	LocalRemovedAwaitingCommitment,
 }
 
-struct HTLCOutput { //TODO: Refactor into Outbound/InboundHTLCOutput (will save memory and fewer panics)
-	outbound: bool, // ie to an HTLC-Timeout transaction
+struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
 	htlc_id: u64,
 	amount_msat: u64,
 	cltv_expiry: u32,
-	payment_hash: [u8; 32],
-	state: HTLCState,
-	/// If we're in a Remote* removed state, set if they failed, otherwise None
+	payment_hash: PaymentHash,
+	state: OutboundHTLCState,
+	source: HTLCSource,
+	/// If we're in a removed state, set if they failed, otherwise None
 	fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>,
-	/// If we're in LocalRemoved*, set to true if we fulfilled the HTLC, and can claim money
-	local_removed_fulfilled: bool,
-	/// state pre-committed Remote* implies pending_forward_state, otherwise it must be None
-	pending_forward_state: Option<PendingForwardHTLCInfo>,
 }
 
-impl HTLCOutput {
-	fn get_in_commitment(&self, offered: bool) -> HTLCOutputInCommitment {
+macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
+	($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
 		HTLCOutputInCommitment {
-			offered: offered,
-			amount_msat: self.amount_msat,
-			cltv_expiry: self.cltv_expiry,
-			payment_hash: self.payment_hash,
+			offered: $offered,
+			amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
+			cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
+			payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
 			transaction_output_index: 0
 		}
 	}
@@ -173,20 +149,28 @@ enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
 		// always outbound
 		amount_msat: u64,
 		cltv_expiry: u32,
-		payment_hash: [u8; 32],
+		payment_hash: PaymentHash,
+		source: HTLCSource,
 		onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
 		time_created: Instant, //TODO: Some kind of timeout thing-a-majig
 	},
 	ClaimHTLC {
-		payment_preimage: [u8; 32],
-		payment_hash: [u8; 32], // Only here for effecient duplicate detection
+		payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
+		htlc_id: u64,
 	},
 	FailHTLC {
-		payment_hash: [u8; 32],
+		htlc_id: u64,
 		err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
 	},
 }
 
+/// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
+/// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
+/// TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
+/// move on to ChannelFunded.
+/// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelFunded and FundingSent.
+/// ChannelFunded can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
+/// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
 enum ChannelState {
 	/// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
 	OurInitSent = (1 << 0),
@@ -207,43 +191,56 @@ enum ChannelState {
 	/// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
 	OurFundingLocked = (1 << 5),
 	ChannelFunded = 64,
+	/// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
+	/// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
+	/// dance.
+	PeerDisconnected = (1 << 7),
+	/// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating the user has told us they
+	/// failed to update our ChannelMonitor somewhere and we should pause sending any outbound
+	/// messages until they've managed to do so.
+	MonitorUpdateFailed = (1 << 8),
 	/// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
 	/// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
 	/// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
 	/// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
 	/// later.
 	/// Flag is set on ChannelFunded.
-	AwaitingRemoteRevoke = (1 << 7),
+	AwaitingRemoteRevoke = (1 << 9),
 	/// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
 	/// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
 	/// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
-	RemoteShutdownSent = (1 << 8),
+	RemoteShutdownSent = (1 << 10),
 	/// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
 	/// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
 	/// TODO: Investigate some kind of timeout mechanism by which point the remote end must provide
 	/// us their shutdown.
-	LocalShutdownSent = (1 << 9),
+	LocalShutdownSent = (1 << 11),
 	/// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
 	/// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
-	ShutdownComplete = (1 << 10),
+	ShutdownComplete = 4096,
 }
 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32);
+const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
+
+const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
 
 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
 // inbound channel.
-pub struct Channel {
+pub(super) struct Channel {
+	config: ChannelConfig,
+
 	user_id: u64,
 
 	channel_id: [u8; 32],
 	channel_state: u32,
 	channel_outbound: bool,
-	secp_ctx: Secp256k1,
-	announce_publicly: bool,
+	secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
 	channel_value_satoshis: u64,
 
 	local_keys: ChannelKeys,
+	shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
 
 	// Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
 	// generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
@@ -252,13 +249,51 @@ pub struct Channel {
 	cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
 	cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
 	value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
-	pending_htlcs: Vec<HTLCOutput>,
+	/// Upon receipt of a channel_reestablish we have to figure out whether to send a
+	/// revoke_and_ack first or a commitment update first. Generally, we prefer to send
+	/// revoke_and_ack first, but if we had a pending commitment update of our own waiting on a
+	/// remote revoke when we received the latest commitment update from the remote we have to make
+	/// sure that commitment update gets resent first.
+	received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa: bool,
+	pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
+	pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
 	holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
+
+	monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
+	monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
+	monitor_pending_order: Option<RAACommitmentOrder>,
+	monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>,
+	monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
+
+	// pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee
+	// For outbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated with the value from
+	// pending_update_fee when revoke_and_ack is received
+	//
+	// For inbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated when it receives
+	// commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack is generated
+	// The pending value is kept when another pair of update_fee and commitment_signed
+	// is received during AwaitingRemoteRevoke and relieved when the expected
+	// revoke_and_ack is received and new commitment_signed is generated to be
+	// sent to the funder. Otherwise, the pending value is removed when receiving
+	// commitment_signed.
+	pending_update_fee: Option<u64>,
+	// update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke is hold in
+	// holdina_cell_update_fee then moved to pending_udpate_fee when revoke_and_ack
+	// is received. holding_cell_update_fee is updated when there are additional
+	// update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
+	holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u64>,
 	next_local_htlc_id: u64,
 	next_remote_htlc_id: u64,
 	channel_update_count: u32,
 	feerate_per_kw: u64,
 
+	#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
+	/// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
+	max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
+	#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
+	/// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
+	max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
+
 	#[cfg(test)]
 	// Used in ChannelManager's tests to send a revoked transaction
 	pub last_local_commitment_txn: Vec<Transaction>,
@@ -271,16 +306,18 @@ pub struct Channel {
 	/// to detect unconfirmation after a serialize-unserialize roudtrip where we may not see a full
 	/// series of block_connected/block_disconnected calls. Obviously this is not a guarantee as we
 	/// could miss the funding_tx_confirmed_in block as well, but it serves as a useful fallback.
-	funding_tx_confirmed_in: Sha256dHash,
+	funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<Sha256dHash>,
 	short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
-	/// Used to deduplicate block_connected callbacks
-	last_block_connected: Sha256dHash,
+	/// Used to deduplicate block_connected callbacks, also used to verify consistency during
+	/// ChannelManager deserialization (hence pub(super))
+	pub(super) last_block_connected: Sha256dHash,
 	funding_tx_confirmations: u64,
 
 	their_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
 	our_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
 	their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
 	//get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(): u64,
+	/// minimum channel reserve for **self** to maintain - set by them.
 	their_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
 	//get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(): u64,
 	their_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
@@ -289,13 +326,14 @@ pub struct Channel {
 	//implied by BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: our_to_self_delay: u16,
 	their_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
 	//implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: our_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
+	minimum_depth: u32,
 
-	their_funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
-	their_revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
-	their_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
-	their_delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
-	their_htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
-	their_cur_commitment_point: PublicKey,
+	their_funding_pubkey: Option<PublicKey>,
+	their_revocation_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
+	their_payment_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
+	their_delayed_payment_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
+	their_htlc_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
+	their_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
 
 	their_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
 	their_node_id: PublicKey,
@@ -303,10 +341,11 @@ pub struct Channel {
 	their_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
 
 	channel_monitor: ChannelMonitor,
+
+	logger: Arc<Logger>,
 }
 
 const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 5; //TODO
-const CONF_TARGET: u32 = 12; //TODO: Should be much higher
 /// Confirmation count threshold at which we close a channel. Ideally we'd keep the channel around
 /// on ice until the funding transaction gets more confirmations, but the LN protocol doesn't
 /// really allow for this, so instead we're stuck closing it out at that point.
@@ -316,92 +355,135 @@ const UNCONF_THRESHOLD: u32 = 6;
 const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
 /// The amount of time we're willing to wait to claim money back to us
 const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 14;
-const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
-const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
+/// Exposing these two constants for use in test in ChannelMonitor
+pub const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
+pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
 const SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 79; // prevout: 36, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: (3+1)/4, sig: 73/4, if-selector: 1, redeemScript: (6 ops + 2*33 pubkeys + 1*2 delay)/4
 const B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 104; // prevout: 40, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: 3/4, sig: 73/4, pubkey: 33/4, output: 31 (TODO: Wrong? Useless?)
 /// Maximmum `funding_satoshis` value, according to the BOLT #2 specification
 /// it's 2^24.
 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS: u64 = (1 << 24);
 
-macro_rules! secp_call {
-	( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
+#[cfg(test)]
+pub const ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT: usize = 138; //Here we have a diff due to HTLC CLTV expiry being < 2^15 in test
+#[cfg(not(test))]
+pub const ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT: usize = 139;
+pub const OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT: usize = 133;
+
+/// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
+/// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
+/// channel_id in ChannelManager.
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub(super) enum ChannelError {
+	Ignore(&'static str),
+	Close(&'static str),
+}
+
+macro_rules! secp_check {
+	($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
 		match $res {
-			Ok(key) => key,
-			//TODO: make the error a parameter
-			Err(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: $err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None })})
+			Ok(thing) => thing,
+			Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
 		}
 	};
 }
 
-macro_rules! secp_derived_key {
-	( $res: expr ) => {
-		secp_call!($res, "Derived invalid key, peer is maliciously selecting parameters")
-	}
-}
 impl Channel {
 	// Convert constants + channel value to limits:
 	fn get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
 		channel_value_satoshis * 1000 / 10 //TODO
 	}
 
+	/// Returns a minimum channel reserve value **they** need to maintain
+	///
 	/// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
 	fn get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
-		cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, 1000) //TODO
+		let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
+		cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000)) //TODO
 	}
 
 	fn derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(at_open_background_feerate: u64) -> u64 {
-		at_open_background_feerate * B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT / 1000 //TODO
+		cmp::max(at_open_background_feerate * B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT / 1000, 546) //TODO
 	}
 
 	fn derive_our_htlc_minimum_msat(_at_open_channel_feerate_per_kw: u64) -> u64 {
 		1000 // TODO
 	}
 
+	fn derive_minimum_depth(_channel_value_satoshis_msat: u64, _value_to_self_msat: u64) -> u32 {
+		// Note that in order to comply with BOLT 7 announcement_signatures requirements this must
+		// be at least 6.
+		const CONF_TARGET: u32 = 12; //TODO: Should be much higher
+		CONF_TARGET
+	}
+
 	// Constructors:
+	pub fn new_outbound(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, keys_provider: &Arc<KeysInterface>, their_node_id: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, logger: Arc<Logger>, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel, APIError> {
+		let chan_keys = keys_provider.get_channel_keys(false);
 
-	/// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`
-	pub fn new_outbound(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, chan_keys: ChannelKeys, their_node_id: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, announce_publicly: bool, user_id: u64) -> Channel {
 		if channel_value_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
-			panic!("funding value > 2^24");
+			return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "funding value > 2^24"});
 		}
 
-		let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
+		if push_msat > channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
+			return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "push value > channel value"});
+		}
+
+
 		let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
+		if Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis) < Channel::derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate) {
+			return Err(APIError::FeeRateTooHigh{err: format!("Not enough reserve above dust limit can be found at current fee rate({})", background_feerate), feerate: background_feerate});
+		}
+
+		let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
 
 		let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
-		let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = Hash160::from_data(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan_keys.channel_monitor_claim_key).unwrap().serialize());
-		let our_channel_monitor_claim_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script();
-		let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&chan_keys.revocation_base_key,
-		                                          &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan_keys.delayed_payment_base_key).unwrap(),
-		                                          &chan_keys.htlc_base_key,
-		                                          BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, our_channel_monitor_claim_script);
-
-		Channel {
+		let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&chan_keys.revocation_base_key, &chan_keys.delayed_payment_base_key,
+		                                          &chan_keys.htlc_base_key, &chan_keys.payment_base_key, &keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(), BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT,
+		                                          keys_provider.get_destination_script(), logger.clone());
+
+		Ok(Channel {
 			user_id: user_id,
+			config: config.channel_options.clone(),
 
 			channel_id: rng::rand_u832(),
 			channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
 			channel_outbound: true,
 			secp_ctx: secp_ctx,
-			announce_publicly: announce_publicly,
 			channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis,
 
 			local_keys: chan_keys,
-			cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: (1 << 48) - 1,
-			cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: (1 << 48) - 1,
-			value_to_self_msat: channel_value_satoshis * 1000, //TODO: give them something on open? Parameterize it?
-			pending_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+			shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
+			cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
+			cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
+			value_to_self_msat: channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat,
+			received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa: false,
+
+			pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+			pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 			holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
+			pending_update_fee: None,
+			holding_cell_update_fee: None,
 			next_local_htlc_id: 0,
 			next_remote_htlc_id: 0,
 			channel_update_count: 1,
 
+			monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
+			monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
+			monitor_pending_order: None,
+			monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
+			monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
+
+			#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
+			max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
+			#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
+			max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
+
 			last_local_commitment_txn: Vec::new(),
 
 			last_sent_closing_fee: None,
 
-			funding_tx_confirmed_in: Default::default(),
+			funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
 			short_channel_id: None,
 			last_block_connected: Default::default(),
 			funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
@@ -415,13 +497,14 @@ impl Channel {
 			our_htlc_minimum_msat: Channel::derive_our_htlc_minimum_msat(feerate),
 			their_to_self_delay: 0,
 			their_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
+			minimum_depth: 0, // Filled in in accept_channel
 
-			their_funding_pubkey: PublicKey::new(),
-			their_revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::new(),
-			their_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::new(),
-			their_delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::new(),
-			their_htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::new(),
-			their_cur_commitment_point: PublicKey::new(),
+			their_funding_pubkey: None,
+			their_revocation_basepoint: None,
+			their_payment_basepoint: None,
+			their_delayed_payment_basepoint: None,
+			their_htlc_basepoint: None,
+			their_cur_commitment_point: None,
 
 			their_prev_commitment_point: None,
 			their_node_id: their_node_id,
@@ -429,97 +512,167 @@ impl Channel {
 			their_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
 
 			channel_monitor: channel_monitor,
-		}
+
+			logger,
+		})
 	}
 
-	fn check_remote_fee(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+	fn check_remote_fee(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
 		if (feerate_per_kw as u64) < fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background) {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer's feerate much too low", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None })});
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer's feerate much too low"));
 		}
 		if (feerate_per_kw as u64) > fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) * 2 {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer's feerate much too high", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None })});
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer's feerate much too high"));
 		}
 		Ok(())
 	}
 
 	/// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
 	/// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
-	/// Generally prefers to take the DisconnectPeer action on failure, as a notice to the sender
-	/// that we're rejecting the new channel.
-	pub fn new_from_req(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, chan_keys: ChannelKeys, their_node_id: PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, require_announce: bool, allow_announce: bool) -> Result<Channel, HandleError> {
+	pub fn new_from_req(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, keys_provider: &Arc<KeysInterface>, their_node_id: PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, logger: Arc<Logger>, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel, ChannelError> {
+		let chan_keys = keys_provider.get_channel_keys(true);
+		let mut local_config = (*config).channel_options.clone();
+
 		// Check sanity of message fields:
 		if msg.funding_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "funding value > 2^24", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None })});
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("funding value > 2^24"));
 		}
 		if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None })});
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis"));
 		}
 		if msg.push_msat > (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "push_msat more than highest possible value", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None })});
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("push_msat larger than funding value"));
 		}
 		if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer never wants payout outputs?", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None })});
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer never wants payout outputs?"));
+		}
+		if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus; channel reserve is less than dust limit"));
 		}
 		if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Minimum htlc value is full channel value", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None })});
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Miminum htlc value is full channel value"));
 		}
 		Channel::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
+
 		if msg.to_self_delay > MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None })});
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period"));
 		}
 		if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "0 max_accpted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None })});
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accpted_htlcs makes for a useless channel"));
+		}
+		if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > 483 {
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("max_accpted_htlcs > 483"));
+		}
+
+		// Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
+		if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("funding satoshis is less than the user specified limit"));
+		}
+		if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("htlc minimum msat is higher than the user specified limit"));
+		}
+		if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("max htlc value in flight msat is less than the user specified limit"));
+		}
+		if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("channel reserve satoshis is higher than the user specified limit"));
 		}
-		if (msg.channel_flags & 254) != 0 {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "unknown channel_flags", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None })});
+		if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("max accepted htlcs is less than the user specified limit"));
+		}
+		if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.channel_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is less than the user specified limit"));
+		}
+		if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.channel_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is greater than the user specified limit"));
 		}
 
 		// Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
 
 		let their_announce = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
-		if require_announce && !their_announce {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer tried to open unannounced channel, but we require public ones", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) });
-		}
-		if !allow_announce && their_announce {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer tried to open announced channel, but we require private ones", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) });
+		if config.channel_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
+			if local_config.announced_channel != their_announce {
+				return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours"));
+			}
 		}
+		// we either accept their preference or the preferences match
+		local_config.announced_channel = their_announce;
 
 		let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
 
+		let our_dust_limit_satoshis = Channel::derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate);
+		let our_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis);
+		if our_channel_reserve_satoshis < our_dust_limit_satoshis {
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Suitable channel reserve not found. aborting"));
+		}
+		if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < our_dust_limit_satoshis {
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("channel_reserve_satoshis too small"));
+		}
+		if our_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Dust limit too high for our channel reserve"));
+		}
+
+		// check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
+		// for full fee payment
+		let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
+		if funders_amount_msat < background_feerate * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT {
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment"));
+		}
+
+		let to_local_msat = msg.push_msat;
+		let to_remote_msat = funders_amount_msat - background_feerate * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
+		if to_local_msat <= msg.channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 && to_remote_msat <= our_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment"));
+		}
+
 		let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
-		let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = Hash160::from_data(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan_keys.channel_monitor_claim_key).unwrap().serialize());
-		let our_channel_monitor_claim_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script();
-		let mut channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&chan_keys.revocation_base_key,
-		                                              &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan_keys.delayed_payment_base_key).unwrap(),
-		                                              &chan_keys.htlc_base_key,
-		                                              BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, our_channel_monitor_claim_script);
-		channel_monitor.set_their_htlc_base_key(&msg.htlc_basepoint);
+		let mut channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&chan_keys.revocation_base_key, &chan_keys.delayed_payment_base_key,
+		                                              &chan_keys.htlc_base_key, &chan_keys.payment_base_key, &keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(), BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT,
+		                                              keys_provider.get_destination_script(), logger.clone());
+		channel_monitor.set_their_base_keys(&msg.htlc_basepoint, &msg.delayed_payment_basepoint);
 		channel_monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(msg.to_self_delay);
 
 		let mut chan = Channel {
 			user_id: user_id,
+			config: local_config,
 
 			channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
 			channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
 			channel_outbound: false,
 			secp_ctx: secp_ctx,
-			announce_publicly: their_announce,
 
 			local_keys: chan_keys,
-			cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: (1 << 48) - 1,
-			cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: (1 << 48) - 1,
+			shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
+			cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
+			cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
 			value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
-			pending_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+			received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa: false,
+
+			pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+			pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 			holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
+			pending_update_fee: None,
+			holding_cell_update_fee: None,
 			next_local_htlc_id: 0,
 			next_remote_htlc_id: 0,
 			channel_update_count: 1,
 
+			monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
+			monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
+			monitor_pending_order: None,
+			monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
+			monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
+
+			#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
+			max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
+			#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
+			max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
+
 			last_local_commitment_txn: Vec::new(),
 
 			last_sent_closing_fee: None,
 
-			funding_tx_confirmed_in: Default::default(),
+			funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
 			short_channel_id: None,
 			last_block_connected: Default::default(),
 			funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
@@ -527,20 +680,21 @@ impl Channel {
 			feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw as u64,
 			channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
 			their_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
-			our_dust_limit_satoshis: Channel::derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate),
+			our_dust_limit_satoshis: our_dust_limit_satoshis,
 			their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
 			their_channel_reserve_satoshis: msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
 			their_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
 			our_htlc_minimum_msat: Channel::derive_our_htlc_minimum_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw as u64),
 			their_to_self_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
 			their_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
+			minimum_depth: Channel::derive_minimum_depth(msg.funding_satoshis*1000, msg.push_msat),
 
-			their_funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
-			their_revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
-			their_payment_basepoint: msg.payment_basepoint,
-			their_delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
-			their_htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint,
-			their_cur_commitment_point: msg.first_per_commitment_point,
+			their_funding_pubkey: Some(msg.funding_pubkey),
+			their_revocation_basepoint: Some(msg.revocation_basepoint),
+			their_payment_basepoint: Some(msg.payment_basepoint),
+			their_delayed_payment_basepoint: Some(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
+			their_htlc_basepoint: Some(msg.htlc_basepoint),
+			their_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
 
 			their_prev_commitment_point: None,
 			their_node_id: their_node_id,
@@ -548,6 +702,8 @@ impl Channel {
 			their_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
 
 			channel_monitor: channel_monitor,
+
+			logger,
 		};
 
 		let obscure_factor = chan.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor();
@@ -567,13 +723,13 @@ impl Channel {
 
 	fn get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self) -> u64 {
 		let mut sha = Sha256::new();
-		let our_payment_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key).unwrap();
+		let our_payment_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key);
 
 		if self.channel_outbound {
 			sha.input(&our_payment_basepoint.serialize());
-			sha.input(&self.their_payment_basepoint.serialize());
+			sha.input(&self.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap().serialize());
 		} else {
-			sha.input(&self.their_payment_basepoint.serialize());
+			sha.input(&self.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap().serialize());
 			sha.input(&our_payment_basepoint.serialize());
 		}
 		let mut res = [0; 32];
@@ -601,14 +757,13 @@ impl Channel {
 	/// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
 	/// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
 	#[inline]
-	fn build_commitment_transaction(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool) -> (Transaction, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) {
-		let obscured_commitment_transaction_number = self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor() ^ (0xffffffffffff - commitment_number);
+	fn build_commitment_transaction(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> (Transaction, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, Vec<(PaymentHash, &HTLCSource, Option<u32>)>) {
+		let obscured_commitment_transaction_number = self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor() ^ (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number);
 
 		let txins = {
 			let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
 			ins.push(TxIn {
-				prev_hash: self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().txid,
-				prev_index: self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().index as u32,
+				previous_output: self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
 				script_sig: Script::new(),
 				sequence: ((0x80 as u32) << 8*3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number >> 3*8) as u32),
 				witness: Vec::new(),
@@ -616,79 +771,126 @@ impl Channel {
 			ins
 		};
 
-		let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, Option<HTLCOutputInCommitment>)> = Vec::with_capacity(self.pending_htlcs.len() + 2);
+		let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, Option<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)> = Vec::with_capacity(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() + 2);
+		let mut unincluded_htlc_sources: Vec<(PaymentHash, &HTLCSource, Option<u32>)> = Vec::new();
 
 		let dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.our_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.their_dust_limit_satoshis };
 		let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
 		let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
 		let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
 
-		for ref htlc in self.pending_htlcs.iter() {
-			let include = match htlc.state {
-				HTLCState::RemoteAnnounced => !generated_by_local,
-				HTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => !generated_by_local,
-				HTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke => true,
-				HTLCState::LocalAnnounced => generated_by_local,
-				HTLCState::Committed => true,
-				HTLCState::RemoteRemoved => generated_by_local,
-				HTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove => generated_by_local,
-				HTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke => false,
-				HTLCState::LocalRemoved => !generated_by_local,
-				HTLCState::LocalRemovedAwaitingCommitment => false,
-			};
-
-			if include {
-				if htlc.outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
-					if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= dust_limit_satoshis + (self.feerate_per_kw * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
-						let htlc_in_tx = htlc.get_in_commitment(true);
+		macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
+			($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr) => {
+				if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
+					if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
+						let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
 						txouts.push((TxOut {
 							script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc_in_tx, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh(),
-							value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000
-						}, Some(htlc_in_tx)));
+							value: $htlc.amount_msat / 1000
+						}, Some((htlc_in_tx, $source))));
+					} else {
+						if let Some(source) = $source {
+							unincluded_htlc_sources.push(($htlc.payment_hash, source, None));
+						}
 					}
 				} else {
-					if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= dust_limit_satoshis + (self.feerate_per_kw * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
-						let htlc_in_tx = htlc.get_in_commitment(false);
+					if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
+						let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
 						txouts.push((TxOut { // "received HTLC output"
 							script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc_in_tx, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh(),
-							value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000
-						}, Some(htlc_in_tx)));
+							value: $htlc.amount_msat / 1000
+						}, Some((htlc_in_tx, $source))));
+					} else {
+						if let Some(source) = $source {
+							unincluded_htlc_sources.push(($htlc.payment_hash, source, None));
+						}
 					}
-				};
-				if htlc.outbound {
-					local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
-				} else {
-					remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
 				}
+			}
+		}
+
+		for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
+			let include = match htlc.state {
+				InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => !generated_by_local,
+				InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => !generated_by_local,
+				InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => true,
+				InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
+				InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => !generated_by_local,
+			};
+
+			if include {
+				add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None);
+				remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
+			} else {
+				match &htlc.state {
+					&InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
+						if generated_by_local {
+							if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
+								value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
+							}
+						}
+					},
+					_ => {},
+				}
+			}
+		}
+
+		for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
+			let include = match htlc.state {
+				OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => generated_by_local,
+				OutboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
+				OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved => generated_by_local,
+				OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove => generated_by_local,
+				OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke => false,
+			};
+
+			if include {
+				add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source));
+				local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
 			} else {
 				match htlc.state {
-					HTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove|HTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke => {
+					OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke => {
 						if htlc.fail_reason.is_none() {
 							value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
 						}
 					},
-					HTLCState::RemoteRemoved => {
+					OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved => {
 						if !generated_by_local && htlc.fail_reason.is_none() {
 							value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
 						}
 					},
-					HTLCState::LocalRemoved => {
-						if generated_by_local && htlc.local_removed_fulfilled {
-							value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
-						}
-					},
-					HTLCState::LocalRemovedAwaitingCommitment => {
-						assert!(htlc.local_removed_fulfilled);
-						value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
-					},
 					_ => {},
 				}
 			}
 		}
 
-		let total_fee: u64 = self.feerate_per_kw * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (txouts.len() as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
-		let value_to_self: i64 = ((self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset) / 1000 - if self.channel_outbound { total_fee as i64 } else { 0 };
-		let value_to_remote: i64 = (((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat - remote_htlc_total_msat) as i64 - value_to_self_msat_offset) / 1000) - if self.channel_outbound { 0 } else { total_fee as i64 };
+
+		let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
+		let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat - remote_htlc_total_msat) as i64 - value_to_self_msat_offset;
+
+		#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
+		{
+			// Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
+			// channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
+			// TODO: This should happen after fee calculation, but we don't handle that correctly
+			// yet!
+			let mut max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
+				self.max_commitment_tx_output_local.lock().unwrap()
+			} else {
+				self.max_commitment_tx_output_remote.lock().unwrap()
+			};
+			debug_assert!(max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
+			max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
+			debug_assert!(max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64);
+			max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
+		}
+
+		let total_fee: u64 = feerate_per_kw * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (txouts.len() as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
+		let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.channel_outbound {
+			(value_to_self_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
+		} else {
+			(value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64)
+		};
 
 		let value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
 		let value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
@@ -714,26 +916,31 @@ impl Channel {
 		transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts);
 
 		let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len());
-		let mut htlcs_used: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment> = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len());
+		let mut htlcs_included: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment> = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len());
+		let mut htlc_sources: Vec<(PaymentHash, &HTLCSource, Option<u32>)> = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len() + unincluded_htlc_sources.len());
 		for (idx, out) in txouts.drain(..).enumerate() {
 			outputs.push(out.0);
-			if let Some(out_htlc) = out.1 {
-				htlcs_used.push(out_htlc);
-				htlcs_used.last_mut().unwrap().transaction_output_index = idx as u32;
+			if let Some((mut htlc, source_option)) = out.1 {
+				htlc.transaction_output_index = idx as u32;
+				if let Some(source) = source_option {
+					htlc_sources.push((htlc.payment_hash, source, Some(idx as u32)));
+				}
+				htlcs_included.push(htlc);
 			}
 		}
+		htlc_sources.append(&mut unincluded_htlc_sources);
 
 		(Transaction {
 			version: 2,
 			lock_time: ((0x20 as u32) << 8*3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number & 0xffffffu64) as u32),
 			input: txins,
 			output: outputs,
-		}, htlcs_used)
+		}, htlcs_included, htlc_sources)
 	}
 
 	#[inline]
 	fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
-		let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::from_data(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.channel_close_key).unwrap().serialize());
+		let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::from_data(&self.shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
 		Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script()
 	}
 
@@ -747,8 +954,7 @@ impl Channel {
 		let txins = {
 			let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
 			ins.push(TxIn {
-				prev_hash: self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().txid,
-				prev_index: self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().index as u32,
+				previous_output: self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
 				script_sig: Script::new(),
 				sequence: 0xffffffff,
 				witness: Vec::new(),
@@ -756,7 +962,8 @@ impl Channel {
 			ins
 		};
 
-		assert!(self.pending_htlcs.is_empty());
+		assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
+		assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
 		let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, ())> = Vec::new();
 
 		let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
@@ -806,33 +1013,35 @@ impl Channel {
 	/// our counterparty!)
 	/// The result is a transaction which we can revoke ownership of (ie a "local" transaction)
 	/// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
-	fn build_local_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, HandleError> {
-		let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(commitment_number)).unwrap();
-		let delayed_payment_base = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key).unwrap();
-		let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key).unwrap();
+	fn build_local_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
+		let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(commitment_number));
+		let delayed_payment_base = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key);
+		let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key);
 
-		Ok(secp_derived_key!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &delayed_payment_base, &htlc_basepoint, &self.their_revocation_basepoint, &self.their_payment_basepoint, &self.their_htlc_basepoint)))
+		Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &delayed_payment_base, &htlc_basepoint, &self.their_revocation_basepoint.unwrap(), &self.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap(), &self.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap()), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys"))
 	}
 
 	#[inline]
 	/// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
 	/// will sign and send to our counterparty.
-	fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, HandleError> {
+	/// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
+	fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
 		//TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
 		//may see payments to it!
-		let payment_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key).unwrap();
-		let revocation_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.revocation_base_key).unwrap();
-		let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key).unwrap();
+		let payment_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key);
+		let revocation_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.revocation_base_key);
+		let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key);
 
-		Ok(secp_derived_key!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.their_cur_commitment_point, &self.their_delayed_payment_basepoint, &self.their_htlc_basepoint, &revocation_basepoint, &payment_basepoint, &htlc_basepoint)))
+		Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &self.their_delayed_payment_basepoint.unwrap(), &self.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap(), &revocation_basepoint, &payment_basepoint, &htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys"))
 	}
 
 	/// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
 	/// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
+	/// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
 	pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
 		let builder = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHNUM_2);
-		let our_funding_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key).unwrap().serialize();
-		let their_funding_key = self.their_funding_pubkey.serialize();
+		let our_funding_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key).serialize();
+		let their_funding_key = self.their_funding_pubkey.expect("get_funding_redeemscript only allowed after accept_channel").serialize();
 		if our_funding_key[..] < their_funding_key[..] {
 			builder.push_slice(&our_funding_key)
 				.push_slice(&their_funding_key)
@@ -853,12 +1062,12 @@ impl Channel {
 		let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
 
 		let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&tx).sighash_all(&tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
-		let our_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key).unwrap();
+		let our_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
 
 		tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
 
-		let our_funding_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key).unwrap().serialize();
-		let their_funding_key = self.their_funding_pubkey.serialize();
+		let our_funding_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key).serialize();
+		let their_funding_key = self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap().serialize();
 		if our_funding_key[..] < their_funding_key[..] {
 			tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
 			tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
@@ -869,7 +1078,7 @@ impl Channel {
 		tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 		tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 
-		tx.input[0].witness.push(funding_redeemscript.into_vec());
+		tx.input[0].witness.push(funding_redeemscript.into_bytes());
 
 		our_sig
 	}
@@ -877,26 +1086,26 @@ impl Channel {
 	/// Builds the htlc-success or htlc-timeout transaction which spends a given HTLC output
 	/// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
 	/// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
-	fn build_htlc_transaction(&self, prev_hash: &Sha256dHash, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, local: bool, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Transaction {
-		chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash, self.feerate_per_kw, if local { self.their_to_self_delay } else { BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT }, htlc, &keys.a_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key)
+	fn build_htlc_transaction(&self, prev_hash: &Sha256dHash, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, local: bool, keys: &TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Transaction {
+		chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash, feerate_per_kw, if local { self.their_to_self_delay } else { BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT }, htlc, &keys.a_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key)
 	}
 
-	fn create_htlc_tx_signature(&self, tx: &Transaction, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Result<(Script, Signature, bool), HandleError> {
+	fn create_htlc_tx_signature(&self, tx: &Transaction, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Result<(Script, Signature, bool), ChannelError> {
 		if tx.input.len() != 1 {
 			panic!("Tried to sign HTLC transaction that had input count != 1!");
 		}
 
 		let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
 
-		let our_htlc_key = secp_derived_key!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &keys.per_commitment_point, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key));
+		let our_htlc_key = secp_check!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &keys.per_commitment_point, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key), "Derived invalid key, peer is maliciously selecting parameters");
 		let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&tx).sighash_all(&tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]).unwrap();
-		let is_local_tx = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &our_htlc_key).unwrap() == keys.a_htlc_key;
-		Ok((htlc_redeemscript, self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &our_htlc_key).unwrap(), is_local_tx))
+		let is_local_tx = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &our_htlc_key) == keys.a_htlc_key;
+		Ok((htlc_redeemscript, self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &our_htlc_key), is_local_tx))
 	}
 
 	/// Signs a transaction created by build_htlc_transaction. If the transaction is an
 	/// HTLC-Success transaction (ie htlc.offered is false), preimate must be set!
-	fn sign_htlc_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, their_sig: &Signature, preimage: &Option<[u8; 32]>, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Result<Signature, HandleError> {
+	fn sign_htlc_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, their_sig: &Signature, preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> {
 		if tx.input.len() != 1 {
 			panic!("Tried to sign HTLC transaction that had input count != 1!");
 		}
@@ -921,15 +1130,18 @@ impl Channel {
 		if htlc.offered {
 			tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
 		} else {
-			tx.input[0].witness.push(preimage.unwrap().to_vec());
+			tx.input[0].witness.push(preimage.unwrap().0.to_vec());
 		}
 
-		tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_redeemscript.into_vec());
+		tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_redeemscript.into_bytes());
 
 		Ok(our_sig)
 	}
 
-	fn get_update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, payment_preimage_arg: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>, Option<ChannelMonitor>), HandleError> {
+	/// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
+	/// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return an IgnoreError. Thus, will always return
+	/// Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on and preconditions are met.
+	fn get_update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>, Option<ChannelMonitor>), ChannelError> {
 		// Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it wont bet unset) or there is no way any
 		// caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
 		// incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
@@ -940,21 +1152,38 @@ impl Channel {
 		assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
 
 		let mut sha = Sha256::new();
-		sha.input(&payment_preimage_arg);
-		let mut payment_hash_calc = [0; 32];
-		sha.result(&mut payment_hash_calc);
+		sha.input(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]);
+		let mut payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash([0; 32]);
+		sha.result(&mut payment_hash_calc.0[..]);
+
+		// ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
+		// on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
+		// these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
 
 		let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
-		for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
-			if !htlc.outbound && htlc.payment_hash == payment_hash_calc {
-				if pending_idx != std::usize::MAX {
-					panic!("Duplicate HTLC payment_hash, you probably re-used payment preimages, NEVER DO THIS!");
+		for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
+			if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
+				assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
+				match htlc.state {
+					InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
+					InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
+						if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
+						} else {
+							log_warn!(self, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+						}
+						return Ok((None, None));
+					},
+					_ => {
+						debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
+						// Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
+					}
 				}
 				pending_idx = idx;
+				break;
 			}
 		}
 		if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given payment preimage", action: None});
+			return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
 		}
 
 		// Now update local state:
@@ -963,52 +1192,50 @@ impl Channel {
 		// can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
 		self.channel_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash_calc, &payment_preimage_arg);
 
-		if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
+		if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
 			for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
 				match pending_update {
-					&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, .. } => {
-						if payment_preimage_arg == *payment_preimage {
+					&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
+						if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
 							return Ok((None, None));
 						}
 					},
-					&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
-						if payment_hash_calc == *payment_hash {
-							return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given payment preimage", action: None});
+					&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
+						if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
+							log_warn!(self, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+							// TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
+							// rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
+							return Ok((None, Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())));
 						}
 					},
 					_ => {}
 				}
 			}
 			self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
-				payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, payment_hash: payment_hash_calc,
+				payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
 			});
 			return Ok((None, Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())));
 		}
 
-		let htlc_id = {
-			let htlc = &mut self.pending_htlcs[pending_idx];
-			if htlc.state == HTLCState::Committed {
-				htlc.state = HTLCState::LocalRemoved;
-				htlc.local_removed_fulfilled = true;
-			} else if htlc.state == HTLCState::RemoteAnnounced {
-				panic!("Somehow forwarded HTLC prior to remote revocation!");
-			} else if htlc.state == HTLCState::LocalRemoved || htlc.state == HTLCState::LocalRemovedAwaitingCommitment {
-				return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given payment preimage", action: None});
+		{
+			let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
+			if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
 			} else {
-				panic!("Have an inbound HTLC when not awaiting remote revoke that had a garbage state");
+				debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
+				return Ok((None, Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())));
 			}
-			htlc.htlc_id
-		};
+			htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
+		}
 
 		Ok((Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
 			channel_id: self.channel_id(),
-			htlc_id: htlc_id,
+			htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
 			payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
 		}), Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())))
 	}
 
-	pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>, Option<ChannelMonitor>), HandleError> {
-		match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(payment_preimage)? {
+	pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>, Option<ChannelMonitor>), ChannelError> {
+		match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage)? {
 			(Some(update_fulfill_htlc), _) => {
 				let (commitment, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
 				Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
@@ -1018,69 +1245,77 @@ impl Channel {
 		}
 	}
 
-	pub fn get_update_fail_htlc(&mut self, payment_hash_arg: &[u8; 32], err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, HandleError> {
+	/// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
+	/// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return an IgnoreError. Thus, will always return
+	/// Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on and preconditions are met.
+	pub fn get_update_fail_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> {
 		if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state", action: None});
+			panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
 		}
 		assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
 
+		// ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
+		// on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
+		// these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
+
+		let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
+		for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
+			if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
+				match htlc.state {
+					InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
+					InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
+						return Ok(None);
+					},
+					_ => {
+						debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
+						return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matchd the given HTLC ID"));
+					}
+				}
+				pending_idx = idx;
+			}
+		}
+		if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
+			return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
+		}
+
 		// Now update local state:
-		if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
+		if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
 			for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
 				match pending_update {
-					&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
-						if *payment_hash_arg == *payment_hash {
-							return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given payment preimage", action: None});
+					&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
+						if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
+							return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
 						}
 					},
-					&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
-						if *payment_hash_arg == *payment_hash {
-							return Ok(None);
+					&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
+						if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
+							return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
 						}
 					},
 					_ => {}
 				}
 			}
 			self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
-				payment_hash: payment_hash_arg.clone(),
+				htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
 				err_packet,
 			});
 			return Ok(None);
 		}
 
-		let mut htlc_id = 0;
-		let mut htlc_amount_msat = 0;
-		for htlc in self.pending_htlcs.iter_mut() {
-			if !htlc.outbound && htlc.payment_hash == *payment_hash_arg {
-				if htlc_id != 0 {
-					panic!("Duplicate HTLC payment_hash, you probably re-used payment preimages, NEVER DO THIS!");
-				}
-				htlc_id = htlc.htlc_id;
-				htlc_amount_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
-				if htlc.state == HTLCState::Committed {
-					htlc.state = HTLCState::LocalRemoved;
-				} else if htlc.state == HTLCState::RemoteAnnounced {
-					panic!("Somehow forwarded HTLC prior to remote revocation!");
-				} else if htlc.state == HTLCState::LocalRemoved || htlc.state == HTLCState::LocalRemovedAwaitingCommitment {
-					return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given payment preimage", action: None});
-				} else {
-					panic!("Have an inbound HTLC when not awaiting remote revoke that had a garbage state");
-				}
-			}
-		}
-		if htlc_amount_msat == 0 {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given payment preimage", action: None});
+		{
+			let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
+			htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
 		}
 
 		Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
 			channel_id: self.channel_id(),
-			htlc_id,
+			htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
 			reason: err_packet
 		}))
 	}
 
-	pub fn get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor)>, HandleError> {
-		match self.get_update_fail_htlc(payment_hash, err_packet)? {
+	pub fn get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor)>, ChannelError> {
+		match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet)? {
 			Some(update_fail_htlc) => {
 				let (commitment, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
 				Ok(Some((update_fail_htlc, commitment, monitor_update)))
@@ -1091,32 +1326,66 @@ impl Channel {
 
 	// Message handlers:
 
-	pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+	pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
 		// Check sanity of message fields:
 		if !self.channel_outbound {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer", action: None});
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer"));
 		}
 		if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Got an accept_channel message at a strange time", action: None});
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time"));
 		}
 		if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer never wants payout outputs?", action: None});
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer never wants payout outputs?"));
 		}
 		if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", action: None});
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis"));
+		}
+		if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus channel_reserve and dust_limit"));
+		}
+		if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < self.our_dust_limit_satoshis {
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer never wants payout outputs?"));
+		}
+		if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) {
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Dust limit is bigger than our channel reverse"));
 		}
 		if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Minimum htlc value is full channel value", action: None});
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is full channel value"));
 		}
-		//TODO do something with minimum_depth
 		if msg.to_self_delay > MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", action: None});
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period"));
 		}
 		if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "0 max_accpted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", action: None});
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accpted_htlcs makes for a useless channel"));
+		}
+		if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > 483 {
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("max_accpted_htlcs > 483"));
+		}
+
+		// Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
+		if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("htlc minimum msat is higher than the user specified limit"));
+		}
+		if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("max htlc value in flight msat is less than the user specified limit"));
+		}
+		if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("channel reserve satoshis is higher than the user specified limit"));
+		}
+		if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("max accepted htlcs is less than the user specified limit"));
+		}
+		if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.channel_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is less than the user specified limit"));
+		}
+		if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.channel_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is greater than the user specified limit"));
+		}
+		if msg.minimum_depth > config.channel_limits.max_minimum_depth {
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large"));
 		}
 
-		self.channel_monitor.set_their_htlc_base_key(&msg.htlc_basepoint);
+		self.channel_monitor.set_their_base_keys(&msg.htlc_basepoint, &msg.delayed_payment_basepoint);
 
 		self.their_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
 		self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
@@ -1124,12 +1393,13 @@ impl Channel {
 		self.their_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
 		self.their_to_self_delay = msg.to_self_delay;
 		self.their_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
-		self.their_funding_pubkey = msg.funding_pubkey;
-		self.their_revocation_basepoint = msg.revocation_basepoint;
-		self.their_payment_basepoint = msg.payment_basepoint;
-		self.their_delayed_payment_basepoint = msg.delayed_payment_basepoint;
-		self.their_htlc_basepoint = msg.htlc_basepoint;
-		self.their_cur_commitment_point = msg.first_per_commitment_point;
+		self.minimum_depth = msg.minimum_depth;
+		self.their_funding_pubkey = Some(msg.funding_pubkey);
+		self.their_revocation_basepoint = Some(msg.revocation_basepoint);
+		self.their_payment_basepoint = Some(msg.payment_basepoint);
+		self.their_delayed_payment_basepoint = Some(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint);
+		self.their_htlc_basepoint = Some(msg.htlc_basepoint);
+		self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
 
 		let obscure_factor = self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor();
 		self.channel_monitor.set_commitment_obscure_factor(obscure_factor);
@@ -1140,32 +1410,40 @@ impl Channel {
 		Ok(())
 	}
 
-	fn funding_created_signature(&mut self, sig: &Signature) -> Result<(Transaction, Signature), HandleError> {
+	fn funding_created_signature(&mut self, sig: &Signature) -> Result<(Transaction, Transaction, Signature, TxCreationKeys), ChannelError> {
 		let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
 
-		let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
-		let remote_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, false).0;
-		let remote_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&remote_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&remote_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
-
 		let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number)?;
-		let local_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false).0;
+		let mut local_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
 		let local_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&local_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
 
-		// They sign the "local" commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
-		secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &sig, &self.their_funding_pubkey), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer");
+		// They sign the "local" commitment transaction...
+		secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &sig, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer");
+
+		// ...and we sign it, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish
+		self.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut local_initial_commitment_tx, sig);
+
+		let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
+		let remote_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
+		let remote_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&remote_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&remote_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
 
 		// We sign the "remote" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
-		Ok((remote_initial_commitment_tx, self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key).unwrap()))
+		Ok((remote_initial_commitment_tx, local_initial_commitment_tx, self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key), local_keys))
 	}
 
-	pub fn funding_created(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor), HandleError> {
+	pub fn funding_created(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
 		if self.channel_outbound {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Received funding_created for an outbound channel?", action: None});
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?"));
 		}
 		if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Received funding_created after we got the channel!", action: None});
-		}
-		if self.channel_monitor.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) || self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != (1 << 48) - 1 || self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != (1 << 48) - 1 {
+			// BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
+			// remember the channel, so its safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
+			// channel.
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!"));
+		}
+		if self.channel_monitor.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
+				self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
+				self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
 			panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
 		}
 
@@ -1173,7 +1451,7 @@ impl Channel {
 		let funding_txo_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
 		self.channel_monitor.set_funding_info((funding_txo, funding_txo_script));
 
-		let (remote_initial_commitment_tx, our_signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature) {
+		let (remote_initial_commitment_tx, local_initial_commitment_tx, our_signature, local_keys) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature) {
 			Ok(res) => res,
 			Err(e) => {
 				self.channel_monitor.unset_funding_info();
@@ -1183,7 +1461,9 @@ impl Channel {
 
 		// Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
 
-		self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&remote_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number);
+		self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&remote_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap());
+		self.last_local_commitment_txn = vec![local_initial_commitment_tx.clone()];
+		self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(local_initial_commitment_tx, local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
 		self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
 		self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
 		self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
@@ -1197,28 +1477,30 @@ impl Channel {
 
 	/// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
 	/// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
-	pub fn funding_signed(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<ChannelMonitor, HandleError> {
+	pub fn funding_signed(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<ChannelMonitor, ChannelError> {
 		if !self.channel_outbound {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?", action: None});
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?"));
 		}
 		if self.channel_state != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Received funding_signed in strange state!", action: None});
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!"));
 		}
-		if self.channel_monitor.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) || self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != (1 << 48) - 2 || self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != (1 << 48) - 1 {
+		if self.channel_monitor.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
+				self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 ||
+				self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
 			panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
 		}
 
 		let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
 
 		let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number)?;
-		let mut local_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false).0;
+		let mut local_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
 		let local_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&local_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
 
 		// They sign the "local" commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
-		secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey), "Invalid funding_signed signature from peer");
+		secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid funding_signed signature from peer");
 
 		self.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut local_initial_commitment_tx, &msg.signature);
-		self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(local_initial_commitment_tx.clone(), local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, Vec::new());
+		self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(local_initial_commitment_tx.clone(), local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
 		self.last_local_commitment_txn = vec![local_initial_commitment_tx];
 		self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
 		self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
@@ -1226,183 +1508,224 @@ impl Channel {
 		Ok(self.channel_monitor.clone())
 	}
 
-	pub fn funding_locked(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
-		let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK);
+	pub fn funding_locked(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
+		if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent funding_locked when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
+		}
+
+		let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
+
 		if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
 			self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32;
 		} else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
-			self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK);
+			self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
 			self.channel_update_count += 1;
+		} else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 &&
+				// Note that funding_signed/funding_created will have decremented both by 1!
+				self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
+				self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
+			if self.their_cur_commitment_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
+				return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect funding_locked with a different point"));
+			}
+			// They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the funding_locked, which is required
+			return Ok(());
 		} else {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer sent a funding_locked at a strange time", action: None});
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a funding_locked at a strange time"));
 		}
 
-		self.their_prev_commitment_point = Some(self.their_cur_commitment_point);
-		self.their_cur_commitment_point = msg.next_per_commitment_point;
+		self.their_prev_commitment_point = self.their_cur_commitment_point;
+		self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
 		Ok(())
 	}
 
-	/// Returns (inbound_htlc_count, outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
-	/// If its for a remote update check, we need to be more lax about checking against messages we
-	/// sent but they may not have received/processed before they sent this message. Further, for
-	/// our own sends, we're more conservative and even consider things they've removed against
-	/// totals, though there is little reason to outside of further avoiding any race condition
-	/// issues.
-	fn get_pending_htlc_stats(&self, for_remote_update_check: bool) -> (u32, u32, u64, u64) {
-		let mut inbound_htlc_count: u32 = 0;
-		let mut outbound_htlc_count: u32 = 0;
-		let mut htlc_outbound_value_msat = 0;
+	/// Returns (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
+	fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
 		let mut htlc_inbound_value_msat = 0;
-		for ref htlc in self.pending_htlcs.iter() {
-			match htlc.state {
-				HTLCState::RemoteAnnounced => {},
-				HTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {},
-				HTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke => {},
-				HTLCState::LocalAnnounced => { if for_remote_update_check { continue; } },
-				HTLCState::Committed => {},
-				HTLCState::RemoteRemoved => { if for_remote_update_check { continue; } },
-				HTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove => { if for_remote_update_check { continue; } },
-				HTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke => { if for_remote_update_check { continue; } },
-				HTLCState::LocalRemoved => {},
-				HTLCState::LocalRemovedAwaitingCommitment => { if for_remote_update_check { continue; } },
-			}
-			if !htlc.outbound {
-				inbound_htlc_count += 1;
-				htlc_inbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
-			} else {
-				outbound_htlc_count += 1;
-				htlc_outbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
-			}
+		for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
+			htlc_inbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
+		}
+		(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
+	}
+
+	/// Returns (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat)
+	fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
+		let mut htlc_outbound_value_msat = 0;
+		for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
+			htlc_outbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
 		}
-		(inbound_htlc_count, outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
+
+		(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32, htlc_outbound_value_msat)
 	}
 
-	pub fn update_add_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, pending_forward_state: PendingForwardHTLCInfo) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+	pub fn update_add_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, pending_forward_state: PendingHTLCStatus) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
 		if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state", action: None});
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
+		}
+		if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
 		}
 		if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel", action: None});
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel"));
 		}
 		if msg.amount_msat < self.our_htlc_minimum_msat {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value", action: None});
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value"));
 		}
 
-		let (inbound_htlc_count, _, htlc_outbound_value_msat, htlc_inbound_value_msat) = self.get_pending_htlc_stats(true);
+		let (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat) = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
 		if inbound_htlc_count + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs", action: None});
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs"));
 		}
 		//TODO: Spec is unclear if this is per-direction or in total (I assume per direction):
 		// Check our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
 		if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > Channel::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis) {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote HTLC add would put them over their max HTLC value in flight", action: None});
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them over their max HTLC value in flight"));
 		}
 		// Check our_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
 		// the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
 		// something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
-		if htlc_inbound_value_msat + htlc_outbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat + self.value_to_self_msat > (self.channel_value_satoshis - Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)) * 1000 {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value", action: None});
+		if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat + self.value_to_self_msat > (self.channel_value_satoshis - Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)) * 1000 {
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"));
 		}
 		if self.next_remote_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote skipped HTLC ID", action: None});
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote skipped HTLC ID"));
 		}
 		if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height", action: None});
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height"));
 		}
 
 		//TODO: Check msg.cltv_expiry further? Do this in channel manager?
 
+		if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
+			if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_state {
+				panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
+			}
+		}
+
 		// Now update local state:
 		self.next_remote_htlc_id += 1;
-		self.pending_htlcs.push(HTLCOutput {
-			outbound: false,
+		self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
 			htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
 			amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
 			payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
 			cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
-			state: HTLCState::RemoteAnnounced,
-			fail_reason: None,
-			local_removed_fulfilled: false,
-			pending_forward_state: Some(pending_forward_state),
+			state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_state),
 		});
 
 		Ok(())
 	}
 
-	/// Removes an outbound HTLC which has been commitment_signed by the remote end
+	/// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
 	#[inline]
-	fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<[u8; 32]>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<[u8; 32], HandleError> {
-		for htlc in self.pending_htlcs.iter_mut() {
-			if htlc.outbound && htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
+	fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentHash>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
+		for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
+			if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
 				match check_preimage {
 					None => {},
 					Some(payment_hash) =>
 						if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
-							return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote tried to fulfill HTLC with an incorrect preimage", action: None});
+							return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC with an incorrect preimage"));
 						}
 				};
-				if htlc.state == HTLCState::LocalAnnounced {
-					return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote tried to fulfill HTLC before it had been committed", action: None});
-				} else if htlc.state == HTLCState::Committed {
-					htlc.state = HTLCState::RemoteRemoved;
-					htlc.fail_reason = fail_reason;
-				} else if htlc.state == HTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove || htlc.state == HTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke || htlc.state == HTLCState::RemoteRemoved {
-					return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote tried to fulfill HTLC that they'd already fulfilled", action: None});
-				} else {
-					panic!("Got a non-outbound state on an outbound HTLC");
+				match htlc.state {
+					OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
+						return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC before it had been committed")),
+					OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
+						htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved;
+						htlc.fail_reason = fail_reason;
+					},
+					OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved =>
+						return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC that they'd already fulfilled/failed")),
 				}
-				return Ok(htlc.payment_hash.clone());
+				return Ok(&htlc.source);
 			}
 		}
-		Err(HandleError{err: "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find", action: None})
+		Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find"))
 	}
 
-	pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+	pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
 		if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state", action: None});
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
+		}
+		if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
 		}
 
 		let mut sha = Sha256::new();
-		sha.input(&msg.payment_preimage);
-		let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
-		sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
+		sha.input(&msg.payment_preimage.0[..]);
+		let mut payment_hash = PaymentHash([0; 32]);
+		sha.result(&mut payment_hash.0[..]);
 
-		self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(payment_hash), None)?;
-		Ok(())
+		self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(payment_hash), None).map(|source| source.clone())
 	}
 
-	pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<[u8; 32], HandleError> {
+	pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
 		if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state", action: None});
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
+		}
+		if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
 		}
 
-		self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))
+		self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
+		Ok(())
 	}
 
-	pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+	pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc<'a>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
 		if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state", action: None});
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
+		}
+		if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
 		}
 
 		self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
 		Ok(())
 	}
 
-	pub fn commitment_signed(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, ChannelMonitor), HandleError> {
+	pub fn commitment_signed(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
 		if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state", action: None});
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state"));
+		}
+		if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
+		}
+		if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds"));
 		}
 
 		let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
 
 		let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number)?;
-		let mut local_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false);
+
+		let mut update_fee = false;
+		let feerate_per_kw = if !self.channel_outbound && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
+			update_fee = true;
+			self.pending_update_fee.unwrap()
+		} else {
+			self.feerate_per_kw
+		};
+
+		let mut local_commitment_tx = {
+			let mut commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false, feerate_per_kw);
+			let htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_tx.2.drain(..).map(|htlc_source| (htlc_source.0, htlc_source.1.clone(), htlc_source.2)).collect();
+			(commitment_tx.0, commitment_tx.1, htlcs_cloned)
+		};
 		let local_commitment_txid = local_commitment_tx.0.txid();
 		let local_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_commitment_tx.0).sighash_all(&local_commitment_tx.0.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
-		secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey), "Invalid commitment tx signature from peer");
+		secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid commitment tx signature from peer");
+
+		//If channel fee was updated by funder confirm funder can afford the new fee rate when applied to the current local commitment transaction
+		if update_fee {
+			let num_htlcs = local_commitment_tx.1.len();
+			let total_fee: u64 = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
+
+			if self.channel_value_satoshis - self.value_to_self_msat / 1000 < total_fee + self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis {
+				return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee"));
+			}
+		}
 
 		if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != local_commitment_tx.1.len() {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Got wrong number of HTLC signatures from remote", action: None});
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures from remote"));
 		}
 
 		let mut new_local_commitment_txn = Vec::with_capacity(local_commitment_tx.1.len() + 1);
@@ -1410,70 +1733,95 @@ impl Channel {
 		new_local_commitment_txn.push(local_commitment_tx.0.clone());
 
 		let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(local_commitment_tx.1.len());
-		for (idx, ref htlc) in local_commitment_tx.1.iter().enumerate() {
-			let mut htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&local_commitment_txid, htlc, true, &local_keys);
+		for (idx, htlc) in local_commitment_tx.1.drain(..).enumerate() {
+			let mut htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&local_commitment_txid, &htlc, true, &local_keys, feerate_per_kw);
 			let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &local_keys);
 			let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]).unwrap();
-			secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &local_keys.b_htlc_key), "Invalid HTLC tx siganture from peer");
+			secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &local_keys.b_htlc_key), "Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer");
 			let htlc_sig = if htlc.offered {
-				let htlc_sig = self.sign_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_tx, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &None, htlc, &local_keys)?;
+				let htlc_sig = self.sign_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_tx, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &None, &htlc, &local_keys)?;
 				new_local_commitment_txn.push(htlc_tx);
 				htlc_sig
 			} else {
-				self.create_htlc_tx_signature(&htlc_tx, htlc, &local_keys)?.1
+				self.create_htlc_tx_signature(&htlc_tx, &htlc, &local_keys)?.1
 			};
-			htlcs_and_sigs.push(((*htlc).clone(), msg.htlc_signatures[idx], htlc_sig));
+			htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, msg.htlc_signatures[idx], htlc_sig));
 		}
 
-		let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number - 1)).unwrap();
+		let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number - 1));
 		let per_commitment_secret = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed, self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
 
 		// Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
-		self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(local_commitment_tx.0, local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, htlcs_and_sigs);
-
 		let mut need_our_commitment = false;
-		for htlc in self.pending_htlcs.iter_mut() {
-			if htlc.state == HTLCState::RemoteAnnounced {
-				htlc.state = HTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
+		if !self.channel_outbound {
+			if let Some(fee_update) = self.pending_update_fee {
+				self.feerate_per_kw = fee_update;
+				// We later use the presence of pending_update_fee to indicate we should generate a
+				// commitment_signed upon receipt of revoke_and_ack, so we can only set it to None
+				// if we're not awaiting a revoke (ie will send a commitment_signed now).
+				if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) == 0 {
+					need_our_commitment = true;
+					self.pending_update_fee = None;
+				}
+			}
+		}
+
+		if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
+			// This is a response to our post-monitor-failed unfreeze messages, so we can clear the
+			// monitor_pending_order requirement as we won't re-send the monitor_pending messages.
+			self.monitor_pending_order = None;
+		}
+
+		self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(local_commitment_tx.0, local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, htlcs_and_sigs, local_commitment_tx.2);
+
+		for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
+			let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
+				Some(forward_info.clone())
+			} else { None };
+			if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
+				htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
 				need_our_commitment = true;
-			} else if htlc.state == HTLCState::RemoteRemoved {
-				htlc.state = HTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove;
+			}
+		}
+		for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
+			if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved = htlc.state {
+				htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove;
 				need_our_commitment = true;
 			}
 		}
-		// Finally delete all the LocalRemovedAwaitingCommitment HTLCs
-		// We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
-		let mut claimed_value_msat = 0;
-		self.pending_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
-			if htlc.state == HTLCState::LocalRemovedAwaitingCommitment {
-				claimed_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
-				false
-			} else { true }
-		});
-		self.value_to_self_msat += claimed_value_msat;
 
 		self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
 		self.last_local_commitment_txn = new_local_commitment_txn;
+		self.received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) != 0;
+
+		if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
+			self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
+			self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= need_our_commitment;
+			return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA"));
+		}
 
-		let (our_commitment_signed, monitor_update) = if need_our_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
+		let (our_commitment_signed, monitor_update, closing_signed) = if need_our_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
 			// If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
 			// we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
 			// free_holding_cell_htlcs().
 			let (msg, monitor) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
-			(Some(msg), monitor)
-		} else { (None, self.channel_monitor.clone()) };
+			(Some(msg), monitor, None)
+		} else if !need_our_commitment {
+			(None, self.channel_monitor.clone(), self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator))
+		} else { (None, self.channel_monitor.clone(), None) };
 
 		Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
 			channel_id: self.channel_id,
 			per_commitment_secret: per_commitment_secret,
 			next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
-		}, our_commitment_signed, monitor_update))
+		}, our_commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update))
 	}
 
 	/// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
 	/// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
-	fn free_holding_cell_htlcs(&mut self) -> Result<Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitor)>, HandleError> {
-		if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 {
+	fn free_holding_cell_htlcs(&mut self) -> Result<Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitor)>, ChannelError> {
+		assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
+		if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
 			let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
 			mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
 			let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
@@ -1490,27 +1838,33 @@ impl Channel {
 					self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(htlc_update);
 				} else {
 					match &htlc_update {
-						&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
-							match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, onion_routing_packet.clone()) {
+						&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
+							match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone()) {
 								Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
 								Err(e) => {
 									err = Some(e);
 								}
 							}
 						},
-						&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { payment_preimage, .. } => {
-							match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(payment_preimage) {
+						&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
+							match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage) {
 								Ok(update_fulfill_msg_option) => update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.0.unwrap()),
 								Err(e) => {
-									err = Some(e);
+									if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
+									else {
+										panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fulfill holding cell HTLC");
+									}
 								}
 							}
 						},
-						&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { payment_hash, ref err_packet } => {
-							match self.get_update_fail_htlc(&payment_hash, err_packet.clone()) {
+						&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
+							match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone()) {
 								Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap()),
 								Err(e) => {
-									err = Some(e);
+									if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
+									else {
+										panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
+									}
 								}
 							}
 						},
@@ -1524,11 +1878,28 @@ impl Channel {
 			//fail it back the route, if its a temporary issue we can ignore it...
 			match err {
 				None => {
+					if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
+						// This should never actually happen and indicates we got some Errs back
+						// from update_fulfill_htlc/update_fail_htlc, but we handle it anyway in
+						// case there is some strange way to hit duplicate HTLC removes.
+						return Ok(None);
+					}
+					let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee {
+							self.pending_update_fee = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take();
+							Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
+								channel_id: self.channel_id,
+								feerate_per_kw: feerate as u32,
+							})
+						} else {
+							None
+						};
 					let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
 					Ok(Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
 						update_add_htlcs,
 						update_fulfill_htlcs,
 						update_fail_htlcs,
+						update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+						update_fee: update_fee,
 						commitment_signed,
 					}, monitor_update)))
 				},
@@ -1544,37 +1915,59 @@ impl Channel {
 	/// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
 	/// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
 	/// revoke_and_ack message.
-	pub fn revoke_and_ack(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Vec<PendingForwardHTLCInfo>, Vec<([u8; 32], HTLCFailReason)>, ChannelMonitor), HandleError> {
+	pub fn revoke_and_ack(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Result<(Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
 		if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state", action: None});
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state"));
+		}
+		if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
 		}
+		if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds"));
+		}
+
 		if let Some(their_prev_commitment_point) = self.their_prev_commitment_point {
-			if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secp_call!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret")).unwrap() != their_prev_commitment_point {
-				return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey", action: None});
+			if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret")) != their_prev_commitment_point {
+				return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey"));
 			}
 		}
-		self.channel_monitor.provide_secret(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret, Some((self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number - 1, msg.next_per_commitment_point)))?;
+		self.channel_monitor.provide_secret(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
+			.map_err(|e| ChannelError::Close(e.0))?;
 
 		// Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
 		// (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
 		// OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
 		// channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
 		self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
-		self.their_prev_commitment_point = Some(self.their_cur_commitment_point);
-		self.their_cur_commitment_point = msg.next_per_commitment_point;
+		self.their_prev_commitment_point = self.their_cur_commitment_point;
+		self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
 		self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
+		self.received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa = false;
+		if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
+			// This is a response to our post-monitor-failed unfreeze messages, so we can clear the
+			// monitor_pending_order requirement as we won't re-send the monitor_pending messages.
+			self.monitor_pending_order = None;
+		}
 
 		let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
 		let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
+		let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
+		let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
 		let mut require_commitment = false;
 		let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
 		// We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
-		self.pending_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
-			if htlc.state == HTLCState::LocalRemoved {
-				if htlc.local_removed_fulfilled { true } else { false }
-			} else if htlc.state == HTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {
+		self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
+			if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
+				if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
+					value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
+				}
+				false
+			} else { true }
+		});
+		self.pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
+			if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke = htlc.state {
 				if let Some(reason) = htlc.fail_reason.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
-					revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.payment_hash, reason));
+					revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
 				} else {
 					// They fulfilled, so we sent them money
 					value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
@@ -1582,103 +1975,541 @@ impl Channel {
 				false
 			} else { true }
 		});
-		for htlc in self.pending_htlcs.iter_mut() {
-			if htlc.state == HTLCState::LocalAnnounced {
-				htlc.state = HTLCState::Committed;
-			} else if htlc.state == HTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
-				htlc.state = HTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke;
-				require_commitment = true;
-			} else if htlc.state == HTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {
-				htlc.state = HTLCState::Committed;
-				to_forward_infos.push(htlc.pending_forward_state.take().unwrap());
-			} else if htlc.state == HTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {
-				htlc.state = HTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke;
+		for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
+			let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
+				true
+			} else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
+				true
+			} else { false };
+			if swap {
+				let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
+				mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
+
+				if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
+					htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
+					require_commitment = true;
+				} else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
+					match forward_info {
+						PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
+							require_commitment = true;
+							match fail_msg {
+								HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
+									htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
+									update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
+								},
+								HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
+									htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
+									update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
+								},
+							}
+						},
+						PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
+							to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
+							htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
+						}
+					}
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
+			if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
+				htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
+			} else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove = htlc.state {
+				htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke;
 				require_commitment = true;
-			} else if htlc.state == HTLCState::LocalRemoved {
-				assert!(htlc.local_removed_fulfilled);
-				htlc.state = HTLCState::LocalRemovedAwaitingCommitment;
 			}
 		}
 		self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
 
-		match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs()? {
-			Some(commitment_update) => {
-				Ok((Some(commitment_update.0), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, commitment_update.1))
-			},
-			None => {
-				if require_commitment {
-					let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
-					Ok((Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
-						update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
-						update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
-						update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
-						commitment_signed
-					}), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, monitor_update))
+		if self.channel_outbound {
+			if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee.take() {
+				self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
+			}
+		} else {
+			if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
+				// Because a node cannot send two commitment_signed's in a row without getting a
+				// revoke_and_ack from us (as it would otherwise not know the per_commitment_point
+				// it should use to create keys with) and because a node can't send a
+				// commitment_signed without changes, checking if the feerate is equal to the
+				// pending feerate update is sufficient to detect require_commitment.
+				if feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
+					require_commitment = true;
+					self.pending_update_fee = None;
+				}
+			}
+		}
+
+		if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 {
+			// We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
+			// cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
+			if require_commitment {
+				self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
+			}
+			self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
+			self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
+			return Ok((None, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, self.channel_monitor.clone()));
+		}
+
+		match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs()? {
+			Some(mut commitment_update) => {
+				commitment_update.0.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
+				for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
+					commitment_update.0.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
+				}
+				commitment_update.0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
+				for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
+					commitment_update.0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
+				}
+				Ok((Some(commitment_update.0), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, commitment_update.1))
+			},
+			None => {
+				if require_commitment {
+					let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
+					Ok((Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
+						update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+						update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+						update_fail_htlcs,
+						update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
+						update_fee: None,
+						commitment_signed
+					}), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update))
 				} else {
-					Ok((None, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, self.channel_monitor.clone()))
+					Ok((None, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), self.channel_monitor.clone()))
 				}
 			}
 		}
+
+	}
+
+	/// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
+	/// further details on the optionness of the return value.
+	/// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
+	fn send_update_fee(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> {
+		if !self.channel_outbound {
+			panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
+		}
+		if !self.is_usable() {
+			panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
+		}
+		if !self.is_live() {
+			panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
+		}
+
+		if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
+			self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
+			return None;
+		}
+
+		debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
+		self.pending_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
+
+		Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
+			channel_id: self.channel_id,
+			feerate_per_kw: feerate_per_kw as u32,
+		})
 	}
 
-	pub fn update_fee(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+	pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor)>, ChannelError> {
+		match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw) {
+			Some(update_fee) => {
+				let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
+				Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
+			},
+			None => Ok(None)
+		}
+	}
+
+	/// Removes any uncommitted HTLCs, to be used on peer disconnection, including any pending
+	/// HTLCs that we intended to add but haven't as we were waiting on a remote revoke.
+	/// Returns the set of PendingHTLCStatuses from remote uncommitted HTLCs (which we're
+	/// implicitly dropping) and the payment_hashes of HTLCs we tried to add but are dropping.
+	/// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
+	/// completed.
+	pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&mut self) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> {
+		let mut outbound_drops = Vec::new();
+
+		assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
+		if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
+			self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
+			return outbound_drops;
+		}
+		// Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
+		// will be retransmitted.
+		self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
+
+		let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
+		self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
+			match htlc.state {
+				InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
+					// They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
+					// We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
+					// this HTLC accordingly
+					inbound_drop_count += 1;
+					false
+				},
+				InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
+					// We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
+					// sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
+					// in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
+					true
+				},
+				InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
+				InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
+					// We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
+					// re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
+					// (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
+					// the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
+					true
+				},
+			}
+		});
+		self.next_remote_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
+
+		for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
+			if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved = htlc.state {
+				// They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
+				// commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
+				// the update upon reconnection.
+				htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
+			}
+		}
+
+		self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
+			match htlc_update {
+				&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
+					outbound_drops.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
+					false
+				},
+				&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {..} | &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {..} => true,
+			}
+		});
+		self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
+		log_debug!(self, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops and {} waiting-to-locally-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", outbound_drops.len(), inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+		outbound_drops
+	}
+
+	/// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update failed to be stored by the client and further
+	/// updates are partially paused.
+	/// This must be called immediately after the call which generated the ChannelMonitor update
+	/// which failed, with the order argument set to the type of call it represented (ie a
+	/// commitment update or a revoke_and_ack generation). The messages which were generated from
+	/// that original call must *not* have been sent to the remote end, and must instead have been
+	/// dropped. They will be regenerated when monitor_updating_restored is called.
+	pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, order: RAACommitmentOrder, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>, mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, raa_first_dropped_cs: bool) {
+		assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
+		match order {
+			RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
+				self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
+				self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
+			},
+			RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
+				self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
+				self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = raa_first_dropped_cs;
+			},
+		}
+		assert!(self.monitor_pending_forwards.is_empty());
+		mem::swap(&mut pending_forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
+		assert!(self.monitor_pending_failures.is_empty());
+		mem::swap(&mut pending_fails, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
+		self.monitor_pending_order = Some(order);
+		self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
+	}
+
+	/// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
+	/// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
+	/// to the remote side.
+	pub fn monitor_updating_restored(&mut self) -> (Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>) {
+		assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
+		self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
+
+		let mut forwards = Vec::new();
+		mem::swap(&mut forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
+		let mut failures = Vec::new();
+		mem::swap(&mut failures, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
+
+		if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
+			// Leave monitor_pending_order so we can order our channel_reestablish responses
+			self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
+			self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
+			return (None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, forwards, failures);
+		}
+
+		let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
+			Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
+		} else { None };
+		let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
+			Some(self.get_last_commitment_update())
+		} else { None };
+
+		self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
+		self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
+		(raa, commitment_update, self.monitor_pending_order.clone().unwrap(), forwards, failures)
+	}
+
+	pub fn update_fee(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
 		if self.channel_outbound {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee", action: None});
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee"));
+		}
+		if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
 		}
 		Channel::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
+		self.pending_update_fee = Some(msg.feerate_per_kw as u64);
 		self.channel_update_count += 1;
-		self.feerate_per_kw = msg.feerate_per_kw as u64;
 		Ok(())
 	}
 
-	pub fn shutdown(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Vec<[u8; 32]>), HandleError> {
-		if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
-			self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
-			self.channel_update_count += 1;
-			return Ok((None, None, Vec::new()));
+	fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
+		let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number));
+		let per_commitment_secret = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed, self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
+		msgs::RevokeAndACK {
+			channel_id: self.channel_id,
+			per_commitment_secret,
+			next_per_commitment_point,
+		}
+	}
+
+	fn get_last_commitment_update(&self) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
+		let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
+		let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
+		let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
+		let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
+
+		for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
+			if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
+				update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
+					channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+					htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
+					amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
+					payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
+					cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
+					onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
+				});
+			}
 		}
-		for htlc in self.pending_htlcs.iter() {
-			if htlc.state == HTLCState::RemoteAnnounced {
-				return Err(HandleError{err: "Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs", action: None});
+
+		for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
+			if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
+				match reason {
+					&InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
+						update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
+							channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+							htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
+							reason: err_packet.clone()
+						});
+					},
+					&InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
+						update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
+							channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+							htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
+							sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
+							failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
+						});
+					},
+					&InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
+						update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
+							channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+							htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
+							payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
+						});
+					},
+				}
 			}
 		}
-		if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote peer sent duplicate shutdown message", action: None});
+
+		msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
+			update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
+			update_fee: None, //TODO: We need to support re-generating any update_fees in the last commitment_signed!
+			commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update().expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
+		}
+	}
+
+	/// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
+	/// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
+	pub fn channel_reestablish(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Option<ChannelMonitor>, RAACommitmentOrder, Option<msgs::Shutdown>), ChannelError> {
+		if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
+			// While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
+			// almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
+			// just close here instead of trying to recover.
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect"));
+		}
+
+		if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
+			msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish"));
+		}
+
+		// Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
+		// remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
+		self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
+
+		let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
+			Some(msgs::Shutdown {
+				channel_id: self.channel_id,
+				scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
+			})
+		} else { None };
+
+		if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
+			if self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32 == 0 {
+				if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
+					return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent funding_locked yet"));
+				}
+				// Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
+				return Ok((None, None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
+			}
+
+			// We have OurFundingLocked set!
+			let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
+			let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
+			return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
+				channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+				next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
+			}), None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
+		}
+
+		let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number {
+			// Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
+			// Note that if we need to repeat our FundingLocked we'll do that in the next if block.
+			None
+		} else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number {
+			if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
+				self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
+				None
+			} else {
+				Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
+			}
+		} else {
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction"));
+		};
+
+		// We increment cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
+		// revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
+		// AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
+		// the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
+		let our_next_remote_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
+
+		let resend_funding_locked = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
+			// We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateFailed resending FundingLocked
+			let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
+			let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
+			Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
+				channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+				next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
+			})
+		} else { None };
+
+		let order = self.monitor_pending_order.clone().unwrap_or(if self.received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa {
+				RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
+			} else {
+				RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst
+			});
+
+		if msg.next_local_commitment_number == our_next_remote_commitment_number {
+			if required_revoke.is_some() {
+				log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+			} else {
+				log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+			}
+
+			if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 &&
+					self.monitor_pending_order.is_none() { // monitor_pending_order indicates we're waiting on a response to a unfreeze
+				// We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
+				// channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
+				// have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
+				// now!
+				match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs() {
+					Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)),
+					Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) => panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs"),
+					Ok(Some((commitment_update, channel_monitor))) => return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(commitment_update), Some(channel_monitor), order, shutdown_msg)),
+					Ok(None) => return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, order, shutdown_msg)),
+				}
+			} else {
+				return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, order, shutdown_msg));
+			}
+		} else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == our_next_remote_commitment_number - 1 {
+			if required_revoke.is_some() {
+				log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+			} else {
+				log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+			}
+
+			// If monitor_pending_order is set, it must be CommitmentSigned if we have no RAA
+			debug_assert!(self.monitor_pending_order != Some(RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst) || required_revoke.is_some());
+
+			if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
+				self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
+				return Ok((resend_funding_locked, None, None, None, order, shutdown_msg));
+			}
+
+			return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(self.get_last_commitment_update()), None, order, shutdown_msg));
+		} else {
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction"));
+		}
+	}
+
+	fn maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Option<msgs::ClosingSigned> {
+		if !self.channel_outbound || !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() ||
+				self.channel_state & (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK ||
+				self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
+			return None;
+		}
+
+		let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
+		if self.feerate_per_kw > proposed_feerate {
+			proposed_feerate = self.feerate_per_kw;
+		}
+		let tx_weight = Self::get_closing_transaction_weight(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(), self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap());
+		let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate * tx_weight / 1000;
+
+		let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(proposed_total_fee_satoshis, false);
+		let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
+		let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
+
+		self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((proposed_feerate, total_fee_satoshis));
+		Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
+			channel_id: self.channel_id,
+			fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
+			signature: self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key),
+		})
+	}
+
+	pub fn shutdown(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> {
+		if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
+		}
+		if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
+			// Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
+			// are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
+			// can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation"));
+		}
+		for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
+			if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
+				return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs"));
+			}
 		}
 		assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
 
 		// BOLT 2 says we must only send a scriptpubkey of certain standard forms, which are up to
 		// 34 bytes in length, so dont let the remote peer feed us some super fee-heavy script.
 		if self.channel_outbound && msg.scriptpubkey.len() > 34 {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Got shutdown_scriptpubkey of absurd length from remote peer", action: None});
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown_scriptpubkey of absurd length from remote peer"));
+		}
+
+		//Check shutdown_scriptpubkey form as BOLT says we must
+		if !msg.scriptpubkey.is_p2pkh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_p2sh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey from remote peer"));
 		}
-		//TODO: Check shutdown_scriptpubkey form as BOLT says we must? WHYYY
 
 		if self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
 			if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
-				return Err(HandleError{err: "Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey which did not match their previous scriptpubkey", action: None});
+				return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey which did not match their previous scriptpubkey"));
 			}
 		} else {
 			self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
 		}
 
-		let our_closing_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
-
-		let (proposed_feerate, proposed_fee, our_sig) = if self.channel_outbound && self.pending_htlcs.is_empty() {
-			let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
-			if self.feerate_per_kw > proposed_feerate {
-				proposed_feerate = self.feerate_per_kw;
-			}
-			let tx_weight = Self::get_closing_transaction_weight(&our_closing_script, &msg.scriptpubkey);
-			let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate * tx_weight / 1000;
-
-			let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(proposed_total_fee_satoshis, false);
-			let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
-			let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
-
-			(Some(proposed_feerate), Some(total_fee_satoshis), Some(self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key).unwrap()))
-		} else { (None, None, None) };
-
 		// From here on out, we may not fail!
 
 		self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
@@ -1687,73 +2518,64 @@ impl Channel {
 		// We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
 		// remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
 		// cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
+		self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
 		let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
 		self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
 			match htlc_update {
-				&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
-					dropped_outbound_htlcs.push(payment_hash.clone());
+				&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
+					dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
 					false
 				},
 				_ => true
 			}
 		});
-		for htlc in self.pending_htlcs.iter() {
-			if htlc.state == HTLCState::LocalAnnounced {
-				return Ok((None, None, dropped_outbound_htlcs));
-			}
-		}
+		// If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back a update_fail_htlc
+		// immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown cause we won't send
+		// any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
 
 		let our_shutdown = if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
 			None
 		} else {
 			Some(msgs::Shutdown {
 				channel_id: self.channel_id,
-				scriptpubkey: our_closing_script,
+				scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
 			})
 		};
 
 		self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
 		self.channel_update_count += 1;
-		if self.pending_htlcs.is_empty() && self.channel_outbound {
-			// There are no more HTLCs and we're the funder, this means we start the closing_signed
-			// dance with an initial fee proposal!
-			self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((proposed_feerate.unwrap(), proposed_fee.unwrap()));
-			Ok((our_shutdown, Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
-				channel_id: self.channel_id,
-				fee_satoshis: proposed_fee.unwrap(),
-				signature: our_sig.unwrap(),
-			}), dropped_outbound_htlcs))
-		} else {
-			Ok((our_shutdown, None, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
-		}
+		Ok((our_shutdown, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), dropped_outbound_htlcs))
 	}
 
-	pub fn closing_signed(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), HandleError> {
+	pub fn closing_signed(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError> {
 		if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown", action: None});
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown"));
+		}
+		if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
 		}
-		if !self.pending_htlcs.is_empty() {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs", action: None});
+		if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs"));
 		}
-		if msg.fee_satoshis > 21000000 * 10000000 {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee", action: None});
+		if msg.fee_satoshis > 21000000 * 10000000 { //this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee"));
 		}
 
 		let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
 		let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
 		if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee greater than the value they can claim", action: None});
+			return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee greater than the value they can claim"));
 		}
 		let mut sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
 
-		match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey) {
+		match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()) {
 			Ok(_) => {},
-			Err(_) => {
+			Err(_e) => {
 				// The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
 				// limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
 				closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
 				sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
-				secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer");
+				secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer");
 			},
 		};
 
@@ -1771,7 +2593,7 @@ impl Channel {
 				let closing_tx_max_weight = Self::get_closing_transaction_weight(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(), self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap());
 				let (closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction($new_feerate * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000, false);
 				sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
-				let our_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key).unwrap();
+				let our_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
 				self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some(($new_feerate, used_total_fee));
 				return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
 					channel_id: self.channel_id,
@@ -1787,7 +2609,7 @@ impl Channel {
 			if proposed_sat_per_kw > our_max_feerate {
 				if let Some((last_feerate, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
 					if our_max_feerate <= last_feerate {
-						return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something higher than our Normal feerate", action: None});
+						return Err(ChannelError::Close("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something higher than our Normal feerate"));
 					}
 				}
 				propose_new_feerate!(our_max_feerate);
@@ -1797,7 +2619,7 @@ impl Channel {
 			if proposed_sat_per_kw < our_min_feerate {
 				if let Some((last_feerate, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
 					if our_min_feerate >= last_feerate {
-						return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something lower than our Background feerate", action: None});
+						return Err(ChannelError::Close("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something lower than our Background feerate"));
 					}
 				}
 				propose_new_feerate!(our_min_feerate);
@@ -1858,17 +2680,77 @@ impl Channel {
 		self.our_htlc_minimum_msat
 	}
 
+	/// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
+	pub fn get_their_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
+		self.our_htlc_minimum_msat
+	}
+
 	pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
 		self.channel_value_satoshis
 	}
 
+	pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
+		self.config.fee_proportional_millionths
+	}
+
+	#[cfg(test)]
+	pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u64 {
+		self.feerate_per_kw
+	}
+
+	pub fn get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
+		self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 1
+	}
+
+	pub fn get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
+		self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
+	}
+
+	pub fn get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
+		self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 2
+	}
+
+	//TODO: Testing purpose only, should be changed in another way after #81
+	#[cfg(test)]
+	pub fn get_local_keys(&self) -> &ChannelKeys {
+		&self.local_keys
+	}
+
+	#[cfg(test)]
+	pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
+		ChannelValueStat {
+			value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
+			channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
+			channel_reserve_msat: self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000,
+			pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
+			pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
+			holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
+				let mut res = 0;
+				for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
+					match h {
+						&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
+							res += amount_msat;
+						}
+						_ => {}
+					}
+				}
+				res
+			},
+			their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
+		}
+	}
+
 	/// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
 	pub fn get_channel_update_count(&self) -> u32 {
 		self.channel_update_count
 	}
 
 	pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
-		self.announce_publicly
+		self.config.announced_channel
+	}
+
+	pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
+		self.channel_outbound
 	}
 
 	/// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
@@ -1891,6 +2773,11 @@ impl Channel {
 		res as u32
 	}
 
+	/// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
+	pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
+		self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
+	}
+
 	/// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
 	/// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
 	pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
@@ -1902,7 +2789,13 @@ impl Channel {
 	/// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
 	/// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
 	pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
-		self.is_usable()
+		self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0)
+	}
+
+	/// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
+	/// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
+	pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
+		(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0
 	}
 
 	/// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
@@ -1926,34 +2819,46 @@ impl Channel {
 	/// In case of Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard requirements
 	/// apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed post-shutdown.
 	/// Only returns an ErrorAction of DisconnectPeer, if Err.
-	pub fn block_connected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, HandleError> {
-		let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK);
-		if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
-			if header.bitcoin_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
-				self.last_block_connected = header.bitcoin_hash();
+	pub fn block_connected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, msgs::ErrorMessage> {
+		let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
+		if header.bitcoin_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
+			self.last_block_connected = header.bitcoin_hash();
+			self.channel_monitor.last_block_hash = self.last_block_connected;
+			if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
 				self.funding_tx_confirmations += 1;
-				if self.funding_tx_confirmations == CONF_TARGET as u64 {
-					if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
+				if self.funding_tx_confirmations == self.minimum_depth as u64 {
+					let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
 						self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
+						true
 					} else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
-						self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK);
+						self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
 						self.channel_update_count += 1;
-						//TODO: Something about a state where we "lost confirmation"
+						true
+					} else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
+						// We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
+						// funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
+						false
 					} else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
-						panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?");
-					}
-					self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = header.bitcoin_hash();
+						panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
+					} else {
+						// We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
+						// funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
+						false
+					};
+					self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(header.bitcoin_hash());
 
 					//TODO: Note that this must be a duplicate of the previous commitment point they sent us,
 					//as otherwise we will have a commitment transaction that they can't revoke (well, kinda,
 					//they can by sending two revoke_and_acks back-to-back, but not really). This appears to be
 					//a protocol oversight, but I assume I'm just missing something.
-					let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
-					let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret).unwrap();
-					return Ok(Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
-						channel_id: self.channel_id,
-						next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
-					}));
+					if need_commitment_update {
+						let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
+						let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
+						return Ok(Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
+							channel_id: self.channel_id,
+							next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
+						}));
+					}
 				}
 			}
 		}
@@ -1962,11 +2867,33 @@ impl Channel {
 				if tx.txid() == self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().txid {
 					let txo_idx = self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().index as usize;
 					if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
-						tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
+							tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
+						if self.channel_outbound {
+							// If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
+							// should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
+							// tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
+							// probability in fuzztarget mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
+							// channel and move on.
+							#[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+							panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
+						}
 						self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
 						self.channel_update_count += 1;
-						return Err(HandleError{err: "funding tx had wrong script/value", action: Some(ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{msg: None})});
+						return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
+							channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+							data: "funding tx had wrong script/value".to_owned()
+						});
 					} else {
+						if self.channel_outbound {
+							for input in tx.input.iter() {
+								if input.witness.is_empty() {
+									// We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
+									// just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
+									#[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+									panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
+								}
+							}
+						}
 						self.funding_tx_confirmations = 1;
 						self.short_channel_id = Some(((height as u64)          << (5*8)) |
 						                             ((*index_in_block as u64) << (2*8)) |
@@ -1988,34 +2915,36 @@ impl Channel {
 				return true;
 			}
 		}
-		if header.bitcoin_hash() == self.funding_tx_confirmed_in {
-			self.funding_tx_confirmations = CONF_TARGET as u64 - 1;
+		if Some(header.bitcoin_hash()) == self.funding_tx_confirmed_in {
+			self.funding_tx_confirmations = self.minimum_depth as u64 - 1;
 		}
+		self.last_block_connected = header.bitcoin_hash();
+		self.channel_monitor.last_block_hash = self.last_block_connected;
 		false
 	}
 
 	// Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
 	// something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
 
-	pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: Sha256dHash, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, HandleError> {
+	pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: Sha256dHash, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
 		if !self.channel_outbound {
 			panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
 		}
 		if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward", action: None});
+			panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
 		}
 
-		if self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != (1 << 48) - 1 {
+		if self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
 			panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
 		}
 
 		let local_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
 
-		Ok(msgs::OpenChannel {
+		msgs::OpenChannel {
 			chain_hash: chain_hash,
 			temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
 			funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
-			push_msat: 0, //TODO: Something about feerate?
+			push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
 			dust_limit_satoshis: self.our_dust_limit_satoshis,
 			max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
 			channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
@@ -2023,58 +2952,59 @@ impl Channel {
 			feerate_per_kw: fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background) as u32,
 			to_self_delay: BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT,
 			max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
-			funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key).unwrap(),
-			revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.revocation_base_key).unwrap(),
-			payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key).unwrap(),
-			delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key).unwrap(),
-			htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key).unwrap(),
-			first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_commitment_secret).unwrap(),
-			channel_flags: if self.announce_publicly {1} else {0},
+			funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key),
+			revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.revocation_base_key),
+			payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key),
+			delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key),
+			htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key),
+			first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_commitment_secret),
+			channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
 			shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
-		})
+		}
 	}
 
-	pub fn get_accept_channel(&self) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, HandleError> {
+	pub fn get_accept_channel(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
 		if self.channel_outbound {
 			panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
 		}
 		if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
 			panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
 		}
-		if self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != (1 << 48) - 1 {
+		if self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
 			panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
 		}
 
 		let local_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
 
-		Ok(msgs::AcceptChannel {
+		msgs::AcceptChannel {
 			temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
 			dust_limit_satoshis: self.our_dust_limit_satoshis,
 			max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
 			channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
 			htlc_minimum_msat: self.our_htlc_minimum_msat,
-			minimum_depth: CONF_TARGET,
+			minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth,
 			to_self_delay: BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT,
 			max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
-			funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key).unwrap(),
-			revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.revocation_base_key).unwrap(),
-			payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key).unwrap(),
-			delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key).unwrap(),
-			htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key).unwrap(),
-			first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_commitment_secret).unwrap(),
+			funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key),
+			revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.revocation_base_key),
+			payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key),
+			delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key),
+			htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key),
+			first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_commitment_secret),
 			shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
-		})
+		}
 	}
 
-	fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature(&mut self) -> Result<(Signature, Transaction), HandleError> {
+	/// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
+	fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature(&mut self) -> Result<(Signature, Transaction), ChannelError> {
 		let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
 
 		let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
-		let remote_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, false).0;
+		let remote_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
 		let remote_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&remote_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&remote_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
 
 		// We sign the "remote" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
-		Ok((self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key).unwrap(), remote_initial_commitment_tx))
+		Ok((self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key), remote_initial_commitment_tx))
 	}
 
 	/// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
@@ -2083,14 +3013,17 @@ impl Channel {
 	/// or if called on an inbound channel.
 	/// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
 	/// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
-	pub fn get_outbound_funding_created(&mut self, funding_txo: OutPoint) -> Result<(msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelMonitor), HandleError> {
+	/// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
+	pub fn get_outbound_funding_created(&mut self, funding_txo: OutPoint) -> Result<(msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
 		if !self.channel_outbound {
 			panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
 		}
 		if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
 			panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
 		}
-		if self.channel_monitor.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) || self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != (1 << 48) - 1 || self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != (1 << 48) - 1 {
+		if self.channel_monitor.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
+				self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
+				self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
 			panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
 		}
 
@@ -2100,6 +3033,7 @@ impl Channel {
 		let (our_signature, commitment_tx) = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature() {
 			Ok(res) => res,
 			Err(e) => {
+				log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
 				self.channel_monitor.unset_funding_info();
 				return Err(e);
 			}
@@ -2108,7 +3042,7 @@ impl Channel {
 		let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
 
 		// Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
-		self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number);
+		self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap());
 		self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
 		self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
 		self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
@@ -2123,21 +3057,25 @@ impl Channel {
 
 	/// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, as well as a signature covering it using our
 	/// bitcoin_key, if available, for this channel. The channel must be publicly announceable and
-	/// available for use (have exchanged FundingLocked messages in both directions. Should be used
+	/// available for use (have exchanged FundingLocked messages in both directions). Should be used
 	/// for both loose and in response to an AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
-	/// Note that you can get an announcement for a channel which is closing, though you should
-	/// likely not announce such a thing. In case its already been announced, a channel_update
-	/// message can mark the channel disabled.
-	pub fn get_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: Sha256dHash) -> Result<(msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, Signature), HandleError> {
-		if !self.announce_publicly {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel is not available for public announcements", action: None});
+	/// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
+	/// closing).
+	/// Note that the "channel must be funded" requirement is stricter than BOLT 7 requires - see
+	/// https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/468
+	pub fn get_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: Sha256dHash) -> Result<(msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, Signature), ChannelError> {
+		if !self.config.announced_channel {
+			return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements"));
 		}
-		if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement until the channel funding has been locked", action: None});
+		if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) == 0 {
+			return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement until the channel funding has been locked"));
+		}
+		if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32)) != 0 {
+			return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement once the channel is closing"));
 		}
 
 		let were_node_one = our_node_id.serialize()[..] < self.their_node_id.serialize()[..];
-		let our_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key).unwrap();
+		let our_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
 
 		let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
 			features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
@@ -2145,16 +3083,46 @@ impl Channel {
 			short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
 			node_id_1: if were_node_one { our_node_id } else { self.get_their_node_id() },
 			node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_their_node_id() } else { our_node_id },
-			bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_key } else { self.their_funding_pubkey },
-			bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.their_funding_pubkey } else { our_bitcoin_key },
+			bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_key } else { self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap() },
+			bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap() } else { our_bitcoin_key },
+			excess_data: Vec::new(),
 		};
 
 		let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
-		let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.local_keys.funding_key).unwrap();
+		let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
 
 		Ok((msg, sig))
 	}
 
+	/// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
+	/// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
+	pub fn get_channel_reestablish(&self) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish {
+		assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
+		assert_ne!(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
+		msgs::ChannelReestablish {
+			channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+			// The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
+			// transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
+			// index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
+			// commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
+			// revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
+			// to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
+
+			// next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
+			// receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
+			next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number,
+			// We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
+			// receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
+			// (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
+			// the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
+			// cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
+			// dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
+			// overflow here.
+			next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
+			data_loss_protect: None,
+		}
+	}
+
 
 	// Send stuff to our remote peers:
 
@@ -2163,30 +3131,53 @@ impl Channel {
 	/// This returns an option instead of a pure UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we are
 	/// waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack during which time we cannot add new
 	/// HTLCs on the wire or we wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed.
-	pub fn send_htlc(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: [u8; 32], cltv_expiry: u32, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, HandleError> {
+	/// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
+	pub fn send_htlc(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> {
 		if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down", action: None});
+			return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down"));
 		}
 
 		if amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot send more than the total value of the channel", action: None});
+			return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send more than the total value of the channel"));
 		}
 		if amount_msat < self.their_htlc_minimum_msat {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value", action: None});
+			return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value"));
+		}
+
+		if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
+			// Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
+			// incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
+			// the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
+			// disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
+			// end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
+			// IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
+			return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected/frozen for channel monitor update"));
 		}
 
-		let (_, outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat, htlc_inbound_value_msat) = self.get_pending_htlc_stats(false);
+		let (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
 		if outbound_htlc_count + 1 > self.their_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs", action: None});
+			return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs"));
 		}
 		//TODO: Spec is unclear if this is per-direction or in total (I assume per direction):
 		// Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
 		if htlc_outbound_value_msat + amount_msat > self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight", action: None});
+			return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"));
 		}
-		// Check their_channel_reserve_satoshis:
-		if htlc_inbound_value_msat + htlc_outbound_value_msat + amount_msat + (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) > (self.channel_value_satoshis - self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value", action: None});
+
+		let mut holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat = 0;
+		for holding_htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
+			match holding_htlc {
+				&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } => {
+					holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat += *amount_msat;
+				}
+				_ => {}
+			}
+		}
+
+		// Check self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
+		// reserve for them to have something to claim if we misbehave)
+		if self.value_to_self_msat < self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 + amount_msat + holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat + htlc_outbound_value_msat {
+			return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"));
 		}
 
 		//TODO: Check cltv_expiry? Do this in channel manager?
@@ -2198,22 +3189,21 @@ impl Channel {
 				amount_msat: amount_msat,
 				payment_hash: payment_hash,
 				cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
+				source,
 				onion_routing_packet: onion_routing_packet,
 				time_created: Instant::now(),
 			});
 			return Ok(None);
 		}
 
-		self.pending_htlcs.push(HTLCOutput {
-			outbound: true,
+		self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
 			htlc_id: self.next_local_htlc_id,
 			amount_msat: amount_msat,
 			payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
 			cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
-			state: HTLCState::LocalAnnounced,
+			state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
+			source,
 			fail_reason: None,
-			local_removed_fulfilled: false,
-			pending_forward_state: None
 		});
 
 		let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
@@ -2230,73 +3220,108 @@ impl Channel {
 	}
 
 	/// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
-	pub fn send_commitment(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor), HandleError> {
+	/// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
+	/// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
+	/// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
+	pub fn send_commitment(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
 		if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established", action: None});
+			panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
 		}
 		if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment", action: None});
+			panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
+		}
+		if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
+			panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
+		}
+		if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) {
+			panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
 		}
-		let mut have_updates = false; // TODO initialize with "have we sent a fee update?"
-		for htlc in self.pending_htlcs.iter() {
-			if htlc.state == HTLCState::LocalAnnounced {
+		let mut have_updates = self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
+		for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
+			if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
 				have_updates = true;
 			}
 			if have_updates { break; }
 		}
 		if !have_updates {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send", action: None});
+			panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
 		}
 		self.send_commitment_no_status_check()
 	}
 	/// Only fails in case of bad keys
-	fn send_commitment_no_status_check(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor), HandleError> {
-		let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
-
+	fn send_commitment_no_status_check(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
 		// We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
 		// fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
 		// is acceptable.
-		for htlc in self.pending_htlcs.iter_mut() {
-			if htlc.state == HTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
-				htlc.state = HTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke;
-			} else if htlc.state == HTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {
-				htlc.state = HTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke;
+		for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
+			let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
+				Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
+			} else { None };
+			if let Some(state) = new_state {
+				htlc.state = state;
+			}
+		}
+		for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
+			if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove = htlc.state {
+				htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke;
+			}
+		}
+
+		let (res, remote_commitment_tx, htlcs, htlc_sources) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update() {
+			Ok((res, (remote_commitment_tx, htlcs, mut htlc_sources))) => {
+				// Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
+				let htlc_sources_no_ref = htlc_sources.drain(..).map(|htlc_source| (htlc_source.0, htlc_source.1.clone(), htlc_source.2)).collect();
+				(res, remote_commitment_tx, htlcs, htlc_sources_no_ref)
+			},
+			Err(e) => return Err(e),
+		};
+
+		self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&remote_commitment_tx, htlcs, htlc_sources, self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap());
+		self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
+		Ok((res, self.channel_monitor.clone()))
+	}
+
+	/// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
+	/// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
+	fn send_commitment_no_state_update(&self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Transaction, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, Vec<(PaymentHash, &HTLCSource, Option<u32>)>)), ChannelError> {
+		let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
+
+		let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
+		if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
+			if self.channel_outbound {
+				feerate_per_kw = feerate;
 			}
 		}
 
 		let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
-		let remote_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, true);
+		let remote_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, true, feerate_per_kw);
 		let remote_commitment_txid = remote_commitment_tx.0.txid();
 		let remote_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&remote_commitment_tx.0).sighash_all(&remote_commitment_tx.0.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
-		let our_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key).unwrap();
+		let our_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
 
 		let mut htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
 
 		for ref htlc in remote_commitment_tx.1.iter() {
-			let htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&remote_commitment_txid, htlc, false, &remote_keys);
+			let htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&remote_commitment_txid, htlc, false, &remote_keys, feerate_per_kw);
 			let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &remote_keys);
 			let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]).unwrap();
-			let our_htlc_key = secp_derived_key!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &remote_keys.per_commitment_point, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key));
-			htlc_sigs.push(self.secp_ctx.sign(&htlc_sighash, &our_htlc_key).unwrap());
+			let our_htlc_key = secp_check!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &remote_keys.per_commitment_point, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key), "Derived invalid key, peer is maliciously selecting parameters");
+			htlc_sigs.push(self.secp_ctx.sign(&htlc_sighash, &our_htlc_key));
 		}
 
-		// Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
-		self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&remote_commitment_tx.0, remote_commitment_tx.1, self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number);
-		self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
-
 		Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
 			channel_id: self.channel_id,
 			signature: our_sig,
 			htlc_signatures: htlc_sigs,
-		}, self.channel_monitor.clone()))
+		}, remote_commitment_tx))
 	}
 
 	/// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
 	/// to send to the remote peer in one go.
 	/// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
 	/// more info.
-	pub fn send_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: [u8; 32], cltv_expiry: u32, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor)>, HandleError> {
-		match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, onion_routing_packet)? {
+	pub fn send_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor)>, ChannelError> {
+		match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet)? {
 			Some(update_add_htlc) => {
 				let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
 				Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
@@ -2307,16 +3332,24 @@ impl Channel {
 
 	/// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
 	/// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
-	pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Vec<[u8; 32]>), HandleError> {
-		for htlc in self.pending_htlcs.iter() {
-			if htlc.state == HTLCState::LocalAnnounced {
-				return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs, call send_commitment first", action: None});
+	pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError> {
+		for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
+			if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
+				return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first"});
 			}
 		}
 		if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Shutdown already in progress", action: None});
+			if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
+				return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress"});
+			}
+			else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
+				return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote"});
+			}
 		}
 		assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
+		if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
+			return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?"});
+		}
 
 		let our_closing_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
 
@@ -2328,14 +3361,14 @@ impl Channel {
 		}
 		self.channel_update_count += 1;
 
-		// We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
-		// remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
-		// cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
+		// Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
+		// our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
+		self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
 		let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
 		self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
 			match htlc_update {
-				&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
-					dropped_outbound_htlcs.push(payment_hash.clone());
+				&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
+					dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
 					false
 				},
 				_ => true
@@ -2353,7 +3386,7 @@ impl Channel {
 	/// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
 	/// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
 	/// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
-	pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<[u8; 32]>) {
+	pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) {
 		assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
 
 		// We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
@@ -2361,17 +3394,14 @@ impl Channel {
 		let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
 		for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
 			match htlc_update {
-				HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { payment_hash, .. } => {
-					dropped_outbound_htlcs.push(payment_hash);
+				HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
+					dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash));
 				},
 				_ => {}
 			}
 		}
 
-		for htlc in self.pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
-			if htlc.state == HTLCState::LocalAnnounced {
-				dropped_outbound_htlcs.push(htlc.payment_hash);
-			}
+		for _htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
 			//TODO: Do something with the remaining HTLCs
 			//(we need to have the ChannelManager monitor them so we can claim the inbound HTLCs
 			//which correspond)
@@ -2385,23 +3415,521 @@ impl Channel {
 	}
 }
 
+const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
+const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
+
+impl Writeable for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
+	fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+		match self {
+			&InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref error_packet) => {
+				0u8.write(writer)?;
+				error_packet.write(writer)?;
+			},
+			&InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref onion_hash, ref err_code)) => {
+				1u8.write(writer)?;
+				onion_hash.write(writer)?;
+				err_code.write(writer)?;
+			},
+			&InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
+				2u8.write(writer)?;
+				payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
+			},
+		}
+		Ok(())
+	}
+}
+
+impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
+	fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+		Ok(match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+			0 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(Readable::read(reader)?),
+			1 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
+			2 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(Readable::read(reader)?),
+			_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+impl Writeable for Channel {
+	fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+		// Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
+		// called but include holding cell updates (and obviously we don't modify self).
+
+		writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
+		writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
+
+		self.user_id.write(writer)?;
+		self.config.write(writer)?;
+
+		self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
+		(self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
+		self.channel_outbound.write(writer)?;
+		self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
+
+		self.local_keys.write(writer)?;
+		self.shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?;
+
+		self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
+		self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
+		self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
+
+		self.received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa.write(writer)?;
+
+		let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
+		for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
+			if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
+				dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
+			}
+		}
+		(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
+		for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
+			htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
+			htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
+			htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
+			htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
+			match &htlc.state {
+				&InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {}, // Drop
+				&InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
+					1u8.write(writer)?;
+					htlc_state.write(writer)?;
+				},
+				&InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
+					2u8.write(writer)?;
+					htlc_state.write(writer)?;
+				},
+				&InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
+					3u8.write(writer)?;
+				},
+				&InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
+					4u8.write(writer)?;
+					removal_reason.write(writer)?;
+				},
+			}
+		}
+
+		macro_rules! write_option {
+			($thing: expr) => {
+				match &$thing {
+					&None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
+					&Some(ref v) => {
+						1u8.write(writer)?;
+						v.write(writer)?;
+					},
+				}
+			}
+		}
+
+		(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
+		for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
+			htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
+			htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
+			htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
+			htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
+			htlc.source.write(writer)?;
+			write_option!(htlc.fail_reason);
+			match &htlc.state {
+				&OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
+					0u8.write(writer)?;
+					onion_packet.write(writer)?;
+				},
+				&OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
+					1u8.write(writer)?;
+				},
+				&OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved => {
+					2u8.write(writer)?;
+				},
+				&OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove => {
+					3u8.write(writer)?;
+				},
+				&OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke => {
+					4u8.write(writer)?;
+				},
+			}
+		}
+
+		(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
+		for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
+			match update {
+				&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, time_created: _ } => {
+					0u8.write(writer)?;
+					amount_msat.write(writer)?;
+					cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
+					payment_hash.write(writer)?;
+					source.write(writer)?;
+					onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
+					// time_created is not serialized - we re-init the timeout upon deserialization
+				},
+				&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
+					1u8.write(writer)?;
+					payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
+					htlc_id.write(writer)?;
+				},
+				&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
+					2u8.write(writer)?;
+					htlc_id.write(writer)?;
+					err_packet.write(writer)?;
+				}
+			}
+		}
+
+		self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
+		self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
+		match self.monitor_pending_order {
+			None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
+			Some(RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
+			Some(RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst) => 2u8.write(writer)?,
+		}
+
+		(self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
+		for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
+			pending_forward.write(writer)?;
+			htlc_id.write(writer)?;
+		}
+
+		(self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
+		for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
+			htlc_source.write(writer)?;
+			payment_hash.write(writer)?;
+			fail_reason.write(writer)?;
+		}
+
+		write_option!(self.pending_update_fee);
+		write_option!(self.holding_cell_update_fee);
+
+		self.next_local_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
+		(self.next_remote_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
+		self.channel_update_count.write(writer)?;
+		self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
+
+		(self.last_local_commitment_txn.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
+		for tx in self.last_local_commitment_txn.iter() {
+			if let Err(e) = tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) {
+				match e {
+					encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
+					_ => panic!("last_local_commitment_txn must have been well-formed!"),
+				}
+			}
+		}
+
+		match self.last_sent_closing_fee {
+			Some((feerate, fee)) => {
+				1u8.write(writer)?;
+				feerate.write(writer)?;
+				fee.write(writer)?;
+			},
+			None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
+		}
+
+		write_option!(self.funding_tx_confirmed_in);
+		write_option!(self.short_channel_id);
+
+		self.last_block_connected.write(writer)?;
+		self.funding_tx_confirmations.write(writer)?;
+
+		self.their_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
+		self.our_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
+		self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
+		self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis.write(writer)?;
+		self.their_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
+		self.our_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
+		self.their_to_self_delay.write(writer)?;
+		self.their_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
+		self.minimum_depth.write(writer)?;
+
+		write_option!(self.their_funding_pubkey);
+		write_option!(self.their_revocation_basepoint);
+		write_option!(self.their_payment_basepoint);
+		write_option!(self.their_delayed_payment_basepoint);
+		write_option!(self.their_htlc_basepoint);
+		write_option!(self.their_cur_commitment_point);
+
+		write_option!(self.their_prev_commitment_point);
+		self.their_node_id.write(writer)?;
+
+		write_option!(self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey);
+
+		self.channel_monitor.write_for_disk(writer)?;
+		Ok(())
+	}
+}
+
+impl<R : ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for Channel {
+	fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+		let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+		let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+		if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
+			return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
+		}
+
+		let user_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
+		let config: ChannelConfig = Readable::read(reader)?;
+
+		let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
+		let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
+		let channel_outbound = Readable::read(reader)?;
+		let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
+
+		let local_keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
+		let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
+
+		let cur_local_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
+		let cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
+		let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
+
+		let received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa = Readable::read(reader)?;
+
+		let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+		let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
+		for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
+			pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
+				htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
+				amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
+				cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
+				payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
+				state: match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+					1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
+					2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
+					3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
+					4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
+					_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+				},
+			});
+		}
+
+		macro_rules! read_option { () => {
+			match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+				0 => None,
+				1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
+				_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+			}
+		} }
+
+		let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+		let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
+		for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
+			pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
+				htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
+				amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
+				cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
+				payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
+				source: Readable::read(reader)?,
+				fail_reason: read_option!(),
+				state: match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+					0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
+					1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
+					2 => OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved,
+					3 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove,
+					4 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke,
+					_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+				},
+			});
+		}
+
+		let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+		let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
+		for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
+			holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+				0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
+					amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
+					cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
+					payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
+					source: Readable::read(reader)?,
+					onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
+					time_created: Instant::now(),
+				},
+				1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
+					payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
+					htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
+				},
+				2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
+					htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
+					err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
+				},
+				_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+			});
+		}
+
+		let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
+		let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
+
+		let monitor_pending_order = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+			0 => None,
+			1 => Some(RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst),
+			2 => Some(RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst),
+			_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+		};
+
+		let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+		let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
+		for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
+			monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
+		}
+
+		let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+		let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
+		for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
+			monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
+		}
+
+		let pending_update_fee = read_option!();
+		let holding_cell_update_fee = read_option!();
+
+		let next_local_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
+		let next_remote_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
+		let channel_update_count = Readable::read(reader)?;
+		let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
+
+		let last_local_commitment_txn_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+		let mut last_local_commitment_txn = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(last_local_commitment_txn_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2 + 1));
+		for _ in 0..last_local_commitment_txn_count {
+			last_local_commitment_txn.push(match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) {
+				Ok(tx) => tx,
+				Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+			});
+		}
+
+		let last_sent_closing_fee = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+			0 => None,
+			1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
+			_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+		};
+
+		let funding_tx_confirmed_in = read_option!();
+		let short_channel_id = read_option!();
+
+		let last_block_connected = Readable::read(reader)?;
+		let funding_tx_confirmations = Readable::read(reader)?;
+
+		let their_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
+		let our_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
+		let their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
+		let their_channel_reserve_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
+		let their_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
+		let our_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
+		let their_to_self_delay = Readable::read(reader)?;
+		let their_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
+		let minimum_depth = Readable::read(reader)?;
+
+		let their_funding_pubkey = read_option!();
+		let their_revocation_basepoint = read_option!();
+		let their_payment_basepoint = read_option!();
+		let their_delayed_payment_basepoint = read_option!();
+		let their_htlc_basepoint = read_option!();
+		let their_cur_commitment_point = read_option!();
+
+		let their_prev_commitment_point = read_option!();
+		let their_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
+
+		let their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = read_option!();
+		let (monitor_last_block, channel_monitor) = ReadableArgs::read(reader, logger.clone())?;
+		// We drop the ChannelMonitor's last block connected hash cause we don't actually bother
+		// doing full block connection operations on the internal CHannelMonitor copies
+		if monitor_last_block != last_block_connected {
+			return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
+		}
+
+		Ok(Channel {
+			user_id,
+
+			config,
+			channel_id,
+			channel_state,
+			channel_outbound,
+			secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
+			channel_value_satoshis,
+
+			local_keys,
+			shutdown_pubkey,
+
+			cur_local_commitment_transaction_number,
+			cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number,
+			value_to_self_msat,
+
+			received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa,
+			pending_inbound_htlcs,
+			pending_outbound_htlcs,
+			holding_cell_htlc_updates,
+
+			monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
+			monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
+			monitor_pending_order,
+			monitor_pending_forwards,
+			monitor_pending_failures,
+
+			pending_update_fee,
+			holding_cell_update_fee,
+			next_local_htlc_id,
+			next_remote_htlc_id,
+			channel_update_count,
+			feerate_per_kw,
+
+			#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
+			max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
+			#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
+			max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
+
+			last_local_commitment_txn,
+
+			last_sent_closing_fee,
+
+			funding_tx_confirmed_in,
+			short_channel_id,
+			last_block_connected,
+			funding_tx_confirmations,
+
+			their_dust_limit_satoshis,
+			our_dust_limit_satoshis,
+			their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
+			their_channel_reserve_satoshis,
+			their_htlc_minimum_msat,
+			our_htlc_minimum_msat,
+			their_to_self_delay,
+			their_max_accepted_htlcs,
+			minimum_depth,
+
+			their_funding_pubkey,
+			their_revocation_basepoint,
+			their_payment_basepoint,
+			their_delayed_payment_basepoint,
+			their_htlc_basepoint,
+			their_cur_commitment_point,
+
+			their_prev_commitment_point,
+			their_node_id,
+
+			their_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
+
+			channel_monitor,
+
+			logger,
+		})
+	}
+}
+
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
-	use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
+	use bitcoin::util::hash::{Sha256dHash, Hash160};
 	use bitcoin::util::bip143;
-	use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize;
-	use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
+	use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
+	use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
 	use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
+	use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
 	use hex;
-	use ln::channel::{Channel,ChannelKeys,HTLCOutput,HTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,TxCreationKeys};
+	use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
+	use ln::channel::{Channel,ChannelKeys,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,TxCreationKeys};
 	use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
 	use ln::chan_utils;
 	use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
+	use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
 	use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
+	use util::config::UserConfig;
+	use util::test_utils;
+	use util::logger::Logger;
 	use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
 	use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
 	use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
 	use crypto::digest::Digest;
+	use std::sync::Arc;
 
 	struct TestFeeEstimator {
 		fee_est: u64
@@ -2418,10 +3946,33 @@ mod tests {
 		        "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS is greater than all satoshis on existence");
 	}
 
+	struct Keys {
+		chan_keys: ChannelKeys,
+	}
+	impl KeysInterface for Keys {
+		fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); }
+		fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
+			let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
+			let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+			let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = Hash160::from_data(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
+			Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
+		}
+
+		fn get_shutdown_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey {
+			let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
+			let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+			PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)
+		}
+
+		fn get_channel_keys(&self, _inbound: bool) -> ChannelKeys { self.chan_keys.clone() }
+		fn get_session_key(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); }
+	}
+
 	#[test]
 	fn outbound_commitment_test() {
 		// Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix C:
 		let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
+		let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
 		let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 
 		let chan_keys = ChannelKeys {
@@ -2432,55 +3983,60 @@ mod tests {
 
 			// These aren't set in the test vectors:
 			revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
-			channel_close_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
-			channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
 			commitment_seed: [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
 		};
-		assert_eq!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan_keys.funding_key).unwrap().serialize()[..],
+		assert_eq!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan_keys.funding_key).serialize()[..],
 				hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
+		let keys_provider: Arc<KeysInterface> = Arc::new(Keys { chan_keys });
 
-		let mut chan = Channel::new_outbound(&feeest, chan_keys, PublicKey::new(), 10000000, false, 42); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
+		let their_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap());
+		let mut config = UserConfig::new();
+		config.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
+		let mut chan = Channel::new_outbound(&feeest, &keys_provider, their_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, Arc::clone(&logger), &config).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
 		chan.their_to_self_delay = 144;
 		chan.our_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
 
 		let funding_info = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), 0);
 		chan.channel_monitor.set_funding_info((funding_info, Script::new()));
 
-		chan.their_payment_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()).unwrap();
-		assert_eq!(chan.their_payment_basepoint.serialize()[..],
+		chan.their_payment_basepoint = Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()));
+		assert_eq!(chan.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap().serialize()[..],
 				hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
 
-		chan.their_funding_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()).unwrap();
-		assert_eq!(chan.their_funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
+		chan.their_funding_pubkey = Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()));
+		assert_eq!(chan.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap().serialize()[..],
 				hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
 
-		chan.their_htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()).unwrap();
-		assert_eq!(chan.their_htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
+		chan.their_htlc_basepoint = Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()));
+		assert_eq!(chan.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap().serialize()[..],
 				hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
 
-		chan.their_revocation_basepoint = PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+		chan.their_revocation_basepoint = Some(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
 
 		// We can't just use build_local_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
 		// derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
 		// build_commitment_transaction.
-		let delayed_payment_base = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key).unwrap();
+		let delayed_payment_base = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key);
 		let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
-		let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret).unwrap();
-		let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan.local_keys.htlc_base_key).unwrap();
-		let keys = TxCreationKeys::new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &delayed_payment_base, &htlc_basepoint, &chan.their_revocation_basepoint, &chan.their_payment_basepoint, &chan.their_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
+		let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
+		let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan.local_keys.htlc_base_key);
+		let keys = TxCreationKeys::new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &delayed_payment_base, &htlc_basepoint, &chan.their_revocation_basepoint.unwrap(), &chan.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap(), &chan.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap()).unwrap();
 
 		let mut unsigned_tx: (Transaction, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>);
 
 		macro_rules! test_commitment {
 			( $their_sig_hex: expr, $our_sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr) => {
-				unsigned_tx = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false);
+				unsigned_tx = {
+					let res = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, chan.feerate_per_kw);
+					(res.0, res.1)
+				};
 				let their_signature = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode($their_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
 				let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&unsigned_tx.0).sighash_all(&unsigned_tx.0.input[0], &chan.get_funding_redeemscript(), chan.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
-				secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &their_signature, &chan.their_funding_pubkey).unwrap();
+				secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &their_signature, &chan.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()).unwrap();
 
 				chan.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut unsigned_tx.0, &their_signature);
 
-				assert_eq!(serialize(&unsigned_tx.0).unwrap()[..],
+				assert_eq!(serialize(&unsigned_tx.0)[..],
 						hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..]);
 			};
 		}
@@ -2490,22 +4046,22 @@ mod tests {
 				let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode($their_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
 
 				let ref htlc = unsigned_tx.1[$htlc_idx];
-				let mut htlc_tx = chan.build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.0.txid(), &htlc, true, &keys);
+				let mut htlc_tx = chan.build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.0.txid(), &htlc, true, &keys, chan.feerate_per_kw);
 				let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
 				let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]).unwrap();
 				secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.b_htlc_key).unwrap();
 
-				let mut preimage: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
+				let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
 				if !htlc.offered {
 					for i in 0..5 {
 						let mut sha = Sha256::new();
 						sha.input(&[i; 32]);
 
-						let mut out = [0; 32];
-						sha.result(&mut out);
+						let mut out = PaymentHash([0; 32]);
+						sha.result(&mut out.0[..]);
 
 						if out == htlc.payment_hash {
-							preimage = Some([i; 32]);
+							preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
 						}
 					}
 
@@ -2513,7 +4069,7 @@ mod tests {
 				}
 
 				chan.sign_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_tx, &remote_signature, &preimage, &htlc, &keys).unwrap();
-				assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx).unwrap()[..],
+				assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..],
 						hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..]);
 			};
 		}
@@ -2527,89 +4083,73 @@ mod tests {
 			                 "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");
 		}
 
-		chan.pending_htlcs.push({
-			let mut out = HTLCOutput{
+		chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
+			let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
 				htlc_id: 0,
-				outbound: false,
 				amount_msat: 1000000,
 				cltv_expiry: 500,
-				payment_hash: [0; 32],
-				state: HTLCState::Committed,
-				fail_reason: None,
-				local_removed_fulfilled: false,
-				pending_forward_state: None,
+				payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
+				state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
 			};
 			let mut sha = Sha256::new();
 			sha.input(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
-			sha.result(&mut out.payment_hash);
+			sha.result(&mut out.payment_hash.0[..]);
 			out
 		});
-		chan.pending_htlcs.push({
-			let mut out = HTLCOutput{
+		chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
+			let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
 				htlc_id: 1,
-				outbound: false,
 				amount_msat: 2000000,
 				cltv_expiry: 501,
-				payment_hash: [0; 32],
-				state: HTLCState::Committed,
-				fail_reason: None,
-				local_removed_fulfilled: false,
-				pending_forward_state: None,
+				payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
+				state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
 			};
 			let mut sha = Sha256::new();
 			sha.input(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
-			sha.result(&mut out.payment_hash);
+			sha.result(&mut out.payment_hash.0[..]);
 			out
 		});
-		chan.pending_htlcs.push({
-			let mut out = HTLCOutput{
+		chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
+			let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
 				htlc_id: 2,
-				outbound: true,
 				amount_msat: 2000000,
 				cltv_expiry: 502,
-				payment_hash: [0; 32],
-				state: HTLCState::Committed,
+				payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
+				state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
+				source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
 				fail_reason: None,
-				local_removed_fulfilled: false,
-				pending_forward_state: None,
 			};
 			let mut sha = Sha256::new();
 			sha.input(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap());
-			sha.result(&mut out.payment_hash);
+			sha.result(&mut out.payment_hash.0[..]);
 			out
 		});
-		chan.pending_htlcs.push({
-			let mut out = HTLCOutput{
+		chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
+			let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
 				htlc_id: 3,
-				outbound: true,
 				amount_msat: 3000000,
 				cltv_expiry: 503,
-				payment_hash: [0; 32],
-				state: HTLCState::Committed,
+				payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
+				state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
+				source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
 				fail_reason: None,
-				local_removed_fulfilled: false,
-				pending_forward_state: None,
 			};
 			let mut sha = Sha256::new();
 			sha.input(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap());
-			sha.result(&mut out.payment_hash);
+			sha.result(&mut out.payment_hash.0[..]);
 			out
 		});
-		chan.pending_htlcs.push({
-			let mut out = HTLCOutput{
+		chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
+			let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
 				htlc_id: 4,
-				outbound: false,
 				amount_msat: 4000000,
 				cltv_expiry: 504,
-				payment_hash: [0; 32],
-				state: HTLCState::Committed,
-				fail_reason: None,
-				local_removed_fulfilled: false,
-				pending_forward_state: None,
+				payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
+				state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
 			};
 			let mut sha = Sha256::new();
 			sha.input(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap());
-			sha.result(&mut out.payment_hash);
+			sha.result(&mut out.payment_hash.0[..]);
 			out
 		});
 
@@ -2964,10 +4504,10 @@ mod tests {
 		let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
 		let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
 
-		let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret).unwrap();
+		let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
 		assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
 
-		let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret).unwrap();
+		let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
 		assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
 
 		assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],