X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=src%2Fln%2Fchannel.rs;h=ab8b3bcdf6cb0ca0bd8251ff8f474f939758df68;hb=90b545ffe3e6855e09156361ecb1d5384add1e46;hp=69b4645c0f31517debad5681e7a5198ceeffca48;hpb=da014797b0e9b36a160541cccad454c09200706a;p=rust-lightning

diff --git a/src/ln/channel.rs b/src/ln/channel.rs
index 69b4645c..ab8b3bcd 100644
--- a/src/ln/channel.rs
+++ b/src/ln/channel.rs
@@ -14,19 +14,23 @@ use crypto::digest::Digest;
 use crypto::hkdf::{hkdf_extract,hkdf_expand};
 
 use ln::msgs;
-use ln::msgs::{HandleError, MsgEncodable};
+use ln::msgs::{ErrorAction, HandleError, MsgEncodable};
 use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
-use ln::channelmanager::{PendingForwardHTLCInfo, HTLCFailReason};
+use ln::channelmanager::{PendingHTLCStatus, PendingForwardHTLCInfo, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg};
 use ln::chan_utils::{TxCreationKeys,HTLCOutputInCommitment,HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT,HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT};
 use ln::chan_utils;
 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
 use util::{transaction_utils,rng};
 use util::sha2::Sha256;
+use util::logger::Logger;
+use util::errors::APIError;
 
+use std;
 use std::default::Default;
 use std::{cmp,mem};
 use std::time::Instant;
+use std::sync::{Arc};
 
 pub struct ChannelKeys {
 	pub funding_key: SecretKey,
@@ -85,18 +89,21 @@ impl ChannelKeys {
 #[derive(PartialEq)]
 enum HTLCState {
 	/// Added by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx.
+	/// Implies HTLCOutput::outbound: false
 	RemoteAnnounced,
 	/// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
 	/// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
 	/// accept this HTLC. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 	/// We also have not yet included this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on
 	/// a remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
+	/// Implies HTLCOutput::outbound: false
 	AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
 	/// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
 	/// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
 	/// accept this HTLC. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 	/// We have included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
 	/// revoke_and_ack.
+	/// Implies HTLCOutput::outbound: true
 	AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke,
 	/// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
 	/// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
@@ -108,35 +115,39 @@ enum HTLCState {
 	///    allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
 	///    doesn't matter to us and its up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
 	///    we'll never get out of sync).
+	/// Implies HTLCOutput::outbound: true
 	LocalAnnounced,
 	Committed,
 	/// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
 	/// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
+	/// Implies HTLCOutput::outbound: true
 	RemoteRemoved,
 	/// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
 	/// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
 	/// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 	/// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
 	/// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
+	/// Implies HTLCOutput::outbound: true
 	AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove,
 	/// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
 	/// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
 	/// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 	/// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
 	/// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
+	/// Implies HTLCOutput::outbound: true
 	AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke,
 	/// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
 	/// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
-	/// we'll promote to LocalRemovedAwaitingCommitment if we fulfilled, otherwise we'll drop at
-	/// that point.
+	/// we'll drop it.
 	/// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
 	/// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
 	/// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
-	/// anyway).
+	/// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
+	/// ChannelMonitor::would_broadcast_at_height) so we actually remove the HTLC from our own
+	/// local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
+	/// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info will not include this HTLC.
+	/// Implies HTLCOutput::outbound: false
 	LocalRemoved,
-	/// Removed by us, sent a new commitment_signed and got a revoke_and_ack. Just waiting on an
-	/// updated local commitment transaction.
-	LocalRemovedAwaitingCommitment,
 }
 
 struct HTLCOutput { //TODO: Refactor into Outbound/InboundHTLCOutput (will save memory and fewer panics)
@@ -151,7 +162,7 @@ struct HTLCOutput { //TODO: Refactor into Outbound/InboundHTLCOutput (will save
 	/// If we're in LocalRemoved*, set to true if we fulfilled the HTLC, and can claim money
 	local_removed_fulfilled: bool,
 	/// state pre-committed Remote* implies pending_forward_state, otherwise it must be None
-	pending_forward_state: Option<PendingForwardHTLCInfo>,
+	pending_forward_state: Option<PendingHTLCStatus>,
 }
 
 impl HTLCOutput {
@@ -238,7 +249,7 @@ pub struct Channel {
 	channel_id: [u8; 32],
 	channel_state: u32,
 	channel_outbound: bool,
-	secp_ctx: Secp256k1,
+	secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
 	announce_publicly: bool,
 	channel_value_satoshis: u64,
 
@@ -270,7 +281,7 @@ pub struct Channel {
 	/// to detect unconfirmation after a serialize-unserialize roudtrip where we may not see a full
 	/// series of block_connected/block_disconnected calls. Obviously this is not a guarantee as we
 	/// could miss the funding_tx_confirmed_in block as well, but it serves as a useful fallback.
-	funding_tx_confirmed_in: Sha256dHash,
+	funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<Sha256dHash>,
 	short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
 	/// Used to deduplicate block_connected callbacks
 	last_block_connected: Sha256dHash,
@@ -289,12 +300,12 @@ pub struct Channel {
 	their_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
 	//implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: our_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
 
-	their_funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
-	their_revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
-	their_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
-	their_delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
-	their_htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
-	their_cur_commitment_point: PublicKey,
+	their_funding_pubkey: Option<PublicKey>,
+	their_revocation_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
+	their_payment_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
+	their_delayed_payment_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
+	their_htlc_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
+	their_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
 
 	their_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
 	their_node_id: PublicKey,
@@ -302,10 +313,11 @@ pub struct Channel {
 	their_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
 
 	channel_monitor: ChannelMonitor,
+
+	logger: Arc<Logger>,
 }
 
 const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 5; //TODO
-const CONF_TARGET: u32 = 12; //TODO: Should be much higher
 /// Confirmation count threshold at which we close a channel. Ideally we'd keep the channel around
 /// on ice until the funding transaction gets more confirmations, but the LN protocol doesn't
 /// really allow for this, so instead we're stuck closing it out at that point.
@@ -324,18 +336,17 @@ const B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 104; // prevout: 40, nSequence:
 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS: u64 = (1 << 24);
 
 macro_rules! secp_call {
-	( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
+	( $res: expr, $err: expr, $chan_id: expr ) => {
 		match $res {
 			Ok(key) => key,
-			//TODO: make the error a parameter
-			Err(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: $err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None })})
+			Err(_) => return Err(HandleError {err: $err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {channel_id: $chan_id, data: $err.to_string()}})})
 		}
 	};
 }
 
 macro_rules! secp_derived_key {
-	( $res: expr ) => {
-		secp_call!($res, "Derived invalid key, peer is maliciously selecting parameters")
+	( $res: expr, $chan_id: expr ) => {
+		secp_call!($res, "Derived invalid key, peer is maliciously selecting parameters", $chan_id)
 	}
 }
 impl Channel {
@@ -346,7 +357,8 @@ impl Channel {
 
 	/// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
 	fn get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
-		cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, 1000) //TODO
+		let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
+		cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000)) //TODO
 	}
 
 	fn derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(at_open_background_feerate: u64) -> u64 {
@@ -357,26 +369,45 @@ impl Channel {
 		1000 // TODO
 	}
 
-	// Constructors:
+	fn derive_minimum_depth(_channel_value_satoshis_msat: u64, _value_to_self_msat: u64) -> u32 {
+		// Note that in order to comply with BOLT 7 announcement_signatures requirements this must
+		// be at least 6.
+		const CONF_TARGET: u32 = 12; //TODO: Should be much higher
+		CONF_TARGET
+	}
+
+	fn derive_maximum_minimum_depth(_channel_value_satoshis_msat: u64, _value_to_self_msat: u64) -> u32 {
+		const CONF_TARGET: u32 = 12; //TODO: Should be much higher
+		CONF_TARGET * 2
+	}
 
-	/// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`
-	pub fn new_outbound(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, chan_keys: ChannelKeys, their_node_id: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, announce_publicly: bool, user_id: u64) -> Channel {
+	// Constructors:
+	pub fn new_outbound(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, chan_keys: ChannelKeys, their_node_id: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, announce_publicly: bool, user_id: u64, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Channel, APIError> {
 		if channel_value_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
-			panic!("funding value > 2^24");
+			return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "funding value > 2^24"});
 		}
 
-		let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
+		if push_msat > channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
+			return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "push value > channel value"});
+		}
+
+
 		let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
+		if Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis) < Channel::derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate) {
+			return Err(APIError::FeeRateTooHigh{err: format!("Not enough reserve above dust limit can be found at current fee rate({})", background_feerate), feerate: background_feerate});
+		}
+
+		let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
 
 		let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
-		let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = Hash160::from_data(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan_keys.channel_monitor_claim_key).unwrap().serialize());
+		let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = Hash160::from_data(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan_keys.channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
 		let our_channel_monitor_claim_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script();
 		let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&chan_keys.revocation_base_key,
-		                                          &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan_keys.delayed_payment_base_key).unwrap(),
+		                                          &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan_keys.delayed_payment_base_key),
 		                                          &chan_keys.htlc_base_key,
 		                                          BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, our_channel_monitor_claim_script);
 
-		Channel {
+		Ok(Channel {
 			user_id: user_id,
 
 			channel_id: rng::rand_u832(),
@@ -389,7 +420,7 @@ impl Channel {
 			local_keys: chan_keys,
 			cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: (1 << 48) - 1,
 			cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: (1 << 48) - 1,
-			value_to_self_msat: channel_value_satoshis * 1000, //TODO: give them something on open? Parameterize it?
+			value_to_self_msat: channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat,
 			pending_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 			holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
 			next_local_htlc_id: 0,
@@ -400,7 +431,7 @@ impl Channel {
 
 			last_sent_closing_fee: None,
 
-			funding_tx_confirmed_in: Default::default(),
+			funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
 			short_channel_id: None,
 			last_block_connected: Default::default(),
 			funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
@@ -415,12 +446,12 @@ impl Channel {
 			their_to_self_delay: 0,
 			their_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
 
-			their_funding_pubkey: PublicKey::new(),
-			their_revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::new(),
-			their_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::new(),
-			their_delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::new(),
-			their_htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::new(),
-			their_cur_commitment_point: PublicKey::new(),
+			their_funding_pubkey: None,
+			their_revocation_basepoint: None,
+			their_payment_basepoint: None,
+			their_delayed_payment_basepoint: None,
+			their_htlc_basepoint: None,
+			their_cur_commitment_point: None,
 
 			their_prev_commitment_point: None,
 			their_node_id: their_node_id,
@@ -428,7 +459,9 @@ impl Channel {
 			their_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
 
 			channel_monitor: channel_monitor,
-		}
+
+			logger,
+		})
 	}
 
 	fn check_remote_fee(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
@@ -445,51 +478,88 @@ impl Channel {
 	/// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
 	/// Generally prefers to take the DisconnectPeer action on failure, as a notice to the sender
 	/// that we're rejecting the new channel.
-	pub fn new_from_req(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, chan_keys: ChannelKeys, their_node_id: PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, require_announce: bool, allow_announce: bool) -> Result<Channel, HandleError> {
+	pub fn new_from_req(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, chan_keys: ChannelKeys, their_node_id: PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, require_announce: bool, allow_announce: bool, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Channel, HandleError> {
+		macro_rules! return_error_message {
+			( $msg: expr ) => {
+				return Err(HandleError{err: $msg, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{ msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id, data: $msg.to_string() }})});
+			}
+		}
+
 		// Check sanity of message fields:
 		if msg.funding_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "funding value > 2^24", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None })});
+			return_error_message!("funding value > 2^24");
 		}
 		if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None })});
+			return_error_message!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis");
 		}
 		if msg.push_msat > (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "push_msat more than highest possible value", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None })});
+			return_error_message!("push_msat larger than funding value");
 		}
 		if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer never wants payout outputs?", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None })});
+			return_error_message!("Peer never wants payout outputs?");
+		}
+		if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
+			return_error_message!("Bogus; channel reserve is less than dust limit");
 		}
 		if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Minimum htlc value is full channel value", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None })});
+			return_error_message!("Miminum htlc value is full channel value");
 		}
-		Channel::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
+		Channel::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw).map_err(|e|
+			HandleError{err: e.err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{ msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id, data: e.err.to_string() }})}
+		)?;
+
 		if msg.to_self_delay > MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None })});
+			return_error_message!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period");
 		}
 		if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "0 max_accpted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None })});
+			return_error_message!("0 max_accpted_htlcs makes for a useless channel");
 		}
-		if (msg.channel_flags & 254) != 0 {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "unknown channel_flags", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None })});
+		if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > 483 {
+			return_error_message!("max_accpted_htlcs > 483");
 		}
 
 		// Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
 
 		let their_announce = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
 		if require_announce && !their_announce {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer tried to open unannounced channel, but we require public ones", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) });
+			return_error_message!("Peer tried to open unannounced channel, but we require public ones");
 		}
 		if !allow_announce && their_announce {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer tried to open announced channel, but we require private ones", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) });
+			return_error_message!("Peer tried to open announced channel, but we require private ones");
 		}
 
 		let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
 
+		let our_dust_limit_satoshis = Channel::derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate);
+		let our_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis);
+		if our_channel_reserve_satoshis < our_dust_limit_satoshis {
+			return_error_message!("Suitalbe channel reserve not found. aborting");
+		}
+		if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < our_dust_limit_satoshis {
+			return_error_message!("channel_reserve_satoshis too small");
+		}
+		if our_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
+			return_error_message!("Dust limit too high for our channel reserve");
+		}
+
+		// check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
+		// for full fee payment
+		let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
+		if funders_amount_msat < background_feerate * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT {
+			return_error_message!("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment");
+		}
+
+		let to_local_msat = msg.push_msat;
+		let to_remote_msat = funders_amount_msat - background_feerate * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
+		if to_local_msat <= msg.channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 && to_remote_msat <= our_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
+			return_error_message!("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment");
+		}
+
 		let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
-		let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = Hash160::from_data(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan_keys.channel_monitor_claim_key).unwrap().serialize());
+		let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = Hash160::from_data(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan_keys.channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
 		let our_channel_monitor_claim_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script();
 		let mut channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&chan_keys.revocation_base_key,
-		                                              &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan_keys.delayed_payment_base_key).unwrap(),
+		                                              &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan_keys.delayed_payment_base_key),
 		                                              &chan_keys.htlc_base_key,
 		                                              BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, our_channel_monitor_claim_script);
 		channel_monitor.set_their_htlc_base_key(&msg.htlc_basepoint);
@@ -518,7 +588,7 @@ impl Channel {
 
 			last_sent_closing_fee: None,
 
-			funding_tx_confirmed_in: Default::default(),
+			funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
 			short_channel_id: None,
 			last_block_connected: Default::default(),
 			funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
@@ -526,7 +596,7 @@ impl Channel {
 			feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw as u64,
 			channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
 			their_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
-			our_dust_limit_satoshis: Channel::derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate),
+			our_dust_limit_satoshis: our_dust_limit_satoshis,
 			their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
 			their_channel_reserve_satoshis: msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
 			their_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
@@ -534,12 +604,12 @@ impl Channel {
 			their_to_self_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
 			their_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
 
-			their_funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
-			their_revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
-			their_payment_basepoint: msg.payment_basepoint,
-			their_delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
-			their_htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint,
-			their_cur_commitment_point: msg.first_per_commitment_point,
+			their_funding_pubkey: Some(msg.funding_pubkey),
+			their_revocation_basepoint: Some(msg.revocation_basepoint),
+			their_payment_basepoint: Some(msg.payment_basepoint),
+			their_delayed_payment_basepoint: Some(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
+			their_htlc_basepoint: Some(msg.htlc_basepoint),
+			their_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
 
 			their_prev_commitment_point: None,
 			their_node_id: their_node_id,
@@ -547,6 +617,8 @@ impl Channel {
 			their_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
 
 			channel_monitor: channel_monitor,
+
+			logger,
 		};
 
 		let obscure_factor = chan.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor();
@@ -566,13 +638,13 @@ impl Channel {
 
 	fn get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self) -> u64 {
 		let mut sha = Sha256::new();
-		let our_payment_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key).unwrap();
+		let our_payment_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key);
 
 		if self.channel_outbound {
 			sha.input(&our_payment_basepoint.serialize());
-			sha.input(&self.their_payment_basepoint.serialize());
+			sha.input(&self.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap().serialize());
 		} else {
-			sha.input(&self.their_payment_basepoint.serialize());
+			sha.input(&self.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap().serialize());
 			sha.input(&our_payment_basepoint.serialize());
 		}
 		let mut res = [0; 32];
@@ -606,8 +678,7 @@ impl Channel {
 		let txins = {
 			let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
 			ins.push(TxIn {
-				prev_hash: self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().txid,
-				prev_index: self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().index as u32,
+				previous_output: self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
 				script_sig: Script::new(),
 				sequence: ((0x80 as u32) << 8*3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number >> 3*8) as u32),
 				witness: Vec::new(),
@@ -633,7 +704,6 @@ impl Channel {
 				HTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove => generated_by_local,
 				HTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke => false,
 				HTLCState::LocalRemoved => !generated_by_local,
-				HTLCState::LocalRemovedAwaitingCommitment => false,
 			};
 
 			if include {
@@ -662,7 +732,7 @@ impl Channel {
 			} else {
 				match htlc.state {
 					HTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove|HTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke => {
-						if generated_by_local && htlc.fail_reason.is_none() {
+						if htlc.fail_reason.is_none() {
 							value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
 						}
 					},
@@ -676,9 +746,6 @@ impl Channel {
 							value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
 						}
 					},
-					HTLCState::LocalRemovedAwaitingCommitment => {
-						value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
-					},
 					_ => {},
 				}
 			}
@@ -731,7 +798,7 @@ impl Channel {
 
 	#[inline]
 	fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
-		let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::from_data(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.channel_close_key).unwrap().serialize());
+		let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::from_data(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.channel_close_key).serialize());
 		Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script()
 	}
 
@@ -745,8 +812,7 @@ impl Channel {
 		let txins = {
 			let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
 			ins.push(TxIn {
-				prev_hash: self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().txid,
-				prev_index: self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().index as u32,
+				previous_output: self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
 				script_sig: Script::new(),
 				sequence: 0xffffffff,
 				witness: Vec::new(),
@@ -805,11 +871,11 @@ impl Channel {
 	/// The result is a transaction which we can revoke ownership of (ie a "local" transaction)
 	/// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
 	fn build_local_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, HandleError> {
-		let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(commitment_number)).unwrap();
-		let delayed_payment_base = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key).unwrap();
-		let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key).unwrap();
+		let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(commitment_number));
+		let delayed_payment_base = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key);
+		let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key);
 
-		Ok(secp_derived_key!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &delayed_payment_base, &htlc_basepoint, &self.their_revocation_basepoint, &self.their_payment_basepoint, &self.their_htlc_basepoint)))
+		Ok(secp_derived_key!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &delayed_payment_base, &htlc_basepoint, &self.their_revocation_basepoint.unwrap(), &self.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap(), &self.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap()), self.channel_id()))
 	}
 
 	#[inline]
@@ -818,19 +884,19 @@ impl Channel {
 	fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, HandleError> {
 		//TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
 		//may see payments to it!
-		let payment_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key).unwrap();
-		let revocation_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.revocation_base_key).unwrap();
-		let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key).unwrap();
+		let payment_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key);
+		let revocation_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.revocation_base_key);
+		let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key);
 
-		Ok(secp_derived_key!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.their_cur_commitment_point, &self.their_delayed_payment_basepoint, &self.their_htlc_basepoint, &revocation_basepoint, &payment_basepoint, &htlc_basepoint)))
+		Ok(secp_derived_key!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &self.their_delayed_payment_basepoint.unwrap(), &self.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap(), &revocation_basepoint, &payment_basepoint, &htlc_basepoint), self.channel_id()))
 	}
 
 	/// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
 	/// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
 	pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
 		let builder = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHNUM_2);
-		let our_funding_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key).unwrap().serialize();
-		let their_funding_key = self.their_funding_pubkey.serialize();
+		let our_funding_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key).serialize();
+		let their_funding_key = self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap().serialize();
 		if our_funding_key[..] < their_funding_key[..] {
 			builder.push_slice(&our_funding_key)
 				.push_slice(&their_funding_key)
@@ -851,12 +917,12 @@ impl Channel {
 		let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
 
 		let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&tx).sighash_all(&tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
-		let our_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key).unwrap();
+		let our_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
 
 		tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
 
-		let our_funding_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key).unwrap().serialize();
-		let their_funding_key = self.their_funding_pubkey.serialize();
+		let our_funding_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key).serialize();
+		let their_funding_key = self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap().serialize();
 		if our_funding_key[..] < their_funding_key[..] {
 			tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
 			tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
@@ -867,7 +933,7 @@ impl Channel {
 		tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 		tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 
-		tx.input[0].witness.push(funding_redeemscript.into_vec());
+		tx.input[0].witness.push(funding_redeemscript.into_bytes());
 
 		our_sig
 	}
@@ -886,10 +952,10 @@ impl Channel {
 
 		let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
 
-		let our_htlc_key = secp_derived_key!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &keys.per_commitment_point, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key));
+		let our_htlc_key = secp_derived_key!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &keys.per_commitment_point, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key), self.channel_id());
 		let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&tx).sighash_all(&tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]).unwrap();
-		let is_local_tx = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &our_htlc_key).unwrap() == keys.a_htlc_key;
-		Ok((htlc_redeemscript, self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &our_htlc_key).unwrap(), is_local_tx))
+		let is_local_tx = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &our_htlc_key) == keys.a_htlc_key;
+		Ok((htlc_redeemscript, self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &our_htlc_key), is_local_tx))
 	}
 
 	/// Signs a transaction created by build_htlc_transaction. If the transaction is an
@@ -922,12 +988,12 @@ impl Channel {
 			tx.input[0].witness.push(preimage.unwrap().to_vec());
 		}
 
-		tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_redeemscript.into_vec());
+		tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_redeemscript.into_bytes());
 
 		Ok(our_sig)
 	}
 
-	pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, payment_preimage_arg: [u8; 32]) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, ChannelMonitor)>, HandleError> {
+	fn get_update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, payment_preimage_arg: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>, Option<ChannelMonitor>), HandleError> {
 		// Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it wont bet unset) or there is no way any
 		// caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
 		// incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
@@ -942,13 +1008,35 @@ impl Channel {
 		let mut payment_hash_calc = [0; 32];
 		sha.result(&mut payment_hash_calc);
 
+		let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
+		for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
+			if !htlc.outbound && htlc.payment_hash == payment_hash_calc &&
+					htlc.state != HTLCState::LocalRemoved {
+				if let Some(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(_)) = htlc.pending_forward_state {
+				} else {
+					if pending_idx != std::usize::MAX {
+						panic!("Duplicate HTLC payment_hash, ChannelManager should have prevented this!");
+					}
+					pending_idx = idx;
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
+			return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given payment preimage", action: None});
+		}
+
 		// Now update local state:
+		//
+		// We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
+		// can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
+		self.channel_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash_calc, &payment_preimage_arg);
+
 		if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
 			for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
 				match pending_update {
 					&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, .. } => {
 						if payment_preimage_arg == *payment_preimage {
-							return Ok(None);
+							return Ok((None, None));
 						}
 					},
 					&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
@@ -962,49 +1050,44 @@ impl Channel {
 			self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
 				payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, payment_hash: payment_hash_calc,
 			});
-			return Ok(None);
-		}
-
-		let mut htlc_id = 0;
-		let mut htlc_amount_msat = 0;
-		for htlc in self.pending_htlcs.iter_mut() {
-			if !htlc.outbound && htlc.payment_hash == payment_hash_calc {
-				if htlc_id != 0 {
-					panic!("Duplicate HTLC payment_hash, you probably re-used payment preimages, NEVER DO THIS!");
-				}
-				htlc_id = htlc.htlc_id;
-				htlc_amount_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
-				if htlc.state == HTLCState::Committed {
-					htlc.state = HTLCState::LocalRemoved;
-					htlc.local_removed_fulfilled = true;
-				} else if htlc.state == HTLCState::RemoteAnnounced {
-					panic!("Somehow forwarded HTLC prior to remote revocation!");
-				} else if htlc.state == HTLCState::LocalRemoved || htlc.state == HTLCState::LocalRemovedAwaitingCommitment {
-					return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given payment preimage", action: None});
-				} else {
-					panic!("Have an inbound HTLC when not awaiting remote revoke that had a garbage state");
-				}
+			return Ok((None, Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())));
+		}
+
+		let htlc_id = {
+			let htlc = &mut self.pending_htlcs[pending_idx];
+			if htlc.state == HTLCState::Committed {
+				htlc.state = HTLCState::LocalRemoved;
+				htlc.local_removed_fulfilled = true;
+			} else if htlc.state == HTLCState::RemoteAnnounced || htlc.state == HTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce || htlc.state == HTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {
+				// Theoretically we can hit this if we get the preimage on an HTLC prior to us
+				// having forwarded it to anyone. This implies that the sender is busted as someone
+				// else knows the preimage, but handling this case and implementing the logic to
+				// take their money would be a lot of (never-tested) code to handle a case that
+				// hopefully never happens. Instead, we make sure we get the preimage into the
+				// channel_monitor and pretend we didn't just see the preimage.
+				return Ok((None, Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())));
+			} else {
+				// LocalRemoved/LocalRemovedAwaitingCOmmitment handled in the search loop
+				panic!("Have an inbound HTLC when not awaiting remote revoke that had a garbage state");
 			}
-		}
-		if htlc_amount_msat == 0 {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given payment preimage", action: None});
-		}
-		self.channel_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash_calc, &payment_preimage_arg);
+			htlc.htlc_id
+		};
 
-		Ok(Some((msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
+		Ok((Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
 			channel_id: self.channel_id(),
 			htlc_id: htlc_id,
 			payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
-		}, self.channel_monitor.clone())))
+		}), Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())))
 	}
 
-	pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor)>, HandleError> {
+	pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>, Option<ChannelMonitor>), HandleError> {
 		match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(payment_preimage)? {
-			Some(update_fulfill_htlc) => {
+			(Some(update_fulfill_htlc), _) => {
 				let (commitment, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
-				Ok(Some((update_fulfill_htlc.0, commitment, monitor_update)))
+				Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
 			},
-			None => Ok(None)
+			(None, Some(channel_monitor)) => Ok((None, Some(channel_monitor))),
+			(None, None) => Ok((None, None))
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -1042,20 +1125,27 @@ impl Channel {
 		let mut htlc_amount_msat = 0;
 		for htlc in self.pending_htlcs.iter_mut() {
 			if !htlc.outbound && htlc.payment_hash == *payment_hash_arg {
-				if htlc_id != 0 {
-					panic!("Duplicate HTLC payment_hash, you probably re-used payment preimages, NEVER DO THIS!");
-				}
-				htlc_id = htlc.htlc_id;
-				htlc_amount_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
 				if htlc.state == HTLCState::Committed {
 					htlc.state = HTLCState::LocalRemoved;
 				} else if htlc.state == HTLCState::RemoteAnnounced {
-					panic!("Somehow forwarded HTLC prior to remote revocation!");
-				} else if htlc.state == HTLCState::LocalRemoved || htlc.state == HTLCState::LocalRemovedAwaitingCommitment {
+					if let Some(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_)) = htlc.pending_forward_state {
+						panic!("Somehow forwarded HTLC prior to remote revocation!");
+					} else {
+						// We have to pretend this isn't here - we're probably a duplicate with the
+						// same payment_hash as some other HTLC, and the other is getting failed,
+						// we'll fail this one as soon as remote commits to it.
+						continue;
+					}
+				} else if htlc.state == HTLCState::LocalRemoved {
 					return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given payment preimage", action: None});
 				} else {
 					panic!("Have an inbound HTLC when not awaiting remote revoke that had a garbage state");
 				}
+				if htlc_id != 0 {
+					panic!("Duplicate HTLC payment_hash, you probably re-used payment preimages, NEVER DO THIS!");
+				}
+				htlc_id = htlc.htlc_id;
+				htlc_amount_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
 			}
 		}
 		if htlc_amount_msat == 0 {
@@ -1082,29 +1172,57 @@ impl Channel {
 	// Message handlers:
 
 	pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+		macro_rules! return_error_message {
+			( $msg: expr ) => {
+				return Err(HandleError{err: $msg, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{ msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id, data: $msg.to_string() }})});
+			}
+		}
 		// Check sanity of message fields:
 		if !self.channel_outbound {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer", action: None});
+			return_error_message!("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer");
 		}
 		if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Got an accept_channel message at a strange time", action: None});
+			return_error_message!("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time");
 		}
 		if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer never wants payout outputs?", action: None});
+			return_error_message!("Peer never wants payout outputs?");
 		}
 		if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", action: None});
+			return_error_message!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis");
+		}
+		if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
+			return_error_message!("Bogus channel_reserve and dust_limit");
+		}
+		if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < self.our_dust_limit_satoshis {
+			return_error_message!("Peer never wants payout outputs?");
+		}
+		if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) {
+			return_error_message!("Dust limit is bigger than our channel reverse");
 		}
 		if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Minimum htlc value is full channel value", action: None});
+			return_error_message!("Minimum htlc value is full channel value");
+		}
+		if msg.minimum_depth > Channel::derive_maximum_minimum_depth(self.channel_value_satoshis*1000,  self.value_to_self_msat) {
+			return_error_message!("minimum_depth too large");
 		}
-		//TODO do something with minimum_depth
 		if msg.to_self_delay > MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", action: None});
+			return_error_message!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period");
 		}
 		if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "0 max_accpted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", action: None});
+			return_error_message!("0 max_accpted_htlcs makes for a useless channel");
 		}
+		if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > 483 {
+			return_error_message!("max_accpted_htlcs > 483");
+		}
+
+		// TODO: Optional additional constraints mentioned in the spec
+		// MAY fail the channel if
+		// funding_satoshi is too small
+		// htlc_minimum_msat too large
+		// max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat too small
+		// channel_reserve_satoshis too large
+		// max_accepted_htlcs too small
+		// dust_limit_satoshis too small
 
 		self.channel_monitor.set_their_htlc_base_key(&msg.htlc_basepoint);
 
@@ -1114,12 +1232,12 @@ impl Channel {
 		self.their_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
 		self.their_to_self_delay = msg.to_self_delay;
 		self.their_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
-		self.their_funding_pubkey = msg.funding_pubkey;
-		self.their_revocation_basepoint = msg.revocation_basepoint;
-		self.their_payment_basepoint = msg.payment_basepoint;
-		self.their_delayed_payment_basepoint = msg.delayed_payment_basepoint;
-		self.their_htlc_basepoint = msg.htlc_basepoint;
-		self.their_cur_commitment_point = msg.first_per_commitment_point;
+		self.their_funding_pubkey = Some(msg.funding_pubkey);
+		self.their_revocation_basepoint = Some(msg.revocation_basepoint);
+		self.their_payment_basepoint = Some(msg.payment_basepoint);
+		self.their_delayed_payment_basepoint = Some(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint);
+		self.their_htlc_basepoint = Some(msg.htlc_basepoint);
+		self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
 
 		let obscure_factor = self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor();
 		self.channel_monitor.set_commitment_obscure_factor(obscure_factor);
@@ -1142,18 +1260,21 @@ impl Channel {
 		let local_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&local_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
 
 		// They sign the "local" commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
-		secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &sig, &self.their_funding_pubkey), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer");
+		secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &sig, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer", self.channel_id());
 
 		// We sign the "remote" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
-		Ok((remote_initial_commitment_tx, self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key).unwrap()))
+		Ok((remote_initial_commitment_tx, self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key)))
 	}
 
 	pub fn funding_created(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor), HandleError> {
 		if self.channel_outbound {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Received funding_created for an outbound channel?", action: None});
+			return Err(HandleError{err: "Received funding_created for an outbound channel?", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {channel_id: self.channel_id, data: "Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_string()}})});
 		}
 		if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Received funding_created after we got the channel!", action: None});
+			// BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
+			// remember the channel, so its safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
+			// channel.
+			return Err(HandleError{err: "Received funding_created after we got the channel!", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {channel_id: self.channel_id, data: "Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_string()}})});
 		}
 		if self.channel_monitor.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) || self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != (1 << 48) - 1 || self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != (1 << 48) - 1 {
 			panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
@@ -1205,7 +1326,7 @@ impl Channel {
 		let local_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&local_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
 
 		// They sign the "local" commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
-		secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey), "Invalid funding_signed signature from peer");
+		secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid funding_signed signature from peer", self.channel_id());
 
 		self.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut local_initial_commitment_tx, &msg.signature);
 		self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(local_initial_commitment_tx.clone(), local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, Vec::new());
@@ -1227,8 +1348,8 @@ impl Channel {
 			return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer sent a funding_locked at a strange time", action: None});
 		}
 
-		self.their_prev_commitment_point = Some(self.their_cur_commitment_point);
-		self.their_cur_commitment_point = msg.next_per_commitment_point;
+		self.their_prev_commitment_point = self.their_cur_commitment_point;
+		self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
 		Ok(())
 	}
 
@@ -1254,7 +1375,6 @@ impl Channel {
 				HTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove => { if for_remote_update_check { continue; } },
 				HTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke => { if for_remote_update_check { continue; } },
 				HTLCState::LocalRemoved => {},
-				HTLCState::LocalRemovedAwaitingCommitment => { if for_remote_update_check { continue; } },
 			}
 			if !htlc.outbound {
 				inbound_htlc_count += 1;
@@ -1267,7 +1387,7 @@ impl Channel {
 		(inbound_htlc_count, outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
 	}
 
-	pub fn update_add_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, pending_forward_state: PendingForwardHTLCInfo) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+	pub fn update_add_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, pending_forward_state: PendingHTLCStatus) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
 		if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
 			return Err(HandleError{err: "Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state", action: None});
 		}
@@ -1347,7 +1467,7 @@ impl Channel {
 		Err(HandleError{err: "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find", action: None})
 	}
 
-	pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<ChannelMonitor, HandleError> {
+	pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
 		if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
 			return Err(HandleError{err: "Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state", action: None});
 		}
@@ -1357,9 +1477,8 @@ impl Channel {
 		let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
 		sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
 
-		self.channel_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &msg.payment_preimage);
 		self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(payment_hash), None)?;
-		Ok(self.channel_monitor.clone())
+		Ok(())
 	}
 
 	pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<[u8; 32], HandleError> {
@@ -1390,7 +1509,7 @@ impl Channel {
 		let mut local_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false);
 		let local_commitment_txid = local_commitment_tx.0.txid();
 		let local_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_commitment_tx.0).sighash_all(&local_commitment_tx.0.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
-		secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey), "Invalid commitment tx signature from peer");
+		secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid commitment tx signature from peer", self.channel_id());
 
 		if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != local_commitment_tx.1.len() {
 			return Err(HandleError{err: "Got wrong number of HTLC signatures from remote", action: None});
@@ -1405,7 +1524,7 @@ impl Channel {
 			let mut htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&local_commitment_txid, htlc, true, &local_keys);
 			let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &local_keys);
 			let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]).unwrap();
-			secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &local_keys.b_htlc_key), "Invalid HTLC tx siganture from peer");
+			secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &local_keys.b_htlc_key), "Invalid HTLC tx siganture from peer", self.channel_id());
 			let htlc_sig = if htlc.offered {
 				let htlc_sig = self.sign_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_tx, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &None, htlc, &local_keys)?;
 				new_local_commitment_txn.push(htlc_tx);
@@ -1416,7 +1535,7 @@ impl Channel {
 			htlcs_and_sigs.push(((*htlc).clone(), msg.htlc_signatures[idx], htlc_sig));
 		}
 
-		let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number - 1)).unwrap();
+		let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number - 1));
 		let per_commitment_secret = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed, self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
 
 		// Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
@@ -1432,16 +1551,6 @@ impl Channel {
 				need_our_commitment = true;
 			}
 		}
-		// Finally delete all the LocalRemovedAwaitingCommitment HTLCs
-		// We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
-		let mut claimed_value_msat = 0;
-		self.pending_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
-			if htlc.state == HTLCState::LocalRemovedAwaitingCommitment {
-				claimed_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
-				false
-			} else { true }
-		});
-		self.value_to_self_msat += claimed_value_msat;
 
 		self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
 		self.last_local_commitment_txn = new_local_commitment_txn;
@@ -1491,7 +1600,7 @@ impl Channel {
 						},
 						&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { payment_preimage, .. } => {
 							match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(payment_preimage) {
-								Ok(update_fulfill_msg_option) => update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap().0),
+								Ok(update_fulfill_msg_option) => update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.0.unwrap()),
 								Err(e) => {
 									err = Some(e);
 								}
@@ -1520,6 +1629,7 @@ impl Channel {
 						update_add_htlcs,
 						update_fulfill_htlcs,
 						update_fail_htlcs,
+						update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 						commitment_signed,
 					}, monitor_update)))
 				},
@@ -1540,7 +1650,7 @@ impl Channel {
 			return Err(HandleError{err: "Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state", action: None});
 		}
 		if let Some(their_prev_commitment_point) = self.their_prev_commitment_point {
-			if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secp_call!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret")).unwrap() != their_prev_commitment_point {
+			if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secp_call!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret", self.channel_id())) != their_prev_commitment_point {
 				return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey", action: None});
 			}
 		}
@@ -1551,18 +1661,23 @@ impl Channel {
 		// OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
 		// channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
 		self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
-		self.their_prev_commitment_point = Some(self.their_cur_commitment_point);
-		self.their_cur_commitment_point = msg.next_per_commitment_point;
+		self.their_prev_commitment_point = self.their_cur_commitment_point;
+		self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
 		self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
 
 		let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
 		let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
+		let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
+		let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
 		let mut require_commitment = false;
 		let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
 		// We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
 		self.pending_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
 			if htlc.state == HTLCState::LocalRemoved {
-				if htlc.local_removed_fulfilled { true } else { false }
+				if htlc.local_removed_fulfilled {
+					value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
+				}
+				false
 			} else if htlc.state == HTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {
 				if let Some(reason) = htlc.fail_reason.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
 					revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.payment_hash, reason));
@@ -1580,20 +1695,37 @@ impl Channel {
 				htlc.state = HTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke;
 				require_commitment = true;
 			} else if htlc.state == HTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {
-				htlc.state = HTLCState::Committed;
-				to_forward_infos.push(htlc.pending_forward_state.take().unwrap());
+				match htlc.pending_forward_state.take().unwrap() {
+					PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
+						htlc.state = HTLCState::LocalRemoved;
+						require_commitment = true;
+						match fail_msg {
+							HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => update_fail_htlcs.push(msg),
+							HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg),
+						}
+					},
+					PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
+						to_forward_infos.push(forward_info);
+						htlc.state = HTLCState::Committed;
+					}
+				}
 			} else if htlc.state == HTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {
 				htlc.state = HTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke;
 				require_commitment = true;
-			} else if htlc.state == HTLCState::LocalRemoved {
-				assert!(htlc.local_removed_fulfilled);
-				htlc.state = HTLCState::LocalRemovedAwaitingCommitment;
 			}
 		}
 		self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
 
 		match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs()? {
-			Some(commitment_update) => {
+			Some(mut commitment_update) => {
+				commitment_update.0.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
+				for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
+					commitment_update.0.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
+				}
+				commitment_update.0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
+				for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
+					commitment_update.0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
+				}
 				Ok((Some(commitment_update.0), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, commitment_update.1))
 			},
 			None => {
@@ -1602,7 +1734,8 @@ impl Channel {
 					Ok((Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
 						update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 						update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
-						update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+						update_fail_htlcs,
+						update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
 						commitment_signed
 					}), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, monitor_update))
 				} else {
@@ -1667,7 +1800,7 @@ impl Channel {
 			let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
 			let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
 
-			(Some(proposed_feerate), Some(total_fee_satoshis), Some(self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key).unwrap()))
+			(Some(proposed_feerate), Some(total_fee_satoshis), Some(self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key)))
 		} else { (None, None, None) };
 
 		// From here on out, we may not fail!
@@ -1737,14 +1870,14 @@ impl Channel {
 		}
 		let mut sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
 
-		match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey) {
+		match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()) {
 			Ok(_) => {},
-			Err(_) => {
+			Err(_e) => {
 				// The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
 				// limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
 				closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
 				sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
-				secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer");
+				secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer", self.channel_id());
 			},
 		};
 
@@ -1762,7 +1895,7 @@ impl Channel {
 				let closing_tx_max_weight = Self::get_closing_transaction_weight(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(), self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap());
 				let (closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction($new_feerate * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000, false);
 				sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
-				let our_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key).unwrap();
+				let our_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
 				self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some(($new_feerate, used_total_fee));
 				return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
 					channel_id: self.channel_id,
@@ -1818,6 +1951,7 @@ impl Channel {
 		self.user_id
 	}
 
+	/// May only be called after funding has been initiated (ie is_funding_initiated() is true)
 	pub fn channel_monitor(&self) -> ChannelMonitor {
 		if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
 			panic!("Can't get a channel monitor until funding has been created");
@@ -1827,6 +1961,7 @@ impl Channel {
 
 	/// Guaranteed to be Some after both FundingLocked messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
 	/// is_usable() returns true).
+	/// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
 	pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
 		self.short_channel_id
 	}
@@ -1837,10 +1972,12 @@ impl Channel {
 		self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo()
 	}
 
+	/// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
 	pub fn get_their_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
 		self.their_node_id
 	}
 
+	/// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
 	pub fn get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
 		self.our_htlc_minimum_msat
 	}
@@ -1849,6 +1986,13 @@ impl Channel {
 		self.channel_value_satoshis
 	}
 
+	//TODO: Testing purpose only, should be changed in another way after #81
+	#[cfg(test)]
+	pub fn get_local_keys(&self) -> &ChannelKeys {
+		&self.local_keys
+	}
+
+	/// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
 	pub fn get_channel_update_count(&self) -> u32 {
 		self.channel_update_count
 	}
@@ -1858,6 +2002,7 @@ impl Channel {
 	}
 
 	/// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
+	/// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
 	pub fn get_our_fee_base_msat(&self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> u32 {
 		// For lack of a better metric, we calculate what it would cost to consolidate the new HTLC
 		// output value back into a transaction with the regular channel output:
@@ -1877,6 +2022,7 @@ impl Channel {
 	}
 
 	/// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
+	/// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
 	pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
 		let mask = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
 		(self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)
@@ -1884,10 +2030,16 @@ impl Channel {
 
 	/// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
 	/// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
+	/// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
 	pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
 		self.is_usable()
 	}
 
+	/// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
+	pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
+		self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32
+	}
+
 	/// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
 	/// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
 	/// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
@@ -1901,34 +2053,48 @@ impl Channel {
 	/// Called by channelmanager based on chain blocks being connected.
 	/// Note that we only need to use this to detect funding_signed, anything else is handled by
 	/// the channel_monitor.
-	pub fn block_connected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) -> Option<msgs::FundingLocked> {
+	/// In case of Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard requirements
+	/// apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed post-shutdown.
+	/// Only returns an ErrorAction of DisconnectPeer, if Err.
+	pub fn block_connected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, HandleError> {
 		let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK);
 		if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
 			if header.bitcoin_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
 				self.last_block_connected = header.bitcoin_hash();
 				self.funding_tx_confirmations += 1;
-				if self.funding_tx_confirmations == CONF_TARGET as u64 {
-					if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
+				if self.funding_tx_confirmations == Channel::derive_minimum_depth(self.channel_value_satoshis*1000, self.value_to_self_msat) as u64 {
+					let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
 						self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
+						true
 					} else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
 						self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK);
 						self.channel_update_count += 1;
-						//TODO: Something about a state where we "lost confirmation"
+						true
+					} else if self.channel_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
+						// We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
+						// funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
+						false
 					} else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
-						panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?");
-					}
-					self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = header.bitcoin_hash();
+						panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
+					} else {
+						// We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
+						// funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
+						false
+					};
+					self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(header.bitcoin_hash());
 
 					//TODO: Note that this must be a duplicate of the previous commitment point they sent us,
 					//as otherwise we will have a commitment transaction that they can't revoke (well, kinda,
 					//they can by sending two revoke_and_acks back-to-back, but not really). This appears to be
 					//a protocol oversight, but I assume I'm just missing something.
-					let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
-					let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret).unwrap();
-					return Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
-						channel_id: self.channel_id,
-						next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
-					});
+					if need_commitment_update {
+						let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
+						let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
+						return Ok(Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
+							channel_id: self.channel_id,
+							next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
+						}));
+					}
 				}
 			}
 		}
@@ -1937,9 +2103,19 @@ impl Channel {
 				if tx.txid() == self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().txid {
 					let txo_idx = self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().index as usize;
 					if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
-						tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
+							tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
+						if self.channel_outbound {
+							// If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
+							// should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
+							// tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
+							// probability in fuzztarget mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
+							// channel and move on.
+							#[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+							panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
+						}
 						self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
 						self.channel_update_count += 1;
+						return Err(HandleError{err: "funding tx had wrong script/value", action: Some(ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{msg: None})});
 					} else {
 						self.funding_tx_confirmations = 1;
 						self.short_channel_id = Some(((height as u64)          << (5*8)) |
@@ -1949,7 +2125,7 @@ impl Channel {
 				}
 			}
 		}
-		None
+		Ok(None)
 	}
 
 	/// Called by channelmanager based on chain blocks being disconnected.
@@ -1962,8 +2138,8 @@ impl Channel {
 				return true;
 			}
 		}
-		if header.bitcoin_hash() == self.funding_tx_confirmed_in {
-			self.funding_tx_confirmations = CONF_TARGET as u64 - 1;
+		if Some(header.bitcoin_hash()) == self.funding_tx_confirmed_in {
+			self.funding_tx_confirmations = Channel::derive_minimum_depth(self.channel_value_satoshis*1000, self.value_to_self_msat) as u64 - 1;
 		}
 		false
 	}
@@ -1971,12 +2147,12 @@ impl Channel {
 	// Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
 	// something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
 
-	pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: Sha256dHash, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, HandleError> {
+	pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: Sha256dHash, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, APIError> {
 		if !self.channel_outbound {
 			panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
 		}
 		if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward", action: None});
+			panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
 		}
 
 		if self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != (1 << 48) - 1 {
@@ -1989,7 +2165,7 @@ impl Channel {
 			chain_hash: chain_hash,
 			temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
 			funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
-			push_msat: 0, //TODO: Something about feerate?
+			push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
 			dust_limit_satoshis: self.our_dust_limit_satoshis,
 			max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
 			channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
@@ -1997,18 +2173,18 @@ impl Channel {
 			feerate_per_kw: fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background) as u32,
 			to_self_delay: BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT,
 			max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
-			funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key).unwrap(),
-			revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.revocation_base_key).unwrap(),
-			payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key).unwrap(),
-			delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key).unwrap(),
-			htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key).unwrap(),
-			first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_commitment_secret).unwrap(),
+			funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key),
+			revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.revocation_base_key),
+			payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key),
+			delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key),
+			htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key),
+			first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_commitment_secret),
 			channel_flags: if self.announce_publicly {1} else {0},
 			shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
 		})
 	}
 
-	pub fn get_accept_channel(&self) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, HandleError> {
+	pub fn get_accept_channel(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
 		if self.channel_outbound {
 			panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
 		}
@@ -2021,23 +2197,23 @@ impl Channel {
 
 		let local_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
 
-		Ok(msgs::AcceptChannel {
+		msgs::AcceptChannel {
 			temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
 			dust_limit_satoshis: self.our_dust_limit_satoshis,
 			max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
 			channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
 			htlc_minimum_msat: self.our_htlc_minimum_msat,
-			minimum_depth: CONF_TARGET,
+			minimum_depth: Channel::derive_minimum_depth(self.channel_value_satoshis*1000, self.value_to_self_msat),
 			to_self_delay: BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT,
 			max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
-			funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key).unwrap(),
-			revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.revocation_base_key).unwrap(),
-			payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key).unwrap(),
-			delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key).unwrap(),
-			htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key).unwrap(),
-			first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_commitment_secret).unwrap(),
+			funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key),
+			revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.revocation_base_key),
+			payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key),
+			delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key),
+			htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key),
+			first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_commitment_secret),
 			shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
-		})
+		}
 	}
 
 	fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature(&mut self) -> Result<(Signature, Transaction), HandleError> {
@@ -2048,7 +2224,7 @@ impl Channel {
 		let remote_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&remote_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&remote_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
 
 		// We sign the "remote" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
-		Ok((self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key).unwrap(), remote_initial_commitment_tx))
+		Ok((self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key), remote_initial_commitment_tx))
 	}
 
 	/// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
@@ -2074,6 +2250,7 @@ impl Channel {
 		let (our_signature, commitment_tx) = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature() {
 			Ok(res) => res,
 			Err(e) => {
+				log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
 				self.channel_monitor.unset_funding_info();
 				return Err(e);
 			}
@@ -2097,21 +2274,25 @@ impl Channel {
 
 	/// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, as well as a signature covering it using our
 	/// bitcoin_key, if available, for this channel. The channel must be publicly announceable and
-	/// available for use (have exchanged FundingLocked messages in both directions. Should be used
+	/// available for use (have exchanged FundingLocked messages in both directions). Should be used
 	/// for both loose and in response to an AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
-	/// Note that you can get an announcement for a channel which is closing, though you should
-	/// likely not announce such a thing. In case its already been announced, a channel_update
-	/// message can mark the channel disabled.
+	/// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
+	/// closing).
+	/// Note that the "channel must be funded" requirement is stricter than BOLT 7 requires - see
+	/// https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/468
 	pub fn get_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: Sha256dHash) -> Result<(msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, Signature), HandleError> {
 		if !self.announce_publicly {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel is not available for public announcements", action: None});
+			return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel is not available for public announcements", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)});
 		}
-		if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
-			return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement until the channel funding has been locked", action: None});
+		if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) == 0 {
+			return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement until the channel funding has been locked", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)});
+		}
+		if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32)) != 0 {
+			return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement once the channel is closing", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)});
 		}
 
 		let were_node_one = our_node_id.serialize()[..] < self.their_node_id.serialize()[..];
-		let our_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key).unwrap();
+		let our_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
 
 		let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
 			features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
@@ -2119,12 +2300,13 @@ impl Channel {
 			short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
 			node_id_1: if were_node_one { our_node_id } else { self.get_their_node_id() },
 			node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_their_node_id() } else { our_node_id },
-			bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_key } else { self.their_funding_pubkey },
-			bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.their_funding_pubkey } else { our_bitcoin_key },
+			bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_key } else { self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap() },
+			bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap() } else { our_bitcoin_key },
+			excess_data: Vec::new(),
 		};
 
 		let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
-		let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.local_keys.funding_key).unwrap();
+		let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
 
 		Ok((msg, sig))
 	}
@@ -2137,6 +2319,7 @@ impl Channel {
 	/// This returns an option instead of a pure UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we are
 	/// waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack during which time we cannot add new
 	/// HTLCs on the wire or we wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed.
+	/// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
 	pub fn send_htlc(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: [u8; 32], cltv_expiry: u32, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, HandleError> {
 		if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
 			return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down", action: None});
@@ -2204,6 +2387,8 @@ impl Channel {
 	}
 
 	/// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
+	/// Always returns a Channel-failing HandleError::action if an immediately-preceding (read: the
+	/// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
 	pub fn send_commitment(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor), HandleError> {
 		if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
 			return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established", action: None});
@@ -2242,7 +2427,7 @@ impl Channel {
 		let remote_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, true);
 		let remote_commitment_txid = remote_commitment_tx.0.txid();
 		let remote_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&remote_commitment_tx.0).sighash_all(&remote_commitment_tx.0.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
-		let our_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key).unwrap();
+		let our_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
 
 		let mut htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
 
@@ -2250,8 +2435,8 @@ impl Channel {
 			let htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&remote_commitment_txid, htlc, false, &remote_keys);
 			let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &remote_keys);
 			let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]).unwrap();
-			let our_htlc_key = secp_derived_key!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &remote_keys.per_commitment_point, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key));
-			htlc_sigs.push(self.secp_ctx.sign(&htlc_sighash, &our_htlc_key).unwrap());
+			let our_htlc_key = secp_derived_key!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &remote_keys.per_commitment_point, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key), self.channel_id());
+			htlc_sigs.push(self.secp_ctx.sign(&htlc_sighash, &our_htlc_key));
 		}
 
 		// Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
@@ -2323,34 +2508,62 @@ impl Channel {
 	}
 
 	/// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependant transactions for relay (forcing
-	/// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards.
-	pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self) -> Vec<Transaction> {
+	/// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
+	/// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
+	/// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
+	/// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
+	pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<[u8; 32]>) {
 		assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
+
+		// We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
+		// return them to fail the payment.
+		let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
+		for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
+			match htlc_update {
+				HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { payment_hash, .. } => {
+					dropped_outbound_htlcs.push(payment_hash);
+				},
+				_ => {}
+			}
+		}
+
+		for htlc in self.pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
+			if htlc.state == HTLCState::LocalAnnounced {
+				dropped_outbound_htlcs.push(htlc.payment_hash);
+			}
+			//TODO: Do something with the remaining HTLCs
+			//(we need to have the ChannelManager monitor them so we can claim the inbound HTLCs
+			//which correspond)
+		}
+
 		self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
 		self.channel_update_count += 1;
 		let mut res = Vec::new();
 		mem::swap(&mut res, &mut self.last_local_commitment_txn);
-		res
+		(res, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
 	}
 }
 
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
-	use bitcoin::util::misc::hex_bytes;
 	use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
 	use bitcoin::util::bip143;
 	use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize;
 	use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
 	use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
+	use hex;
 	use ln::channel::{Channel,ChannelKeys,HTLCOutput,HTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,TxCreationKeys};
 	use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
 	use ln::chan_utils;
 	use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
 	use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
+	use util::test_utils;
+	use util::logger::Logger;
 	use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
 	use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
 	use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
 	use crypto::digest::Digest;
+	use std::sync::Arc;
 
 	struct TestFeeEstimator {
 		fee_est: u64
@@ -2371,72 +2584,74 @@ mod tests {
 	fn outbound_commitment_test() {
 		// Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix C:
 		let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
+		let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
 		let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 
 		let chan_keys = ChannelKeys {
-			funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
-			payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
-			delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
-			htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+			funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+			payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+			delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+			htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
 
 			// These aren't set in the test vectors:
-			revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
-			channel_close_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
-			channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+			revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+			channel_close_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+			channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
 			commitment_seed: [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
 		};
-		assert_eq!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan_keys.funding_key).unwrap().serialize()[..],
-				hex_bytes("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
+		assert_eq!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan_keys.funding_key).serialize()[..],
+				hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
 
-		let mut chan = Channel::new_outbound(&feeest, chan_keys, PublicKey::new(), 10000000, false, 42); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
+		let their_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap());
+		let mut chan = Channel::new_outbound(&feeest, chan_keys, their_node_id, 10000000, 100000, false, 42, Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
 		chan.their_to_self_delay = 144;
 		chan.our_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
 
 		let funding_info = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), 0);
 		chan.channel_monitor.set_funding_info((funding_info, Script::new()));
 
-		chan.their_payment_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()).unwrap();
-		assert_eq!(chan.their_payment_basepoint.serialize()[..],
-				hex_bytes("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
+		chan.their_payment_basepoint = Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()));
+		assert_eq!(chan.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap().serialize()[..],
+				hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
 
-		chan.their_funding_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()).unwrap();
-		assert_eq!(chan.their_funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
-				hex_bytes("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
+		chan.their_funding_pubkey = Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()));
+		assert_eq!(chan.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap().serialize()[..],
+				hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
 
-		chan.their_htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()).unwrap();
-		assert_eq!(chan.their_htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
-				hex_bytes("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
+		chan.their_htlc_basepoint = Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()));
+		assert_eq!(chan.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap().serialize()[..],
+				hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
 
-		chan.their_revocation_basepoint = PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+		chan.their_revocation_basepoint = Some(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
 
 		// We can't just use build_local_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
 		// derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
 		// build_commitment_transaction.
-		let delayed_payment_base = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key).unwrap();
-		let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
-		let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret).unwrap();
-		let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan.local_keys.htlc_base_key).unwrap();
-		let keys = TxCreationKeys::new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &delayed_payment_base, &htlc_basepoint, &chan.their_revocation_basepoint, &chan.their_payment_basepoint, &chan.their_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
+		let delayed_payment_base = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key);
+		let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+		let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
+		let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan.local_keys.htlc_base_key);
+		let keys = TxCreationKeys::new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &delayed_payment_base, &htlc_basepoint, &chan.their_revocation_basepoint.unwrap(), &chan.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap(), &chan.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap()).unwrap();
 
 		let mut unsigned_tx: (Transaction, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>);
 
 		macro_rules! test_commitment {
 			( $their_sig_hex: expr, $our_sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr) => {
 				unsigned_tx = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false);
-				let their_signature = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes($their_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+				let their_signature = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode($their_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
 				let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&unsigned_tx.0).sighash_all(&unsigned_tx.0.input[0], &chan.get_funding_redeemscript(), chan.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
-				secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &their_signature, &chan.their_funding_pubkey).unwrap();
+				secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &their_signature, &chan.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()).unwrap();
 
 				chan.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut unsigned_tx.0, &their_signature);
 
 				assert_eq!(serialize(&unsigned_tx.0).unwrap()[..],
-						hex_bytes($tx_hex).unwrap()[..]);
+						hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..]);
 			};
 		}
 
 		macro_rules! test_htlc_output {
 			( $htlc_idx: expr, $their_sig_hex: expr, $our_sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr ) => {
-				let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes($their_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+				let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode($their_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
 
 				let ref htlc = unsigned_tx.1[$htlc_idx];
 				let mut htlc_tx = chan.build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.0.txid(), &htlc, true, &keys);
@@ -2463,7 +2678,7 @@ mod tests {
 
 				chan.sign_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_tx, &remote_signature, &preimage, &htlc, &keys).unwrap();
 				assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx).unwrap()[..],
-						hex_bytes($tx_hex).unwrap()[..]);
+						hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..]);
 			};
 		}
 
@@ -2489,7 +2704,7 @@ mod tests {
 				pending_forward_state: None,
 			};
 			let mut sha = Sha256::new();
-			sha.input(&hex_bytes("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
+			sha.input(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
 			sha.result(&mut out.payment_hash);
 			out
 		});
@@ -2506,7 +2721,7 @@ mod tests {
 				pending_forward_state: None,
 			};
 			let mut sha = Sha256::new();
-			sha.input(&hex_bytes("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
+			sha.input(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
 			sha.result(&mut out.payment_hash);
 			out
 		});
@@ -2523,7 +2738,7 @@ mod tests {
 				pending_forward_state: None,
 			};
 			let mut sha = Sha256::new();
-			sha.input(&hex_bytes("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap());
+			sha.input(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap());
 			sha.result(&mut out.payment_hash);
 			out
 		});
@@ -2540,7 +2755,7 @@ mod tests {
 				pending_forward_state: None,
 			};
 			let mut sha = Sha256::new();
-			sha.input(&hex_bytes("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap());
+			sha.input(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap());
 			sha.result(&mut out.payment_hash);
 			out
 		});
@@ -2557,7 +2772,7 @@ mod tests {
 				pending_forward_state: None,
 			};
 			let mut sha = Sha256::new();
-			sha.input(&hex_bytes("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap());
+			sha.input(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap());
 			sha.result(&mut out.payment_hash);
 			out
 		});
@@ -2886,23 +3101,23 @@ mod tests {
 		// Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
 
 		let mut seed = [0; 32];
-		seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
+		seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
 		assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(seed, 281474976710655),
-		           hex_bytes("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
+		           hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
 
-		seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
+		seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
 		assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(seed, 281474976710655),
-		           hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
+		           hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
 
 		assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
-		           hex_bytes("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
+		           hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
 
 		assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(seed, 0x555555555555),
-		           hex_bytes("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
+		           hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
 
-		seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
+		seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
 		assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(seed, 1),
-		           hex_bytes("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
+		           hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
 	}
 
 	#[test]
@@ -2910,25 +3125,25 @@ mod tests {
 		// Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
 		let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 
-		let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
-		let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+		let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+		let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
 
-		let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret).unwrap();
-		assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
+		let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
+		assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
 
-		let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret).unwrap();
-		assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
+		let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
+		assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
 
 		assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
-				hex_bytes("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
+				hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
 
 		assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
-				SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
+				SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
 
 		assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
-				hex_bytes("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
+				hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
 
 		assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
-				SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
+				SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
 	}
 }