X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=src%2Fln%2Fchannelmanager.rs;h=20e6f3739ec63ee3eee62715cd21bb8a21f4805e;hb=a66e597e958584b7fbfff8f5891d656010cd58fa;hp=76c7bb18ff30be84e8b8a491622efd244e221577;hpb=11e5975523147ae7024b03f05445c78c9b695752;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/src/ln/channelmanager.rs b/src/ln/channelmanager.rs index 76c7bb18..20e6f373 100644 --- a/src/ln/channelmanager.rs +++ b/src/ln/channelmanager.rs @@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ mod channel_held_info { use ln::msgs; /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards + #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo { pub(super) onion_packet: Option, pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32], @@ -49,17 +50,24 @@ mod channel_held_info { pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32, } + /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info + #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug + pub enum PendingHTLCStatus { + Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo), + Fail(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC), + } + #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")] - impl PendingForwardHTLCInfo { + impl PendingHTLCStatus { pub fn dummy() -> Self { - Self { + PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { onion_packet: None, payment_hash: [0; 32], short_channel_id: 0, prev_short_channel_id: 0, amt_to_forward: 0, outgoing_cltv_value: 0, - } + }) } } @@ -667,6 +675,180 @@ impl ChannelManager { ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..]) } + fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, SharedSecret, MutexGuard) { + let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key, &self.our_network_key); + let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret); + + macro_rules! get_onion_hash { + () => { + { + let mut sha = Sha256::new(); + sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data); + let mut onion_hash = [0; 32]; + sha.result(&mut onion_hash); + onion_hash + } + } + } + + let mut channel_state = None; + macro_rules! return_err { + ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => { + { + log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg); + if channel_state.is_none() { + channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); + } + return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { + channel_id: msg.channel_id, + htlc_id: msg.htlc_id, + reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data), + }), shared_secret, channel_state.unwrap()); + } + } + } + + if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 { + //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other + //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way, + //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the + //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the + //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the + //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there... + return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!()); + } + + let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu); + hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data); + hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash); + if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) { + return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!()); + } + + let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]); + let next_hop_data = { + let mut decoded = [0; 65]; + chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded); + match msgs::OnionHopData::decode(&decoded[..]) { + Err(err) => { + let error_code = match err { + msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRealmByte => 0x4000 | 1, + _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen + }; + return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]); + }, + Ok(msg) => msg + } + }; + + //TODO: Check that msg.cltv_expiry is within acceptable bounds! + + let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] { + // OUR PAYMENT! + if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward != msg.amount_msat { + return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat)); + } + if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry { + return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry)); + } + + // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc + // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so + // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a + // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed! + + PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { + onion_packet: None, + payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(), + short_channel_id: 0, + prev_short_channel_id: 0, + amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward, + outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value, + }) + } else { + let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65]; + chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]); + chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]); + + let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.clone(); + + let blinding_factor = { + let mut sha = Sha256::new(); + sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]); + sha.input(&shared_secret[..]); + let mut res = [0u8; 32]; + sha.result(&mut res); + match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) { + Err(_) => { + // Return temporary node failure as its technically our issue, not the + // channel's issue. + return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]); + }, + Ok(key) => key + } + }; + + match new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) { + Err(_) => { + // Return temporary node failure as its technically our issue, not the + // channel's issue. + return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]); + }, + Ok(_) => {} + }; + + let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket { + version: 0, + public_key: new_pubkey, + hop_data: new_packet_data, + hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(), + }; + + PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { + onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet), + payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(), + short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id, + prev_short_channel_id: 0, + amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward, + outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value, + }) + }; + + channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); + if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info { + if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here + let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned(); + let forwarding_id = match id_option { + None => { + return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]); + }, + Some(id) => id.clone(), + }; + if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = { + let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap(); + if !chan.is_live() { + Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())) + } else { + let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(self.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) }); + if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { + Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())) + } else { + if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { + Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())) + } else { + None + } + } + } + } { + return_err!(err, code, &chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]); + } + } + } + + (pending_forward_info, shared_secret, channel_state.unwrap()) + } + /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result { let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() { @@ -770,10 +952,14 @@ impl ChannelManager { } let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); - events.push(events::Event::SendHTLCs { + events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: first_hop_node_id, - msgs: vec![update_add], - commitment_msg: commitment_signed, + updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { + update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add], + update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(), + update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(), + commitment_signed, + }, }); Ok(()) } @@ -910,10 +1096,14 @@ impl ChannelManager { continue; }, }; - new_events.push((Some(monitor), events::Event::SendHTLCs { + new_events.push((Some(monitor), events::Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(), - msgs: add_htlc_msgs, - commitment_msg: commitment_msg, + updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { + update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs, + update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(), + update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(), + commitment_signed: commitment_msg, + }, })); } } else { @@ -1029,11 +1219,14 @@ impl ChannelManager { } let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); - //TODO: replace by HandleError ? UpdateFailHTLC in handle_update_add_htlc need also to build a CommitmentSigned - pending_events.push(events::Event::SendFailHTLC { + pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, - msg: msg, - commitment_msg: commitment_msg, + updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { + update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(), + update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(), + update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg], + commitment_signed: commitment_msg, + }, }); }, None => {}, @@ -1125,10 +1318,14 @@ impl ChannelManager { if let Some((msg, commitment_msg)) = fulfill_msgs.0 { let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); - pending_events.push(events::Event::SendFulfillHTLC { + pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: node_id, - msg, - commitment_msg, + updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { + update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(), + update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg], + update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(), + commitment_signed: commitment_msg, + } }); } true @@ -1507,183 +1704,34 @@ impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager { //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that, //but we should prevent it anyway. - let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key, &self.our_network_key); - let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret); - - macro_rules! get_onion_hash { - () => { - { - let mut sha = Sha256::new(); - sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data); - let mut onion_hash = [0; 32]; - sha.result(&mut onion_hash); - onion_hash - } - } - } - - macro_rules! return_err { - ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => { - return Err(msgs::HandleError { - err: $msg, - action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::UpdateFailHTLC { - msg: msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { - channel_id: msg.channel_id, - htlc_id: msg.htlc_id, - reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data), - } - }), - }); - } - } - - if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 { - //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other - //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way, - //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the - //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the - //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the - //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there... - return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!()); - } - - let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu); - hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data); - hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash); - if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) { - return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!()); - } - - let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]); - let next_hop_data = { - let mut decoded = [0; 65]; - chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded); - match msgs::OnionHopData::decode(&decoded[..]) { - Err(err) => { - let error_code = match err { - msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRealmByte => 0x4000 | 1, - _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen - }; - return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]); - }, - Ok(msg) => msg - } - }; - - //TODO: Check that msg.cltv_expiry is within acceptable bounds! - - let mut pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] { - // OUR PAYMENT! - if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward != msg.amount_msat { - return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat)); - } - if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry { - return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry)); - } - - // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc - // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so - // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a - // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed! - - PendingForwardHTLCInfo { - onion_packet: None, - payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(), - short_channel_id: 0, - prev_short_channel_id: 0, - amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward, - outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value, - } - } else { - let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65]; - chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]); - chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]); - - let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.clone(); - - let blinding_factor = { - let mut sha = Sha256::new(); - sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]); - sha.input(&shared_secret[..]); - let mut res = [0u8; 32]; - sha.result(&mut res); - match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) { - Err(_) => { - // Return temporary node failure as its technically our issue, not the - // channel's issue. - return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]); - }, - Ok(key) => key - } - }; - - match new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) { - Err(_) => { - // Return temporary node failure as its technically our issue, not the - // channel's issue. - return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]); - }, - Ok(_) => {} - }; - - let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket { - version: 0, - public_key: new_pubkey, - hop_data: new_packet_data, - hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(), - }; - - PendingForwardHTLCInfo { - onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet), - payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(), - short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id, - prev_short_channel_id: 0, - amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward, - outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value, - } - }; - - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + let (mut pending_forward_info, shared_secret, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg); let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts(); - if pending_forward_info.onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here - let forwarding_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&pending_forward_info.short_channel_id) { - None => { - return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]); - }, - Some(id) => id.clone(), - }; - let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap(); - let fee = chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) + (pending_forward_info.amt_to_forward * self.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 / 1000000) as u32; - if msg.amount_msat < fee as u64 || (msg.amount_msat - fee as u64) < pending_forward_info.amt_to_forward { - log_debug!(self, "HTLC {} incorrect amount: in {} out {} fee required {}", msg.htlc_id, msg.amount_msat, pending_forward_info.amt_to_forward, fee); - let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap(); - return_err!("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, &chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]); - } - if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < pending_forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { - log_debug!(self, "HTLC {} incorrect CLTV: in {} out {} delta required {}", msg.htlc_id, msg.cltv_expiry, pending_forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA); - let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap(); - return_err!("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, &chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]); - } - if !chan.is_live() { - let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap(); - return_err!("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, &chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]); - } - } - let claimable_htlcs_entry = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(msg.payment_hash.clone()); // We dont correctly handle payments that route through us twice on their way to their // destination. That's OK since those nodes are probably busted or trying to do network // mapping through repeated loops. In either case, we want them to stop talking to us, so // we send permanent_node_failure. - if let &hash_map::Entry::Occupied(ref e) = &claimable_htlcs_entry { - let mut acceptable_cycle = false; - if let &PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } = e.get() { - acceptable_cycle = pending_forward_info.short_channel_id == 0; - } - if !acceptable_cycle { - return_err!("Payment looped through us twice", 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]); + let mut will_forward = false; + if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { short_channel_id, .. }) = pending_forward_info { + if let &hash_map::Entry::Occupied(ref e) = &claimable_htlcs_entry { + let mut acceptable_cycle = false; + if let &PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } = e.get() { + acceptable_cycle = short_channel_id == 0; + } + if !acceptable_cycle { + log_info!(self, "Failed to accept incoming HTLC: Payment looped through us twice"); + pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { + channel_id: msg.channel_id, + htlc_id: msg.htlc_id, + reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]), + }); + } else { + will_forward = true; + } + } else { + will_forward = true; } } @@ -1696,33 +1744,37 @@ impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager { return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet available for receiving HTLCs", action: None}); } let short_channel_id = chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(); - pending_forward_info.prev_short_channel_id = short_channel_id; + if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref mut forward_info) = pending_forward_info { + forward_info.prev_short_channel_id = short_channel_id; + } (short_channel_id, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info)?) }, None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None}), }; - match claimable_htlcs_entry { - hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => { - let outbound_route = e.get_mut(); - let (route, session_priv) = match outbound_route { - &mut PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv } => { - (route.clone(), session_priv.clone()) - }, - _ => unreachable!(), - }; - *outbound_route = PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { - source_short_channel_id, - incoming_packet_shared_secret: shared_secret, - route, - session_priv, - }; - }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { - e.insert(PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { - source_short_channel_id, - incoming_packet_shared_secret: shared_secret, - }); + if will_forward { + match claimable_htlcs_entry { + hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => { + let outbound_route = e.get_mut(); + let (route, session_priv) = match outbound_route { + &mut PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv } => { + (route.clone(), session_priv.clone()) + }, + _ => unreachable!(), + }; + *outbound_route = PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { + source_short_channel_id, + incoming_packet_shared_secret: shared_secret, + route, + session_priv, + }; + }, + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { + e.insert(PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { + source_short_channel_id, + incoming_packet_shared_secret: shared_secret, + }); + } } } @@ -2424,8 +2476,10 @@ mod tests { impl SendEvent { fn from_event(event: Event) -> SendEvent { match event { - Event::SendHTLCs { node_id, msgs, commitment_msg } => { - SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: msgs, commitment_msg: commitment_msg } + Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed } } => { + assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); + SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: commitment_signed } }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"), } @@ -2581,9 +2635,12 @@ mod tests { let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); match events[0] { - Event::SendFulfillHTLC { ref node_id, ref msg, ref commitment_msg } => { + Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed } } => { + assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1); + assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); expected_next_node = node_id.clone(); - next_msgs = Some((msg.clone(), commitment_msg.clone())); + next_msgs = Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), }; @@ -2702,9 +2759,12 @@ mod tests { let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); match events[0] { - Event::SendFailHTLC { ref node_id, ref msg, ref commitment_msg } => { + Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed } } => { + assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1); expected_next_node = node_id.clone(); - next_msgs = Some((msg.clone(), commitment_msg.clone())); + next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), }; @@ -3020,7 +3080,9 @@ mod tests { let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); match events[0] { - Event::SendFulfillHTLC { ref node_id, .. } => { + Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => { + assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id()); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),