X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=src%2Fln%2Fchannelmanager.rs;h=20e6f3739ec63ee3eee62715cd21bb8a21f4805e;hb=a66e597e958584b7fbfff8f5891d656010cd58fa;hp=e142e8ad5091bb52a9290e1694fbf0e6df6f000f;hpb=50668644cf69f1ce92d71b3a1627e129741f4655;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/src/ln/channelmanager.rs b/src/ln/channelmanager.rs index e142e8ad..20e6f373 100644 --- a/src/ln/channelmanager.rs +++ b/src/ln/channelmanager.rs @@ -20,7 +20,8 @@ use ln::msgs::{HandleError,ChannelMessageHandler,MsgEncodable,MsgDecodable}; use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng}; use util::sha2::Sha256; use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20; -use util::logger::{Logger, Record}; +use util::logger::Logger; +use util::errors::APIError; use crypto; use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult}; @@ -39,6 +40,7 @@ mod channel_held_info { use ln::msgs; /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards + #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo { pub(super) onion_packet: Option, pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32], @@ -48,17 +50,24 @@ mod channel_held_info { pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32, } + /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info + #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug + pub enum PendingHTLCStatus { + Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo), + Fail(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC), + } + #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")] - impl PendingForwardHTLCInfo { + impl PendingHTLCStatus { pub fn dummy() -> Self { - Self { + PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { onion_packet: None, payment_hash: [0; 32], short_channel_id: 0, prev_short_channel_id: 0, amt_to_forward: 0, outgoing_cltv_value: 0, - } + }) } } @@ -161,7 +170,7 @@ pub struct ChannelManager { announce_channels_publicly: bool, fee_proportional_millionths: u32, latest_block_height: AtomicUsize, - secp_ctx: Secp256k1, + secp_ctx: Secp256k1, channel_state: Mutex, our_network_key: SecretKey, @@ -254,7 +263,8 @@ impl ChannelManager { /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here. /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel event, so you should probably poll /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards. - pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), HandleError> { + /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat being greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k + pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> { let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") { ChannelKeys { funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(), @@ -275,7 +285,7 @@ impl ChannelManager { } }; - let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, self.announce_channels_publicly, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger)); + let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, self.announce_channels_publicly, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger))?; let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator)?; let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); match channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel) { @@ -413,6 +423,14 @@ impl ChannelManager { } } + /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction + /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each. + pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) { + for chan in self.list_channels() { + self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id); + } + } + #[inline] fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) { ({ @@ -451,9 +469,9 @@ impl ChannelManager { // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid #[inline] - fn construct_onion_keys_callback (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), HandleError> { + fn construct_onion_keys_callback (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), HandleError> { let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone(); - let mut blinded_pub = secp_call!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv)); + let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv); let mut first_iteration = true; for hop in route.hops.iter() { @@ -466,13 +484,13 @@ impl ChannelManager { sha.result(&mut blinding_factor); if first_iteration { - blinded_pub = secp_call!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv)); + blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv); first_iteration = false; } let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub; secp_call!(blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &secp_call!(SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)))); - blinded_pub = secp_call!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv)); + blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv); callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop); } @@ -481,7 +499,7 @@ impl ChannelManager { } // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid - fn construct_onion_keys(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result, HandleError> { + fn construct_onion_keys(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result, HandleError> { let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len()); Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| { @@ -657,6 +675,180 @@ impl ChannelManager { ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..]) } + fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, SharedSecret, MutexGuard) { + let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key, &self.our_network_key); + let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret); + + macro_rules! get_onion_hash { + () => { + { + let mut sha = Sha256::new(); + sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data); + let mut onion_hash = [0; 32]; + sha.result(&mut onion_hash); + onion_hash + } + } + } + + let mut channel_state = None; + macro_rules! return_err { + ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => { + { + log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg); + if channel_state.is_none() { + channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); + } + return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { + channel_id: msg.channel_id, + htlc_id: msg.htlc_id, + reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data), + }), shared_secret, channel_state.unwrap()); + } + } + } + + if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 { + //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other + //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way, + //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the + //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the + //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the + //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there... + return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!()); + } + + let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu); + hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data); + hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash); + if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) { + return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!()); + } + + let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]); + let next_hop_data = { + let mut decoded = [0; 65]; + chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded); + match msgs::OnionHopData::decode(&decoded[..]) { + Err(err) => { + let error_code = match err { + msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRealmByte => 0x4000 | 1, + _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen + }; + return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]); + }, + Ok(msg) => msg + } + }; + + //TODO: Check that msg.cltv_expiry is within acceptable bounds! + + let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] { + // OUR PAYMENT! + if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward != msg.amount_msat { + return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat)); + } + if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry { + return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry)); + } + + // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc + // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so + // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a + // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed! + + PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { + onion_packet: None, + payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(), + short_channel_id: 0, + prev_short_channel_id: 0, + amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward, + outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value, + }) + } else { + let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65]; + chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]); + chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]); + + let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.clone(); + + let blinding_factor = { + let mut sha = Sha256::new(); + sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]); + sha.input(&shared_secret[..]); + let mut res = [0u8; 32]; + sha.result(&mut res); + match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) { + Err(_) => { + // Return temporary node failure as its technically our issue, not the + // channel's issue. + return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]); + }, + Ok(key) => key + } + }; + + match new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) { + Err(_) => { + // Return temporary node failure as its technically our issue, not the + // channel's issue. + return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]); + }, + Ok(_) => {} + }; + + let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket { + version: 0, + public_key: new_pubkey, + hop_data: new_packet_data, + hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(), + }; + + PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { + onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet), + payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(), + short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id, + prev_short_channel_id: 0, + amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward, + outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value, + }) + }; + + channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); + if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info { + if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here + let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned(); + let forwarding_id = match id_option { + None => { + return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]); + }, + Some(id) => id.clone(), + }; + if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = { + let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap(); + if !chan.is_live() { + Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())) + } else { + let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(self.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) }); + if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { + Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())) + } else { + if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { + Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())) + } else { + None + } + } + } + } { + return_err!(err, code, &chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]); + } + } + } + + (pending_forward_info, shared_secret, channel_state.unwrap()) + } + /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result { let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() { @@ -664,7 +856,7 @@ impl ChannelManager { Some(id) => id, }; - let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).unwrap().serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..]; + let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..]; let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { chain_hash: self.genesis_hash, @@ -678,7 +870,7 @@ impl ChannelManager { }; let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]); - let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).unwrap(); //TODO Can we unwrap here? + let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key); //TODO Can we unwrap here? Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate { signature: sig, @@ -760,10 +952,14 @@ impl ChannelManager { } let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); - events.push(events::Event::SendHTLCs { + events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: first_hop_node_id, - msgs: vec![update_add], - commitment_msg: commitment_signed, + updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { + update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add], + update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(), + update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(), + commitment_signed, + }, }); Ok(()) } @@ -829,7 +1025,7 @@ impl ChannelManager { let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone())?; let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap(); - let our_node_sig = secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key)); + let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key); Ok(Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), @@ -900,10 +1096,14 @@ impl ChannelManager { continue; }, }; - new_events.push((Some(monitor), events::Event::SendHTLCs { + new_events.push((Some(monitor), events::Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(), - msgs: add_htlc_msgs, - commitment_msg: commitment_msg, + updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { + update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs, + update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(), + update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(), + commitment_signed: commitment_msg, + }, })); } } else { @@ -1019,11 +1219,14 @@ impl ChannelManager { } let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); - //TODO: replace by HandleError ? UpdateFailHTLC in handle_update_add_htlc need also to build a CommitmentSigned - pending_events.push(events::Event::SendFailHTLC { + pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, - msg: msg, - commitment_msg: commitment_msg, + updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { + update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(), + update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(), + update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg], + commitment_signed: commitment_msg, + }, }); }, None => {}, @@ -1115,10 +1318,14 @@ impl ChannelManager { if let Some((msg, commitment_msg)) = fulfill_msgs.0 { let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); - pending_events.push(events::Event::SendFulfillHTLC { + pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: node_id, - msg, - commitment_msg, + updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { + update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(), + update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg], + update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(), + commitment_signed: commitment_msg, + } }); } true @@ -1128,7 +1335,7 @@ impl ChannelManager { /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey { - PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).unwrap() + PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key) } /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a @@ -1185,7 +1392,7 @@ impl ChainListener for ChannelManager { if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() { for tx in txn_matched { for inp in tx.input.iter() { - if inp.prev_hash == funding_txo.txid && inp.prev_index == funding_txo.index as u32 { + if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() { if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() { short_to_id.remove(&short_id); } @@ -1497,174 +1704,34 @@ impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager { //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that, //but we should prevent it anyway. - let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key, &self.our_network_key); - let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret); - - macro_rules! get_onion_hash { - () => { - { - let mut sha = Sha256::new(); - sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data); - let mut onion_hash = [0; 32]; - sha.result(&mut onion_hash); - onion_hash - } - } - } - - macro_rules! return_err { - ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => { - return Err(msgs::HandleError { - err: $msg, - action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::UpdateFailHTLC { - msg: msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { - channel_id: msg.channel_id, - htlc_id: msg.htlc_id, - reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data), - } - }), - }); - } - } - - if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 { - //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other - //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way, - //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the - //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the - //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the - //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there... - return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!()); - } - - let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu); - hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data); - hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash); - if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) { - return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!()); - } - - let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]); - let next_hop_data = { - let mut decoded = [0; 65]; - chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded); - match msgs::OnionHopData::decode(&decoded[..]) { - Err(err) => { - let error_code = match err { - msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRealmByte => 0x4000 | 1, - _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen - }; - return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]); - }, - Ok(msg) => msg - } - }; - - //TODO: Check that msg.cltv_expiry is within acceptable bounds! - - let mut pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] { - // OUR PAYMENT! - if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward != msg.amount_msat { - return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat)); - } - if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry { - return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry)); - } - - // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc - // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so - // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a - // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed! - - PendingForwardHTLCInfo { - onion_packet: None, - payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(), - short_channel_id: 0, - prev_short_channel_id: 0, - amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward, - outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value, - } - } else { - let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65]; - chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]); - chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]); - - let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.clone(); - - let blinding_factor = { - let mut sha = Sha256::new(); - sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]); - sha.input(&shared_secret[..]); - let mut res = [0u8; 32]; - sha.result(&mut res); - match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) { - Err(_) => { - // Return temporary node failure as its technically our issue, not the - // channel's issue. - return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]); - }, - Ok(key) => key - } - }; - - match new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) { - Err(_) => { - // Return temporary node failure as its technically our issue, not the - // channel's issue. - return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]); - }, - Ok(_) => {} - }; - - let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket { - version: 0, - public_key: new_pubkey, - hop_data: new_packet_data, - hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(), - }; - - //TODO: Check amt_to_forward and outgoing_cltv_value are within acceptable ranges! - - PendingForwardHTLCInfo { - onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet), - payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(), - short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id, - prev_short_channel_id: 0, - amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward, - outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value, - } - }; - - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + let (mut pending_forward_info, shared_secret, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg); let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts(); - if pending_forward_info.onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here - let forwarding_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&pending_forward_info.short_channel_id) { - None => { - return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]); - }, - Some(id) => id.clone(), - }; - let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap(); - if !chan.is_live() { - let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap(); - return_err!("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, &chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]); - } - } - let claimable_htlcs_entry = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(msg.payment_hash.clone()); // We dont correctly handle payments that route through us twice on their way to their // destination. That's OK since those nodes are probably busted or trying to do network // mapping through repeated loops. In either case, we want them to stop talking to us, so // we send permanent_node_failure. - if let &hash_map::Entry::Occupied(ref e) = &claimable_htlcs_entry { - let mut acceptable_cycle = false; - if let &PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } = e.get() { - acceptable_cycle = pending_forward_info.short_channel_id == 0; - } - if !acceptable_cycle { - return_err!("Payment looped through us twice", 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]); + let mut will_forward = false; + if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { short_channel_id, .. }) = pending_forward_info { + if let &hash_map::Entry::Occupied(ref e) = &claimable_htlcs_entry { + let mut acceptable_cycle = false; + if let &PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } = e.get() { + acceptable_cycle = short_channel_id == 0; + } + if !acceptable_cycle { + log_info!(self, "Failed to accept incoming HTLC: Payment looped through us twice"); + pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { + channel_id: msg.channel_id, + htlc_id: msg.htlc_id, + reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]), + }); + } else { + will_forward = true; + } + } else { + will_forward = true; } } @@ -1677,33 +1744,37 @@ impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager { return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet available for receiving HTLCs", action: None}); } let short_channel_id = chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(); - pending_forward_info.prev_short_channel_id = short_channel_id; + if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref mut forward_info) = pending_forward_info { + forward_info.prev_short_channel_id = short_channel_id; + } (short_channel_id, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info)?) }, None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None}), }; - match claimable_htlcs_entry { - hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => { - let outbound_route = e.get_mut(); - let (route, session_priv) = match outbound_route { - &mut PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv } => { - (route.clone(), session_priv.clone()) - }, - _ => unreachable!(), - }; - *outbound_route = PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { - source_short_channel_id, - incoming_packet_shared_secret: shared_secret, - route, - session_priv, - }; - }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { - e.insert(PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { - source_short_channel_id, - incoming_packet_shared_secret: shared_secret, - }); + if will_forward { + match claimable_htlcs_entry { + hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => { + let outbound_route = e.get_mut(); + let (route, session_priv) = match outbound_route { + &mut PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv } => { + (route.clone(), session_priv.clone()) + }, + _ => unreachable!(), + }; + *outbound_route = PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { + source_short_channel_id, + incoming_packet_shared_secret: shared_secret, + route, + session_priv, + }; + }, + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { + e.insert(PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { + source_short_channel_id, + incoming_packet_shared_secret: shared_secret, + }); + } } } @@ -1920,7 +1991,7 @@ impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager { secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 })); secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 })); - let our_node_sig = secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key)); + let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key); (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement { node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature }, @@ -2192,7 +2263,7 @@ mod tests { static mut CHAN_COUNT: u32 = 0; fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) { - node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42).unwrap(); + node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42).unwrap(); let events_1 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1); @@ -2405,8 +2476,10 @@ mod tests { impl SendEvent { fn from_event(event: Event) -> SendEvent { match event { - Event::SendHTLCs { node_id, msgs, commitment_msg } => { - SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: msgs, commitment_msg: commitment_msg } + Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed } } => { + assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); + SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: commitment_signed } }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"), } @@ -2562,9 +2635,12 @@ mod tests { let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); match events[0] { - Event::SendFulfillHTLC { ref node_id, ref msg, ref commitment_msg } => { + Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed } } => { + assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1); + assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); expected_next_node = node_id.clone(); - next_msgs = Some((msg.clone(), commitment_msg.clone())); + next_msgs = Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), }; @@ -2683,9 +2759,12 @@ mod tests { let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); match events[0] { - Event::SendFailHTLC { ref node_id, ref msg, ref commitment_msg } => { + Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed } } => { + assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1); expected_next_node = node_id.clone(); - next_msgs = Some((msg.clone(), commitment_msg.clone())); + next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), }; @@ -2723,7 +2802,7 @@ mod tests { SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &key_slice).unwrap() }; let node = ChannelManager::new(node_id.clone(), 0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap(); - let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id).unwrap(), Arc::clone(&logger)); + let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id), Arc::clone(&logger)); nodes.push(Node { feeest, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node_id, node, router }); } @@ -2860,7 +2939,7 @@ mod tests { res.push(explicit_tx.clone()); } else { for tx in node_txn.iter() { - if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].prev_hash == chan.3.txid() { + if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() { let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new(); funding_tx_map.insert(chan.3.txid(), chan.3.clone()); tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap(); @@ -2872,7 +2951,7 @@ mod tests { if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE { for tx in node_txn.iter() { - if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].prev_hash == res[0].txid() { + if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() { let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new(); funding_tx_map.insert(res[0].txid(), res[0].clone()); tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap(); @@ -2899,7 +2978,7 @@ mod tests { let mut found_prev = false; for tx in prev_txn { - if node_txn[0].input[0].prev_hash == tx.txid() { + if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() { let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new(); funding_tx_map.insert(tx.txid(), tx.clone()); node_txn[0].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap(); @@ -3001,7 +3080,9 @@ mod tests { let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); match events[0] { - Event::SendFulfillHTLC { ref node_id, .. } => { + Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => { + assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id()); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),