X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=src%2Fln%2Fchannelmanager.rs;h=73e1052d844364a49bd5cd89f9ce8f8d29a2b87b;hb=6b3cc8bb4dd645f6afaa00afe6a4e02d8ff8e2db;hp=d2854ca741145eaeaefc11ab673cbe53c71d3f2c;hpb=69eb59b24d502f3df6f4dd3990aad99cc727385c;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/src/ln/channelmanager.rs b/src/ln/channelmanager.rs index d2854ca7..d4548ce6 100644 --- a/src/ln/channelmanager.rs +++ b/src/ln/channelmanager.rs @@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block; use bitcoin::network::constants::Network; use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash; use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash; -use bitcoin::util::uint::Uint256; use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey}; use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message}; @@ -12,73 +11,184 @@ use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret; use secp256k1; use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator}; -use ln::channel::Channel; +use chain::transaction::OutPoint; +use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelKeys}; use ln::channelmonitor::ManyChannelMonitor; -use ln::router::Route; +use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop}; use ln::msgs; use ln::msgs::{HandleError,ChannelMessageHandler,MsgEncodable,MsgDecodable}; use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng}; use util::sha2::Sha256; +use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20; +use util::logger::Logger; +use util::errors::APIError; +use crypto; use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult}; use crypto::hmac::Hmac; use crypto::digest::Digest; use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher; -use crypto::chacha20::ChaCha20; -use std::sync::{Mutex,MutexGuard,Arc}; +use std::{ptr, mem}; use std::collections::HashMap; use std::collections::hash_map; -use std::{ptr, mem}; +use std::sync::{Mutex,MutexGuard,Arc}; +use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering}; use std::time::{Instant,Duration}; -/// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards -pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo { - onion_packet: Option, - payment_hash: [u8; 32], - short_channel_id: u64, - prev_short_channel_id: u64, - amt_to_forward: u64, - outgoing_cltv_value: u32, -} +/// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself: +/// +/// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should +/// forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail +/// the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer. +/// +/// When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo +/// which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData +/// filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill +/// the HTLC backwards along the relevant path). +/// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is +/// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent. +mod channel_held_info { + use ln::msgs; + use ln::router::Route; + use secp256k1::key::SecretKey; + use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret; + + /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards + #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug + pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo { + pub(super) onion_packet: Option, + pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: SharedSecret, + pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32], + pub(super) short_channel_id: u64, + pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64, + pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32, + } -#[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")] -impl PendingForwardHTLCInfo { - pub fn dummy() -> Self { - Self { - onion_packet: None, - payment_hash: [0; 32], - short_channel_id: 0, - prev_short_channel_id: 0, - amt_to_forward: 0, - outgoing_cltv_value: 0, + #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug + pub enum HTLCFailureMsg { + Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC), + Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC), + } + + /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info + #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug + pub enum PendingHTLCStatus { + Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo), + Fail(HTLCFailureMsg), + } + + #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")] + impl PendingHTLCStatus { + pub fn dummy() -> Self { + let secp_ctx = ::secp256k1::Secp256k1::signing_only(); + PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { + onion_packet: None, + incoming_shared_secret: SharedSecret::new(&secp_ctx, + &::secp256k1::key::PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[1; 32]).unwrap()), + &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[1; 32]).unwrap()), + payment_hash: [0; 32], + short_channel_id: 0, + amt_to_forward: 0, + outgoing_cltv_value: 0, + }) + } + } + + /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC + #[derive(Clone)] + pub struct HTLCPreviousHopData { + pub(super) short_channel_id: u64, + pub(super) htlc_id: u64, + pub(super) incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret, + } + + /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC + #[derive(Clone)] + pub enum HTLCSource { + PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData), + OutboundRoute { + route: Route, + session_priv: SecretKey, + }, + } + #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))] + impl HTLCSource { + pub fn dummy() -> Self { + HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { + route: Route { hops: Vec::new() }, + session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[1; 32]).unwrap(), + } + } + } + + #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug + pub enum HTLCFailReason { + ErrorPacket { + err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, + }, + Reason { + failure_code: u16, + data: Vec, } } -} -enum PendingOutboundHTLC { - IntermediaryHopData { - source_short_channel_id: u64, - incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret, - }, - OutboundRoute { - route: Route, - }, - /// Used for channel rebalancing - CycledRoute { - source_short_channel_id: u64, - incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret, - route: Route, + #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")] + impl HTLCFailReason { + pub fn dummy() -> Self { + HTLCFailReason::Reason { + failure_code: 0, data: Vec::new(), + } + } } } +#[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")] +pub use self::channel_held_info::*; +#[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))] +pub(crate) use self::channel_held_info::*; -enum HTLCFailReason<'a> { - ErrorPacket { - err: &'a msgs::OnionErrorPacket, - }, - Reason { - failure_code: u16, - data: &'a[u8], +struct MsgHandleErrInternal { + err: msgs::HandleError, + needs_channel_force_close: bool, +} +impl MsgHandleErrInternal { + #[inline] + fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self { + Self { + err: HandleError { + err, + action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { + msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { + channel_id, + data: err.to_string() + }, + }), + }, + needs_channel_force_close: false, + } + } + #[inline] + fn send_err_msg_close_chan(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self { + Self { + err: HandleError { + err, + action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { + msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { + channel_id, + data: err.to_string() + }, + }), + }, + needs_channel_force_close: true, + } + } + #[inline] + fn from_maybe_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self { + Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: true } + } + #[inline] + fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self { + Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: false } } } @@ -88,21 +198,32 @@ enum HTLCFailReason<'a> { /// probably increase this significantly. const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50; +struct HTLCForwardInfo { + prev_short_channel_id: u64, + prev_htlc_id: u64, + forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo, +} + struct ChannelHolder { - by_id: HashMap, - short_to_id: HashMap, + by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>, + short_to_id: HashMap, next_forward: Instant, /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received - forward_htlcs: HashMap>, - claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], PendingOutboundHTLC>, + /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency + /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short + /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo! + forward_htlcs: HashMap>, + /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency + /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you + /// go to read them! + claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec>, } struct MutChannelHolder<'a> { - by_id: &'a mut HashMap, - short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap, + by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>, + short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap, next_forward: &'a mut Instant, - /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received - forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap>, - claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], PendingOutboundHTLC>, + forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap>, + claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec>, } impl ChannelHolder { fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder { @@ -110,13 +231,15 @@ impl ChannelHolder { by_id: &mut self.by_id, short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id, next_forward: &mut self.next_forward, - /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs, claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs, } } } +#[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))] +const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height"; + /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately. /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through @@ -130,22 +253,24 @@ pub struct ChannelManager { announce_channels_publicly: bool, fee_proportional_millionths: u32, - secp_ctx: Secp256k1, + latest_block_height: AtomicUsize, + secp_ctx: Secp256k1, channel_state: Mutex, our_network_key: SecretKey, pending_events: Mutex>, + + logger: Arc, } const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO? macro_rules! secp_call { - ( $res : expr ) => { + ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => { match $res { Ok(key) => key, - //TODO: Make the err a parameter! - Err(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Key error", msg: None}) + Err(_) => return Err($err), } }; } @@ -165,7 +290,7 @@ pub struct ChannelDetails { /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output). /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the /// lifetime of the channel. - pub channel_id: Uint256, + pub channel_id: [u8; 32], /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened. pub short_channel_id: Option, @@ -180,8 +305,8 @@ impl ChannelManager { /// the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements ChannelMessageHandler. /// fee_proportional_millionths is an optional fee to charge any payments routed through us. /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator. - /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= (1 << 24)! - pub fn new(our_network_key: SecretKey, fee_proportional_millionths: u32, announce_channels_publicly: bool, network: Network, feeest: Arc, monitor: Arc, chain_monitor: Arc, tx_broadcaster: Arc) -> Result, secp256k1::Error> { + /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`! + pub fn new(our_network_key: SecretKey, fee_proportional_millionths: u32, announce_channels_publicly: bool, network: Network, feeest: Arc, monitor: Arc, chain_monitor: Arc, tx_broadcaster: Arc, logger: Arc) -> Result, secp256k1::Error> { let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager { @@ -193,6 +318,7 @@ impl ChannelManager { announce_channels_publicly, fee_proportional_millionths, + latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value (generally need to replay recent chain on chain_monitor registration) secp_ctx, channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{ @@ -205,20 +331,57 @@ impl ChannelManager { our_network_key, pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), + + logger, }); let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res); res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res); Ok(res) } - pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result { - let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, self.announce_channels_publicly, user_id); + /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value. + /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and + /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which + /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you + /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here. + /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel event, so you should probably poll + /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards. + /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat being greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k + pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> { + let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") { + ChannelKeys { + funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(), + revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(), + payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(), + delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(), + htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(), + channel_close_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(), + channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(), + commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0], + } + } else { + let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32]; + rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed); + match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) { + Ok(key) => key, + Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!") + } + }; + + let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, self.announce_channels_publicly, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger))?; let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator)?; let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); match channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel) { Some(_) => panic!("RNG is bad???"), - None => Ok(res) + None => {} } + + let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); + events.push(events::Event::SendOpenChannel { + node_id: their_network_key, + msg: res, + }); + Ok(()) } /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for @@ -238,28 +401,119 @@ impl ChannelManager { res } + /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to + /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used. + pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec { + let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len()); + for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() { + if channel.is_usable() { + res.push(ChannelDetails { + channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(), + short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(), + remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(), + channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(), + user_id: channel.get_user_id(), + }); + } + } + res + } + /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain. - pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &Uint256) -> Result { - let res = { - let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + /// May generate a SendShutdown event on success, which should be relayed. + pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), HandleError> { + let (mut res, node_id, chan_option) = { + let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts(); match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => { let res = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?; if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() { - chan_entry.remove_entry(); - } - res + if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() { + channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id); + } + (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1)) + } else { (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), None) } }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "No such channel", msg: None}) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "No such channel", action: None}) } }; - for payment_hash in res.1 { + for htlc_source in res.1.drain(..) { // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore.... - self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: &[0; 0] }); + self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }); + } + let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option { + if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) { + Some(update) + } else { None } + } else { None }; + + let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); + if let Some(update) = chan_update { + events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { + msg: update + }); + } + events.push(events::Event::SendShutdown { + node_id, + msg: res.0 + }); + + Ok(()) + } + + #[inline] + fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: (Vec, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>)) { + let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res; + for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) { + // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore.... + self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }); + } + for tx in local_txn { + self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx); + } + //TODO: We need to have a way where outbound HTLC claims can result in us claiming the + //now-on-chain HTLC output for ourselves (and, thereafter, passing the HTLC backwards). + //TODO: We need to handle monitoring of pending offered HTLCs which just hit the chain and + //may be claimed, resulting in us claiming the inbound HTLCs (and back-failing after + //timeouts are hit and our claims confirm). + //TODO: In any case, we need to make sure we remove any pending htlc tracking (via + //fail_backwards or claim_funds) eventually for all HTLCs that were in the channel + } + + /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to + /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. + pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) { + let mut chan = { + let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts(); + if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) { + if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() { + channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id); + } + chan + } else { + return; + } + }; + self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown()); + let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); + if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) { + events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { + msg: update + }); + } + } + + /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction + /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each. + pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) { + for chan in self.list_channels() { + self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id); } - Ok(res.0) } #[inline] @@ -289,6 +543,7 @@ impl ChannelManager { res } + #[inline] fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] { let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]); @@ -297,11 +552,11 @@ impl ChannelManager { res } - fn construct_onion_keys(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result, HandleError> { - let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len()); + // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid + #[inline] + fn construct_onion_keys_callback (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> { let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone(); - let mut blinded_pub = secp_call!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv)); - let mut first_iteration = true; + let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv); for hop in route.hops.iter() { let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv); @@ -312,35 +567,42 @@ impl ChannelManager { let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32]; sha.result(&mut blinding_factor); - if first_iteration { - blinded_pub = secp_call!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv)); - first_iteration = false; - } let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub; - secp_call!(blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &secp_call!(SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)))); - blinded_pub = secp_call!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv)); + blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)?)?; + blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv); + + callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop); + } + + Ok(()) + } + + // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid + fn construct_onion_keys(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result, secp256k1::Error> { + let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len()); + Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| { let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret); res.push(OnionKeys { #[cfg(test)] - shared_secret: shared_secret, + shared_secret, #[cfg(test)] - blinding_factor: blinding_factor, - ephemeral_pubkey: ephemeral_pubkey, - rho: rho, - mu: mu, + blinding_factor: _blinding_factor, + ephemeral_pubkey, + rho, + mu, }); - } + })?; Ok(res) } /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send. - fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route) -> Result<(Vec, u64, u32), HandleError> { + fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec, u64, u32), HandleError> { let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64; - let mut cur_cltv = 0u32; + let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset; let mut last_short_channel_id = 0; let mut res: Vec = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len()); internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::(None); @@ -351,7 +613,7 @@ impl ChannelManager { // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're // the intended recipient). let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat }; - let cltv = if cur_cltv == 0 { hop.cltv_expiry_delta } else { cur_cltv }; + let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv }; res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData { realm: 0, data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData { @@ -363,11 +625,11 @@ impl ChannelManager { }; cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat; if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 { - return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!", msg: None}); + return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!", action: None}); } cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32; if cur_cltv >= 500000000 { - return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!", msg: None}); + return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!", action: None}); } last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id; } @@ -394,7 +656,7 @@ impl ChannelManager { } const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65]; - fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec, onion_keys: Vec, associated_data: Vec) -> Result { + fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec, onion_keys: Vec, associated_data: &[u8; 32]) -> Result { let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65); buf.resize(21*65, 0); @@ -437,7 +699,7 @@ impl ChannelManager { Ok(msgs::OnionPacket{ version: 0, - public_key: onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey, + public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey), hop_data: packet_data, hmac: hmac_res, }) @@ -487,19 +749,197 @@ impl ChannelManager { packet } + #[inline] fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket { let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data); ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..]) } + fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard) { + macro_rules! get_onion_hash { + () => { + { + let mut sha = Sha256::new(); + sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data); + let mut onion_hash = [0; 32]; + sha.result(&mut onion_hash); + onion_hash + } + } + } + + if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key { + log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC with invalid ephemeral pubkey"); + return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC { + channel_id: msg.channel_id, + htlc_id: msg.htlc_id, + sha256_of_onion: get_onion_hash!(), + failure_code: 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, + })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); + } + + let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key); + let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret); + + let mut channel_state = None; + macro_rules! return_err { + ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => { + { + log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg); + if channel_state.is_none() { + channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); + } + return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { + channel_id: msg.channel_id, + htlc_id: msg.htlc_id, + reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data), + })), channel_state.unwrap()); + } + } + } + + if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 { + //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other + //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way, + //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the + //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the + //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the + //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there... + return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!()); + } + + let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu); + hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data); + hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash); + if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) { + return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!()); + } + + let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]); + let next_hop_data = { + let mut decoded = [0; 65]; + chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded); + match msgs::OnionHopData::decode(&decoded[..]) { + Err(err) => { + let error_code = match err { + msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRealmByte => 0x4000 | 1, + _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen + }; + return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]); + }, + Ok(msg) => msg + } + }; + + //TODO: Check that msg.cltv_expiry is within acceptable bounds! + + let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] { + // OUR PAYMENT! + if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward != msg.amount_msat { + return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat)); + } + if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry { + return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry)); + } + + // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc + // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so + // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a + // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed! + + PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { + onion_packet: None, + payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(), + short_channel_id: 0, + incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(), + amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward, + outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value, + }) + } else { + let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65]; + chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]); + chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]); + + let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(); + + let blinding_factor = { + let mut sha = Sha256::new(); + sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]); + sha.input(&shared_secret[..]); + let mut res = [0u8; 32]; + sha.result(&mut res); + match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) { + Err(_) => { + return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!()); + }, + Ok(key) => key + } + }; + + if let Err(_) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) { + return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!()); + } + + let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket { + version: 0, + public_key: Ok(new_pubkey), + hop_data: new_packet_data, + hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(), + }; + + PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { + onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet), + payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(), + short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id, + incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(), + amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward, + outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value, + }) + }; + + channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); + if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info { + if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here + let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned(); + let forwarding_id = match id_option { + None => { + return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]); + }, + Some(id) => id.clone(), + }; + if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = { + let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap(); + if !chan.is_live() { + Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())) + } else { + let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(self.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) }); + if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { + Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())) + } else { + if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { + Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())) + } else { + None + } + } + } + } { + return_err!(err, code, &chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]); + } + } + } + + (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap()) + } + /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id - fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &mut Channel) -> Result { + fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result { let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() { - None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", msg: None}), + None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}), Some(id) => id, }; - let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).unwrap().serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..]; + let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..]; let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { chain_hash: self.genesis_hash, @@ -510,10 +950,11 @@ impl ChannelManager { htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(), fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator), fee_proportional_millionths: self.fee_proportional_millionths, + excess_data: Vec::new(), }; let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]); - let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).unwrap(); //TODO Can we unwrap here? + let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key); //TODO Can we unwrap here? Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate { signature: sig, @@ -521,114 +962,170 @@ impl ChannelManager { }) } - /// Sends a payment along a given route, returning the UpdateAddHTLC message to give to the - /// first hop in route. Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see - /// documentation for RouteHop fields for more info. + /// Sends a payment along a given route. + /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop + /// fields for more info. + /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative + /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided + /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as + /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own + /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of + /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself. /// See-also docs on Channel::send_htlc_and_commit. - pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result, HandleError> { + /// May generate a SendHTLCs event on success, which should be relayed. + pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), HandleError> { if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 { - return Err(HandleError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size", msg: None}); + return Err(HandleError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size", action: None}); } let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id(); for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() { if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id { - return Err(HandleError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us", msg: None}); + return Err(HandleError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us", action: None}); } } - let session_priv = secp_call!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{ + let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{ let mut session_key = [0; 32]; rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key); session_key - })); + }).expect("RNG is bad!"); - let associated_data = Vec::new(); //TODO: What to put here? + let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1; - let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv)?; - let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route)?; - let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, associated_data)?; + //TODO: This should return something other than HandleError, that's really intended for + //p2p-returns only. + let onion_keys = secp_call!(ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv), + HandleError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}); + let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?; + let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash)?; - let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) { - None => return Err(HandleError{err: "No channel available with first hop!", msg: None}), - Some(id) => id.clone() - }; - let res = { - let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap(); - if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey { - return Err(HandleError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!", msg: None}); + let (first_hop_node_id, (update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = { + let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts(); + + let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) { + None => return Err(HandleError{err: "No channel available with first hop!", action: None}), + Some(id) => id.clone() + }; + + let res = { + let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap(); + if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey { + return Err(HandleError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!", action: None}); + } + if !chan.is_live() { + return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected!", action: None}); + } + chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { + route: route.clone(), + session_priv: session_priv.clone(), + }, onion_packet)? + }; + + let first_hop_node_id = route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey; + + match res { + Some(msgs) => (first_hop_node_id, msgs), + None => return Ok(()), } - chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, onion_packet)? }; - if channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { - route: route, - }).is_some() { - // TODO: We need to track these better, we're not generating these, so a - // third-party might make this happen: - panic!("payment_hash was repeated! Don't let this happen"); + if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) { + unimplemented!(); } - Ok(res) + let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); + events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs { + node_id: first_hop_node_id, + updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { + update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add], + update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(), + update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(), + update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(), + commitment_signed, + }, + }); + Ok(()) } /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel. /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel. - pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &Uint256, funding_txo: (Sha256dHash, u16)) { - let (chan, msg) = { - let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - match channel_state.by_id.remove(&temporary_channel_id) { + /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should + /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel). + pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) { + + macro_rules! add_pending_event { + ($event: expr) => { + { + let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); + pending_events.push($event); + } + } + } + + let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = { + let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) { Some(mut chan) => { - match chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo.0, funding_txo.1) { + match chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo) { Ok(funding_msg) => { - (chan, funding_msg) + (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1) }, - Err(_e) => { - //TODO: Push e to pendingevents + Err(e) => { + log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err); + mem::drop(channel_state); + add_pending_event!(events::Event::HandleError { + node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(), + action: e.action, + }); return; - } + }, } }, None => return } }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call, - let chan_monitor = chan.channel_monitor(); - match self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) { - Ok(()) => {}, - Err(_e) => { - //TODO: Push e to pendingevents? - return; - } - }; - - { - let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); - pending_events.push(events::Event::SendFundingCreated { - node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(), - msg: msg, - }); + if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) { + unimplemented!(); } + add_pending_event!(events::Event::SendFundingCreated { + node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(), + msg: msg, + }); let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - channel_state.by_id.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan); + match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) { + hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => { + panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?"); + }, + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { + e.insert(chan); + } + } } - fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result, HandleError> { - if !chan.is_usable() { return Ok(None) } + fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option { + if !chan.should_announce() { return None } - let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone())?; + let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) { + Ok(res) => res, + Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing + }; let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap(); - let our_node_sig = secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key)); + let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key); - Ok(Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures { + Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), node_signature: our_node_sig, bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig, - })) + }) } - pub fn process_pending_htlc_forward(&self) { + /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay. + /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event. + /// Will likely generate further events. + pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) { let mut new_events = Vec::new(); let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new(); { @@ -639,27 +1136,36 @@ impl ChannelManager { return; } - for (short_chan_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() { + for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() { if short_chan_id != 0 { let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) { Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(), None => { failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len()); - for forward_info in pending_forwards { - failed_forwards.push((forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None)); + for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) { + let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { + short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id, + htlc_id: prev_htlc_id, + incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret, + }); + failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None)); } - // TODO: Send a failure packet back on each pending_forward continue; } }; let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap(); let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new(); - for forward_info in pending_forwards { - match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) { + for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) { + let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { + short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id, + htlc_id: prev_htlc_id, + incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret, + }); + match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) { Err(_e) => { let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap(); - failed_forwards.push((forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 7, Some(chan_update))); + failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update))); continue; }, Ok(update_add) => { @@ -680,81 +1186,107 @@ impl ChannelManager { } if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() { - let commitment_msg = match forward_chan.send_commitment() { - Ok(msg) => msg, - Err(_) => { + let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() { + Ok(res) => res, + Err(e) => { + if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{msg: Some(ref _err_msg)}) = &e.action { + } else if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: ref _err_msg}) = &e.action { + } else { + panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met"); + } //TODO: Handle...this is bad! continue; }, }; - new_events.push(events::Event::SendHTLCs { + new_events.push((Some(monitor), events::Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(), - msgs: add_htlc_msgs, - commitment_msg: commitment_msg, - }); + updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { + update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs, + update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(), + update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(), + update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(), + commitment_signed: commitment_msg, + }, + })); } } else { - for forward_info in pending_forwards { - new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived { + for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) { + let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData { + short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id, + htlc_id: prev_htlc_id, + incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret, + }; + match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) { + hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push(prev_hop_data), + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(mut entry) => { entry.insert(vec![prev_hop_data]); }, + }; + new_events.push((None, events::Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash, amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward, - }); + })); } } } } - for failed_forward in failed_forwards.drain(..) { - match failed_forward.2 { - None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &failed_forward.0, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: failed_forward.1, data: &[0;0] }), - Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &failed_forward.0, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: failed_forward.1, data: &chan_update.encode()[..] }), + for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) { + match update { + None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), + Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }), }; } if new_events.is_empty() { return } + new_events.retain(|event| { + if let &Some(ref monitor) = &event.0 { + if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor.clone()) { + unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event... + } + } + true + }); + let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); events.reserve(new_events.len()); for event in new_events.drain(..) { - events.push(event); + events.push(event.1); } } /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown after a PaymentReceived event. pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32]) -> bool { - self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: &[0;0] }) - } - - fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) -> bool { - let mut pending_htlc = { - match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash) { - Some(pending_htlc) => pending_htlc, - None => return false, + let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); + let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash); + if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source { + for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) { + if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); } + self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: Vec::new() }); } - }; - - match pending_htlc { - PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. } => { - pending_htlc = PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }; - }, - _ => {} - } + true + } else { false } + } - match pending_htlc { - PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { .. } => { panic!("WAT"); }, - PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } => { - //TODO: DECRYPT route from OutboundRoute + /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us. + /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here. + /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes + /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may + /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to + /// still-available channels. + fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) { + match source { + HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => { mem::drop(channel_state); + let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }); - false }, - PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret } => { + HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => { let err_packet = match onion_error { HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => { - let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, data).encode(); + let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode(); ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet) }, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => { @@ -762,30 +1294,44 @@ impl ChannelManager { } }; - let (node_id, fail_msg) = { - let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&source_short_channel_id) { + let (node_id, fail_msgs) = { + let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) { Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(), - None => return false + None => return }; let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap(); - match chan.get_update_fail_htlc(payment_hash, err_packet) { + match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, err_packet) { Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg), Err(_e) => { //TODO: Do something with e? - return false; + return; }, } }; - mem::drop(channel_state); - let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); - pending_events.push(events::Event::SendFailHTLC { - node_id, - msg: fail_msg - }); + match fail_msgs { + Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor)) => { + mem::drop(channel_state); - true + if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) { + unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event... + } + + let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); + pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs { + node_id, + updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { + update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(), + update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(), + update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg], + update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(), + commitment_signed: commitment_msg, + }, + }); + }, + None => {}, + } }, } } @@ -793,169 +1339,142 @@ impl ChannelManager { /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true! + /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event. pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool { - self.claim_funds_internal(payment_preimage, true) - } - pub fn claim_funds_internal(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32], from_user: bool) -> bool { let mut sha = Sha256::new(); sha.input(&payment_preimage); let mut payment_hash = [0; 32]; sha.result(&mut payment_hash); - let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let mut pending_htlc = { - match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) { - Some(pending_htlc) => pending_htlc, - None => return false, + let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); + let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash); + if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source { + for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) { + if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); } + self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage); } - }; - - match pending_htlc { - PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, route } => { - if from_user { // This was the end hop back to us - pending_htlc = PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }; - channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { route }); - } else { // This came from the first upstream node - // Bank error in our favor! Maybe we should tell the user this somehow??? - pending_htlc = PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { route }; - channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }); - } - }, - _ => {}, - } - - match pending_htlc { - PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { .. } => { panic!("WAT"); }, - PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } => { - if from_user { - panic!("Called claim_funds with a preimage for an outgoing payment. There is nothing we can do with this, and something is seriously wrong if you knew this..."); - } + true + } else { false } + } + fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) { + match source { + HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => { mem::drop(channel_state); let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage }); - false }, - PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, .. } => { - let (node_id, fulfill_msg) = { - let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&source_short_channel_id) { + HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => { + //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay! + let (node_id, fulfill_msgs) = { + let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) { Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(), - None => return false + None => { + // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to + // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's + // why its missing. + return + } }; let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap(); - match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc(payment_preimage) { + match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) { Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg), Err(_e) => { + // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to + // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain. //TODO: Do something with e? - return false; + return }, } }; mem::drop(channel_state); - let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); - pending_events.push(events::Event::SendFulfillHTLC { - node_id: node_id, - msg: fulfill_msg - }); + if let Some(chan_monitor) = fulfill_msgs.1 { + if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) { + unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event... + } + } - true + if let Some((msg, commitment_msg)) = fulfill_msgs.0 { + let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); + pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs { + node_id: node_id, + updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { + update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(), + update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg], + update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(), + update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(), + commitment_signed: commitment_msg, + } + }); + } }, } } /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey { - PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).unwrap() + PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key) } -} -impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager { - fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec { - let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); - let mut ret = Vec::new(); - mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events); - ret + /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a + /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update + /// operation. + pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) { + unimplemented!(); } -} -impl ChainListener for ChannelManager { - fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) { - let mut new_funding_locked_messages = Vec::new(); - { - let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let mut short_to_ids_to_insert = Vec::new(); - for channel in channel_state.by_id.values_mut() { - match channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched) { - Some(funding_locked) => { - let announcement_sigs = match self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) { - Ok(res) => res, - Err(_e) => { - //TODO: push e on events and blow up the channel (it has bad keys) - continue; - } - }; - new_funding_locked_messages.push(events::Event::SendFundingLocked { - node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(), - msg: funding_locked, - announcement_sigs: announcement_sigs - }); - short_to_ids_to_insert.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id())); - }, - None => {} - } - //TODO: Check if channel was closed (or disabled) here - } - for to_insert in short_to_ids_to_insert { - channel_state.short_to_id.insert(to_insert.0, to_insert.1); - } - } - let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); - for funding_locked in new_funding_locked_messages.drain(..) { - pending_events.push(funding_locked); - } - } - - fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) { - let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - for channel in channel_state.by_id.values_mut() { - if channel.block_disconnected(header) { - //TODO Close channel here - } - } - } -} - -impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager { - //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so) - fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result { + fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result { if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash { - return Err(HandleError{err: "Unknown genesis block hash", msg: None}); + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())); } let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); if channel_state.by_id.contains_key(&msg.temporary_channel_id) { - return Err(HandleError{err: "temporary_channel_id collision!", msg: None}); + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())); } - let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, self.announce_channels_publicly)?; - let accept_msg = channel.get_accept_channel()?; + + let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") { + ChannelKeys { + funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0]).unwrap(), + revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0]).unwrap(), + payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0]).unwrap(), + delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, 0]).unwrap(), + htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0]).unwrap(), + channel_close_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0]).unwrap(), + channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0]).unwrap(), + commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0], + } + } else { + let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32]; + rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed); + match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) { + Ok(key) => key, + Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!") + } + }; + + let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, false, self.announce_channels_publicly, Arc::clone(&self.logger)).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(e))?; + let accept_msg = channel.get_accept_channel(); channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel); Ok(accept_msg) } - fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> { + fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { let (value, output_script, user_id) = { let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.temporary_channel_id) { Some(chan) => { if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { - return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None}) + //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id)); } - chan.accept_channel(&msg)?; + chan.accept_channel(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?; (chan.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get_user_id()) }, - None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None}) + //TODO: same as above + None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id)) } }; let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); @@ -968,53 +1487,63 @@ impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager { Ok(()) } - fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result { - //TODO: broke this - a node shouldn't be able to get their channel removed by sending a - //funding_created a second time, or long after the first, or whatever (note this also - //leaves the short_to_id map in a busted state. - let chan = { + fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result { + let (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update) = { let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - match channel_state.by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) { - Some(mut chan) => { - if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { - return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None}) + match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) { + hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { + if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { + //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id)); } - match chan.funding_created(msg) { - Ok(funding_msg) => { - (chan, funding_msg) + match chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg) { + Ok((funding_msg, monitor_update)) => { + (chan.remove(), funding_msg, monitor_update) }, Err(e) => { - return Err(e); + return Err(e).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e)) } } }, - None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None}) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id)) } }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call, // note that this means if the remote end is misbehaving and sends a message for the same // channel back-to-back with funding_created, we'll end up thinking they sent a message // for a bogus channel. - let chan_monitor = chan.0.channel_monitor(); - self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor)?; + if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { + unimplemented!(); + } let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - channel_state.by_id.insert(chan.1.channel_id, chan.0); - Ok(chan.1) + match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) { + hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => { + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id)) + }, + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { + e.insert(chan); + } + } + Ok(funding_msg) } - fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> { - let (funding_txo, user_id) = { + fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + let (funding_txo, user_id, monitor) = { let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) { Some(chan) => { if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { - return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None}) + //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id)); } - chan.funding_signed(&msg)?; - (chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get_user_id()) + let chan_monitor = chan.funding_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?; + (chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get_user_id(), chan_monitor) }, - None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None}) + None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id)) } }; + if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) { + unimplemented!(); + } let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { funding_txo: funding_txo, @@ -1023,74 +1552,99 @@ impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager { Ok(()) } - fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result, HandleError> { + fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result, MsgHandleErrInternal> { let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) { Some(chan) => { if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { - return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None}) + //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id)); } - chan.funding_locked(&msg)?; - return Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(chan)?); + chan.funding_locked(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?; + return Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(chan)); }, - None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None}) + None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id)) }; } - fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option, Option), HandleError> { - let res = { - let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option, Option), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + let (mut res, chan_option) = { + let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts(); match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => { if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { - return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None}) + //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id)); } - let res = chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg)?; + let res = chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?; if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() { - chan_entry.remove_entry(); - } - res + if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() { + channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id); + } + (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1)) + } else { (res, None) } }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None}) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id)) } }; - for payment_hash in res.2 { + for htlc_source in res.2.drain(..) { // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore.... - self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: &[0; 0] }); + self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }); + } + if let Some(chan) = chan_option { + if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) { + let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); + events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { + msg: update + }); + } } Ok((res.0, res.1)) } - fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result, HandleError> { - let res = { - let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result, MsgHandleErrInternal> { + let (res, chan_option) = { + let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts(); match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => { if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { - return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None}) + //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id)); } - let res = chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg)?; + let res = chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?; if res.1.is_some() { // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to // watch for old state broadcasts)! - chan_entry.remove_entry(); - } - res + if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() { + channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id); + } + (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1)) + } else { (res, None) } }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None}) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id)) } }; if let Some(broadcast_tx) = res.1 { self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx); } + if let Some(chan) = chan_option { + if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) { + let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); + events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { + msg: update + }); + } + } Ok(res.0) } - fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> { + fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack. @@ -1100,307 +1654,187 @@ impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager { //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that, //but we should prevent it anyway. - let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key, &self.our_network_key); - let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret); - - let associated_data = Vec::new(); //TODO: What to put here? - - macro_rules! get_onion_hash { - () => { - { - let mut sha = Sha256::new(); - sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data); - let mut onion_hash = [0; 32]; - sha.result(&mut onion_hash); - onion_hash - } - } - } - - macro_rules! return_err { - ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => { - return Err(msgs::HandleError { - err: $msg, - msg: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::UpdateFailHTLC { - msg: msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { - channel_id: msg.channel_id, - htlc_id: msg.htlc_id, - reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data), - } - }), - }); - } - } - - if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 { - //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other - //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way, - //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the - //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the - //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the - //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there... - return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!()); - } - - let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu); - hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data); - hmac.input(&associated_data[..]); - if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) { - return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!()); - } - - let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]); - let next_hop_data = { - let mut decoded = [0; 65]; - chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded); - match msgs::OnionHopData::decode(&decoded[..]) { - Err(err) => { - let error_code = match err { - msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRealmByte => 0x4000 | 1, - _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen - }; - return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]); - }, - Ok(msg) => msg - } - }; - - let mut pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] { - // OUR PAYMENT! - if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward != msg.amount_msat { - return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat)); - } - if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry { - return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry)); - } - - // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc - // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so - // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a - // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed! - - PendingForwardHTLCInfo { - onion_packet: None, - payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(), - short_channel_id: 0, - prev_short_channel_id: 0, - amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward, - outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value, - } - } else { - let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65]; - chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]); - chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]); - - let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.clone(); - - let blinding_factor = { - let mut sha = Sha256::new(); - sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]); - sha.input(&shared_secret[..]); - let mut res = [0u8; 32]; - sha.result(&mut res); - match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) { - Err(_) => { - // Return temporary node failure as its technically our issue, not the - // channel's issue. - return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]); - }, - Ok(key) => key - } - }; - - match new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) { - Err(_) => { - // Return temporary node failure as its technically our issue, not the - // channel's issue. - return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]); - }, - Ok(_) => {} - }; - - let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket { - version: 0, - public_key: new_pubkey, - hop_data: new_packet_data, - hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(), - }; - - //TODO: Check amt_to_forward and outgoing_cltv_value are within acceptable ranges! - - PendingForwardHTLCInfo { - onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet), - payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(), - short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id, - prev_short_channel_id: 0, - amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward, - outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value, - } - }; - - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg); let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts(); - if pending_forward_info.onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here - let forwarding_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&pending_forward_info.short_channel_id) { - None => { - return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]); - }, - Some(id) => id.clone(), - }; - let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap(); - if !chan.is_live() { - let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap(); - return_err!("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x4000 | 10, &chan_update.encode()[..]); - } - } - - let claimable_htlcs_entry = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(msg.payment_hash.clone()); - - // We dont correctly handle payments that route through us twice on their way to their - // destination. That's OK since those nodes are probably busted or trying to do network - // mapping through repeated loops. In either case, we want them to stop talking to us, so - // we send permanent_node_failure. - match &claimable_htlcs_entry { - &hash_map::Entry::Occupied(ref e) => { - let mut acceptable_cycle = false; - match e.get() { - &PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } => { - acceptable_cycle = pending_forward_info.short_channel_id == 0; - }, - _ => {}, + match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) { + Some(chan) => { + if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { + //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id)); } - if !acceptable_cycle { - return_err!("Payment looped through us twice", 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]); + if !chan.is_usable() { + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet available for receiving HTLCs", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)})); } + chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e)) }, - _ => {}, + None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id)) } + } - let (source_short_channel_id, res) = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) { + fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + let htlc_source = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) { Some(chan) => { if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { - return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None}) - } - if !chan.is_usable() { - return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet available for receiving HTLCs", msg: None}); + //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id)); } - let short_channel_id = chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(); - pending_forward_info.prev_short_channel_id = short_channel_id; - (short_channel_id, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info)?) + chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?.clone() }, - None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None}), //TODO: panic? + None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id)) }; - - match claimable_htlcs_entry { - hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => { - let outbound_route = e.get_mut(); - let route = match outbound_route { - &mut PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { ref route } => { - route.clone() - }, - _ => { panic!("WAT") }, - }; - *outbound_route = PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { - source_short_channel_id, - incoming_packet_shared_secret: shared_secret, - route - }; - }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { - e.insert(PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { - source_short_channel_id, - incoming_packet_shared_secret: shared_secret, - }); - } - } - - Ok(res) - } - - fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> { - { - let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) { - Some(chan) => { - if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { - return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None}) - } - chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg)?; - }, - None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None}) - } - } - //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay! - self.claim_funds_internal(msg.payment_preimage.clone(), false); + self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone()); Ok(()) } - fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> { + fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result, MsgHandleErrInternal> { let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let payment_hash = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) { + let htlc_source = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) { Some(chan) => { if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { - return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None}) + //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id)); } - chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg)? + chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() }).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e)) }, - None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None}) - }; - self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: &msg.reason }); - Ok(()) + None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id)) + }?; + + match htlc_source { + &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, .. } => { + // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler + let mut packet_decrypted = msg.reason.data.clone(); + let mut res = None; + Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| { + if res.is_some() { return; } + + let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret); + + let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len()); + decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0); + let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]); + chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]); + packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp; + + if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::decode(&packet_decrypted) { + if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 2 { + let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret); + + let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um); + hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]); + let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32]; + hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag); + if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) { + const UNKNOWN_CHAN: u16 = 0x4000|10; + const TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE: u16 = 0x4000|7; + match byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]) { + TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE => { + if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 { + let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..4]) as usize; + if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 + update_len { + if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::decode(&err_packet.failuremsg[4..4 + update_len]) { + res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { + msg: chan_update, + }); + } + } + } + }, + UNKNOWN_CHAN => { + // No such next-hop. We know this came from the + // current node as the HMAC validated. + res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { + short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id + }); + }, + _ => {}, //TODO: Enumerate all of these! + } + } + } + } + }).unwrap(); + Ok(res) + }, + _ => { Ok(None) }, + } } - fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> { + fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let payment_hash = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) { + match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) { Some(chan) => { if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { - return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None}) + //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id)); } - chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg)? + chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?; + Ok(()) }, - None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None}) - }; - self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: &[0;0] }); - Ok(()) + None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id)) + } } - fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result { - let mut forward_event = None; - let (res, monitor) = { + fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, chan_monitor) = { let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) { + Some(chan) => { + if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { + //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id)); + } + chan.commitment_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))? + }, + None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id)) + } + }; + if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) { + unimplemented!(); + } + + Ok((revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed)) + } - let ((res, mut forwarding_infos), monitor) = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) { + fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result, MsgHandleErrInternal> { + let ((res, mut pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, chan_monitor), short_channel_id) = { + let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) { Some(chan) => { if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { - return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None}) + //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id)); } - (chan.commitment_signed(&msg)?, chan.channel_monitor()) + (chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?, chan.get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel")) }, - None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None}) - }; + None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id)) + } + }; + if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) { + unimplemented!(); + } + for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) { + self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2); + } + let mut forward_event = None; + if !pending_forwards.is_empty() { + let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() { forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64)); channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap(); } - for forward_info in forwarding_infos.drain(..) { + for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) { match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => { - entry.get_mut().push(forward_info); + entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id: short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }); }, hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { - entry.insert(vec!(forward_info)); + entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id: short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info })); } } } - - (res, monitor) - }; - //TODO: Only if we store HTLC sigs - self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor)?; - + } match forward_event { Some(time) => { let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); @@ -1414,57 +1848,43 @@ impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager { Ok(res) } - fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>, HandleError> { - let (res, monitor) = { - let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) { - Some(chan) => { - if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { - return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None}) - } - (chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg)?, chan.channel_monitor()) - }, - None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None}) - } - }; - self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor)?; - Ok(res) - } - - fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> { + fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) { Some(chan) => { if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { - return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None}) + //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id)); } - chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg) + chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e)) }, - None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None}) + None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id)) } } - fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> { + fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { let (chan_announcement, chan_update) = { let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) { Some(chan) => { if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { - return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None}) + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id)); } if !chan.is_usable() { - return Err(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", msg: None }); + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)})); } let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id(); - let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone())?; + let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) + .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?; let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id; let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap(); - secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 })); - secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 })); + let bad_sig_action = MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature", msg.channel_id); + secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }), bad_sig_action); + secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }), bad_sig_action); - let our_node_sig = secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key)); + let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key); (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement { node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature }, @@ -1474,7 +1894,7 @@ impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager { contents: announcement, }, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()) // can only fail if we're not in a ready state }, - None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None}) + None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id)) } }; let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); @@ -1482,34 +1902,281 @@ impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager { Ok(()) } + +} + +impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager { + fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec { + let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); + let mut ret = Vec::new(); + mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events); + ret + } +} + +impl ChainListener for ChannelManager { + fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) { + let mut new_events = Vec::new(); + let mut failed_channels = Vec::new(); + { + let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts(); + let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id; + channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| { + let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched); + if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res { + let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel); + new_events.push(events::Event::SendFundingLocked { + node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(), + msg: funding_locked, + announcement_sigs: announcement_sigs + }); + short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id()); + } else if let Err(e) = chan_res { + new_events.push(events::Event::HandleError { + node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(), + action: e.action, + }); + if channel.is_shutdown() { + return false; + } + } + if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() { + for tx in txn_matched { + for inp in tx.input.iter() { + if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() { + if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() { + short_to_id.remove(&short_id); + } + // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and + // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its + // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped. + failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown()); + if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) { + new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { + msg: update + }); + } + return false; + } + } + } + } + if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) { + if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() { + short_to_id.remove(&short_id); + } + failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown()); + // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast + // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really + // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler). + failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new(); + if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) { + new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { + msg: update + }); + } + return false; + } + true + }); + } + for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) { + self.finish_force_close_channel(failure); + } + let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); + for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) { + pending_events.push(funding_locked); + } + self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release); + } + + /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown + fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) { + let mut new_events = Vec::new(); + let mut failed_channels = Vec::new(); + { + let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts(); + let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id; + channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| { + if v.block_disconnected(header) { + if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() { + short_to_id.remove(&short_id); + } + failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown()); + if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) { + new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { + msg: update + }); + } + false + } else { + true + } + }); + } + for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) { + self.finish_force_close_channel(failure); + } + if !new_events.is_empty() { + let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); + for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) { + pending_events.push(funding_locked); + } + } + self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel); + } +} + +macro_rules! handle_error { + ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => { + match $internal { + Ok(msg) => Ok(msg), + Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, needs_channel_force_close }) => { + if needs_channel_force_close { + match &err.action { + &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(ref msg) }) => { + if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] { + $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true); + } else { + $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id); + } + }, + &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: None }) => {}, + &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) => {}, + &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }) => { + if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] { + $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true); + } else { + $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id); + } + }, + &None => {}, + } + } + Err(err) + }, + } + } +} + +impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager { + //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so) + fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result { + handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id) + } + + fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> { + handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id) + } + + fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result { + handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id) + } + + fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> { + handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id) + } + + fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result, HandleError> { + handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id) + } + + fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option, Option), HandleError> { + handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id) + } + + fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result, HandleError> { + handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id) + } + + fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> { + handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id) + } + + fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> { + handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id) + } + + fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result, HandleError> { + handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id) + } + + fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> { + handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id) + } + + fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option), HandleError> { + handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id) + } + + fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result, HandleError> { + handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id) + } + + fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> { + handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id) + } + + fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> { + handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id) + } + fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) { - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts(); - let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id; - if no_connection_possible { - channel_state.by_id.retain(move |_, chan| { - if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id { - match chan.get_short_channel_id() { - Some(short_id) => { + let mut new_events = Vec::new(); + let mut failed_channels = Vec::new(); + { + let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts(); + let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id; + if no_connection_possible { + channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| { + if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id { + if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() { short_to_id.remove(&short_id); - }, - None => {}, + } + failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown()); + if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) { + new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { + msg: update + }); + } + false + } else { + true + } + }); + } else { + for chan in channel_state.by_id { + if chan.1.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id { + //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout). Also + //fail and wipe any uncommitted outbound HTLCs as those are considered after + //reconnect. } - //TODO: get the latest commitment tx, any HTLC txn built on top of it, etc out - //of the channel and throw those into the announcement blackhole. - false - } else { - true } - }); - } else { - for chan in channel_state.by_id { - if chan.1.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id { - //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout). Also - //fail and wipe any uncommitted outbound HTLCs as those are considered after - //reconnect. + } + } + for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) { + self.finish_force_close_channel(failure); + } + if !new_events.is_empty() { + let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); + for event in new_events.drain(..) { + pending_events.push(event); + } + } + } + + fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) { + if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] { + for chan in self.list_channels() { + if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id { + self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id); } } + } else { + self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id); } } } @@ -1517,23 +2184,27 @@ impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager { #[cfg(test)] mod tests { use chain::chaininterface; + use chain::transaction::OutPoint; + use chain::chaininterface::ChainListener; use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,OnionKeys}; use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router}; use ln::msgs; use ln::msgs::{MsgEncodable,ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler}; use util::test_utils; use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider}; + use util::logger::Logger; - use bitcoin::util::misc::hex_bytes; use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash; - use bitcoin::util::uint::Uint256; - use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader; + use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader}; use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut}; + use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block; use bitcoin::network::constants::Network; use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize; use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash; - use secp256k1::Secp256k1; + use hex; + + use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message}; use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey}; use crypto::sha2::Sha256; @@ -1541,9 +2212,13 @@ mod tests { use rand::{thread_rng,Rng}; - use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex}; + use std::cell::RefCell; + use std::collections::HashMap; use std::default::Default; + use std::rc::Rc; + use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex}; use std::time::Instant; + use std::mem; fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec { // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests @@ -1552,29 +2227,29 @@ mod tests { let route = Route { hops: vec!( RouteHop { - pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), + pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually }, RouteHop { - pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), + pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually }, RouteHop { - pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), + pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually }, RouteHop { - pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), + pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually }, RouteHop { - pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), + pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually }, ), }; - let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(); + let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(); let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap(); assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len()); @@ -1586,35 +2261,35 @@ mod tests { // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys(); - assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]); - assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]); - assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]); - assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex_bytes("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]); - assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex_bytes("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]); - - assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]); - assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]); - assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]); - assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex_bytes("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]); - assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex_bytes("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]); - - assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]); - assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]); - assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]); - assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex_bytes("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]); - assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex_bytes("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]); - - assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]); - assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]); - assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]); - assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex_bytes("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]); - assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex_bytes("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]); - - assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]); - assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]); - assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]); - assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex_bytes("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]); - assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex_bytes("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]); + assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]); + assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]); + assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]); + assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]); + assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]); + + assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]); + assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]); + assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]); + assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]); + assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]); + + assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]); + assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]); + assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]); + assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]); + assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]); + + assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]); + assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]); + assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]); + assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]); + assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]); + + assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]); + assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]); + assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]); + assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]); + assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]); // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/ let payloads = vec!( @@ -1665,10 +2340,10 @@ mod tests { }, ); - let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, hex_bytes("4242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242").unwrap()).unwrap(); + let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &[0x42; 32]).unwrap(); // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it // anyway... - assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex_bytes("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").unwrap()); + assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap()); } #[test] @@ -1677,47 +2352,66 @@ mod tests { let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys(); let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, 0x2002, &[0; 0]); - assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex_bytes("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").unwrap()); + assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap()); let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, &onion_error.encode()[..]); - assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex_bytes("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").unwrap()); + assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap()); let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret, &onion_packet_1.data[..]); - assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex_bytes("c49a1ce81680f78f5f2000cda36268de34a3f0a0662f55b4e837c83a8773c22aa081bab1616a0011585323930fa5b9fae0c85770a2279ff59ec427ad1bbff9001c0cd1497004bd2a0f68b50704cf6d6a4bf3c8b6a0833399a24b3456961ba00736785112594f65b6b2d44d9f5ea4e49b5e1ec2af978cbe31c67114440ac51a62081df0ed46d4a3df295da0b0fe25c0115019f03f15ec86fabb4c852f83449e812f141a9395b3f70b766ebbd4ec2fae2b6955bd8f32684c15abfe8fd3a6261e52650e8807a92158d9f1463261a925e4bfba44bd20b166d532f0017185c3a6ac7957adefe45559e3072c8dc35abeba835a8cb01a71a15c736911126f27d46a36168ca5ef7dccd4e2886212602b181463e0dd30185c96348f9743a02aca8ec27c0b90dca270").unwrap()); + assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap()); let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret, &onion_packet_2.data[..]); - assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex_bytes("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").unwrap()); + assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("a5d3e8634cfe78b2307d87c6d90be6fe7855b4f2cc9b1dfb19e92e4b79103f61ff9ac25f412ddfb7466e74f81b3e545563cdd8f5524dae873de61d7bdfccd496af2584930d2b566b4f8d3881f8c043df92224f38cf094cfc09d92655989531524593ec6d6caec1863bdfaa79229b5020acc034cd6deeea1021c50586947b9b8e6faa83b81fbfa6133c0af5d6b07c017f7158fa94f0d206baf12dda6b68f785b773b360fd0497e16cc402d779c8d48d0fa6315536ef0660f3f4e1865f5b38ea49c7da4fd959de4e83ff3ab686f059a45c65ba2af4a6a79166aa0f496bf04d06987b6d2ea205bdb0d347718b9aeff5b61dfff344993a275b79717cd815b6ad4c0beb568c4ac9c36ff1c315ec1119a1993c4b61e6eaa0375e0aaf738ac691abd3263bf937e3").unwrap()); let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret, &onion_packet_3.data[..]); - assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex_bytes("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").unwrap()); + assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("aac3200c4968f56b21f53e5e374e3a2383ad2b1b6501bbcc45abc31e59b26881b7dfadbb56ec8dae8857add94e6702fb4c3a4de22e2e669e1ed926b04447fc73034bb730f4932acd62727b75348a648a1128744657ca6a4e713b9b646c3ca66cac02cdab44dd3439890ef3aaf61708714f7375349b8da541b2548d452d84de7084bb95b3ac2345201d624d31f4d52078aa0fa05a88b4e20202bd2b86ac5b52919ea305a8949de95e935eed0319cf3cf19ebea61d76ba92532497fcdc9411d06bcd4275094d0a4a3c5d3a945e43305a5a9256e333e1f64dbca5fcd4e03a39b9012d197506e06f29339dfee3331995b21615337ae060233d39befea925cc262873e0530408e6990f1cbd233a150ef7b004ff6166c70c68d9f8c853c1abca640b8660db2921").unwrap()); let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret, &onion_packet_4.data[..]); - assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex_bytes("9c5add3963fc7f6ed7f148623c84134b5647e1306419dbe2174e523fa9e2fbed3a06a19f899145610741c83ad40b7712aefaddec8c6baf7325d92ea4ca4d1df8bce517f7e54554608bf2bd8071a4f52a7a2f7ffbb1413edad81eeea5785aa9d990f2865dc23b4bc3c301a94eec4eabebca66be5cf638f693ec256aec514620cc28ee4a94bd9565bc4d4962b9d3641d4278fb319ed2b84de5b665f307a2db0f7fbb757366067d88c50f7e829138fde4f78d39b5b5802f1b92a8a820865af5cc79f9f30bc3f461c66af95d13e5e1f0381c184572a91dee1c849048a647a1158cf884064deddbf1b0b88dfe2f791428d0ba0f6fb2f04e14081f69165ae66d9297c118f0907705c9c4954a199bae0bb96fad763d690e7daa6cfda59ba7f2c8d11448b604d12d").unwrap()); + assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("9c5add3963fc7f6ed7f148623c84134b5647e1306419dbe2174e523fa9e2fbed3a06a19f899145610741c83ad40b7712aefaddec8c6baf7325d92ea4ca4d1df8bce517f7e54554608bf2bd8071a4f52a7a2f7ffbb1413edad81eeea5785aa9d990f2865dc23b4bc3c301a94eec4eabebca66be5cf638f693ec256aec514620cc28ee4a94bd9565bc4d4962b9d3641d4278fb319ed2b84de5b665f307a2db0f7fbb757366067d88c50f7e829138fde4f78d39b5b5802f1b92a8a820865af5cc79f9f30bc3f461c66af95d13e5e1f0381c184572a91dee1c849048a647a1158cf884064deddbf1b0b88dfe2f791428d0ba0f6fb2f04e14081f69165ae66d9297c118f0907705c9c4954a199bae0bb96fad763d690e7daa6cfda59ba7f2c8d11448b604d12d").unwrap()); } - static mut CHAN_COUNT: u16 = 0; - fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction) { + fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) { + assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx)); let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; - let chan_id = unsafe { CHAN_COUNT }; - chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id as u32; 1]); + chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]); for i in 2..100 { header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]); } } - fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &ChannelManager, chain_a: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, node_b: &ChannelManager, chain_b: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, Uint256) { - let open_chan = node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42).unwrap(); - let accept_chan = node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan).unwrap(); - node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan).unwrap(); + struct Node { + chain_monitor: Arc, + tx_broadcaster: Arc, + chan_monitor: Arc, + node: Arc, + router: Router, + network_payment_count: Rc>, + network_chan_count: Rc>, + } + + fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) { + node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42).unwrap(); + + let events_1 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1); + let accept_chan = match events_1[0] { + Event::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, ref msg } => { + assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()); + node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap() + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + }; + + node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan).unwrap(); - let chan_id = unsafe { CHAN_COUNT }; + let chan_id = *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow(); let tx; let funding_output; - let events_1 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events(); - assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1); - match events_1[0] { + let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1); + match events_2[0] { Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => { assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, 100000); assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42); @@ -1725,30 +2419,43 @@ mod tests { tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut { value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(), }]}; - funding_output = (Sha256dHash::from_data(&serialize(&tx).unwrap()[..]), 0); + funding_output = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_data(&serialize(&tx).unwrap()[..]), 0); - node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output.clone()); - //TODO: Check that we got added to chan_monitor_a! + node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output); + let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output); + added_monitors.clear(); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } - let events_2 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events(); - assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1); - let funding_signed = match events_2[0] { + let events_3 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1); + let funding_signed = match events_3[0] { Event::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, ref msg } => { - assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id()); - node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap() - //TODO: Check that we got added to chan_monitor_b! + assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()); + let res = node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap(); + let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output); + added_monitors.clear(); + res }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), }; - node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed).unwrap(); + node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed).unwrap(); + { + let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output); + added_monitors.clear(); + } - let events_3 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events(); - assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1); - match events_3[0] { + let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1); + match events_4[0] { Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => { assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42); assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output); @@ -1756,47 +2463,47 @@ mod tests { _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), }; - confirm_transaction(&chain_a, &tx); - let events_4 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events(); - assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1); - match events_4[0] { + confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, chan_id); + let events_5 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1); + match events_5[0] { Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => { - assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id()); + assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()); assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none()); - node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap() + node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap() }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), }; let channel_id; - confirm_transaction(&chain_b, &tx); - let events_5 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events(); - assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1); - let as_announcement_sigs = match events_5[0] { + confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, chan_id); + let events_6 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1); + let as_announcement_sigs = match events_6[0] { Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => { - assert_eq!(*node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id()); + assert_eq!(*node_id, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()); channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone(); - let as_announcement_sigs = node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap().unwrap(); - node_a.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &(*announcement_sigs).clone().unwrap()).unwrap(); + let as_announcement_sigs = node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap().unwrap(); + node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &(*announcement_sigs).clone().unwrap()).unwrap(); as_announcement_sigs }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), }; - let events_6 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events(); - assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1); - let (announcement, as_update) = match events_6[0] { + let events_7 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1); + let (announcement, as_update) = match events_7[0] { Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => { (msg, update_msg) }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), }; - node_b.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs).unwrap(); - let events_7 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events(); - assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1); - let bs_update = match events_7[0] { + node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs).unwrap(); + let events_8 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1); + let bs_update = match events_8[0] { Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => { assert!(*announcement == *msg); update_msg @@ -1804,19 +2511,37 @@ mod tests { _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), }; - unsafe { - CHAN_COUNT += 1; - } + *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow_mut() += 1; - ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone(), channel_id) + ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone(), channel_id, tx) } - fn close_channel(outbound_node: &ChannelManager, outbound_broadcaster: &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, inbound_node: &ChannelManager, inbound_broadcaster: &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, channel_id: &Uint256, close_inbound_first: bool) { - let (node_a, broadcaster_a) = if close_inbound_first { (inbound_node, inbound_broadcaster) } else { (outbound_node, outbound_broadcaster) }; - let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (outbound_node, outbound_broadcaster) } else { (inbound_node, inbound_broadcaster) }; + fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) { + let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[a], &nodes[b]); + for node in nodes { + assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap()); + node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap(); + node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap(); + } + (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4) + } + + fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) { + let (node_a, broadcaster_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) }; + let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) }; let (tx_a, tx_b); - let shutdown_a = node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap(); + node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap(); + let events_1 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1); + let shutdown_a = match events_1[0] { + Event::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => { + assert_eq!(node_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id()); + msg.clone() + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + }; + let (shutdown_b, mut closing_signed_b) = node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_a).unwrap(); if !close_inbound_first { assert!(closing_signed_b.is_none()); @@ -1844,6 +2569,29 @@ mod tests { tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0); } assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b); + let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new(); + funding_tx_map.insert(funding_tx.txid(), funding_tx); + tx_a.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap(); + + let events_2 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1); + let as_update = match events_2[0] { + Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => { + msg.clone() + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + }; + + let events_3 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1); + let bs_update = match events_3[0] { + Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => { + msg.clone() + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + }; + + (as_update, bs_update) } struct SendEvent { @@ -1854,18 +2602,20 @@ mod tests { impl SendEvent { fn from_event(event: Event) -> SendEvent { match event { - Event::SendHTLCs { node_id, msgs, commitment_msg } => { - SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: msgs, commitment_msg: commitment_msg } + Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, commitment_signed } } => { + assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); + SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: commitment_signed } }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"), } } } - static mut PAYMENT_COUNT: u8 = 0; - fn send_along_route(origin_node: &ChannelManager, route: Route, expected_route: &[&ChannelManager], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) { - let our_payment_preimage = unsafe { [PAYMENT_COUNT; 32] }; - unsafe { PAYMENT_COUNT += 1 }; + fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) { + let our_payment_preimage = [*origin_node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32]; + *origin_node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1; let our_payment_hash = { let mut sha = Sha256::new(); sha.input(&our_payment_preimage[..]); @@ -1875,33 +2625,60 @@ mod tests { }; let mut payment_event = { - let msgs = origin_node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap().unwrap(); - SendEvent { - node_id: expected_route[0].get_our_node_id(), - msgs: vec!(msgs.0), - commitment_msg: msgs.1, + origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap(); + { + let mut added_monitors = origin_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1); + added_monitors.clear(); } + + let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0)) }; let mut prev_node = origin_node; - for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() { - assert_eq!(node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id); + for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() { + assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id); + + node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap(); + { + let added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0); + } - node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap(); - let revoke_and_ack = node.handle_commitment_signed(&prev_node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); - assert!(prev_node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none()); + let revoke_and_ack = node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); + { + let mut added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1); + added_monitors.clear(); + } + assert!(prev_node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none()); + let prev_revoke_and_ack = prev_node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.1.unwrap()).unwrap(); + { + let mut added_monitors = prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2); + added_monitors.clear(); + } + assert!(node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &prev_revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none()); + assert!(prev_revoke_and_ack.1.is_none()); + { + let mut added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1); + added_monitors.clear(); + } - let events_1 = node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1); match events_1[0] { Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), }; - node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now(); - node.process_pending_htlc_forward(); + node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now(); + node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards(); - let mut events_2 = node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1); if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 { match events_2[0] { @@ -1912,9 +2689,12 @@ mod tests { _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } } else { - for event in events_2.drain(..) { - payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(event); + { + let mut added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1); + added_monitors.clear(); } + payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0)); assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1); } @@ -1924,26 +2704,70 @@ mod tests { (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) } - fn claim_payment(origin_node: &ChannelManager, expected_route: &[&ChannelManager], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) { - assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().claim_funds(our_payment_preimage)); + fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) { + assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage)); + { + let mut added_monitors = expected_route.last().unwrap().chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1); + added_monitors.clear(); + } + + let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None; + macro_rules! update_fulfill_dance { + ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => { + { + $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap(); + { + let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap(); + if $last_node { + assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0); + } else { + assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1); + } + added_monitors.clear(); + } + let revoke_and_commit = $node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1).unwrap(); + { + let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1); + added_monitors.clear(); + } + assert!($prev_node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.0).unwrap().is_none()); + let revoke_and_ack = $prev_node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.1.unwrap()).unwrap(); + assert!(revoke_and_ack.1.is_none()); + { + let mut added_monitors = $prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2); + added_monitors.clear(); + } + assert!($node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none()); + { + let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1); + added_monitors.clear(); + } + } + } + } - let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().get_our_node_id(); + let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(); let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap(); - let mut next_msg = None; for node in expected_route.iter().rev() { - assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.get_our_node_id()); - match next_msg { - Some(msg) => { - node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&prev_node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap(); - }, None => {} + assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id()); + if next_msgs.is_some() { + update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, false); } - let events = node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); match events[0] { - Event::SendFulfillHTLC { ref node_id, ref msg } => { + Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed } } => { + assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1); + assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); expected_next_node = node_id.clone(); - next_msg = Some(msg.clone()); + next_msgs = Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), }; @@ -1951,10 +2775,10 @@ mod tests { prev_node = node; } - assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.get_our_node_id()); - origin_node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&expected_route.first().unwrap().get_our_node_id(), &next_msg.unwrap()).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id()); + update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true); - let events = origin_node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); match events[0] { Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => { @@ -1964,25 +2788,27 @@ mod tests { } } - fn route_payment(origin_node: &ChannelManager, origin_router: &Router, expected_route: &[&ChannelManager], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) { - let route = origin_router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().get_our_node_id(), &Vec::new(), recv_value, 142).unwrap(); + const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32; + + fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) { + let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(); assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len()); for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) { - assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.get_our_node_id()); + assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id()); } send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value) } - fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &ChannelManager, origin_router: &Router, expected_route: &[&ChannelManager], recv_value: u64) { - let route = origin_router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().get_our_node_id(), &Vec::new(), recv_value, 142).unwrap(); + fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) { + let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(); assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len()); for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) { - assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.get_our_node_id()); + assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id()); } - let our_payment_preimage = unsafe { [PAYMENT_COUNT; 32] }; - unsafe { PAYMENT_COUNT += 1 }; + let our_payment_preimage = [*origin_node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32]; + *origin_node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1; let our_payment_hash = { let mut sha = Sha256::new(); sha.input(&our_payment_preimage[..]); @@ -1991,42 +2817,82 @@ mod tests { ret }; - let err = origin_node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap(); + let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap(); assert_eq!(err.err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"); } - fn send_payment(origin_node: &ChannelManager, origin_router: &Router, expected_route: &[&ChannelManager], recv_value: u64) { - let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(origin_node, origin_router, expected_route, recv_value).0; - claim_payment(origin_node, expected_route, our_payment_preimage); + fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) { + let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0; + claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage); } - fn send_failed_payment(origin_node: &ChannelManager, origin_router: &Router, expected_route: &[&ChannelManager]) { - let route = origin_router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().get_our_node_id(), &Vec::new(), 1000000, 142).unwrap(); - assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len()); - for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) { - assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.get_our_node_id()); + fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) { + assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash)); + { + let mut added_monitors = expected_route.last().unwrap().chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1); + added_monitors.clear(); } - let our_payment_hash = send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, 1000000).1; - assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash)); + let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None; + macro_rules! update_fail_dance { + ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => { + { + $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap(); + let revoke_and_commit = $node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1).unwrap(); + + { + let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1); + added_monitors.clear(); + } + assert!($prev_node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.0).unwrap().is_none()); + { + let mut added_monitors = $prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1); + added_monitors.clear(); + } + let revoke_and_ack = $prev_node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.1.unwrap()).unwrap(); + { + let mut added_monitors = $prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1); + added_monitors.clear(); + } + assert!(revoke_and_ack.1.is_none()); + assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); + assert!($node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none()); + { + let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap(); + if $last_node { + assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1); + } else { + assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2); + assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0); + } + added_monitors.clear(); + } + } + } + } - let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().get_our_node_id(); + let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(); let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap(); - let mut next_msg = None; for node in expected_route.iter().rev() { - assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.get_our_node_id()); - match next_msg { - Some(msg) => { - node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&prev_node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap(); - }, None => {} + assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id()); + if next_msgs.is_some() { + update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, false); } - let events = node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); match events[0] { - Event::SendFailHTLC { ref node_id, ref msg } => { + Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed } } => { + assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1); + assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); expected_next_node = node_id.clone(); - next_msg = Some(msg.clone()); + next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), }; @@ -2034,10 +2900,10 @@ mod tests { prev_node = node; } - assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.get_our_node_id()); - origin_node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&expected_route.first().unwrap().get_our_node_id(), &next_msg.unwrap()).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id()); + update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true); - let events = origin_node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); match events[0] { Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash } => { @@ -2047,193 +2913,512 @@ mod tests { } } + fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec { + let mut nodes = Vec::new(); + let mut rng = thread_rng(); + let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); + let logger: Arc = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()); + + let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0)); + let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0)); + + for _ in 0..node_count { + let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }); + let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger))); + let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())}); + let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone())); + let node_id = { + let mut key_slice = [0; 32]; + rng.fill_bytes(&mut key_slice); + SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &key_slice).unwrap() + }; + let node = ChannelManager::new(node_id.clone(), 0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap(); + let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger)); + nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router, + network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(), + network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(), + }); + } + + nodes + } + #[test] fn fake_network_test() { // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways. - let mut rng = thread_rng(); - let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); - - let feeest_1 = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_vbyte: 1 }); - let chain_monitor_1 = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new()); - let chan_monitor_1 = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor{}); - let tx_broadcaster_1 = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())}); - let node_id_1 = { - let mut key_slice = [0; 32]; - rng.fill_bytes(&mut key_slice); - SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &key_slice).unwrap() - }; - let node_1 = ChannelManager::new(node_id_1.clone(), 0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest_1.clone(), chan_monitor_1.clone(), chain_monitor_1.clone(), tx_broadcaster_1.clone()).unwrap(); - let router_1 = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id_1).unwrap()); - - let feeest_2 = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_vbyte: 1 }); - let chain_monitor_2 = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new()); - let chan_monitor_2 = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor{}); - let tx_broadcaster_2 = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())}); - let node_id_2 = { - let mut key_slice = [0; 32]; - rng.fill_bytes(&mut key_slice); - SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &key_slice).unwrap() - }; - let node_2 = ChannelManager::new(node_id_2.clone(), 0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest_2.clone(), chan_monitor_2.clone(), chain_monitor_2.clone(), tx_broadcaster_2.clone()).unwrap(); - let router_2 = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id_2).unwrap()); - - let feeest_3 = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_vbyte: 1 }); - let chain_monitor_3 = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new()); - let chan_monitor_3 = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor{}); - let tx_broadcaster_3 = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())}); - let node_id_3 = { - let mut key_slice = [0; 32]; - rng.fill_bytes(&mut key_slice); - SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &key_slice).unwrap() - }; - let node_3 = ChannelManager::new(node_id_3.clone(), 0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest_3.clone(), chan_monitor_3.clone(), chain_monitor_3.clone(), tx_broadcaster_3.clone()).unwrap(); - let router_3 = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id_3).unwrap()); - - let feeest_4 = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_vbyte: 1 }); - let chain_monitor_4 = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new()); - let chan_monitor_4 = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor{}); - let tx_broadcaster_4 = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())}); - let node_id_4 = { - let mut key_slice = [0; 32]; - rng.fill_bytes(&mut key_slice); - SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &key_slice).unwrap() - }; - let node_4 = ChannelManager::new(node_id_4.clone(), 0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest_4.clone(), chan_monitor_4.clone(), chain_monitor_4.clone(), tx_broadcaster_4.clone()).unwrap(); - let router_4 = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id_4).unwrap()); + let nodes = create_network(4); // Create some initial channels - let chan_announcement_1 = create_chan_between_nodes(&node_1, &chain_monitor_1, &node_2, &chain_monitor_2); - for router in vec!(&router_1, &router_2, &router_3, &router_4) { - assert!(router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement_1.0).unwrap()); - router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement_1.1).unwrap(); - router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement_1.2).unwrap(); - } - let chan_announcement_2 = create_chan_between_nodes(&node_2, &chain_monitor_2, &node_3, &chain_monitor_3); - for router in vec!(&router_1, &router_2, &router_3, &router_4) { - assert!(router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement_2.0).unwrap()); - router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement_2.1).unwrap(); - router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement_2.2).unwrap(); - } - let chan_announcement_3 = create_chan_between_nodes(&node_3, &chain_monitor_3, &node_4, &chain_monitor_4); - for router in vec!(&router_1, &router_2, &router_3, &router_4) { - assert!(router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement_3.0).unwrap()); - router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement_3.1).unwrap(); - router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement_3.2).unwrap(); - } + let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); + let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2); + let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3); // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels... - send_payment(&node_1, &router_1, &vec!(&*node_2, &*node_3, &*node_4)[..], 8000000); - send_payment(&node_1, &router_1, &vec!(&*node_2, &*node_3, &*node_4)[..], 8000000); - send_payment(&node_1, &router_1, &vec!(&*node_2, &*node_3, &*node_4)[..], 8000000); - send_payment(&node_1, &router_1, &vec!(&*node_2, &*node_3, &*node_4)[..], 8000000); - send_payment(&node_1, &router_1, &vec!(&*node_2, &*node_3, &*node_4)[..], 8000000); + send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000); + send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000); + send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000); + send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000); // Send some more payments - send_payment(&node_2, &router_2, &vec!(&*node_3, &*node_4)[..], 1000000); - send_payment(&node_4, &router_4, &vec!(&*node_3, &*node_2, &*node_1)[..], 1000000); - send_payment(&node_4, &router_4, &vec!(&*node_3, &*node_2)[..], 1000000); + send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000); + send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000); + send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000); // Test failure packets - send_failed_payment(&node_1, &router_1, &vec!(&*node_2, &*node_3, &*node_4)[..]); + let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1; + fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1); // Add a new channel that skips 3 - let chan_announcement_4 = create_chan_between_nodes(&node_2, &chain_monitor_2, &node_4, &chain_monitor_4); - for router in vec!(&router_1, &router_2, &router_3, &router_4) { - assert!(router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement_4.0).unwrap()); - router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement_4.1).unwrap(); - router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement_4.2).unwrap(); - } + let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3); - send_payment(&node_1, &router_1, &vec!(&*node_2, &*node_4)[..], 1000000); - send_payment(&node_3, &router_3, &vec!(&*node_4)[..], 1000000); - send_payment(&node_2, &router_2, &vec!(&*node_4)[..], 8000000); - send_payment(&node_2, &router_2, &vec!(&*node_4)[..], 8000000); - send_payment(&node_2, &router_2, &vec!(&*node_4)[..], 8000000); - send_payment(&node_2, &router_2, &vec!(&*node_4)[..], 8000000); - send_payment(&node_2, &router_2, &vec!(&*node_4)[..], 8000000); + send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000); + send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000); + send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000); + send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000); + send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000); + send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000); + send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000); // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3); hops.push(RouteHop { - pubkey: node_3.get_our_node_id(), - short_channel_id: chan_announcement_2.1.contents.short_channel_id, + pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), + short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, fee_msat: 0, - cltv_expiry_delta: chan_announcement_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32 + cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32 }); hops.push(RouteHop { - pubkey: node_4.get_our_node_id(), - short_channel_id: chan_announcement_3.1.contents.short_channel_id, + pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), + short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id, fee_msat: 0, - cltv_expiry_delta: chan_announcement_4.2.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32 + cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32 }); hops.push(RouteHop { - pubkey: node_2.get_our_node_id(), - short_channel_id: chan_announcement_4.1.contents.short_channel_id, + pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), + short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id, fee_msat: 1000000, - cltv_expiry_delta: 142, + cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV, }); - hops[1].fee_msat = chan_announcement_4.2.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_announcement_4.2.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000; - hops[0].fee_msat = chan_announcement_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_announcement_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000; - let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&node_2, Route { hops }, &vec!(&*node_3, &*node_4, &*node_2)[..], 1000000).0; + hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000; + hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000; + let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0; let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3); hops.push(RouteHop { - pubkey: node_4.get_our_node_id(), - short_channel_id: chan_announcement_4.1.contents.short_channel_id, + pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), + short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id, fee_msat: 0, - cltv_expiry_delta: chan_announcement_3.2.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32 + cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32 }); hops.push(RouteHop { - pubkey: node_3.get_our_node_id(), - short_channel_id: chan_announcement_3.1.contents.short_channel_id, + pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), + short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id, fee_msat: 0, - cltv_expiry_delta: chan_announcement_2.2.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32 + cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32 }); hops.push(RouteHop { - pubkey: node_2.get_our_node_id(), - short_channel_id: chan_announcement_2.1.contents.short_channel_id, + pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), + short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, fee_msat: 1000000, - cltv_expiry_delta: 142, + cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV, }); - hops[1].fee_msat = chan_announcement_2.2.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_announcement_2.2.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000; - hops[0].fee_msat = chan_announcement_3.2.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_announcement_3.2.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000; - let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&node_2, Route { hops }, &vec!(&*node_4, &*node_3, &*node_2)[..], 1000000).0; + hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000; + hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000; + let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1; // Claim the rebalances... - claim_payment(&node_2, &vec!(&*node_4, &*node_3, &*node_2)[..], payment_preimage_2); - claim_payment(&node_2, &vec!(&*node_3, &*node_4, &*node_2)[..], payment_preimage_1); + fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2); + claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1); // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4 - let chan_announcement_5 = create_chan_between_nodes(&node_2, &chain_monitor_2, &node_4, &chain_monitor_4); - for router in vec!(&router_1, &router_2, &router_3, &router_4) { - assert!(router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement_5.0).unwrap()); - router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement_5.1).unwrap(); - router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement_5.2).unwrap(); - } + let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3); // Send some payments across both channels - let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&node_1, &router_1, &vec!(&*node_2, &*node_4)[..], 3000000).0; - let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&node_1, &router_1, &vec!(&*node_2, &*node_4)[..], 3000000).0; - let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&node_1, &router_1, &vec!(&*node_2, &*node_4)[..], 3000000).0; + let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0; + let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0; + let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0; - route_over_limit(&node_1, &router_1, &vec!(&*node_2, &*node_4)[..], 3000000); + route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000); //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full - claim_payment(&node_1, &vec!(&*node_2, &*node_4)[..], payment_preimage_3); - claim_payment(&node_1, &vec!(&*node_2, &*node_4)[..], payment_preimage_4); - claim_payment(&node_1, &vec!(&*node_2, &*node_4)[..], payment_preimage_5); + claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3); + claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4); + claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5); // Close down the channels... - close_channel(&node_1, &tx_broadcaster_1, &node_2, &tx_broadcaster_2, &chan_announcement_1.3, true); - close_channel(&node_2, &tx_broadcaster_2, &node_3, &tx_broadcaster_3, &chan_announcement_2.3, false); - close_channel(&node_3, &tx_broadcaster_3, &node_4, &tx_broadcaster_4, &chan_announcement_3.3, true); - close_channel(&node_2, &tx_broadcaster_2, &node_4, &tx_broadcaster_4, &chan_announcement_4.3, false); + close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true); + close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false); + close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true); + close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false); + close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false); + + // Check that we processed all pending events + for node in nodes { + assert_eq!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0); + assert_eq!(node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0); + } + } + + #[derive(PartialEq)] + enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS } + fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec { + let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); + assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 }); + + let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2); + + if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx { + res.push(explicit_tx.clone()); + } else { + for tx in node_txn.iter() { + if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() { + let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new(); + funding_tx_map.insert(chan.3.txid(), chan.3.clone()); + tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap(); + res.push(tx.clone()); + } + } + } + assert_eq!(res.len(), 1); + + if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE { + for tx in node_txn.iter() { + if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() { + let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new(); + funding_tx_map.insert(res[0].txid(), res[0].clone()); + tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap(); + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT { + assert!(tx.lock_time != 0); + } else { + assert!(tx.lock_time == 0); + } + res.push(tx.clone()); + break; + } + } + assert_eq!(res.len(), 2); + } + node_txn.clear(); + res + } + + fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec) -> Vec { + let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); + + assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1); + assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); + let mut found_prev = false; + + for tx in prev_txn { + if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() { + let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new(); + funding_tx_map.insert(tx.txid(), tx.clone()); + node_txn[0].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap(); + + assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output + assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx + + found_prev = true; + break; + } + } + assert!(found_prev); + + let mut res = Vec::new(); + mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res); + res + } + + fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec, a: usize, b: usize) { + let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1); + let as_update = match events_1[0] { + Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => { + msg.clone() + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + }; + + let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1); + let bs_update = match events_2[0] { + Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => { + msg.clone() + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + }; + + for node in nodes { + node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap(); + node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap(); + } + } + + #[test] + fn channel_monitor_network_test() { + // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and + // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states. + let nodes = create_network(5); + + // Create some initial channels + let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); + let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2); + let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3); + let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4); + + // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels... + send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000); + send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000); + send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000); + send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000); + + // Simple case with no pending HTLCs: + nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true); + { + let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE); + let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; + nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1); + test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE); + } + get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1); + assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0); + assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1); + + // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close: + let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0; + + // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout + nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true); + { + let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT); + let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; + nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1); + test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE); + } + get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2); + assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0); + assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1); + + macro_rules! claim_funds { + ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => { + { + assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage)); + { + let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1); + added_monitors.clear(); + } + + let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + match events[0] { + Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => { + assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id()); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + }; + } + } + } + + // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2] + // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces) + nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true); + { + let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT); + + // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage + claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1); + + let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; + nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1); + + check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn); + } + get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3); + assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0); + assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1); + + // One pending HTLC to time out: + let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0; + + { + let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; + nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]); + for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 3 { + header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; + nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]); + } + + let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT); + + // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage + claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2); + + header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; + nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]); + for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 3 { + header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; + nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]); + } + + test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS); + + header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; + nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5); + + check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn); + } + get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4); + assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0); + assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0); + + // Create some new channels: + let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); + + // A pending HTLC which will be revoked: + let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0; + // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0] + let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone(); + // Revoke the old state + claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3); + + { + let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; + nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1); + { + let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); + assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected + assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); + + let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new(); + funding_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone()); + node_txn[0].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap(); + node_txn.swap_remove(0); + } + test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE); + + nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1); + let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT); + header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; + nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1); + + //TODO: At this point nodes[1] should claim the revoked HTLC-Timeout output, but that's + //not yet implemented in ChannelMonitor + } + get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1); + assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0); + assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0); // Check that we processed all pending events - for node in vec!(&node_1, &node_2, &node_3, &node_4) { - assert_eq!(node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0); + for node in nodes { + assert_eq!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0); + assert_eq!(node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0); + } + } + + #[test] + fn test_unconf_chan() { + // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side + let nodes = create_network(2); + create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); + + let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1); + mem::drop(channel_state); + + let mut headers = Vec::new(); + let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; + headers.push(header.clone()); + for _i in 2..100 { + header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; + headers.push(header.clone()); + } + while !headers.is_empty() { + nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap()); + } + let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0); + assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0); + } + + #[test] + fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() { + //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs + let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); + let nodes = create_network(2); + + let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]); + + let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap(); + let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap(); + + let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap() } ); + + let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key); + let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key); + + let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(); + let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(); + + let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..]; + + let mut chan_announcement; + + macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg { + () => { + msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement { + features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(), + chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(), + short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), + node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key }, + node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key }, + bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key }, + bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key }, + excess_data: Vec::new(), + }; + } + } + + macro_rules! sign_msg { + ($unsigned_msg: expr) => { + let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap(); + let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key); + let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key); + let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key); + let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key); + chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement { + node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig}, + node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig}, + bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig }, + bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig }, + contents: $unsigned_msg + } + } } + + let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!(); + sign_msg!(unsigned_msg); + assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true); + let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap() } ); + + // Configured with Network::Testnet + let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!(); + unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash(); + sign_msg!(unsigned_msg); + assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err()); + + let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!(); + unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]); + sign_msg!(unsigned_msg); + assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err()); } }