X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=src%2Fln%2Fchannelmanager.rs;h=82fa06de1ccedd5aedb8adc5d60879b6e8e14d53;hb=497643a65b67ee0ecc7d09a94459c0f42cc5ac99;hp=fe18560caf34b45f8b6ee33f3c078368be145d40;hpb=e7526112470409c921e08da91dee8eeeaf0b0563;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/src/ln/channelmanager.rs b/src/ln/channelmanager.rs index fe18560c..d6ba67c2 100644 --- a/src/ln/channelmanager.rs +++ b/src/ln/channelmanager.rs @@ -1,3 +1,13 @@ +//! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here. +//! +//! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is +//! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those +//! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s). +//! +//! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing +//! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might +//! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages). + use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader; use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction; use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block; @@ -12,14 +22,17 @@ use secp256k1; use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator}; use chain::transaction::OutPoint; -use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelKeys}; -use ln::channelmonitor::ManyChannelMonitor; +use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelKeys}; +use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS}; use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop}; use ln::msgs; -use ln::msgs::{HandleError,ChannelMessageHandler,MsgEncodable,MsgDecodable}; +use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, HandleError, RAACommitmentOrder}; use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng}; use util::sha2::Sha256; +use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable}; use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20; +use util::logger::Logger; +use util::errors::APIError; use crypto; use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult}; @@ -30,39 +43,86 @@ use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher; use std::{ptr, mem}; use std::collections::HashMap; use std::collections::hash_map; +use std::io::Cursor; use std::sync::{Mutex,MutexGuard,Arc}; use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering}; use std::time::{Instant,Duration}; +/// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself: +/// +/// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should +/// forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail +/// the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer. +/// +/// When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo +/// which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData +/// filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill +/// the HTLC backwards along the relevant path). +/// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is +/// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent. mod channel_held_info { use ln::msgs; + use ln::router::Route; + use secp256k1::key::SecretKey; + use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret; /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards + #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo { pub(super) onion_packet: Option, + pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: SharedSecret, pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32], pub(super) short_channel_id: u64, - pub(super) prev_short_channel_id: u64, pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64, pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32, } - #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")] - impl PendingForwardHTLCInfo { + #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug + pub enum HTLCFailureMsg { + Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC), + Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC), + } + + /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info + #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug + pub enum PendingHTLCStatus { + Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo), + Fail(HTLCFailureMsg), + } + + /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC + #[derive(Clone)] + pub struct HTLCPreviousHopData { + pub(super) short_channel_id: u64, + pub(super) htlc_id: u64, + pub(super) incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret, + } + + /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC + #[derive(Clone)] + pub enum HTLCSource { + PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData), + OutboundRoute { + route: Route, + session_priv: SecretKey, + /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid + /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back + first_hop_htlc_msat: u64, + }, + } + #[cfg(test)] + impl HTLCSource { pub fn dummy() -> Self { - Self { - onion_packet: None, - payment_hash: [0; 32], - short_channel_id: 0, - prev_short_channel_id: 0, - amt_to_forward: 0, - outgoing_cltv_value: 0, + HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { + route: Route { hops: Vec::new() }, + session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[1; 32]).unwrap(), + first_hop_htlc_msat: 0, } } } #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug - pub enum HTLCFailReason { + pub(crate) enum HTLCFailReason { ErrorPacket { err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, }, @@ -71,36 +131,93 @@ mod channel_held_info { data: Vec, } } +} +pub(super) use self::channel_held_info::*; - #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")] - impl HTLCFailReason { - pub fn dummy() -> Self { - HTLCFailReason::Reason { - failure_code: 0, data: Vec::new(), - } +struct MsgHandleErrInternal { + err: msgs::HandleError, + needs_channel_force_close: bool, +} +impl MsgHandleErrInternal { + #[inline] + fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self { + Self { + err: HandleError { + err, + action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { + msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { + channel_id, + data: err.to_string() + }, + }), + }, + needs_channel_force_close: false, } } -} -#[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")] -pub use self::channel_held_info::*; -#[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))] -pub(crate) use self::channel_held_info::*; - -enum PendingOutboundHTLC { - IntermediaryHopData { - source_short_channel_id: u64, - incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret, - }, - OutboundRoute { - route: Route, - session_priv: SecretKey, - }, - /// Used for channel rebalancing - CycledRoute { - source_short_channel_id: u64, - incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret, - route: Route, - session_priv: SecretKey, + #[inline] + fn send_err_msg_close_chan(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self { + Self { + err: HandleError { + err, + action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { + msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { + channel_id, + data: err.to_string() + }, + }), + }, + needs_channel_force_close: true, + } + } + #[inline] + fn from_maybe_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self { + Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: true } + } + #[inline] + fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self { + Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: false } + } + #[inline] + fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self { + Self { + err: match err { + ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError { + err: msg, + action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError), + }, + ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError { + err: msg, + action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { + msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { + channel_id, + data: msg.to_string() + }, + }), + }, + }, + needs_channel_force_close: false, + } + } + #[inline] + fn from_chan_maybe_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self { + Self { + err: match err { + ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError { + err: msg, + action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError), + }, + ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError { + err: msg, + action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { + msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { + channel_id, + data: msg.to_string() + }, + }), + }, + }, + needs_channel_force_close: true, + } } } @@ -110,6 +227,12 @@ enum PendingOutboundHTLC { /// probably increase this significantly. const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50; +struct HTLCForwardInfo { + prev_short_channel_id: u64, + prev_htlc_id: u64, + forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo, +} + struct ChannelHolder { by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>, short_to_id: HashMap, @@ -118,18 +241,18 @@ struct ChannelHolder { /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo! - forward_htlcs: HashMap>, + forward_htlcs: HashMap>, /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you /// go to read them! - claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], PendingOutboundHTLC>, + claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec>, } struct MutChannelHolder<'a> { by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>, short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap, next_forward: &'a mut Instant, - forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap>, - claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], PendingOutboundHTLC>, + forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap>, + claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec>, } impl ChannelHolder { fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder { @@ -148,6 +271,7 @@ const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assum /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately. +/// /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through /// to individual Channels. pub struct ChannelManager { @@ -160,22 +284,43 @@ pub struct ChannelManager { announce_channels_publicly: bool, fee_proportional_millionths: u32, latest_block_height: AtomicUsize, - secp_ctx: Secp256k1, + secp_ctx: Secp256k1, channel_state: Mutex, our_network_key: SecretKey, pending_events: Mutex>, + + logger: Arc, } +/// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound +/// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, +/// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out +/// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the +/// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that its at least 3 blocks more). const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO? +const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO? + +// Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ie that +// if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS then we'll still have +// HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS left to fail it backwards ourselves before hitting the +// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point and failing the channel on-chain to time out the HTLC. +#[deny(const_err)] +#[allow(dead_code)] +const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER; + +// Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See +// ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed. +#[deny(const_err)] +#[allow(dead_code)] +const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER; macro_rules! secp_call { - ( $res : expr ) => { + ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => { match $res { Ok(key) => key, - //TODO: Make the err a parameter! - Err(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Key error", action: None}) + Err(_) => return Err($err), } }; } @@ -190,6 +335,7 @@ struct OnionKeys { mu: [u8; 32], } +/// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels pub struct ChannelDetails { /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes, /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output). @@ -199,19 +345,25 @@ pub struct ChannelDetails { /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened. pub short_channel_id: Option, + /// The node_id of our counterparty pub remote_network_id: PublicKey, + /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output pub channel_value_satoshis: u64, /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound. pub user_id: u64, } impl ChannelManager { - /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them. This is - /// the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements ChannelMessageHandler. + /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them. + /// + /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements + /// ChannelMessageHandler. + /// /// fee_proportional_millionths is an optional fee to charge any payments routed through us. /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator. + /// /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`! - pub fn new(our_network_key: SecretKey, fee_proportional_millionths: u32, announce_channels_publicly: bool, network: Network, feeest: Arc, monitor: Arc, chain_monitor: Arc, tx_broadcaster: Arc) -> Result, secp256k1::Error> { + pub fn new(our_network_key: SecretKey, fee_proportional_millionths: u32, announce_channels_publicly: bool, network: Network, feeest: Arc, monitor: Arc, chain_monitor: Arc, tx_broadcaster: Arc, logger: Arc) -> Result, secp256k1::Error> { let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager { @@ -236,6 +388,8 @@ impl ChannelManager { our_network_key, pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), + + logger, }); let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res); res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res); @@ -243,13 +397,17 @@ impl ChannelManager { } /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value. + /// /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here. + /// /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel event, so you should probably poll /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards. - pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), HandleError> { + /// + /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat being greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k + pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> { let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") { ChannelKeys { funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(), @@ -270,12 +428,18 @@ impl ChannelManager { } }; - let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, self.announce_channels_publicly, user_id); - let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator)?; + let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, self.announce_channels_publicly, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger))?; + let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator); let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - match channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel) { - Some(_) => panic!("RNG is bad???"), - None => {} + match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) { + hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => { + if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") { + return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" }); + } else { + panic!("RNG is bad???"); + } + }, + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); } } let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); @@ -309,7 +473,10 @@ impl ChannelManager { let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len()); for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() { - if channel.is_usable() { + // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused + // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user + // really wanted anyway. + if channel.is_live() { res.push(ChannelDetails { channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(), short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(), @@ -325,9 +492,10 @@ impl ChannelManager { /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain. + /// /// May generate a SendShutdown event on success, which should be relayed. - pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), HandleError> { - let (res, node_id, chan_option) = { + pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> { + let (mut res, node_id, chan_option) = { let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts(); match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) { @@ -340,12 +508,12 @@ impl ChannelManager { (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1)) } else { (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), None) } }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "No such channel", action: None}) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"}) } }; - for payment_hash in res.1 { + for htlc_source in res.1.drain(..) { // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore.... - self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }); + self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }); } let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option { if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) { @@ -368,11 +536,11 @@ impl ChannelManager { } #[inline] - fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: (Vec, Vec<[u8; 32]>)) { - let (local_txn, failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res; - for payment_hash in failed_htlcs { + fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: (Vec, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>)) { + let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res; + for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) { // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore.... - self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }); + self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }); } for tx in local_txn { self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx); @@ -382,6 +550,8 @@ impl ChannelManager { //TODO: We need to handle monitoring of pending offered HTLCs which just hit the chain and //may be claimed, resulting in us claiming the inbound HTLCs (and back-failing after //timeouts are hit and our claims confirm). + //TODO: In any case, we need to make sure we remove any pending htlc tracking (via + //fail_backwards or claim_funds) eventually for all HTLCs that were in the channel } /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to @@ -408,6 +578,41 @@ impl ChannelManager { } } + /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction + /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each. + pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) { + for chan in self.list_channels() { + self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id); + } + } + + fn handle_monitor_update_fail(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard, channel_id: &[u8; 32], err: ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, reason: RAACommitmentOrder) { + match err { + ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => { + let mut chan = { + let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts(); + let chan = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id).expect("monitor_update_failed must be called within the same lock as the channel get!"); + if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() { + channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id); + } + chan + }; + mem::drop(channel_state_lock); + self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown()); + let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); + if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) { + events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { + msg: update + }); + } + }, + ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => { + let channel = channel_state_lock.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).expect("monitor_update_failed must be called within the same lock as the channel get!"); + channel.monitor_update_failed(reason); + }, + } + } + #[inline] fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) { ({ @@ -446,10 +651,9 @@ impl ChannelManager { // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid #[inline] - fn construct_onion_keys_callback (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), HandleError> { + fn construct_onion_keys_callback (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> { let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone(); - let mut blinded_pub = secp_call!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv)); - let mut first_iteration = true; + let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv); for hop in route.hops.iter() { let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv); @@ -460,14 +664,10 @@ impl ChannelManager { let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32]; sha.result(&mut blinding_factor); - if first_iteration { - blinded_pub = secp_call!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv)); - first_iteration = false; - } let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub; - secp_call!(blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &secp_call!(SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)))); - blinded_pub = secp_call!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv)); + blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)?)?; + blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv); callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop); } @@ -476,7 +676,7 @@ impl ChannelManager { } // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid - fn construct_onion_keys(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result, HandleError> { + fn construct_onion_keys(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result, secp256k1::Error> { let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len()); Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| { @@ -497,7 +697,7 @@ impl ChannelManager { } /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send. - fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec, u64, u32), HandleError> { + fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec, u64, u32), APIError> { let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64; let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset; let mut last_short_channel_id = 0; @@ -522,11 +722,11 @@ impl ChannelManager { }; cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat; if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 { - return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!", action: None}); + return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!"}); } cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32; if cur_cltv >= 500000000 { - return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!", action: None}); + return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!"}); } last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id; } @@ -553,7 +753,7 @@ impl ChannelManager { } const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65]; - fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec, onion_keys: Vec, associated_data: &[u8; 32]) -> Result { + fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec, onion_keys: Vec, associated_data: &[u8; 32]) -> msgs::OnionPacket { let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65); buf.resize(21*65, 0); @@ -594,12 +794,12 @@ impl ChannelManager { hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res); } - Ok(msgs::OnionPacket{ + msgs::OnionPacket{ version: 0, - public_key: onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey, + public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey), hop_data: packet_data, hmac: hmac_res, - }) + } } /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a @@ -652,14 +852,221 @@ impl ChannelManager { ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..]) } + fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard) { + macro_rules! get_onion_hash { + () => { + { + let mut sha = Sha256::new(); + sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data); + let mut onion_hash = [0; 32]; + sha.result(&mut onion_hash); + onion_hash + } + } + } + + if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key { + log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC with invalid ephemeral pubkey"); + return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC { + channel_id: msg.channel_id, + htlc_id: msg.htlc_id, + sha256_of_onion: get_onion_hash!(), + failure_code: 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, + })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); + } + + let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key); + let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret); + + let mut channel_state = None; + macro_rules! return_err { + ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => { + { + log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg); + if channel_state.is_none() { + channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); + } + return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { + channel_id: msg.channel_id, + htlc_id: msg.htlc_id, + reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data), + })), channel_state.unwrap()); + } + } + } + + if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 { + //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other + //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way, + //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the + //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the + //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the + //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there... + return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!()); + } + + let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu); + hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data); + hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash); + if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) { + return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!()); + } + + let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]); + let next_hop_data = { + let mut decoded = [0; 65]; + chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded); + match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) { + Err(err) => { + let error_code = match err { + msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte + _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen + }; + return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]); + }, + Ok(msg) => msg + } + }; + + let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] { + // OUR PAYMENT! + // final_expiry_too_soon + if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS) as u64 { + return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]); + } + // final_incorrect_htlc_amount + if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat { + return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat)); + } + // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry + if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry { + return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry)); + } + + // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc + // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so + // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a + // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed! + + PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { + onion_packet: None, + payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(), + short_channel_id: 0, + incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(), + amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward, + outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value, + }) + } else { + let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65]; + chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]); + chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]); + + let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(); + + let blinding_factor = { + let mut sha = Sha256::new(); + sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]); + sha.input(&shared_secret[..]); + let mut res = [0u8; 32]; + sha.result(&mut res); + match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) { + Err(_) => { + return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!()); + }, + Ok(key) => key + } + }; + + if let Err(_) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) { + return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!()); + } + + let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket { + version: 0, + public_key: Ok(new_pubkey), + hop_data: new_packet_data, + hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(), + }; + + PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { + onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet), + payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(), + short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id, + incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(), + amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward, + outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value, + }) + }; + + channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); + if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info { + if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here + let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned(); + let forwarding_id = match id_option { + None => { // unknown_next_peer + return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]); + }, + Some(id) => id.clone(), + }; + if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop { + let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap(); + + // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope + // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get + // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and + // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur + // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale. + if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled + break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))); + } + if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum + break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))); + } + let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(self.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) }); + if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient + break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))); + } + if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry + break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))); + } + let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1; + // We want to have at least HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration + if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon + break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))); + } + if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far + break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None)); + } + break None; + } + { + let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128); + if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 { + res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat)); + } + else if code == 0x1000 | 13 { + res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry)); + } + if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update { + res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]); + } + return_err!(err, code, &res[..]); + } + } + } + + (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap()) + } + /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id + /// May be called with channel_state already locked! fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result { let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() { None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}), Some(id) => id, }; - let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).unwrap().serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..]; + let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..]; let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { chain_hash: self.genesis_hash, @@ -670,10 +1077,11 @@ impl ChannelManager { htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(), fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator), fee_proportional_millionths: self.fee_proportional_millionths, + excess_data: Vec::new(), }; let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]); - let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).unwrap(); //TODO Can we unwrap here? + let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key); Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate { signature: sig, @@ -682,89 +1090,114 @@ impl ChannelManager { } /// Sends a payment along a given route. + /// /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop /// fields for more info. + /// /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself. - /// See-also docs on Channel::send_htlc_and_commit. + /// /// May generate a SendHTLCs event on success, which should be relayed. - pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), HandleError> { + /// + /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter + /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified + pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> { if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 { - return Err(HandleError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size", action: None}); + return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}); } let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id(); for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() { if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id { - return Err(HandleError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us", action: None}); + return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}); } } - let session_priv = secp_call!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{ + let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{ let mut session_key = [0; 32]; rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key); session_key - })); + }).expect("RNG is bad!"); let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1; - let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv)?; + let onion_keys = secp_call!(ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv), + APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"}); let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?; - let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash)?; + let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash); - let (first_hop_node_id, (update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = { - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts(); + let (first_hop_node_id, update_add, commitment_signed) = { + let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) { - None => return Err(HandleError{err: "No channel available with first hop!", action: None}), - Some(id) => id.clone() + None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}), + Some(id) => id.clone(), }; - let claimable_htlc_entry = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash.clone()); - if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) = claimable_htlc_entry { - return Err(HandleError{err: "Already had pending HTLC with the same payment_hash", action: None}); - } - let res = { - let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap(); - if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey { - return Err(HandleError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!", action: None}); + let res = { + let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap(); + if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey { + return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"}); + } + if chan.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { + return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed); + } + if !chan.is_live() { + return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected!"}); + } + chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { + route: route.clone(), + session_priv: session_priv.clone(), + first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat, + }, onion_packet).map_err(|he| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: he.err})? + }; + match res { + Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => { + if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) { + self.handle_monitor_update_fail(channel_state, &id, e, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst); + return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed); + } + Some((update_add, commitment_signed)) + }, + None => None, } - chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash, htlc_cltv, onion_packet)? }; let first_hop_node_id = route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey; - claimable_htlc_entry.or_insert(PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { - route, - session_priv, - }); - match res { - Some(msgs) => (first_hop_node_id, msgs), + Some((update_add, commitment_signed)) => { + (first_hop_node_id, update_add, commitment_signed) + }, None => return Ok(()), } }; - if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) { - unimplemented!(); // maybe remove from claimable_htlcs? - } - let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); - events.push(events::Event::SendHTLCs { + events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: first_hop_node_id, - msgs: vec![update_add], - commitment_msg: commitment_signed, + updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { + update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add], + update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(), + update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(), + update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(), + update_fee: None, + commitment_signed, + }, }); Ok(()) } /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel. + /// /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel. + /// + /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should + /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel). pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) { macro_rules! add_pending_event { ($event: expr) => { @@ -784,6 +1217,7 @@ impl ChannelManager { (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1) }, Err(e) => { + log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err); mem::drop(channel_state); add_pending_event!(events::Event::HandleError { node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(), @@ -795,9 +1229,11 @@ impl ChannelManager { }, None => return } - }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call, + }; + // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state + // lock before add_update_monitor if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) { - unimplemented!(); // maybe remove from claimable_htlcs? + unimplemented!(); } add_pending_event!(events::Event::SendFundingCreated { node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(), @@ -805,25 +1241,36 @@ impl ChannelManager { }); let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - channel_state.by_id.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan); + match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) { + hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => { + panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?"); + }, + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { + e.insert(chan); + } + } } - fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result, HandleError> { - if !chan.is_usable() || !chan.should_announce() { return Ok(None) } + fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option { + if !chan.should_announce() { return None } - let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone())?; + let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) { + Ok(res) => res, + Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing + }; let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap(); - let our_node_sig = secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key)); + let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key); - Ok(Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures { + Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), node_signature: our_node_sig, bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig, - })) + }) } /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay. + /// /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event. /// Will likely generate further events. pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) { @@ -837,14 +1284,19 @@ impl ChannelManager { return; } - for (short_chan_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() { + for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() { if short_chan_id != 0 { let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) { Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(), None => { failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len()); - for forward_info in pending_forwards { - failed_forwards.push((forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None)); + for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) { + let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { + short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id, + htlc_id: prev_htlc_id, + incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret, + }); + failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None)); } continue; } @@ -852,11 +1304,16 @@ impl ChannelManager { let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap(); let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new(); - for forward_info in pending_forwards { - match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) { + for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) { + let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { + short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id, + htlc_id: prev_htlc_id, + incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret, + }); + match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) { Err(_e) => { let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap(); - failed_forwards.push((forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update))); + failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update))); continue; }, Ok(update_add) => { @@ -879,56 +1336,76 @@ impl ChannelManager { if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() { let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() { Ok(res) => res, - Err(_) => { + Err(e) => { + if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{msg: Some(ref _err_msg)}) = &e.action { + } else if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: ref _err_msg}) = &e.action { + } else { + panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met"); + } //TODO: Handle...this is bad! continue; }, }; - new_events.push((Some(monitor), events::Event::SendHTLCs { + if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) { + unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event... + } + new_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(), - msgs: add_htlc_msgs, - commitment_msg: commitment_msg, - })); + updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { + update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs, + update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(), + update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(), + update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(), + update_fee: None, + commitment_signed: commitment_msg, + }, + }); } } else { - for forward_info in pending_forwards { - new_events.push((None, events::Event::PaymentReceived { + for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) { + let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData { + short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id, + htlc_id: prev_htlc_id, + incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret, + }; + match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) { + hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push(prev_hop_data), + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![prev_hop_data]); }, + }; + new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash, amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward, - })); + }); } } } } - for failed_forward in failed_forwards.drain(..) { - match failed_forward.2 { - None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &failed_forward.0, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: failed_forward.1, data: Vec::new() }), - Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &failed_forward.0, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: failed_forward.1, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }), + for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) { + match update { + None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), + Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }), }; } if new_events.is_empty() { return } - - new_events.retain(|event| { - if let &Some(ref monitor) = &event.0 { - if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor.clone()) { - unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event... - } - } - true - }); - let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); - events.reserve(new_events.len()); - for event in new_events.drain(..) { - events.push(event.1); - } + events.append(&mut new_events); } /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown after a PaymentReceived event. pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32]) -> bool { - self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: Vec::new() }) + // TODO: Add ability to return 0x4000|16 (incorrect_payment_amount) if the amount we + // received is < expected or > 2*expected + let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); + let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash); + if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source { + for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) { + if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); } + self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: Vec::new() }); + } + true + } else { false } } /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us. @@ -937,41 +1414,31 @@ impl ChannelManager { /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to /// still-available channels. - fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) -> bool { - let mut pending_htlc = { - match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash) { - Some(pending_htlc) => pending_htlc, - None => return false, - } - }; - - match pending_htlc { - PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, route, session_priv } => { - channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.clone(), PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { - route, - session_priv, - }); - pending_htlc = PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }; - }, - _ => {} - } - - match pending_htlc { - PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { .. } => unreachable!(), - PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } => { + fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) { + match source { + HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => { mem::drop(channel_state); - - let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); - pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed { - payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() - }); - false - }, - PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret } => { - let err_packet = match onion_error { - HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => { - let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode(); - ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet) + if let &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } = &onion_error { + let (channel_update, payment_retryable) = self.process_onion_failure(&source, err.data.clone()); + let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); + if let Some(channel_update) = channel_update { + pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { + update: channel_update, + }); + } + pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed { + payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(), + rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable, + }); + } else { + panic!("should have onion error packet here"); + } + }, + HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => { + let err_packet = match onion_error { + HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => { + let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode(); + ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet) }, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => { ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data) @@ -979,41 +1446,46 @@ impl ChannelManager { }; let (node_id, fail_msgs) = { - let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&source_short_channel_id) { + let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) { Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(), - None => return false + None => return }; let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap(); - match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(payment_hash, err_packet) { - Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg), + match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, err_packet) { + Ok(Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor))) => { + if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) { + unimplemented!(); + } + (chan.get_their_node_id(), Some((msg, commitment_msg))) + }, + Ok(None) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), None), Err(_e) => { //TODO: Do something with e? - return false; + return; }, } }; match fail_msgs { - Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor)) => { + Some((msg, commitment_msg)) => { mem::drop(channel_state); - if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) { - unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event... - } - let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); - //TODO: replace by HandleError ? UpdateFailHTLC in handle_update_add_htlc need also to build a CommitmentSigned - pending_events.push(events::Event::SendFailHTLC { + pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, - msg: msg, - commitment_msg: commitment_msg, + updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { + update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(), + update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(), + update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg], + update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(), + update_fee: None, + commitment_signed: commitment_msg, + }, }); }, None => {}, } - - true }, } } @@ -1021,247 +1493,178 @@ impl ChannelManager { /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true! + /// /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event. pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool { - self.claim_funds_internal(payment_preimage, true) - } - fn claim_funds_internal(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32], from_user: bool) -> bool { let mut sha = Sha256::new(); sha.input(&payment_preimage); let mut payment_hash = [0; 32]; sha.result(&mut payment_hash); - let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let mut pending_htlc = { - match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) { - Some(pending_htlc) => pending_htlc, - None => return false, + let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); + let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash); + if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source { + for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) { + if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); } + self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage); } - }; - - match pending_htlc { - PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, route, session_priv } => { - if from_user { // This was the end hop back to us - pending_htlc = PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }; - channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { route, session_priv }); - } else { // This came from the first upstream node - // Bank error in our favor! Maybe we should tell the user this somehow??? - pending_htlc = PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { route, session_priv }; - channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }); - } - }, - _ => {}, - } - - match pending_htlc { - PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { .. } => unreachable!(), - PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } => { - if from_user { - panic!("Called claim_funds with a preimage for an outgoing payment. There is nothing we can do with this, and something is seriously wrong if you knew this..."); - } + true + } else { false } + } + fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) { + match source { + HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => { mem::drop(channel_state); let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage }); - false }, - PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, .. } => { + HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => { + //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay! let (node_id, fulfill_msgs) = { - let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&source_short_channel_id) { + let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) { Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(), None => { // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's // why its missing. - return false + return } }; let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap(); - match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(payment_preimage) { - Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg), + match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) { + Ok((msgs, Some(chan_monitor))) => { + if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) { + unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event... + } + (chan.get_their_node_id(), msgs) + }, + Ok((msgs, None)) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msgs), Err(_e) => { // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain. //TODO: Do something with e? - return false; + return }, } }; mem::drop(channel_state); - if let Some(chan_monitor) = fulfill_msgs.1 { - if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) { - unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event... - } - } - - if let Some((msg, commitment_msg)) = fulfill_msgs.0 { + if let Some((msg, commitment_msg)) = fulfill_msgs { let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); - pending_events.push(events::Event::SendFulfillHTLC { + pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: node_id, - msg, - commitment_msg, + updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { + update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(), + update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg], + update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(), + update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(), + update_fee: None, + commitment_signed: commitment_msg, + } }); } - true }, } } /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey { - PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).unwrap() + PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key) } /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update /// operation. pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) { - unimplemented!(); - } -} - -impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager { - fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec { - let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); - let mut ret = Vec::new(); - mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events); - ret - } -} - -impl ChainListener for ChannelManager { - fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) { let mut new_events = Vec::new(); - let mut failed_channels = Vec::new(); + let mut close_results = Vec::new(); + let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new(); + let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new(); + { let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts(); let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id; channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| { - let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched); - if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res { - let announcement_sigs = match self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) { - Ok(res) => res, - Err(_e) => { - //TODO: push e on events and blow up the channel (it has bad keys) - return true; - } - }; - new_events.push(events::Event::SendFundingLocked { - node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(), - msg: funding_locked, - announcement_sigs: announcement_sigs - }); - short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id()); - } else if let Err(e) = chan_res { - new_events.push(events::Event::HandleError { - node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(), - action: e.action, - }); - if channel.is_shutdown() { - return false; - } - } - if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() { - for tx in txn_matched { - for inp in tx.input.iter() { - if inp.prev_hash == funding_txo.txid && inp.prev_index == funding_txo.index as u32 { + if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { + let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor(); + if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) { + match e { + ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => { if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() { short_to_id.remove(&short_id); } - // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and - // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its - // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped. - failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown()); + close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown()); if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) { new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: update }); } - return false; + false + }, + ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true, + } + } else { + let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures) = channel.monitor_updating_restored(); + if !pending_forwards.is_empty() { + htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards)); + } + htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures); + + macro_rules! handle_cs { () => { + if let Some(update) = commitment_update { + new_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs { + node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(), + updates: update, + }); } + } } + macro_rules! handle_raa { () => { + if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa { + new_events.push(events::Event::SendRevokeAndACK { + node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(), + msg: revoke_and_ack, + }); + } + } } + match order { + RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { + handle_cs!(); + handle_raa!(); + }, + RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { + handle_raa!(); + handle_cs!(); + }, } + true } - } - if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) { - if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() { - short_to_id.remove(&short_id); - } - failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown()); - // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast - // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really - // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler). - failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new(); - if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) { - new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { - msg: update - }); - } - return false; - } - true + } else { true } }); } - for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) { - self.finish_force_close_channel(failure); - } - let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); - for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) { - pending_events.push(funding_locked); - } - self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release); - } - /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown - fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) { - let mut new_events = Vec::new(); - let mut failed_channels = Vec::new(); - { - let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts(); - let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id; - channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| { - if v.block_disconnected(header) { - if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() { - short_to_id.remove(&short_id); - } - failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown()); - if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) { - new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { - msg: update - }); - } - false - } else { - true - } - }); - } - for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) { - self.finish_force_close_channel(failure); + for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) { + self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2); } - if !new_events.is_empty() { - let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); - for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) { - pending_events.push(funding_locked); - } + self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]); + + for res in close_results.drain(..) { + self.finish_force_close_channel(res); } - self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel); + + self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().append(&mut new_events); } -} -impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager { - //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so) - fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result { + fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result { if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash { - return Err(HandleError{err: "Unknown genesis block hash", action: None}); + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())); } let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); if channel_state.by_id.contains_key(&msg.temporary_channel_id) { - return Err(HandleError{err: "temporary_channel_id collision!", action: None}); + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())); } let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") { @@ -1284,24 +1687,28 @@ impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager { } }; - let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, false, self.announce_channels_publicly)?; - let accept_msg = channel.get_accept_channel()?; + let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, false, self.announce_channels_publicly, Arc::clone(&self.logger)) + .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?; + let accept_msg = channel.get_accept_channel(); channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel); Ok(accept_msg) } - fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> { + fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { let (value, output_script, user_id) = { let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.temporary_channel_id) { Some(chan) => { if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { - return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None}) + //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id)); } - chan.accept_channel(&msg)?; + chan.accept_channel(&msg) + .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?; (chan.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get_user_id()) }, - None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None}) + //TODO: same as above + None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id)) } }; let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); @@ -1314,57 +1721,62 @@ impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager { Ok(()) } - fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result { - //TODO: broke this - a node shouldn't be able to get their channel removed by sending a - //funding_created a second time, or long after the first, or whatever (note this also - //leaves the short_to_id map in a busted state. + fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result { let (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update) = { let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - match channel_state.by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) { - Some(mut chan) => { - if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { - return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None}) + match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) { + hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { + if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { + //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id)); } - match chan.funding_created(msg) { + match chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg) { Ok((funding_msg, monitor_update)) => { - (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update) + (chan.remove(), funding_msg, monitor_update) }, Err(e) => { - return Err(e); + return Err(e).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e)) } } }, - None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None}) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id)) } - }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call, - // note that this means if the remote end is misbehaving and sends a message for the same - // channel back-to-back with funding_created, we'll end up thinking they sent a message - // for a bogus channel. + }; + // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state + // lock before add_update_monitor if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { unimplemented!(); } let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - channel_state.by_id.insert(funding_msg.channel_id, chan); + match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) { + hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => { + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id)) + }, + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { + e.insert(chan); + } + } Ok(funding_msg) } - fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> { - let (funding_txo, user_id, monitor) = { + fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + let (funding_txo, user_id) = { let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) { Some(chan) => { if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { - return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None}) + //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id)); + } + let chan_monitor = chan.funding_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?; + if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) { + unimplemented!(); } - let chan_monitor = chan.funding_signed(&msg)?; - (chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get_user_id(), chan_monitor) + (chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get_user_id()) }, - None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None}) + None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id)) } }; - if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) { - unimplemented!(); - } let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { funding_txo: funding_txo, @@ -1373,31 +1785,34 @@ impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager { Ok(()) } - fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result, HandleError> { + fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result, MsgHandleErrInternal> { let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) { Some(chan) => { if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { - return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None}) + //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id)); } - chan.funding_locked(&msg)?; - return Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(chan)?); + chan.funding_locked(&msg) + .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?; + return Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(chan)); }, - None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None}) + None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id)) }; } - fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option, Option), HandleError> { - let (res, chan_option) = { + fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option, Option), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + let (mut res, chan_option) = { let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts(); match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => { if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { - return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None}) + //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id)); } - let res = chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg)?; + let res = chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?; if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() { if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() { channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id); @@ -1405,12 +1820,12 @@ impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager { (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1)) } else { (res, None) } }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None}) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id)) } }; - for payment_hash in res.2 { + for htlc_source in res.2.drain(..) { // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore.... - self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }); + self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }); } if let Some(chan) = chan_option { if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) { @@ -1423,16 +1838,17 @@ impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager { Ok((res.0, res.1)) } - fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result, HandleError> { + fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result, MsgHandleErrInternal> { let (res, chan_option) = { let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts(); match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => { if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { - return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None}) + //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id)); } - let res = chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg)?; + let res = chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?; if res.1.is_some() { // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This @@ -1445,7 +1861,7 @@ impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager { (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1)) } else { (res, None) } }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None}) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id)) } }; if let Some(broadcast_tx) = res.1 { @@ -1462,7 +1878,7 @@ impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager { Ok(res.0) } - fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> { + fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack. @@ -1472,430 +1888,390 @@ impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager { //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that, //but we should prevent it anyway. - let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key, &self.our_network_key); - let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret); + let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg); + let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts(); - macro_rules! get_onion_hash { - () => { - { - let mut sha = Sha256::new(); - sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data); - let mut onion_hash = [0; 32]; - sha.result(&mut onion_hash); - onion_hash + match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) { + Some(chan) => { + if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { + //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id)); } - } + if !chan.is_usable() { + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet available for receiving HTLCs", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)})); + } + chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e)) + }, + None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id)) } + } - macro_rules! return_err { - ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => { - return Err(msgs::HandleError { - err: $msg, - action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::UpdateFailHTLC { - msg: msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { - channel_id: msg.channel_id, - htlc_id: msg.htlc_id, - reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data), - } - }), - }); + fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + let htlc_source = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) { + Some(chan) => { + if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { + //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id)); + } + chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg) + .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?.clone() + }, + None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id)) + }; + self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone()); + Ok(()) + } + + // Process failure we got back from upstream on a payment we sent. Returns update and a boolean + // indicating that the payment itself failed + fn process_onion_failure(&self, htlc_source: &HTLCSource, mut packet_decrypted: Vec) -> (Option, bool) { + if let &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } = htlc_source { + macro_rules! onion_failure_log { + ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr, $reported_name: expr, $reported_value: expr ) => { + log_trace!(self, "{}({:#x}) {}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code, $reported_name, $reported_value); + }; + ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr ) => { + log_trace!(self, "{}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code); + }; } - } - if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 { - //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other - //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way, - //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the - //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the - //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the - //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there... - return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!()); - } + const BADONION: u16 = 0x8000; + const PERM: u16 = 0x4000; + const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000; - let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu); - hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data); - hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash); - if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) { - return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!()); - } + let mut res = None; + let mut htlc_msat = *first_hop_htlc_msat; - let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]); - let next_hop_data = { - let mut decoded = [0; 65]; - chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded); - match msgs::OnionHopData::decode(&decoded[..]) { - Err(err) => { - let error_code = match err { - msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRealmByte => 0x4000 | 1, - _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen - }; - return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]); - }, - Ok(msg) => msg - } - }; + // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler + Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| { + if res.is_some() { return; } - //TODO: Check that msg.cltv_expiry is within acceptable bounds! + let incoming_htlc_msat = htlc_msat; + let amt_to_forward = htlc_msat - route_hop.fee_msat; + htlc_msat = amt_to_forward; - let mut pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] { - // OUR PAYMENT! - if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward != msg.amount_msat { - return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat)); - } - if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry { - return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry)); - } + let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret); - // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc - // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so - // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a - // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed! + let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len()); + decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0); + let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]); + chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]); + packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp; - PendingForwardHTLCInfo { - onion_packet: None, - payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(), - short_channel_id: 0, - prev_short_channel_id: 0, - amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward, - outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value, - } - } else { - let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65]; - chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]); - chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]); - - let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.clone(); - - let blinding_factor = { - let mut sha = Sha256::new(); - sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]); - sha.input(&shared_secret[..]); - let mut res = [0u8; 32]; - sha.result(&mut res); - match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) { - Err(_) => { - // Return temporary node failure as its technically our issue, not the - // channel's issue. - return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]); - }, - Ok(key) => key - } - }; - - match new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) { - Err(_) => { - // Return temporary node failure as its technically our issue, not the - // channel's issue. - return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]); - }, - Ok(_) => {} - }; - - let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket { - version: 0, - public_key: new_pubkey, - hop_data: new_packet_data, - hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(), - }; - - //TODO: Check amt_to_forward and outgoing_cltv_value are within acceptable ranges! - - PendingForwardHTLCInfo { - onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet), - payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(), - short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id, - prev_short_channel_id: 0, - amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward, - outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value, - } - }; - - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts(); + let is_from_final_node = route.hops.last().unwrap().pubkey == route_hop.pubkey; - if pending_forward_info.onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here - let forwarding_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&pending_forward_info.short_channel_id) { - None => { - return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]); - }, - Some(id) => id.clone(), - }; - let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap(); - if !chan.is_live() { - let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap(); - return_err!("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, &chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]); - } - } + if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) { + let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret); + let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um); + hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]); + let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32]; + hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag); - let claimable_htlcs_entry = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(msg.payment_hash.clone()); + if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) { + if err_packet.failuremsg.len() < 2 { + // Useless packet that we can't use but it passed HMAC, so it + // definitely came from the peer in question + res = Some((None, !is_from_final_node)); + } else { + let error_code = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]); + + match error_code & 0xff { + 1|2|3 => { + // either from an intermediate or final node + // invalid_realm(PERM|1), + // temporary_node_failure(NODE|2) + // permanent_node_failure(PERM|NODE|2) + // required_node_feature_mssing(PERM|NODE|3) + res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure { + node_id: route_hop.pubkey, + is_permanent: error_code & PERM == PERM, + }), !(error_code & PERM == PERM && is_from_final_node))); + // node returning invalid_realm is removed from network_map, + // although NODE flag is not set, TODO: or remove channel only? + // retry payment when removed node is not a final node + return; + }, + _ => {} + } - // We dont correctly handle payments that route through us twice on their way to their - // destination. That's OK since those nodes are probably busted or trying to do network - // mapping through repeated loops. In either case, we want them to stop talking to us, so - // we send permanent_node_failure. - if let &hash_map::Entry::Occupied(ref e) = &claimable_htlcs_entry { - let mut acceptable_cycle = false; - if let &PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } = e.get() { - acceptable_cycle = pending_forward_info.short_channel_id == 0; - } - if !acceptable_cycle { - return_err!("Payment looped through us twice", 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]); - } - } + if is_from_final_node { + let payment_retryable = match error_code { + c if c == PERM|15 => false, // unknown_payment_hash + c if c == PERM|16 => false, // incorrect_payment_amount + 17 => true, // final_expiry_too_soon + 18 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 6 => { // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry + let _reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]); + true + }, + 19 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 10 => { // final_incorrect_htlc_amount + let _reported_incoming_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]); + true + }, + _ => { + // A final node has sent us either an invalid code or an error_code that + // MUST be sent from the processing node, or the formmat of failuremsg + // does not coform to the spec. + // Remove it from the network map and don't may retry payment + res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure { + node_id: route_hop.pubkey, + is_permanent: true, + }), false)); + return; + } + }; + res = Some((None, payment_retryable)); + return; + } - let (source_short_channel_id, res) = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) { - Some(chan) => { - if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { - return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None}) - } - if !chan.is_usable() { - return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet available for receiving HTLCs", action: None}); + // now, error_code should be only from the intermediate nodes + match error_code { + _c if error_code & PERM == PERM => { + res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { + short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id, + is_permanent: true, + }), false)); + }, + _c if error_code & UPDATE == UPDATE => { + let offset = match error_code { + c if c == UPDATE|7 => 0, // temporary_channel_failure + c if c == UPDATE|11 => 8, // amount_below_minimum + c if c == UPDATE|12 => 8, // fee_insufficient + c if c == UPDATE|13 => 4, // incorrect_cltv_expiry + c if c == UPDATE|14 => 0, // expiry_too_soon + c if c == UPDATE|20 => 2, // channel_disabled + _ => { + // node sending unknown code + res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure { + node_id: route_hop.pubkey, + is_permanent: true, + }), false)); + return; + } + }; + + if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 2 { + let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset+2..offset+4]) as usize; + if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 4 + update_len { + if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset + 4..offset + 4 + update_len])) { + // if channel_update should NOT have caused the failure: + // MAY treat the channel_update as invalid. + let is_chan_update_invalid = match error_code { + c if c == UPDATE|7 => { // temporary_channel_failure + false + }, + c if c == UPDATE|11 => { // amount_below_minimum + let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]); + onion_failure_log!("amount_below_minimum", UPDATE|11, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat); + incoming_htlc_msat > chan_update.contents.htlc_minimum_msat + }, + c if c == UPDATE|12 => { // fee_insufficient + let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]); + let new_fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan_update.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan_update.contents.fee_base_msat as u64) }); + onion_failure_log!("fee_insufficient", UPDATE|12, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat); + new_fee.is_none() || incoming_htlc_msat >= new_fee.unwrap() && incoming_htlc_msat >= amt_to_forward + new_fee.unwrap() + } + c if c == UPDATE|13 => { // incorrect_cltv_expiry + let reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]); + onion_failure_log!("incorrect_cltv_expiry", UPDATE|13, "cltv_expiry", reported_cltv_expiry); + route_hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u16 >= chan_update.contents.cltv_expiry_delta + }, + c if c == UPDATE|20 => { // channel_disabled + let reported_flags = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+2]); + onion_failure_log!("channel_disabled", UPDATE|20, "flags", reported_flags); + chan_update.contents.flags & 0x01 == 0x01 + }, + c if c == UPDATE|21 => true, // expiry_too_far + _ => { unreachable!(); }, + }; + + let msg = if is_chan_update_invalid { None } else { + Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { + msg: chan_update, + }) + }; + res = Some((msg, true)); + return; + } + } + } + }, + _c if error_code & BADONION == BADONION => { + //TODO + }, + 14 => { // expiry_too_soon + res = Some((None, true)); + return; + } + _ => { + // node sending unknown code + res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure { + node_id: route_hop.pubkey, + is_permanent: true, + }), false)); + return; + } + } + } + } } - let short_channel_id = chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(); - pending_forward_info.prev_short_channel_id = short_channel_id; - (short_channel_id, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info)?) - }, - None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None}), - }; - - match claimable_htlcs_entry { - hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => { - let outbound_route = e.get_mut(); - let (route, session_priv) = match outbound_route { - &mut PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv } => { - (route.clone(), session_priv.clone()) - }, - _ => unreachable!(), - }; - *outbound_route = PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { - source_short_channel_id, - incoming_packet_shared_secret: shared_secret, - route, - session_priv, - }; - }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { - e.insert(PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { - source_short_channel_id, - incoming_packet_shared_secret: shared_secret, - }); - } - } - - Ok(res) + }).expect("Route that we sent via spontaneously grew invalid keys in the middle of it?"); + res.unwrap_or((None, true)) + } else { ((None, true)) } } - fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> { - //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay! - // Claim funds first, cause we don't really care if the channel we received the message on - // is broken, we may have enough info to get our own money! - self.claim_funds_internal(msg.payment_preimage.clone(), false); - + fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) { Some(chan) => { if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { - return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None}) - } - chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg) - }, - None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None}) - } - } - - fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result, HandleError> { - let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let payment_hash = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) { - Some(chan) => { - if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { - return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None}) + //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id)); } chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() }) + .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id)) }, - None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None}) + None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id)) }?; - - if let Some(pending_htlc) = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.get(&payment_hash) { - match pending_htlc { - &PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv } => { - // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler - let mut packet_decrypted = msg.reason.data.clone(); - let mut res = None; - Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| { - if res.is_some() { return; } - - let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret); - - let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len()); - decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0); - let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]); - chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]); - packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp; - - if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::decode(&packet_decrypted) { - if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 2 { - let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret); - - let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um); - hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]); - let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32]; - hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag); - if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) { - const UNKNOWN_CHAN: u16 = 0x4000|10; - const TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE: u16 = 0x4000|7; - match byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]) { - TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE => { - if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 { - let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..4]) as usize; - if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 + update_len { - if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::decode(&err_packet.failuremsg[4..4 + update_len]) { - res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { - msg: chan_update, - }); - } - } - } - }, - UNKNOWN_CHAN => { - // No such next-hop. We know this came from the - // current node as the HMAC validated. - res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { - short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id - }); - }, - _ => {}, //TODO: Enumerate all of these! - } - } - } - } - }).unwrap(); - Ok(res) - }, - _ => { Ok(None) }, - } - } else { - Ok(None) - } + Ok(()) } - fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> { + fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) { Some(chan) => { if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { - return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None}) + //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id)); + } + if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) != 0 { + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION set", msg.channel_id)); } chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }) + .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?; + Ok(()) }, - None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None}) + None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id)) } } - fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option), HandleError> { - let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, chan_monitor) = { + fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = { let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) { Some(chan) => { if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { - return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None}) + //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id)); } - chan.commitment_signed(&msg)? + let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, chan_monitor) = chan.commitment_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?; + if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) { + unimplemented!(); + } + (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) }, - None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None}) + None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id)) } }; - if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) { - unimplemented!(); - } - Ok((revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed)) } - fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result, HandleError> { - let (res, mut pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, chan_monitor) = { + #[inline] + fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) { + for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards { + let mut forward_event = None; + if !pending_forwards.is_empty() { + let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() { + forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64)); + channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap(); + } + for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) { + match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) { + hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => { + entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }); + }, + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { + entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info })); + } + } + } + } + match forward_event { + Some(time) => { + let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); + pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { + time_forwardable: time + }); + } + None => {}, + } + } + } + + fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result, MsgHandleErrInternal> { + let ((res, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures), short_channel_id) = { let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) { Some(chan) => { if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { - return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None}) + //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id)); + } + let (res, pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan_monitor) = chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?; + if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) { + unimplemented!(); } - chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg)? + ((res, pending_forwards, pending_failures), chan.get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel")) }, - None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None}) + None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id)) } }; - if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) { - unimplemented!(); - } for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) { - self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &failure.0, failure.1); - } - - let mut forward_event = None; - if !pending_forwards.is_empty() { - let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() { - forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64)); - channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap(); - } - for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) { - match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) { - hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => { - entry.get_mut().push(forward_info); - }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { - entry.insert(vec!(forward_info)); - } - } - } - } - match forward_event { - Some(time) => { - let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); - pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { - time_forwardable: time - }); - } - None => {}, + self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2); } + self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]); Ok(res) } - fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> { + fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) { Some(chan) => { if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { - return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None}) + //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id)); } - chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg) + chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id)) }, - None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None}) + None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id)) } } - fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> { + fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { let (chan_announcement, chan_update) = { let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) { Some(chan) => { if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { - return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None}) + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id)); } if !chan.is_usable() { - return Err(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: None }); + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)})); } let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id(); - let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone())?; + let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) + .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?; let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id; let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap(); - secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 })); - secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 })); + let bad_sig_action = MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature", msg.channel_id); + secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }), bad_sig_action); + secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }), bad_sig_action); - let our_node_sig = secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key)); + let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key); (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement { node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature }, @@ -1905,7 +2281,7 @@ impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager { contents: announcement, }, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()) // can only fail if we're not in a ready state }, - None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None}) + None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id)) } }; let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); @@ -1913,1195 +2289,3809 @@ impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager { Ok(()) } - fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) { - let mut new_events = Vec::new(); - let mut failed_channels = Vec::new(); - { - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts(); - let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id; - if no_connection_possible { - channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| { - if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id { - if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() { - short_to_id.remove(&short_id); - } - failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown()); - if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) { - new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { - msg: update - }); + fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option, Option, Option, RAACommitmentOrder), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + let res = { + let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) { + Some(chan) => { + if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id)); + } + let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, order) = chan.channel_reestablish(msg) + .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?; + if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor { + if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) { + unimplemented!(); } - false - } else { - true } - }); - } else { - for chan in channel_state.by_id { - if chan.1.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id { - //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout). Also - //fail and wipe any uncommitted outbound HTLCs as those are considered after - //reconnect. + Ok((funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order)) + }, + None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id)) + } + }; + + res + } + + /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel. + /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll + /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards. + /// Note: This API is likely to change! + #[doc(hidden)] + pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> { + let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) { + None => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}), + Some(chan) => { + if !chan.is_outbound() { + return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"}); + } + if chan.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { + return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed); + } + if !chan.is_live() { + return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"}); + } + if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw).map_err(|e| APIError::APIMisuseError{err: e.err})? { + if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) { + unimplemented!(); } + let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); + pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs { + node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(), + updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { + update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(), + update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(), + update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(), + update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(), + update_fee: Some(update_fee), + commitment_signed, + }, + }); } - } - } - for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) { - self.finish_force_close_channel(failure); - } - if !new_events.is_empty() { - let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); - for event in new_events.drain(..) { - pending_events.push(event); - } + }, } + Ok(()) } } -#[cfg(test)] -mod tests { - use chain::chaininterface; - use chain::transaction::OutPoint; - use chain::chaininterface::ChainListener; - use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,OnionKeys}; - use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router}; - use ln::msgs; - use ln::msgs::{MsgEncodable,ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler}; - use util::test_utils; - use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider}; - - use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash; - use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader}; - use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut}; - use bitcoin::network::constants::Network; - use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize; - use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash; - - use hex; - - use secp256k1::Secp256k1; - use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey}; - - use crypto::sha2::Sha256; - use crypto::digest::Digest; - - use rand::{thread_rng,Rng}; - - use std::collections::HashMap; - use std::default::Default; - use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex}; - use std::time::Instant; - use std::mem; - - fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec { - // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests - let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); +impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager { + fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec { + let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); + let mut ret = Vec::new(); + mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events); + ret + } +} - let route = Route { - hops: vec!( - RouteHop { - pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), - short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually - }, - RouteHop { - pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), - short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually - }, - RouteHop { - pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), - short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually +impl ChainListener for ChannelManager { + fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) { + let mut new_events = Vec::new(); + let mut failed_channels = Vec::new(); + { + let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts(); + let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id; + channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| { + let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched); + if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res { + let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel); + new_events.push(events::Event::SendFundingLocked { + node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(), + msg: funding_locked, + announcement_sigs: announcement_sigs + }); + short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id()); + } else if let Err(e) = chan_res { + new_events.push(events::Event::HandleError { + node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(), + action: e.action, + }); + if channel.is_shutdown() { + return false; + } + } + if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() { + for tx in txn_matched { + for inp in tx.input.iter() { + if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() { + if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() { + short_to_id.remove(&short_id); + } + // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and + // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its + // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped. + failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown()); + if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) { + new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { + msg: update + }); + } + return false; + } + } + } + } + if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) { + if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() { + short_to_id.remove(&short_id); + } + failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown()); + // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast + // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really + // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler). + failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new(); + if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) { + new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { + msg: update + }); + } + return false; + } + true + }); + } + for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) { + self.finish_force_close_channel(failure); + } + let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); + for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) { + pending_events.push(funding_locked); + } + self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release); + } + + /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown + fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) { + let mut new_events = Vec::new(); + let mut failed_channels = Vec::new(); + { + let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts(); + let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id; + channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| { + if v.block_disconnected(header) { + if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() { + short_to_id.remove(&short_id); + } + failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown()); + if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) { + new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { + msg: update + }); + } + false + } else { + true + } + }); + } + for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) { + self.finish_force_close_channel(failure); + } + if !new_events.is_empty() { + let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); + for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) { + pending_events.push(funding_locked); + } + } + self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel); + } +} + +macro_rules! handle_error { + ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => { + match $internal { + Ok(msg) => Ok(msg), + Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, needs_channel_force_close }) => { + if needs_channel_force_close { + match &err.action { + &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(ref msg) }) => { + if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] { + $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true); + } else { + $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id); + } + }, + &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: None }) => {}, + &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) => {}, + &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }) => { + if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] { + $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true); + } else { + $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id); + } + }, + &None => {}, + } + } + Err(err) + }, + } + } +} + +impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager { + //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so) + fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result { + handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id) + } + + fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> { + handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id) + } + + fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result { + handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id) + } + + fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> { + handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id) + } + + fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result, HandleError> { + handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id) + } + + fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option, Option), HandleError> { + handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id) + } + + fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result, HandleError> { + handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id) + } + + fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> { + handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id) + } + + fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> { + handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id) + } + + fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> { + handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id) + } + + fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> { + handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id) + } + + fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option), HandleError> { + handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id) + } + + fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result, HandleError> { + handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id) + } + + fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> { + handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id) + } + + fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> { + handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id) + } + + fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option, Option, Option, RAACommitmentOrder), HandleError> { + handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id) + } + + fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) { + let mut new_events = Vec::new(); + let mut failed_channels = Vec::new(); + let mut failed_payments = Vec::new(); + { + let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts(); + let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id; + if no_connection_possible { + channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| { + if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id { + if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() { + short_to_id.remove(&short_id); + } + failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown()); + if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) { + new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { + msg: update + }); + } + false + } else { + true + } + }); + } else { + channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| { + if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id { + //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout). + let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(); + if !failed_adds.is_empty() { + let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe + failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds)); + } + if chan.is_shutdown() { + if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() { + short_to_id.remove(&short_id); + } + return false; + } + } + true + }) + } + } + for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) { + self.finish_force_close_channel(failure); + } + if !new_events.is_empty() { + let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); + for event in new_events.drain(..) { + pending_events.push(event); + } + } + for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments { + for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) { + self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() }); + } + } + } + + fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec { + let mut res = Vec::new(); + let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| { + if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id { + if !chan.have_received_message() { + // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the + // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now + // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just + // drop it. + false + } else { + res.push(chan.get_channel_reestablish()); + true + } + } else { true } + }); + //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures + res + } + + fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) { + if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] { + for chan in self.list_channels() { + if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id { + self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id); + } + } + } else { + self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id); + } + } +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use chain::chaininterface; + use chain::transaction::OutPoint; + use chain::chaininterface::ChainListener; + use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,OnionKeys}; + use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS}; + use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router}; + use ln::msgs; + use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler}; + use util::test_utils; + use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider}; + use util::errors::APIError; + use util::logger::Logger; + use util::ser::Writeable; + + use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash; + use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader}; + use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut}; + use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block; + use bitcoin::network::constants::Network; + use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize; + use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash; + + use hex; + + use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message}; + use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey}; + + use crypto::sha2::Sha256; + use crypto::digest::Digest; + + use rand::{thread_rng,Rng}; + + use std::cell::RefCell; + use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap}; + use std::default::Default; + use std::rc::Rc; + use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex}; + use std::sync::atomic::Ordering; + use std::time::Instant; + use std::mem; + + fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec { + // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests + let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); + + let route = Route { + hops: vec!( + RouteHop { + pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), + short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually + }, + RouteHop { + pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), + short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually + }, + RouteHop { + pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), + short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually + }, + RouteHop { + pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), + short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually + }, + RouteHop { + pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), + short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually + }, + ), + }; + + let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(); + + let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len()); + onion_keys + } + + #[test] + fn onion_vectors() { + // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4 + let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys(); + + assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]); + assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]); + assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]); + assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]); + assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]); + + assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]); + assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]); + assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]); + assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]); + assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]); + + assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]); + assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]); + assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]); + assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]); + assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]); + + assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]); + assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]); + assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]); + assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]); + assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]); + + assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]); + assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]); + assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]); + assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]); + assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]); + + // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/ + let payloads = vec!( + msgs::OnionHopData { + realm: 0, + data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData { + short_channel_id: 0, + amt_to_forward: 0, + outgoing_cltv_value: 0, + }, + hmac: [0; 32], + }, + msgs::OnionHopData { + realm: 0, + data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData { + short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101, + amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001, + outgoing_cltv_value: 0, + }, + hmac: [0; 32], + }, + msgs::OnionHopData { + realm: 0, + data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData { + short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202, + amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002, + outgoing_cltv_value: 0, + }, + hmac: [0; 32], + }, + msgs::OnionHopData { + realm: 0, + data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData { + short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303, + amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003, + outgoing_cltv_value: 0, + }, + hmac: [0; 32], + }, + msgs::OnionHopData { + realm: 0, + data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData { + short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404, + amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004, + outgoing_cltv_value: 0, + }, + hmac: [0; 32], + }, + ); + + let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &[0x42; 32]); + // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it + // anyway... + assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap()); + } + + #[test] + fn test_failure_packet_onion() { + // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4 + + let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys(); + let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, 0x2002, &[0; 0]); + assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap()); + + let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, &onion_error.encode()[..]); + assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap()); + + let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret, &onion_packet_1.data[..]); + assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap()); + + let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret, &onion_packet_2.data[..]); + assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap()); + + let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret, &onion_packet_3.data[..]); + assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap()); + + let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret, &onion_packet_4.data[..]); + assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap()); + } + + fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) { + assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx)); + let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; + chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]); + for i in 2..100 { + header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; + chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]); + } + } + + struct Node { + chain_monitor: Arc, + tx_broadcaster: Arc, + chan_monitor: Arc, + node: Arc, + router: Router, + network_payment_count: Rc>, + network_chan_count: Rc>, + } + impl Drop for Node { + fn drop(&mut self) { + if !::std::thread::panicking() { + // Check that we processed all pending events + assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0); + assert_eq!(self.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0); + } + } + } + + fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) { + create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a, node_b, 100000, 10001) + } + + fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) { + let (funding_locked, channel_id, tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat); + let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a, node_b, &funding_locked); + (announcement, as_update, bs_update, channel_id, tx) + } + + fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> Transaction { + node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42).unwrap(); + + let events_1 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1); + let accept_chan = match events_1[0] { + Event::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, ref msg } => { + assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()); + node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap() + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + }; + + node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan).unwrap(); + + let chan_id = *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow(); + let tx; + let funding_output; + + let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1); + match events_2[0] { + Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => { + assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, channel_value); + assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42); + + tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut { + value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(), + }]}; + funding_output = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_data(&serialize(&tx).unwrap()[..]), 0); + + node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output); + let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output); + added_monitors.clear(); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + + let events_3 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1); + let funding_signed = match events_3[0] { + Event::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, ref msg } => { + assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()); + let res = node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap(); + let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output); + added_monitors.clear(); + res + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + }; + + node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed).unwrap(); + { + let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output); + added_monitors.clear(); + } + + let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1); + match events_4[0] { + Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => { + assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42); + assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + }; + + tx + } + + fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, tx: &Transaction) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32]) { + confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version); + let events_5 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1); + match events_5[0] { + Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => { + assert_eq!(*node_id, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()); + assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none()); + node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap() + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + }; + + let channel_id; + + confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version); + let events_6 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1); + (match events_6[0] { + Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => { + channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone(); + assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()); + (msg.clone(), announcement_sigs.clone().unwrap()) + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + }, channel_id) + } + + fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32], Transaction) { + let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat); + let (msgs, chan_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a, node_b, &tx); + (msgs, chan_id, tx) + } + + fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, as_funding_msgs: &(msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures)) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) { + let bs_announcement_sigs = { + let bs_announcement_sigs = node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.0).unwrap().unwrap(); + node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.1).unwrap(); + bs_announcement_sigs + }; + + let events_7 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1); + let (announcement, bs_update) = match events_7[0] { + Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => { + (msg, update_msg) + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + }; + + node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs).unwrap(); + let events_8 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1); + let as_update = match events_8[0] { + Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => { + assert!(*announcement == *msg); + update_msg + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + }; + + *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow_mut() += 1; + + ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone()) + } + + fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) { + create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes, a, b, 100000, 10001) + } + + fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes: &Vec, a: usize, b: usize, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) { + let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes[a], &nodes[b], channel_value, push_msat); + for node in nodes { + assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap()); + node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap(); + node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap(); + } + (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4) + } + + macro_rules! check_spends { + ($tx: expr, $spends_tx: expr) => { + { + let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new(); + let spends_tx = $spends_tx; + funding_tx_map.insert(spends_tx.txid(), spends_tx); + $tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap(); + } + } + } + + fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) { + let (node_a, broadcaster_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) }; + let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) }; + let (tx_a, tx_b); + + node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap(); + let events_1 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1); + let shutdown_a = match events_1[0] { + Event::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => { + assert_eq!(node_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id()); + msg.clone() + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + }; + + let (shutdown_b, mut closing_signed_b) = node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_a).unwrap(); + if !close_inbound_first { + assert!(closing_signed_b.is_none()); + } + let (empty_a, mut closing_signed_a) = node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b.unwrap()).unwrap(); + assert!(empty_a.is_none()); + if close_inbound_first { + assert!(closing_signed_a.is_none()); + closing_signed_a = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1); + tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0); + + let empty_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap(); + assert!(empty_b.is_none()); + assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1); + tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0); + } else { + closing_signed_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1); + tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0); + + let empty_a2 = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap(); + assert!(empty_a2.is_none()); + assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1); + tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0); + } + assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b); + check_spends!(tx_a, funding_tx); + + let events_2 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1); + let as_update = match events_2[0] { + Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => { + msg.clone() + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + }; + + let events_3 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1); + let bs_update = match events_3[0] { + Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => { + msg.clone() + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + }; + + (as_update, bs_update) + } + + struct SendEvent { + node_id: PublicKey, + msgs: Vec, + commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned, + } + impl SendEvent { + fn from_commitment_update(node_id: PublicKey, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate) -> SendEvent { + assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none()); + SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: updates.update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: updates.commitment_signed } + } + + fn from_event(event: Event) -> SendEvent { + match event { + Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => SendEvent::from_commitment_update(node_id, updates), + _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"), + } + } + } + + macro_rules! check_added_monitors { + ($node: expr, $count: expr) => { + { + let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), $count); + added_monitors.clear(); + } + } + } + + macro_rules! commitment_signed_dance { + ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr) => { + { + check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0); + let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1); + check_added_monitors!($node_b, 0); + assert!($node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none()); + check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1); + let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_none) = $node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap(); + assert!(bs_none.is_none()); + check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1); + if $fail_backwards { + assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); + } + assert!($node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none()); + { + let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap(); + if $fail_backwards { + assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2); + assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0); + } else { + assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1); + } + added_monitors.clear(); + } + } + } + } + + macro_rules! get_payment_preimage_hash { + ($node: expr) => { + { + let payment_preimage = [*$node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32]; + *$node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1; + let mut payment_hash = [0; 32]; + let mut sha = Sha256::new(); + sha.input(&payment_preimage[..]); + sha.result(&mut payment_hash); + (payment_preimage, payment_hash) + } + } + } + + fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) { + let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node); + + let mut payment_event = { + origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(origin_node, 1); + + let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0)) + }; + let mut prev_node = origin_node; + + for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() { + assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id); + + node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(node, 0); + commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false); + + let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1); + match events_1[0] { + Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + }; + + node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now(); + node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards(); + + let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1); + if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 { + match events_2[0] { + Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => { + assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash); + assert_eq!(amt, recv_value); }, - RouteHop { - pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), - short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + } else { + check_added_monitors!(node, 1); + payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0)); + assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1); + } + + prev_node = node; + } + + (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) + } + + fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) { + assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage)); + check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1); + + let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None; + macro_rules! update_fulfill_dance { + ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => { + { + $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap(); + if $last_node { + check_added_monitors!($node, 0); + } else { + check_added_monitors!($node, 1); + } + commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false); + } + } + } + + let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(); + let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap(); + for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() { + assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id()); + if next_msgs.is_some() { + update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, false); + } + + let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 { + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + match events[0] { + Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => { + assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1); + assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(update_fee.is_none()); + expected_next_node = node_id.clone(); + next_msgs = Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())); }, - RouteHop { - pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), - short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + } else { + assert!(events.is_empty()); + } + if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 { + assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id()); + } + + prev_node = node; + } + + if !skip_last { + update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true); + let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + match events[0] { + Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => { + assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + } + } + + fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) { + claim_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_preimage); + } + + const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32; + + fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) { + let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len()); + for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) { + assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id()); + } + + send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value) + } + + fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) { + let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len()); + for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) { + assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id()); + } + + let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node); + + let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap(); + match err { + APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"), + _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"), + }; + } + + fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) { + let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0; + claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage); + } + + fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) { + assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash)); + check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1); + + let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None; + macro_rules! update_fail_dance { + ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => { + { + $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap(); + commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, !$last_node); + } + } + } + + let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(); + let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap(); + for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() { + assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id()); + if next_msgs.is_some() { + // We may be the "last node" for the purpose of the commitment dance if we're + // skipping the last node (implying it is disconnected) and we're the + // second-to-last node! + update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1); + } + + let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 { + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + match events[0] { + Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => { + assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1); + assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(update_fee.is_none()); + expected_next_node = node_id.clone(); + next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + } else { + assert!(events.is_empty()); + } + if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 { + assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id()); + } + + prev_node = node; + } + + if !skip_last { + update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true); + + let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + match events[0] { + Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => { + assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash); + assert!(rejected_by_dest); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + } + } + + fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) { + fail_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_hash); + } + + fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec { + let mut nodes = Vec::new(); + let mut rng = thread_rng(); + let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); + let logger: Arc = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()); + + let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0)); + let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0)); + + for _ in 0..node_count { + let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }); + let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger))); + let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())}); + let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone())); + let node_id = { + let mut key_slice = [0; 32]; + rng.fill_bytes(&mut key_slice); + SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &key_slice).unwrap() + }; + let node = ChannelManager::new(node_id.clone(), 0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap(); + let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger)); + nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router, + network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(), + network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(), + }); + } + + nodes + } + + #[test] + fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() { + let mut nodes = create_network(2); + let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); + let channel_id = chan.2; + + macro_rules! get_feerate { + ($node: expr) => {{ + let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap(); + chan.get_feerate() + }} + } + + // balancing + send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000); + + // A B + // update_fee -> + // send (1) commitment_signed -. + // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed + // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -. + // (1) commitment_signed is delivered -> + // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) + // (2) RAA is delivered -> + // .- send (4) commitment_signed + // <- (3) RAA is delivered + // send (5) commitment_signed -. + // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered + // send (6) RAA -. + // (5) commitment_signed is delivered -> + // <- RAA + // (6) RAA is delivered -> + + // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee + nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + + let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1); + let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1) + Event::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => { + (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed) + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + }; + + nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap(); + + // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]... + let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]); + nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + + let payment_event = { + let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1); + SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0)) + }; + assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1); + + // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy + nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap(); + let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2) + assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + + // deliver(1), generate (3): + let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap(); + assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + + let bs_update = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (2) + assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4) + assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4) + assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4) + assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4) + assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none()); // (4) + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + + let as_update = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (3) + assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5) + assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5) + assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5) + assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5) + assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none()); // (5) + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + + let (as_second_revoke, as_second_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (4) + assert!(as_second_commitment_signed.is_none()); // only (6) + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + + let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (5) + assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.is_none()); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + + assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none()); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + + let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1); + match events_2[0] { + Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + + assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none()); // deliver (6) + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + } + + #[test] + fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() { + // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a + // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch) + let mut nodes = create_network(2); + let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); + let channel_id = chan.2; + + macro_rules! get_feerate { + ($node: expr) => {{ + let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap(); + chan.get_feerate() + }} + } + + // balancing + send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000); + + // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee + nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + + let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1); + let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1) + Event::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => { + update_fee.as_ref() + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + }; + + nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap(); + + // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]... + let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]); + nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + + let payment_event = { + let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1); + SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0)) + }; + assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1); + + // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy + nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap(); + let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2) + assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + + assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap().is_none()); // deliver (2) + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + + // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature + } + + #[test] + fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() { + let nodes = create_network(2); + let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); + let channel_id = chan.2; + + macro_rules! get_feerate { + ($node: expr) => {{ + let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap(); + chan.get_feerate() + }} + } + + // A B + // update_fee/commitment_signed -> + // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed + // update_fee (never committed) -> + // (3) update_fee -> + // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we + // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in + // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet. + // <- (1) RAA delivered + // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -. + // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't + // know the per_commitment_point to use for it. + // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered + // revoke_and_ack -> + // B should send no response here + // (4) commitment_signed delivered -> + // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered + // revoke_and_ack -> + + // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee + let initial_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]); + nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 20).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + + let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1); + let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1) + Event::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => { + (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed) + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + }; + + // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2): + nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1).unwrap(); + let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + + // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment + // transaction: + nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 40).unwrap(); + assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); + + // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does... + let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee { + channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(), + feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32, + }; + + nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap(); + + update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32; + // Deliver (3) + nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap(); + + // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4) + let as_second_update = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); + // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered: + assert_eq!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id); + assert_eq!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw); + + // Deliver (2) commitment_signed + let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), bs_commitment_signed.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none()); + + assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap().is_none()); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + + // Delever (4) + let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + + assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none()); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + + let (as_second_revoke, as_second_commitment) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment.unwrap()).unwrap(); + assert!(as_second_commitment.is_none()); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + + assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none()); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + } + + #[test] + fn test_update_fee_vanilla() { + let nodes = create_network(2); + let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); + let channel_id = chan.2; + + macro_rules! get_feerate { + ($node: expr) => {{ + let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap(); + chan.get_feerate() + }} + } + + let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]); + nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap(); + + let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1); + let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { + Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => { + (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed) + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + }; + nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap(); + + let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap(); + let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + + let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap(); + assert!(resp_option.is_none()); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + + let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap(); + assert!(commitment_signed.is_none()); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + + let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap(); + assert!(resp_option.is_none()); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + } + + #[test] + fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() { + let mut nodes = create_network(2); + let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); + let channel_id = chan.2; + + macro_rules! get_feerate { + ($node: expr) => {{ + let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap(); + chan.get_feerate() + }} + } + + // balancing + send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000); + + let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]); + nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap(); + + let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1); + let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { + Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => { + (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed) + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + }; + nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap(); + let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + + let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 800000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(); + + let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]); + + // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke + nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap(); + { + let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0); + added_monitors.clear(); + } + let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 0); + // node[1] has nothing to do + + let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap(); + assert!(resp_option.is_none()); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + + let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap(); + assert!(commitment_signed.is_none()); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap(); + // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here + + let commitment_update = resp_option.unwrap(); + assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0); + assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0); + assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0); + assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true); + + nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap(); + let (revoke, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap(); + let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + assert!(resp_option.is_none()); + + let (revoke, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + assert!(commitment_signed.is_none()); + let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + assert!(resp_option.is_none()); + + let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + match events[0] { + Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + }; + nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now(); + nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards(); + + let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + match events[0] { + Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + }; + + claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage); + + send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000); + send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000); + close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true); + } + + #[test] + fn test_update_fee() { + let nodes = create_network(2); + let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); + let channel_id = chan.2; + + macro_rules! get_feerate { + ($node: expr) => {{ + let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap(); + chan.get_feerate() + }} + } + + // A B + // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed -> + // <- (2) revoke_and_ack + // .- send (3) commitment_signed + // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed -> + // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke) + // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered + // send (6) revoke_and_ack -. + // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack + // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack -> + // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4) + // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed + // revoke_and_ack -> + + // Create and deliver (1)... + let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]); + nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap(); + + let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1); + let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { + Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => { + (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed) + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + }; + nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap(); + + // Generate (2) and (3): + let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap(); + let commitment_signed_0 = commitment_signed.unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + + // Deliver (2): + let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap(); + assert!(resp_option.is_none()); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + + // Create and deliver (4)... + nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+30).unwrap(); + let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1); + let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { + Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => { + (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed) + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + }; + nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap(); + + let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap(); + // ... creating (5) + assert!(commitment_signed.is_none()); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + + // Handle (3), creating (6): + let (revoke_msg_0, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0).unwrap(); + assert!(commitment_signed.is_none()); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + + // Deliver (5): + let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap(); + assert!(resp_option.is_none()); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + + // Deliver (6), creating (7): + let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0).unwrap(); + let commitment_signed = resp_option.unwrap().commitment_signed; + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + + // Deliver (7) + let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap(); + assert!(commitment_signed.is_none()); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap(); + assert!(resp_option.is_none()); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + + assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0]), feerate + 30); + assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1]), feerate + 30); + close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true); + } + + #[test] + fn fake_network_test() { + // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and + // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways. + let nodes = create_network(4); + + // Create some initial channels + let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); + let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2); + let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3); + + // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels... + send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000); + send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000); + send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000); + send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000); + + // Send some more payments + send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000); + send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000); + send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000); + + // Test failure packets + let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1; + fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1); + + // Add a new channel that skips 3 + let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3); + + send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000); + send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000); + send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000); + send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000); + send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000); + send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000); + send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000); + + // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously + let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3); + hops.push(RouteHop { + pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), + short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, + fee_msat: 0, + cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32 + }); + hops.push(RouteHop { + pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), + short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id, + fee_msat: 0, + cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32 + }); + hops.push(RouteHop { + pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), + short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id, + fee_msat: 1000000, + cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV, + }); + hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000; + hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000; + let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0; + + let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3); + hops.push(RouteHop { + pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), + short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id, + fee_msat: 0, + cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32 + }); + hops.push(RouteHop { + pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), + short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id, + fee_msat: 0, + cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32 + }); + hops.push(RouteHop { + pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), + short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, + fee_msat: 1000000, + cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV, + }); + hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000; + hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000; + let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1; + + // Claim the rebalances... + fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2); + claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1); + + // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4 + let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3); + + // Send some payments across both channels + let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0; + let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0; + let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0; + + route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000); + + //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full + + claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3); + claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4); + claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5); + + // Close down the channels... + close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true); + close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false); + close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true); + close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false); + close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false); + } + + #[test] + fn duplicate_htlc_test() { + // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that + // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't effect each other + let mut nodes = create_network(6); + + // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2 + create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3); + create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3); + create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3); + create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4); + create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5); + + let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000); + + *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1; + assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage); + + *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1; + assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage); + + claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage); + fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash); + claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage); + } + + #[derive(PartialEq)] + enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS } + /// Tests that the given node has broadcast transactions for the given Channel + /// + /// First checks that the latest local commitment tx has been broadcast, unless an explicit + /// commitment_tx is provided, which may be used to test that a remote commitment tx was + /// broadcast and the revoked outputs were claimed. + /// + /// Next tests that there is (or is not) a transaction that spends the commitment transaction + /// that appears to be the type of HTLC transaction specified in has_htlc_tx. + /// + /// All broadcast transactions must be accounted for in one of the above three types of we'll + /// also fail. + fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec { + let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); + assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 }); + + let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2); + node_txn.retain(|tx| { + if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() { + check_spends!(tx, chan.3.clone()); + if commitment_tx.is_none() { + res.push(tx.clone()); + } + false + } else { true } + }); + if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx { + res.push(explicit_tx.clone()); + } + + assert_eq!(res.len(), 1); + + if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE { + node_txn.retain(|tx| { + if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() { + check_spends!(tx, res[0].clone()); + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT { + assert!(tx.lock_time != 0); + } else { + assert!(tx.lock_time == 0); + } + res.push(tx.clone()); + false + } else { true } + }); + assert_eq!(res.len(), 2); + } + + assert!(node_txn.is_empty()); + res + } + + /// Tests that the given node has broadcast a claim transaction against the provided revoked + /// HTLC transaction. + fn test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, revoked_tx: Transaction) { + let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); + node_txn.retain(|tx| { + if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_tx.txid() { + check_spends!(tx, revoked_tx.clone()); + false + } else { true } + }); + assert!(node_txn.is_empty()); + } + + fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec) -> Vec { + let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); + + assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1); + assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); + let mut found_prev = false; + + for tx in prev_txn { + if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() { + check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx.clone()); + assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output + assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx + + found_prev = true; + break; + } + } + assert!(found_prev); + + let mut res = Vec::new(); + mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res); + res + } + + fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec, a: usize, b: usize) { + let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1); + let as_update = match events_1[0] { + Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => { + msg.clone() + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + }; + + let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1); + let bs_update = match events_2[0] { + Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => { + msg.clone() + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + }; + + for node in nodes { + node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap(); + node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap(); + } + } + + macro_rules! expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable { + ($node: expr) => {{ + let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + match events[0] { + Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + }; + $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now(); + $node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards(); + }} + } + + #[test] + fn channel_reserve_test() { + use util::rng; + use std::sync::atomic::Ordering; + use ln::msgs::HandleError; + + macro_rules! get_channel_value_stat { + ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {{ + let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap(); + chan.get_value_stat() + }} + } + + let mut nodes = create_network(3); + let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1900, 1001); + let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1900, 1001); + + let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2); + let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2); + + let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2); + let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2); + + macro_rules! get_route_and_payment_hash { + ($recv_value: expr) => {{ + let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), $recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(); + let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]); + (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage) + }} + }; + + macro_rules! expect_forward { + ($node: expr) => {{ + let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + check_added_monitors!($node, 1); + let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0)); + payment_event + }} + } + + macro_rules! expect_payment_received { + ($node: expr, $expected_payment_hash: expr, $expected_recv_value: expr) => { + let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + match events[0] { + Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => { + assert_eq!($expected_payment_hash, *payment_hash); + assert_eq!($expected_recv_value, amt); }, - ), + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + } }; - let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(); + let feemsat = 239; // somehow we know? + let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * 239; - let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap(); - assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len()); - onion_keys + let recv_value_0 = stat01.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat; + + // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + { + let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_0 + 1); + assert!(route.hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat)); + let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap(); + match err { + APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"), + _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"), + } + } + + let mut htlc_id = 0; + // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete + // nodes[0]'s wealth + loop { + let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat; + if stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat { + break; + } + send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0); + htlc_id += 1; + + let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = ( + get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2), + get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2), + get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2), + get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2), + ); + + assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat); + assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat); + assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat)); + assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat)); + stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_; + } + + { + let recv_value = stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat; + // attempt to get channel_reserve violation + let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value + 1); + let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), our_payment_hash).err().unwrap(); + match err { + APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"), + _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"), + } + } + + // adding pending output + let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat)/2; + let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat; + + let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_1); + let payment_event_1 = { + nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, our_payment_hash_1).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + + let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0)) + }; + nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]).unwrap(); + + // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0 + let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat; + { + let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1); + match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() { + APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"), + _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"), + } + } + + { + // test channel_reserve test on nodes[1] side + let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1); + + // Need to manually create update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc() + let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); + let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &{ + let mut session_key = [0; 32]; + rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key); + session_key + }).expect("RNG is bad!"); + + let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1; + let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap(); + let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap(); + let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &our_payment_hash); + let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC { + channel_id: chan_1.2, + htlc_id, + amount_msat: htlc_msat, + payment_hash: our_payment_hash, + cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv, + onion_routing_packet: onion_packet, + }; + + let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).err().unwrap(); + match err { + HandleError{err, .. } => assert_eq!(err, "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"), + } + } + + // split the rest to test holding cell + let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2; + let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat; + { + let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2); + assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat), stat.channel_reserve_msat); + } + + // now see if they go through on both sides + let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_21); + // but this will stuck in the holding cell + nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_21, our_payment_hash_21).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0); + let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 0); + + // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0 + { + let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22+1); + match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() { + APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"), + _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"), + } + } + + let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22); + // this will also stuck in the holding cell + nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_22, our_payment_hash_22).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0); + let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 0); + + // flush the pending htlc + let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + + let commitment_update_2 = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_none) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap(); + assert!(bs_none.is_none()); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none()); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + + expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]); + + let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]); + nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]).unwrap(); + commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false); + + expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]); + expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, recv_value_1); + + // flush the htlcs in the holding cell + assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2); + nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap(); + nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]).unwrap(); + commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false); + expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]); + + let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]); + assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2); + nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]).unwrap(); + nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]).unwrap(); + + commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false); + expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]); + + let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 2); + match events[0] { + Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => { + assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash); + assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + match events[1] { + Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => { + assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash); + assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + + claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1); + claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21); + claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22); + + let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat); + let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2); + assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self); + assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat); + + let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2); + assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22); } #[test] - fn onion_vectors() { - // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4 - let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys(); + fn channel_monitor_network_test() { + // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and + // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states. + let nodes = create_network(5); - assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]); - assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]); - assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]); - assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]); - assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]); + // Create some initial channels + let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); + let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2); + let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3); + let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4); - assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]); - assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]); - assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]); - assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]); - assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]); + // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels... + send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000); + send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000); + send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000); + send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000); - assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]); - assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]); - assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]); - assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]); - assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]); + // Simple case with no pending HTLCs: + nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true); + { + let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE); + let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; + nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1); + test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE); + } + get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1); + assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0); + assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1); - assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]); - assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]); - assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]); - assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]); - assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]); + // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close: + let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0; - assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]); - assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]); - assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]); - assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]); - assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]); + // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout + nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true); + { + let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT); + let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; + nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1); + test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE); + } + get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2); + assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0); + assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1); + + macro_rules! claim_funds { + ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => { + { + assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage)); + check_added_monitors!($node, 1); + + let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + match events[0] { + Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => { + assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id()); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + }; + } + } + } + + // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2] + // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces) + nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true); + { + let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT); + + // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage + claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1); + + let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; + nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1); + + check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn); + } + get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3); + assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0); + assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1); + + { // Cheat and reset nodes[4]'s height to 1 + let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; + nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 1); + } + + assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1); + assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1); + // One pending HTLC to time out: + let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0; + // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for + // buffer space). + + { + let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; + nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]); + for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1 { + header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; + nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]); + } - // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/ - let payloads = vec!( - msgs::OnionHopData { - realm: 0, - data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData { - short_channel_id: 0, - amt_to_forward: 0, - outgoing_cltv_value: 0, - }, - hmac: [0; 32], - }, - msgs::OnionHopData { - realm: 0, - data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData { - short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101, - amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001, - outgoing_cltv_value: 0, - }, - hmac: [0; 32], - }, - msgs::OnionHopData { - realm: 0, - data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData { - short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202, - amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002, - outgoing_cltv_value: 0, - }, - hmac: [0; 32], - }, - msgs::OnionHopData { - realm: 0, - data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData { - short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303, - amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003, - outgoing_cltv_value: 0, - }, - hmac: [0; 32], - }, - msgs::OnionHopData { - realm: 0, - data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData { - short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404, - amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004, - outgoing_cltv_value: 0, - }, - hmac: [0; 32], - }, - ); + let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT); - let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &[0x42; 32]).unwrap(); - // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it - // anyway... - assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap()); - } + // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage + claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2); - #[test] - fn test_failure_packet_onion() { - // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4 + header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; + nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]); + for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 1 { + header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; + nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]); + } - let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys(); - let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, 0x2002, &[0; 0]); - assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap()); + test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS); - let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, &onion_error.encode()[..]); - assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap()); + header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; + nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5); - let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret, &onion_packet_1.data[..]); - assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap()); + check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn); + } + get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4); + assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0); + assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0); - let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret, &onion_packet_2.data[..]); - assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap()); + // Create some new channels: + let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); - let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret, &onion_packet_3.data[..]); - assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap()); + // A pending HTLC which will be revoked: + let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0; + // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0] + let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone(); + assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx + assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid()); + assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present + assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid()); + assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout + // Revoke the old state + claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3); - let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret, &onion_packet_4.data[..]); - assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap()); - } + { + let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; + nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1); + { + let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); + assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected + assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output - fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) { - assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx)); - let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; - chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]); - for i in 2..100 { + check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone()); + node_txn.swap_remove(0); + } + test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE); + + nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1); + let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT); header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; - chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]); + nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1); + test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone()); } + get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1); + assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0); + assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0); } - struct Node { - feeest: Arc, - chain_monitor: Arc, - tx_broadcaster: Arc, - chan_monitor: Arc, - node_id: SecretKey, - node: Arc, - router: Router, + #[test] + fn revoked_output_claim() { + // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment + // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty + let nodes = create_network(2); + let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); + // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output + let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone(); + assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); + // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]: + assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1); + // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn + send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000); + + // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx + let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; + nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1); + let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // nodes[1] will broadcast justice tx twice, and its own local state once + + assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]); + + check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone()); + check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone()); + + // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan + nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1); + get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1); } - static mut CHAN_COUNT: u32 = 0; - fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) { - node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42).unwrap(); - - let events_1 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); - assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1); - let accept_chan = match events_1[0] { - Event::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, ref msg } => { - assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()); - node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap() - }, - _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), - }; + #[test] + fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() { + // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx + let nodes = create_network(2); - node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan).unwrap(); + // Create some new channel: + let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); - let chan_id = unsafe { CHAN_COUNT }; - let tx; - let funding_output; + // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions + send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000); + // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx + let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0; + let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0; + + // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0] + let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone(); + assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx + assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); + assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid()); + assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout + check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone()); + + //Revoke the old state + claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1); - let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); - assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1); - match events_2[0] { - Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => { - assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, 100000); - assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42); + { + let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; - tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut { - value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(), - }]}; - funding_output = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_data(&serialize(&tx).unwrap()[..]), 0); + nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1); - node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output); - let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap(); - assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1); - assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output); - added_monitors.clear(); - }, - _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1); + let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); + + assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs + check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone()); + + assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); // justice tx is duplicated due to block re-scanning + + let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new(); + witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len()); + witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len()); + witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len()); + assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3); + assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local + assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC + assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC + + // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state: + assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager + + assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1); + let witness_script = node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.pop().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output + assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].txid()); + assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid); + assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid); } + get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1); + assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0); + assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0); + } - let events_3 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); - assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1); - let funding_signed = match events_3[0] { - Event::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, ref msg } => { - assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()); - let res = node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap(); - let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap(); - assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1); - assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output); - added_monitors.clear(); - res - }, - _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), - }; + #[test] + fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() { + // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx + let nodes = create_network(2); - node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed).unwrap(); - { - let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap(); - assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1); - assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output); - added_monitors.clear(); - } + let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); - let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); - assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1); - match events_4[0] { - Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => { - assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42); - assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output); - }, - _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), - }; + // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions + send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000); + // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this + // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height + let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0; + let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0; - confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, chan_id); - let events_5 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); - assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1); - match events_5[0] { - Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => { - assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()); - assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none()); - node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap() - }, - _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), - }; + // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0] + let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone(); - let channel_id; + //Revoke the old state + claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1); - confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, chan_id); - let events_6 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); - assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1); - let as_announcement_sigs = match events_6[0] { - Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => { - assert_eq!(*node_id, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()); - channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone(); - let as_announcement_sigs = node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap().unwrap(); - node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &(*announcement_sigs).clone().unwrap()).unwrap(); - as_announcement_sigs - }, - _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), - }; + { + let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; - let events_7 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); - assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1); - let (announcement, as_update) = match events_7[0] { - Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => { - (msg, update_msg) - }, - _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), - }; + nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200); + + nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200); + let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 12); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan) + + assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[7]); + assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[8]); + assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[9]); + assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[10]); + assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[11]); + assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcated by ChannelManger + assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]); + + assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1); + + let mut revoked_tx_map = HashMap::new(); + revoked_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone()); + node_txn[0].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap(); + node_txn[1].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap(); + node_txn[2].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap(); + + let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new(); + witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len()); + witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len()); + witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len()); + assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3); + assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local + assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC + assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC + + assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1); + check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3.clone()); + + assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1); + let witness_script = node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output + assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[3].txid()); + assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid); + assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid); + } + get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1); + assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0); + assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0); + } - node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs).unwrap(); - let events_8 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); - assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1); - let bs_update = match events_8[0] { - Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => { - assert!(*announcement == *msg); - update_msg - }, - _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), - }; + #[test] + fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() { + // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply + // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap(). + let nodes = create_network(2); + create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); - unsafe { - CHAN_COUNT += 1; + route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000); + nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id); + { + let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + match events[0] { + Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => { + assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } } - ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone(), channel_id, tx) - } + let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); - fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) { - let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[a], &nodes[b]); - for node in nodes { - assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap()); - node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap(); - node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap(); + let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; + nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]); + + { + let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + match events[0] { + Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => { + assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } } - (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4) + + // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners + // registering new transactions + nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]); } - fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) { - let (node_a, broadcaster_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) }; - let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) }; - let (tx_a, tx_b); + #[test] + fn test_force_close_fail_back() { + // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure + let mut nodes = create_network(3); + create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); + create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2); - node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap(); - let events_1 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap(); + + let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]); + + let mut payment_event = { + nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + + let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0)) + }; + + nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap(); + commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false); + + let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1); - let shutdown_a = match events_1[0] { - Event::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => { - assert_eq!(node_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id()); - msg.clone() - }, + match events_1[0] { + Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), }; - let (shutdown_b, mut closing_signed_b) = node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_a).unwrap(); - if !close_inbound_first { - assert!(closing_signed_b.is_none()); - } - let (empty_a, mut closing_signed_a) = node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b.unwrap()).unwrap(); - assert!(empty_a.is_none()); - if close_inbound_first { - assert!(closing_signed_a.is_none()); - closing_signed_a = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap(); - assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1); - tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0); + nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now(); + nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards(); - let empty_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap(); - assert!(empty_b.is_none()); - assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1); - tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0); - } else { - closing_signed_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap(); - assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1); - tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0); + let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1); + payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0)); + assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1); - let empty_a2 = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap(); - assert!(empty_a2.is_none()); - assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1); - tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0); - } - assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b); - let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new(); - funding_tx_map.insert(funding_tx.txid(), funding_tx); - tx_a.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap(); + nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1); - let events_2 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events(); - assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1); - let as_update = match events_2[0] { - Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => { - msg.clone() + // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous + // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC + // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!). + + nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id); + let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1); + match events_3[0] { + Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => { + assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + + let tx = { + let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); + // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't + // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go + // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise. + assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); + node_txn.remove(0) }; - let events_3 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events(); - assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1); - let bs_update = match events_3[0] { - Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => { - msg.clone() + let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; + nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]); + + let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]! + assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1); + match events_4[0] { + Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => { + assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), - }; + } - (as_update, bs_update) - } + // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success.. + { + let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap(); + monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]), 0)).unwrap() + .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage); + } + nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]); + let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid()); + assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success + assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success - struct SendEvent { - node_id: PublicKey, - msgs: Vec, - commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned, + check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx); } - impl SendEvent { - fn from_event(event: Event) -> SendEvent { - match event { - Event::SendHTLCs { node_id, msgs, commitment_msg } => { - SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: msgs, commitment_msg: commitment_msg } + + #[test] + fn test_unconf_chan() { + // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side + let nodes = create_network(2); + create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); + + let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1); + mem::drop(channel_state); + + let mut headers = Vec::new(); + let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; + headers.push(header.clone()); + for _i in 2..100 { + header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; + headers.push(header.clone()); + } + while !headers.is_empty() { + nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap()); + } + { + let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + match events[0] { + Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => { + assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10); }, - _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"), + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } } + let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0); + assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0); } - static mut PAYMENT_COUNT: u8 = 0; - fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) { - let our_payment_preimage = unsafe { [PAYMENT_COUNT; 32] }; - unsafe { PAYMENT_COUNT += 1 }; - let our_payment_hash = { - let mut sha = Sha256::new(); - sha.input(&our_payment_preimage[..]); - let mut ret = [0; 32]; - sha.result(&mut ret); - ret - }; + /// pending_htlc_adds includes both the holding cell and in-flight update_add_htlcs, whereas + /// for claims/fails they are separated out. + fn reconnect_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, pre_all_htlcs: bool, pending_htlc_adds: (i64, i64), pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_fails: (usize, usize), pending_raa: (bool, bool)) { + let reestablish_1 = node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id()); + let reestablish_2 = node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id()); - let mut payment_event = { - origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap(); - { - let mut added_monitors = origin_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap(); - assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1); - added_monitors.clear(); - } + let mut resp_1 = Vec::new(); + for msg in reestablish_1 { + resp_1.push(node_b.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap()); + } + if pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 { + check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1); + } else { + check_added_monitors!(node_b, 0); + } - let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); - assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); - SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0)) - }; - let mut prev_node = origin_node; + let mut resp_2 = Vec::new(); + for msg in reestablish_2 { + resp_2.push(node_a.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap()); + } + if pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 { + check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1); + } else { + check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0); + } - for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() { - assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id); + // We dont yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance: + assert!((pending_htlc_adds.0 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 == 0) || + (pending_htlc_adds.1 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 == 0)); - node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap(); - { - let added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap(); - assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0); + for chan_msgs in resp_1.drain(..) { + if pre_all_htlcs { + let a = node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()); + let _announcement_sigs_opt = a.unwrap(); + //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending when we've implemented it + } else { + assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none()); + } + if pending_raa.0 { + assert!(chan_msgs.3 == msgs::RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst); + assert!(node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap().is_none()); + check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1); + } else { + assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none()); } + if pending_htlc_adds.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 { + let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap(); + if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed + assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.0 as usize); + } else { + assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); + } + assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0); + assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0); + assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); + for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs { + node_a.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap(); + } + for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs { + node_a.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap(); + } + for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs { + node_a.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap(); + } - let revoke_and_ack = node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); - { - let mut added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap(); - assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1); - added_monitors.clear(); + if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed + commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false); + } else { + let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1); + assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none()); + assert!(node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none()); + check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1); + } + } else { + assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none()); } - assert!(prev_node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none()); - let prev_revoke_and_ack = prev_node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.1.unwrap()).unwrap(); - { - let mut added_monitors = prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap(); - assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2); - added_monitors.clear(); + } + + for chan_msgs in resp_2.drain(..) { + if pre_all_htlcs { + let _announcement_sigs_opt = node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap(); + //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending when we've implemented it + } else { + assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none()); } - assert!(node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &prev_revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none()); - assert!(prev_revoke_and_ack.1.is_none()); - { - let mut added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap(); - assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1); - added_monitors.clear(); + if pending_raa.1 { + assert!(chan_msgs.3 == msgs::RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst); + assert!(node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap().is_none()); + check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1); + } else { + assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none()); + } + if pending_htlc_adds.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 { + let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap(); + if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed + assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.1 as usize); + } + assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0); + assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0); + assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); + for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs { + node_b.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap(); + } + for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs { + node_b.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap(); + } + for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs { + node_b.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap(); + } + + if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed + commitment_signed_dance!(node_b, node_a, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false); + } else { + let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1); + assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none()); + assert!(node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none()); + check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1); + } + } else { + assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none()); } + } + } - let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); - assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1); - match events_1[0] { - Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { }, + #[test] + fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() { + // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages + let nodes = create_network(3); + create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); + create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2); + + nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false); + nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false); + reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false)); + + let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0; + let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1; + fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2); + claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1); + + nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false); + nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false); + reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false)); + + let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0; + let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0; + let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1; + let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1; + + nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false); + nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false); + + claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3); + fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5); + + reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false)); + { + let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 2); + match events[0] { + Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => { + assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3); + }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), - }; + } + match events[1] { + Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => { + assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5); + assert!(rejected_by_dest); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + } - node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now(); - node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards(); + claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4); + fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6); + } - let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); - assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1); - if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 { - match events_2[0] { - Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => { - assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash); - assert_eq!(amt, recv_value); - }, - _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), - } - } else { - { - let mut added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap(); - assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1); - added_monitors.clear(); + fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8) { + // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped + let mut nodes = create_network(2); + if messages_delivered == 0 { + create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001); + // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect) + } else { + create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); + } + + let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(); + let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]); + + let payment_event = { + nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + + let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0)) + }; + assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id); + + if messages_delivered < 2 { + // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes! + } else { + nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap(); + let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + + if messages_delivered >= 3 { + assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none()); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + + if messages_delivered >= 4 { + let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap(); + assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none()); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + + if messages_delivered >= 5 { + assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none()); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + } } - payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0)); - assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1); } + } - prev_node = node; + nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false); + nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false); + if messages_delivered < 2 { + // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was + // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them. + reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false)); + } else if messages_delivered == 2 { + // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed + reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false)); + } else if messages_delivered == 3 { + // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed + reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false)); + } else if messages_delivered == 4 { + // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA + reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true)); + } else if messages_delivered == 5 { + // Everything was delivered... + reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false)); } - (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) - } + let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1); + match events_1[0] { + Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + }; - fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) { - assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage)); - { - let mut added_monitors = expected_route.last().unwrap().chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap(); - assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1); - added_monitors.clear(); + nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false); + nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false); + reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false)); + + nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now(); + nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards(); + + let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1); + match events_2[0] { + Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => { + assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash); + assert_eq!(amt, 1000000); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } - let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None; - macro_rules! update_fulfill_dance { - ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => { - { - $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap(); - { - let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap(); - if $last_node { - assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0); - } else { - assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1); + nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + + let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1); + let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] { + Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => { + assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1); + assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none()); + (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone()) + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + }; + + if messages_delivered >= 1 { + nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc).unwrap(); + + let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1); + match events_4[0] { + Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => { + assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + + if messages_delivered >= 2 { + let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + + if messages_delivered >= 3 { + assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none()); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + + if messages_delivered >= 4 { + let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap(); + assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none()); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + + if messages_delivered >= 5 { + assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none()); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); } - added_monitors.clear(); - } - let revoke_and_commit = $node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1).unwrap(); - { - let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap(); - assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1); - added_monitors.clear(); - } - assert!($prev_node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.0).unwrap().is_none()); - let revoke_and_ack = $prev_node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.1.unwrap()).unwrap(); - assert!(revoke_and_ack.1.is_none()); - { - let mut added_monitors = $prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap(); - assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2); - added_monitors.clear(); - } - assert!($node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none()); - { - let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap(); - assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1); - added_monitors.clear(); } } } } - let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(); - let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap(); - for node in expected_route.iter().rev() { - assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id()); - if next_msgs.is_some() { - update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, false); - } + nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false); + nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false); + if messages_delivered < 2 { + reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false)); + //TODO: Deduplicate PaymentSent events, then enable this if: + //if messages_delivered < 1 { + let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1); + match events_4[0] { + Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => { + assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + //} + } else if messages_delivered == 2 { + // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed + reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true)); + } else if messages_delivered == 3 { + // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed + reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false)); + } else if messages_delivered == 4 { + // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA + reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false)); + } else if messages_delivered == 5 { + // Everything was delivered... + reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false)); + } - let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); - assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); - match events[0] { - Event::SendFulfillHTLC { ref node_id, ref msg, ref commitment_msg } => { - expected_next_node = node_id.clone(); - next_msgs = Some((msg.clone(), commitment_msg.clone())); - }, - _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), - }; + nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false); + nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false); + reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false)); - prev_node = node; - } + // Channel should still work fine... + let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0; + claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2); + } - assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id()); - update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true); + #[test] + fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() { + do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0); + do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1); + do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2); + } - let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); - assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); - match events[0] { - Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => { - assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage); - }, - _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), - } + #[test] + fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() { + do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3); + do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4); + do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5); } - const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32; + #[test] + fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() { + // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected + let nodes = create_network(2); + let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001); - fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) { - let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(); - assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len()); - for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) { - assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id()); - } + nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false); + nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false); - send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value) - } + confirm_transaction(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version); + let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1); + match events_1[0] { + Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _, ref announcement_sigs } => { + assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none()); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } - fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) { - let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(); - assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len()); - for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) { - assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id()); + confirm_transaction(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version); + let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1); + match events_2[0] { + Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _, ref announcement_sigs } => { + assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none()); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } - let our_payment_preimage = unsafe { [PAYMENT_COUNT; 32] }; - unsafe { PAYMENT_COUNT += 1 }; - let our_payment_hash = { - let mut sha = Sha256::new(); - sha.input(&our_payment_preimage[..]); - let mut ret = [0; 32]; - sha.result(&mut ret); - ret - }; + reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false)); + nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false); + nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false); + reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false)); - let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap(); - assert_eq!(err.err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"); - } + // TODO: We shouldn't need to manually pass list_usable_chanels here once we support + // rebroadcasting announcement_signatures upon reconnect. - fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) { - let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0; - claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage); + let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(); + let (payment_preimage, _) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000); + claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage); } - fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) { - assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash)); - { - let mut added_monitors = expected_route.last().unwrap().chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap(); - assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1); - added_monitors.clear(); - } - - let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None; - macro_rules! update_fail_dance { - ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => { - { - $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap(); - let revoke_and_commit = $node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1).unwrap(); + #[test] + fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() { + // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending + // commitment_updates when we disconnect. + let mut nodes = create_network(2); + create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); - { - let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap(); - assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1); - added_monitors.clear(); - } - assert!($prev_node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.0).unwrap().is_none()); - { - let mut added_monitors = $prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap(); - assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1); - added_monitors.clear(); - } - let revoke_and_ack = $prev_node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.1.unwrap()).unwrap(); - { - let mut added_monitors = $prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap(); - assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1); - added_monitors.clear(); - } - assert!(revoke_and_ack.1.is_none()); - assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); - assert!($node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none()); - { - let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap(); - if $last_node { - assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1); - } else { - assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2); - assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0); - } - added_monitors.clear(); - } - } - } - } + let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000); - let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(); - let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap(); - for node in expected_route.iter().rev() { - assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id()); - if next_msgs.is_some() { - update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, false); - } + // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send + let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(); + let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]); - let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); - assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); - match events[0] { - Event::SendFailHTLC { ref node_id, ref msg, ref commitment_msg } => { - expected_next_node = node_id.clone(); - next_msgs = Some((msg.clone(), commitment_msg.clone())); - }, - _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), - }; + nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); - prev_node = node; + let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1); + match events_1[0] { + Event::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {}, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } - assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id()); - update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true); + assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1)); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); - let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); - assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); - match events[0] { - Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash } => { - assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash); + let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1); + match events_2[0] { + Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => { + assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1); + assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(update_fee.is_none()); + + nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap(); + let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1); + match events_3[0] { + Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => { + assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + + let (_, commitment_update) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap(); + assert!(commitment_update.is_none()); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } - } - fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec { - let mut nodes = Vec::new(); - let mut rng = thread_rng(); - let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); + nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false); + nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false); + + let reestablish_1 = nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1); + let reestablish_2 = nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1); + + let as_resp = nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap(); + let bs_resp = nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap(); + + assert!(as_resp.0.is_none()); + assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none()); + + assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none()); + assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none()); + + assert!(as_resp.3 == msgs::RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst); + + assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1); + assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none()); + nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap(); + let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap(); + assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none()); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + + let bs_second_commitment_signed = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap().unwrap(); + assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none()); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + + let as_commitment_signed = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().unwrap(); + assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none()); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + + let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_second_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap(); + assert!(as_second_commitment_signed.is_none()); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + + let (bs_second_revoke_and_ack, bs_third_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap(); + assert!(bs_third_commitment_signed.is_none()); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + + assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none()); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + + let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1); + match events_4[0] { + Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + }; - for _ in 0..node_count { - let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }); - let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new()); - let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())}); - let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone())); - let node_id = { - let mut key_slice = [0; 32]; - rng.fill_bytes(&mut key_slice); - SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &key_slice).unwrap() - }; - let node = ChannelManager::new(node_id.clone(), 0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone()).unwrap(); - let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id).unwrap()); - nodes.push(Node { feeest, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node_id, node, router }); + nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now(); + nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards(); + + let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1); + match events_5[0] { + Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt: _ } => { + assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } - nodes + assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none()); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + + claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2); } #[test] - fn fake_network_test() { - // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and - // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways. - let nodes = create_network(4); - - // Create some initial channels - let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); - let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2); - let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3); - - // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels... - send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000); - send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000); - send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000); - send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000); + fn test_simple_monitor_permanent_update_fail() { + // Test that we handle a simple permanent monitor update failure + let mut nodes = create_network(2); + create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); - // Send some more payments - send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000); - send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000); - send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000); + let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(); + let (_, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]); - // Test failure packets - let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1; - fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1); + *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure); + if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); } + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); - // Add a new channel that skips 3 - let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3); + let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1); + match events_1[0] { + Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {}, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + }; - send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000); - send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000); - send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000); - send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000); - send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000); - send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000); - send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000); + // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a + // PaymentFailed event - // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously - let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3); - hops.push(RouteHop { - pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), - short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, - fee_msat: 0, - cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32 - }); - hops.push(RouteHop { - pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), - short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id, - fee_msat: 0, - cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32 - }); - hops.push(RouteHop { - pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), - short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id, - fee_msat: 1000000, - cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV, - }); - hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000; - hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000; - let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0; + assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0); + } - let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3); - hops.push(RouteHop { - pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), - short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id, - fee_msat: 0, - cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32 - }); - hops.push(RouteHop { - pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), - short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id, - fee_msat: 0, - cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32 - }); - hops.push(RouteHop { - pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), - short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, - fee_msat: 1000000, - cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV, - }); - hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000; - hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000; - let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1; + fn do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect: bool) { + // Test that we can recover from a simple temporary monitor update failure optionally with + // a disconnect in between + let mut nodes = create_network(2); + create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); - // Claim the rebalances... - fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2); - claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1); + let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(); + let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]); - // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4 - let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3); + *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure); + if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); } + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); - // Send some payments across both channels - let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0; - let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0; - let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0; + let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert!(events_1.is_empty()); + assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1); - route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000); + if disconnect { + nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false); + nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false); + reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false)); + } - //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full + *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(()); + nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); - claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3); - claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4); - claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5); + let mut events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1); + let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.pop().unwrap()); + assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap(); + commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false); - // Close down the channels... - close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true); - close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false); - close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true); - close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false); - close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false); + expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]); - // Check that we processed all pending events - for node in nodes { - assert_eq!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0); - assert_eq!(node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0); + let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1); + match events_3[0] { + Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => { + assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash); + assert_eq!(amt, 1000000); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } - } - - #[derive(PartialEq)] - enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS } - fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec { - let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); - assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 }); - let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2); + claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_1); - if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx { - res.push(explicit_tx.clone()); - } else { - for tx in node_txn.iter() { - if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].prev_hash == chan.3.txid() { - let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new(); - funding_tx_map.insert(chan.3.txid(), chan.3.clone()); - tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap(); - res.push(tx.clone()); - } - } + // Now set it to failed again... + let (_, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]); + *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure); + if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); } + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + + let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert!(events_4.is_empty()); + assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1); + + if disconnect { + nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false); + nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false); + reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false)); } - assert_eq!(res.len(), 1); - if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE { - for tx in node_txn.iter() { - if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].prev_hash == res[0].txid() { - let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new(); - funding_tx_map.insert(res[0].txid(), res[0].clone()); - tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap(); - if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT { - assert!(tx.lock_time != 0); - } else { - assert!(tx.lock_time == 0); - } - res.push(tx.clone()); - break; - } - } - assert_eq!(res.len(), 2); + // ...and make sure we can force-close a TemporaryFailure channel with a PermanentFailure + *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure); + nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + + let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1); + match events_5[0] { + Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {}, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } - node_txn.clear(); - res - } - fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec) -> Vec { - let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); + // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a + // PaymentFailed event - assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1); - assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); - let mut found_prev = false; + assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0); + } - for tx in prev_txn { - if node_txn[0].input[0].prev_hash == tx.txid() { - let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new(); - funding_tx_map.insert(tx.txid(), tx.clone()); - node_txn[0].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap(); + #[test] + fn test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail() { + do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(false); + do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(true); + } - assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output - assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx + fn do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect_count: usize) { + let disconnect_flags = 8 | 16; + + // Test that we can recover from a temporary monitor update failure with some in-flight + // HTLCs going on at the same time potentially with some disconnection thrown in. + // * First we route a payment, then get a temporary monitor update failure when trying to + // route a second payment. We then claim the first payment. + // * If disconnect_count is set, we will disconnect at this point (which is likely as + // TemporaryFailure likely indicates net disconnect which resulted in failing to update + // the ChannelMonitor on a watchtower). + // * If !(disconnect_count & 16) we deliver a update_fulfill_htlc/CS for the first payment + // immediately, otherwise we wait sconnect and deliver them via the reconnect + // channel_reestablish processing (ie disconnect_count & 16 makes no sense if + // disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags is 0). + // * We then update the channel monitor, reconnecting if disconnect_count is set and walk + // through message sending, potentially disconnect/reconnecting multiple times based on + // disconnect_count, to get the update_fulfill_htlc through. + // * We then walk through more message exchanges to get the original update_add_htlc + // through, swapping message ordering based on disconnect_count & 8 and optionally + // disconnect/reconnecting based on disconnect_count. + let mut nodes = create_network(2); + create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); - found_prev = true; - break; - } - } - assert!(found_prev); + let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000); - let mut res = Vec::new(); - mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res); - res - } + // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send + let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(); + let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]); - fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec, a: usize, b: usize) { - let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); - assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1); - let as_update = match events_1[0] { - Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => { - msg.clone() - }, - _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), - }; + *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure); + if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); } + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); - let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert!(events_1.is_empty()); + assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1); + + // Claim the previous payment, which will result in a update_fulfill_htlc/CS from nodes[1] + // but nodes[0] won't respond since it is frozen. + assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1)); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1); - let bs_update = match events_2[0] { - Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => { - msg.clone() + let (bs_initial_fulfill, bs_initial_commitment_signed) = match events_2[0] { + Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => { + assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1); + assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(update_fee.is_none()); + + if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 { + nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap(); + let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1); + match events_3[0] { + Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => { + assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + + if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) }) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed) { + assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA"); + } else { panic!(); } + } + + (update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()) }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), }; - for node in nodes { - node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap(); - node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap(); + if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 { + nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false); + nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false); } - } - #[test] - fn channel_monitor_network_test() { - // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and - // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states. - let nodes = create_network(5); + // Now fix monitor updating... + *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(()); + nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); - // Create some initial channels - let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); - let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2); - let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3); - let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4); + macro_rules! disconnect_reconnect_peers { () => { { + nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false); + nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false); - // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels... - send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000); - send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000); - send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000); - send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000); + let reestablish_1 = nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1); + let reestablish_2 = nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1); - // Simple case with no pending HTLCs: - nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true); - { - let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE); - let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; - nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1); - test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE); - } - get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1); - assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0); - assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1); + let as_resp = nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap(); + let bs_resp = nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap(); - // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close: - let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0; + assert!(as_resp.0.is_none()); + assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none()); - // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout - nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true); - { - let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT); - let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; - nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1); - test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE); - } - get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2); - assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0); - assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1); + (reestablish_1, reestablish_2, as_resp, bs_resp) + } } } - macro_rules! claim_funds { - ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => { - { - assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage)); - { - let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap(); - assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1); - added_monitors.clear(); - } + let (payment_event, initial_revoke_and_ack) = if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 { + let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert!(events_4.is_empty()); - let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); - assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); - match events[0] { - Event::SendFulfillHTLC { ref node_id, .. } => { - assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id()); - }, - _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), - }; + let reestablish_1 = nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1); + let reestablish_2 = nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1); + + let mut as_resp = nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0); + let mut bs_resp = nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0); + + assert!(as_resp.0.is_none()); + assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none()); + + assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none()); + if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 { + assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none()); + + assert!(as_resp.1.is_some()); + assert!(as_resp.2.is_some()); + assert!(as_resp.3 == msgs::RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst); + } else { + assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none()); + assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs == vec![bs_initial_fulfill]); + assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed == bs_initial_commitment_signed); + + assert!(as_resp.1.is_none()); + + nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap(); + let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1); + match events_3[0] { + Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => { + assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } + + let (as_resp_raa, as_resp_cu) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap(); + assert!(as_resp_cu.is_none()); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + + as_resp.1 = Some(as_resp_raa); + bs_resp.2 = None; } - } - // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2] - // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces) - nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true); - { - let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT); + if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 1 { + let (second_reestablish_1, second_reestablish_2, second_as_resp, second_bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!(); - // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage - claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1); + if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 { + assert!(reestablish_1 == second_reestablish_1); + assert!(reestablish_2 == second_reestablish_2); + } + assert!(as_resp == second_as_resp); + assert!(bs_resp == second_bs_resp); + } - let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; - nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1); + (SendEvent::from_commitment_update(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.2.unwrap()), as_resp.1.unwrap()) + } else { + let mut events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 2); + (SendEvent::from_event(events_4.remove(0)), match events_4[0] { + Event::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => { + assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + msg.clone() + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + }) + }; - check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn); + assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + + nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap(); + let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); + assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[1] is awaiting an RAA from nodes[0] still + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + + if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 2 { + let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!(); + + assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack); + assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack); + + assert!(as_resp.2.is_none()); + assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none()); } - get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3); - assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0); - assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1); - // One pending HTLC to time out: - let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0; + let as_commitment_update; + let bs_second_commitment_update; + + macro_rules! handle_bs_raa { () => { + as_commitment_update = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().unwrap(); + assert!(as_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none()); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + } } + + macro_rules! handle_initial_raa { () => { + bs_second_commitment_update = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().unwrap(); + assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none()); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + } } + + if (disconnect_count & 8) == 0 { + handle_bs_raa!(); + + if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 { + let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!(); + + assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack); + assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none()); + + assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update); + assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none()); + + assert!(as_resp.3 == msgs::RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst); + } - { - let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; - nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]); - for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 3 { - header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; - nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]); + handle_initial_raa!(); + + if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 { + let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!(); + + assert!(as_resp.1.is_none()); + assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none()); + + assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update); + assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update); } + } else { + handle_initial_raa!(); - let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT); + if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 { + let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!(); - // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage - claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2); + assert!(as_resp.1.is_none()); + assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack); - header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; - nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]); - for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 3 { - header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; - nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]); + assert!(as_resp.2.is_none()); + assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update); + + assert!(bs_resp.3 == msgs::RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst); } - test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS); + handle_bs_raa!(); - header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; - nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5); + if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 { + let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!(); - check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn); + assert!(as_resp.1.is_none()); + assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none()); + + assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update); + assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update); + } } - get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4); - assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0); - assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0); - // Create some new channels: - let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); + let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); + assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none()); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); - // A pending HTLC which will be revoked: - let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0; - // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0] - let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone(); - // Revoke the old state - claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3); + let (bs_second_revoke_and_ack, bs_third_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); + assert!(bs_third_commitment_signed.is_none()); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); - { - let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; - nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1); - { - let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); - assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); - assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); + assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none()); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); - let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new(); - funding_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone()); - node_txn[0].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap(); - node_txn.swap_remove(0); - } - test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE); + assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none()); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); - nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1); - let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT); - header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; - nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1); + expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]); - //TODO: At this point nodes[1] should claim the revoked HTLC-Timeout output, but that's - //not yet implemented in ChannelMonitor + let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1); + match events_5[0] { + Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => { + assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash); + assert_eq!(amt, 1000000); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } - get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1); - assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0); - assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0); - // Check that we processed all pending events - for node in nodes { - assert_eq!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0); - assert_eq!(node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0); - } + claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2); } #[test] - fn test_unconf_chan() { - // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side + fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_a() { + do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(0); + do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1); + do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2); + do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3); + do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4); + do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5); + } + + #[test] + fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_b() { + do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8); + do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8); + do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4 | 8); + do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5 | 8); + } + + #[test] + fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_c() { + do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1 | 16); + do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 16); + do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 16); + do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8 | 16); + do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8 | 16); + } + + #[test] + fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() { + //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs + let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); let nodes = create_network(2); - create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); - let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1); - assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1); - mem::drop(channel_state); + let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]); - let mut headers = Vec::new(); - let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; - headers.push(header.clone()); - for _i in 2..100 { - header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; - headers.push(header.clone()); + let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap(); + let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap(); + + let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } ); + + let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key); + let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key); + + let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(); + let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(); + + let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..]; + + let mut chan_announcement; + + macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg { + () => { + msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement { + features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(), + chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(), + short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), + node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key }, + node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key }, + bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key }, + bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key }, + excess_data: Vec::new(), + }; + } } - while !headers.is_empty() { - nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap()); + + macro_rules! sign_msg { + ($unsigned_msg: expr) => { + let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap(); + let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key); + let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key); + let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key); + let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key); + chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement { + node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig}, + node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig}, + bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig }, + bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig }, + contents: $unsigned_msg + } + } } - let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0); - assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0); + + let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!(); + sign_msg!(unsigned_msg); + assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true); + let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } ); + + // Configured with Network::Testnet + let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!(); + unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash(); + sign_msg!(unsigned_msg); + assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err()); + + let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!(); + unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]); + sign_msg!(unsigned_msg); + assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err()); } }