X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=src%2Fln%2Fchannelmanager.rs;h=ac4fa819f52d7447adb6bce7c181496f1a48297f;hb=7e59e1e3927f3baf586bc393bdd519449eaed08b;hp=bb61fe901986b122062b1f3a8b3617d63322b488;hpb=546bd37c197dd38b8b81204e4f37b25c167778b2;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/src/ln/channelmanager.rs b/src/ln/channelmanager.rs index bb61fe90..ac4fa819 100644 --- a/src/ln/channelmanager.rs +++ b/src/ln/channelmanager.rs @@ -1199,11 +1199,7 @@ impl ChannelManager { } } - let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{ - let mut session_key = [0; 32]; - rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key); - session_key - }).expect("RNG is bad!"); + let session_priv = self.keys_manager.get_session_key(); let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1; @@ -1988,10 +1984,20 @@ impl ChannelManager { // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding. if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info { + let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan); pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id: msg.channel_id, htlc_id: msg.htlc_id, - reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap().encode_with_len()[..]), + reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update { + ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &update.encode_with_len()[..]) + } else { + // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded + // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments + // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should + // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no + // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer + ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[]) + }, })); } } @@ -7756,6 +7762,36 @@ mod tests { check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone()); } + #[test] + fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() { + // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and + // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH + + let nodes = create_network(2); + + let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000); + let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0; + let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone(); + assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid()); + + claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage); + let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; + nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1); + let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + match events[0] { + MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {}, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); + let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1); + assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 4); + assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx + check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone()); + assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]); // to_local output on local commitment tx + check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0].clone()); + } + #[test] fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() { let nodes = create_network(2);