X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=src%2Fln%2Fchannelmanager.rs;h=ccfb9f776973a217b812fbdf59eb8058bee0c96a;hb=832fc4fd4435fa236f15d3e737bebf64619ff60e;hp=87326f2be940a672773d8db19f69b322e1979c4e;hpb=787644d795193eaae3041078030efebca1a5687c;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/src/ln/channelmanager.rs b/src/ln/channelmanager.rs index 87326f2b..ccfb9f77 100644 --- a/src/ln/channelmanager.rs +++ b/src/ln/channelmanager.rs @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ use secp256k1; use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator}; use chain::transaction::OutPoint; use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError}; -use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS}; +use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY}; use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop}; use ln::msgs; use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, HandleError}; @@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ use std::time::{Instant,Duration}; mod channel_held_info { use ln::msgs; use ln::router::Route; + use ln::channelmanager::PaymentHash; use secp256k1::key::SecretKey; /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards @@ -70,7 +71,7 @@ mod channel_held_info { pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo { pub(super) onion_packet: Option, pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32], - pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32], + pub(super) payment_hash: PaymentHash, pub(super) short_channel_id: u64, pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64, pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32, @@ -90,7 +91,7 @@ mod channel_held_info { } /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC - #[derive(Clone)] + #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)] pub struct HTLCPreviousHopData { pub(super) short_channel_id: u64, pub(super) htlc_id: u64, @@ -98,7 +99,7 @@ mod channel_held_info { } /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC - #[derive(Clone)] + #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)] pub enum HTLCSource { PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData), OutboundRoute { @@ -133,13 +134,21 @@ mod channel_held_info { } pub(super) use self::channel_held_info::*; -type ShutdownResult = (Vec, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>); +/// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop +#[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)] +pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]); +/// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop +#[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)] +pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]); + +type ShutdownResult = (Vec, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>); /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it. + struct MsgHandleErrInternal { err: msgs::HandleError, shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option)>, @@ -248,7 +257,7 @@ struct ChannelHolder { /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you /// go to read them! - claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec>, + claimable_htlcs: HashMap>, /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict). pending_msg_events: Vec, @@ -258,7 +267,7 @@ struct MutChannelHolder<'a> { short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap, next_forward: &'a mut Instant, forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap>, - claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec>, + claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap>, pending_msg_events: &'a mut Vec, } impl ChannelHolder { @@ -332,16 +341,17 @@ pub struct ChannelManager { /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that its at least 3 blocks more). -const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO? +const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO? const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO? -// Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ie that -// if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS then we'll still have -// HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS left to fail it backwards ourselves before hitting the -// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point and failing the channel on-chain to time out the HTLC. +// Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + +// HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY, ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within +// HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS then we'll still have HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS left to fail it +// backwards ourselves before hitting the CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point and failing the channel +// on-chain to time out the HTLC. #[deny(const_err)] #[allow(dead_code)] -const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER; +const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY; // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed. @@ -414,6 +424,7 @@ macro_rules! break_chan_entry { break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone())) }, Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => { + log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg); let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry(); if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() { $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id); @@ -432,6 +443,7 @@ macro_rules! try_chan_entry { return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone())) }, Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => { + log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg); let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry(); if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() { $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id); @@ -672,6 +684,7 @@ impl ChannelManager { #[inline] fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) { let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res; + log_trace!(self, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} transactions to broadcast and {} HTLCs to fail", local_txn.len(), failed_htlcs.len()); for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) { // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore.... self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }); @@ -679,13 +692,6 @@ impl ChannelManager { for tx in local_txn { self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx); } - //TODO: We need to have a way where outbound HTLC claims can result in us claiming the - //now-on-chain HTLC output for ourselves (and, thereafter, passing the HTLC backwards). - //TODO: We need to handle monitoring of pending offered HTLCs which just hit the chain and - //may be claimed, resulting in us claiming the inbound HTLCs (and back-failing after - //timeouts are hit and our claims confirm). - //TODO: In any case, we need to make sure we remove any pending htlc tracking (via - //fail_backwards or claim_funds) eventually for all HTLCs that were in the channel } /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to @@ -705,6 +711,7 @@ impl ChannelManager { return; } }; + log_trace!(self, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..])); self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown()); if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) { let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); @@ -865,7 +872,7 @@ impl ChannelManager { } const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65]; - fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec, onion_keys: Vec, associated_data: &[u8; 32]) -> msgs::OnionPacket { + fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec, onion_keys: Vec, associated_data: &PaymentHash) -> msgs::OnionPacket { let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65); buf.resize(21*65, 0); @@ -902,7 +909,7 @@ impl ChannelManager { let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu); hmac.input(&packet_data); - hmac.input(&associated_data[..]); + hmac.input(&associated_data.0[..]); hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res); } @@ -1024,7 +1031,7 @@ impl ChannelManager { let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu); hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data); - hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash); + hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]); if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) { return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!()); } @@ -1232,7 +1239,7 @@ impl ChannelManager { /// In case of APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed, the commitment update has been irrevocably /// committed on our end and we're just waiting for a monitor update to send it. Do NOT retry /// the payment via a different route unless you intend to pay twice! - pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> { + pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash) -> Result<(), APIError> { if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 { return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}); } @@ -1527,7 +1534,7 @@ impl ChannelManager { } /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect after a PaymentReceived event. - pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], reason: PaymentFailReason) -> bool { + pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, reason: PaymentFailReason) -> bool { let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); @@ -1547,9 +1554,10 @@ impl ChannelManager { /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to /// still-available channels. - fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) { + fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) { match source { HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => { + log_trace!(self, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0)); mem::drop(channel_state_lock); if let &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } = &onion_error { let (channel_update, payment_retryable) = self.process_onion_failure(&source, err.data.clone()); @@ -1565,16 +1573,22 @@ impl ChannelManager { rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable, }); } else { - panic!("should have onion error packet here"); + //TODO: Pass this back (see GH #243) + self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed { + payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(), + rejected_by_dest: false, // We failed it ourselves, can't blame them + }); } }, HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => { let err_packet = match onion_error { HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => { + log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code); let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode(); ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet) }, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => { + log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built ErrorPacket", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0)); ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data) } }; @@ -1619,11 +1633,11 @@ impl ChannelManager { /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true! /// /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event. - pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool { + pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool { let mut sha = Sha256::new(); - sha.input(&payment_preimage); - let mut payment_hash = [0; 32]; - sha.result(&mut payment_hash); + sha.input(&payment_preimage.0[..]); + let mut payment_hash = PaymentHash([0; 32]); + sha.result(&mut payment_hash.0[..]); let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); @@ -1637,7 +1651,7 @@ impl ChannelManager { true } else { false } } - fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) { + fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) { match source { HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => { mem::drop(channel_state_lock); @@ -2629,6 +2643,22 @@ impl ChannelManager { impl events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager { fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec { + // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: its very easy for a + // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on + // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events! + { + //TODO: This behavior should be documented. + for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() { + if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage { + log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0)); + self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage); + } else { + log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0)); + self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }); + } + } + } + let mut ret = Vec::new(); let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events); @@ -2638,6 +2668,22 @@ impl events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager { impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager { fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec { + // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: its very easy for a + // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on + // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events! + { + //TODO: This behavior should be documented. + for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() { + if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage { + log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0)); + self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage); + } else { + log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0)); + self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }); + } + } + } + let mut ret = Vec::new(); let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events); @@ -2647,6 +2693,8 @@ impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager { impl ChainListener for ChannelManager { fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) { + let header_hash = header.bitcoin_hash(); + log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", header_hash, height, txn_matched.len()); let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); let mut failed_channels = Vec::new(); { @@ -2679,6 +2727,7 @@ impl ChainListener for ChannelManager { for tx in txn_matched { for inp in tx.input.iter() { if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() { + log_trace!(self, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id())); if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() { short_to_id.remove(&short_id); } @@ -2719,7 +2768,7 @@ impl ChainListener for ChannelManager { self.finish_force_close_channel(failure); } self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release); - *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash(); + *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash; } /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown @@ -3328,8 +3377,9 @@ mod tests { use chain::keysinterface::{KeysInterface, SpendableOutputDescriptor}; use chain::keysinterface; use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC}; - use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,ChannelManagerReadArgs,OnionKeys,PaymentFailReason,RAACommitmentOrder}; + use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,ChannelManagerReadArgs,OnionKeys,PaymentFailReason,RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash}; use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ManyChannelMonitor}; + use ln::channel::{ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT}; use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router}; use ln::msgs; use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler}; @@ -3362,7 +3412,7 @@ mod tests { use rand::{thread_rng,Rng}; use std::cell::RefCell; - use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap}; + use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap, HashSet}; use std::default::Default; use std::rc::Rc; use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex}; @@ -3490,7 +3540,7 @@ mod tests { }, ); - let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &[0x42; 32]); + let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &PaymentHash([0x42; 32])); // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it // anyway... assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap()); @@ -3886,6 +3936,12 @@ mod tests { _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"), } } + + fn from_node(node: &Node) -> SendEvent { + let mut events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap()) + } } macro_rules! check_added_monitors { @@ -3908,7 +3964,7 @@ mod tests { commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, false); } }; - ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, true /* return extra message */) => { + ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, true /* return extra message */, true /* return last RAA */) => { { let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!($node_a, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id()); check_added_monitors!($node_b, 0); @@ -3933,6 +3989,23 @@ mod tests { assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); } + (extra_msg_option, bs_revoke_and_ack) + } + }; + ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, false /* return extra message */, true /* return last RAA */) => { + { + check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0); + assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); + $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1); + let (extra_msg_option, bs_revoke_and_ack) = commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, true, true); + assert!(extra_msg_option.is_none()); + bs_revoke_and_ack + } + }; + ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, true /* return extra message */) => { + { + let (extra_msg_option, bs_revoke_and_ack) = commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, true, true); $node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); { let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap(); @@ -3971,18 +4044,18 @@ mod tests { macro_rules! get_payment_preimage_hash { ($node: expr) => { { - let payment_preimage = [*$node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32]; + let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([*$node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32]); *$node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1; - let mut payment_hash = [0; 32]; + let mut payment_hash = PaymentHash([0; 32]); let mut sha = Sha256::new(); - sha.input(&payment_preimage[..]); - sha.result(&mut payment_hash); + sha.input(&payment_preimage.0[..]); + sha.result(&mut payment_hash.0[..]); (payment_preimage, payment_hash) } } } - fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) { + fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> (PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash) { let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node); let mut payment_event = { @@ -4036,7 +4109,7 @@ mod tests { (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) } - fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) { + fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) { assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage)); check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1); @@ -4121,13 +4194,13 @@ mod tests { } } - fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) { + fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) { claim_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_preimage); } const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32; - fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) { + fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> (PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash) { let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(); assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len()); for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) { @@ -4158,7 +4231,7 @@ mod tests { claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage); } - fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) { + fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: PaymentHash) { assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown)); check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1); @@ -4223,7 +4296,7 @@ mod tests { } } - fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) { + fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: PaymentHash) { fail_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_hash); } @@ -4231,12 +4304,12 @@ mod tests { let mut nodes = Vec::new(); let mut rng = thread_rng(); let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); - let logger: Arc = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()); let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0)); let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0)); - for _ in 0..node_count { + for i in 0..node_count { + let logger: Arc = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", i))); let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }); let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger))); let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())}); @@ -4978,52 +5051,6 @@ mod tests { assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty()); } - #[test] - fn update_fee_async_shutdown() { - // Test update_fee works after shutdown start if messages are delivered out-of-order - let nodes = create_network(2); - let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); - - let starting_feerate = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().get_feerate(); - nodes[0].node.update_fee(chan_1.2.clone(), starting_feerate + 20).unwrap(); - check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); - let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); - assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); - assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); - assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); - assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); - assert!(updates.update_fee.is_some()); - - nodes[1].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap(); - let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); - nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap(); - // Note that we don't actually test normative behavior here. The spec indicates we could - // actually send a closing_signed here, but is kinda unclear and could possibly be amended - // to require waiting on the full commitment dance before doing so (see - // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/499). In any case, to avoid - // ambiguity, we should wait until after the full commitment dance to send closing_signed. - let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); - - nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fee.unwrap()).unwrap(); - nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap(); - check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); - nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap(); - let node_0_closing_signed = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], (), false, true, true); - - assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); - nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), match node_0_closing_signed.unwrap() { - MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => { - assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); - msg - }, - _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), - }).unwrap(); - let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); - nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap(); - let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); - assert!(node_0_none.is_none()); - } - fn do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(recv_count: u8) { // Test that shutdown/closing_signed is re-sent on reconnect with a variable number of // messages delivered prior to disconnect @@ -5367,7 +5394,10 @@ mod tests { false } else { true } }); - assert_eq!(res.len(), 2); + assert!(res.len() == 2 || res.len() == 3); + if res.len() == 3 { + assert_eq!(res[1], res[2]); + } } assert!(node_txn.is_empty()); @@ -5882,7 +5912,7 @@ mod tests { assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1); assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid()); - assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout + assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout // Revoke the old state claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3); @@ -5992,7 +6022,7 @@ mod tests { send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000); // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0; - let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0; + let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000); // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0] let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone(); @@ -6001,7 +6031,7 @@ mod tests { assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1); assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid()); - assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout + assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone()); //Revoke the old state @@ -6009,10 +6039,18 @@ mod tests { { let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; - nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1); - nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1); + + let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + match events[0] { + Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => { + assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); @@ -6027,8 +6065,8 @@ mod tests { witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len()); assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3); assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local - assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC - assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC + assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC + assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state: assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1); @@ -6036,7 +6074,7 @@ mod tests { assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1); let witness_script = node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.pop().unwrap(); - assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output + assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].txid()); assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid); assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid); @@ -6058,7 +6096,7 @@ mod tests { // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0; - let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0; + let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000); // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0] let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone(); @@ -6068,10 +6106,18 @@ mod tests { { let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; - nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200); - nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200); + + let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + match events[0] { + Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => { + assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 12); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan) @@ -6099,15 +6145,15 @@ mod tests { witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len()); assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3); assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local - assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC - assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC + assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC + assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1); check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3.clone()); assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1); let witness_script = node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap(); - assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output + assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[3].txid()); assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid); assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid); @@ -6118,106 +6164,661 @@ mod tests { } #[test] - fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() { - // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply - // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap(). - let nodes = create_network(2); - create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); + fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() { + // Test that in case of an unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output thanks to + // ChainWatchInterface and pass the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is + // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path. + // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage) + // First, C should claim the HTLC output via HTLC-Success when its own latest local + // commitment transaction was broadcast. + // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards + // towards B. + // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx. + // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim + // the HTLC output via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a + // PaymentSent event). - route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000); - nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id); - { - let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); - assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); - match events[0] { - MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => { - assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10); - }, - _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), - } - } + let nodes = create_network(3); - let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); - assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); + // Create some initial channels + let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); + let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2); - let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; - nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]); + // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels... + send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000); + send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000); + + let (our_payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000); + let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42}; + + // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain + // Broadcast HTLC Success transation by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain + let commitment_tx = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone(); + assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1); + check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3.clone()); + nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1); + let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1); + + nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1); + let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + match events[0] { + MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {}, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx) + assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); + assert_eq!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); + assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]); + check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone()); + assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); + assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output + assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); + // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward + nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: node_txn}, 1); + let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); { - let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); - assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); - match events[0] { - MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => { - assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10); - }, - _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), - } + let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); + added_monitors.clear(); + } + assert_eq!(events.len(), 2); + match events[0] { + MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {}, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + match events[1] { + MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => { + assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1); + assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + }; + { + // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate + // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transaction, as well as a + // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success. + let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan) + assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); + assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); + check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone()); + assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); + assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); + assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment + check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_2.3.clone()); + check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1].clone()); + assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71); + assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); + assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output + assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0); + node_txn.clear(); + } + + // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain + // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain + let commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone(); + check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3.clone()); + nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1); + let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + match events[0] { + MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {}, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } + let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success) * 2 (block-rescan) + assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); + assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]); + check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone()); + assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); + assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); + assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment + check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone()); + assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71); + // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as + // we already checked the same situation with A. - // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners - // registering new transactions - nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]); + // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent + nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1); + let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + match events[0] { + MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {}, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + match events[0] { + Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => { + assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan) + assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); + assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); + check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone()); + assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); + assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); + assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output + check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone()); + check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1].clone()); + assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71); + assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); + assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output + assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0); } #[test] - fn test_force_close_fail_back() { - // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure - let mut nodes = create_network(3); - create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); - create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2); + fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() { + // Test that in case of an unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output thanks to + // ChainWatchInterface and timeout the HTLC bacward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is + // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path. + // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout) + // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx + // \ \ + // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx - let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap(); - - let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]); + let nodes = create_network(3); - let mut payment_event = { - nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap(); - check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + // Create some intial channels + let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); + let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2); - let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); - assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); - SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0)) - }; + // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels... + send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000); + send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000); - nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap(); - commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false); + let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000); + let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42}; - let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); - assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1); - match events_1[0] { - Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { }, + // Brodacast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain + let commitment_tx = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone(); + check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3.clone()); + nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown); + { + let mut added_monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1); + added_monitors.clear(); + } + let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + match events[0] { + MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => { + assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id); + }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), }; + nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1); + let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + match events[0] { + MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {}, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx) + assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); + check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3.clone()); + assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71); - nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now(); - nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards(); - - let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); - assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1); - payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0)); - assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1); - + // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output fron C's commitment tx on B's chain + // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence + nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 200); + let timeout_tx; + { + let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 6 (HTLC-Timeout tx, commitment tx, timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan) + assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[5]); + assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[6]); + assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[7]); + check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone()); + assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); + check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_2.3.clone()); + check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1].clone()); + assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71); + assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); + check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_2.3.clone()); + check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3].clone()); + assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71); + assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); + timeout_tx = node_txn[0].clone(); + node_txn.clear(); + } + + nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![timeout_tx]}, 1); + let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); - nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap(); - nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); - check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1); - let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 2); + match events[0] { + MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {}, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + match events[1] { + MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => { + assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + }; + let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // Well... here we detect our own htlc_timeout_tx so no tx to be generated + assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0); - // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous - // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC - // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!). + // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain + let commitment_tx = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone(); + check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3.clone()); - nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id); - let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); - assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1); - match events_3[0] { - MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => { - assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10); - }, + nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 200); + let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + match events[0] { + MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {}, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } - - let tx = { + let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (timeout tx) * 2 block-rescan + assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); + assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); + check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone()); + assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); + check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone()); + check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1].clone()); + assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71); + assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); + } + + #[test] + fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() { + // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx + // and fail backward accordingly. + + let nodes = create_network(3); + + // Create some initial channels + create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); + let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2); + + let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000); + // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2] + let revoked_local_txn = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone(); + // Revoke the old state + claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage); + + route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000); + + let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42}; + nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1); + let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 2); + match events[0] { + MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {}, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + match events[1] { + MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => { + assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1); + assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id); + + nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap(); + commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true); + + let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + match events[0] { + MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {}, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + match events[0] { + Event::PaymentFailed { .. } => {}, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + } + + fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool) { + // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all + // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest + // commitment transaction anymore. + // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send + // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in + // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not + // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably. + // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet + // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment + // transactions: + // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a + // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction). + // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC, + // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new + // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards. + let mut nodes = create_network(3); + + // Create some initial channels + create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); + let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2); + + let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000); + // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2] + let revoked_local_txn = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone(); + // Revoke the old state + claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage); + + let (_, first_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000); + let (_, second_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000); + let (_, third_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000); + + assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown)); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1); + let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1); + assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none()); + nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap(); + let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true); + // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2 + + assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown)); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1); + let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1); + assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none()); + nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap(); + nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS + let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1); + + assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown)); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1); + let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1); + assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none()); + nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap(); + // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment + // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking... + nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS + let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1); + + // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting + // on nodes[2]'s RAA. + let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(); + let (_, fourth_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]); + nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, fourth_payment_hash).unwrap(); + assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); + assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0); + + if deliver_bs_raa { + nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa).unwrap(); + // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, one as we generate a commitment for + // nodes[0] to fail first_payment_hash backwards. + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2); + } + + let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new(); + assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); + + let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42}; + nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1); + + let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + match events[0] { + Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => { + assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + + if !deliver_bs_raa { + // If we delivered the RAA already then we already failed first_payment_hash backwards. + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + } + + let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }); + match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 0 }] { + MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {}, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + if deliver_bs_raa { + match events[0] { + MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => { + assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id); + assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1); + assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + } + // Due to the way backwards-failing occurs we do the updates in two steps. + let updates = match events[1] { + MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => { + assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1); + assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id); + + nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap(); + nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + let bs_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + + if !deliver_bs_raa { + // If we delievered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something + // that we should update our routing table for. + let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + match events[0] { + MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {}, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + } + let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + match events[0] { + Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => { + assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0)); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + + bs_second_update + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + }; + + assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2); + assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); + nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap(); + nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]).unwrap(); + commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true); + + let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 2); + for event in events { + match event { + MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {}, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + } + + let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 2); + match events[0] { + Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => { + assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0)); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + match events[1] { + Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => { + assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0)); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + + assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0)); + assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0)); + assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0)); + } + + #[test] + fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive() { + do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false); + do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true); + } + + #[test] + fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() { + // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply + // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap(). + let nodes = create_network(2); + create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); + + route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000); + nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id); + { + let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + match events[0] { + MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => { + assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + } + + let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); + + let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; + nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]); + + { + let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + match events[0] { + MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => { + assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + } + + // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners + // registering new transactions + nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]); + } + + #[test] + fn test_force_close_fail_back() { + // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure + let mut nodes = create_network(3); + create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); + create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2); + + let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap(); + + let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]); + + let mut payment_event = { + nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + + let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0)) + }; + + nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap(); + commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false); + + let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1); + match events_1[0] { + Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + }; + + nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now(); + nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards(); + + let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1); + payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0)); + assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1); + + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap(); + nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1); + let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + + // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous + // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC + // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!). + + nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id); + let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1); + match events_3[0] { + MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => { + assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + + let tx = { let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go @@ -7455,10 +8056,440 @@ mod tests { } #[test] - fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() { - //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs - let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); - let nodes = create_network(2); + fn test_monitor_update_fail_cs() { + // Tests handling of a monitor update failure when processing an incoming commitment_signed + let mut nodes = create_network(2); + create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); + + let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(); + let (payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]); + nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + + let send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0)); + nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap(); + + *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure); + if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.commitment_msg).unwrap_err() { + assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor"); + } else { panic!(); } + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); + + *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(()); + nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + let responses = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + assert_eq!(responses.len(), 2); + + match responses[0] { + MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, ref node_id } => { + assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + match responses[1] { + MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, ref node_id } => { + assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none()); + assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + + *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure); + if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap_err() { + assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor"); + } else { panic!(); } + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + + *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(()); + nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + + let final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &final_raa).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + + let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + match events[0] { + Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + }; + nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now(); + nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards(); + + events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + match events[0] { + Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, amt } => { + assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash); + assert_eq!(amt, 1000000); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + }; + + claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage); + } + + fn do_test_monitor_update_fail_raa(test_ignore_second_cs: bool) { + // Tests handling of a monitor update failure when processing an incoming RAA + let mut nodes = create_network(3); + create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); + create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2); + + // Rebalance a bit so that we can send backwards from 2 to 1. + send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 5000000); + + // Route a first payment that we'll fail backwards + let (_, payment_hash_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000); + + // Fail the payment backwards, failing the monitor update on nodes[1]'s receipt of the RAA + assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown)); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1); + + let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1); + assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none()); + nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap(); + + let bs_revoke_and_ack = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0); + + // While the second channel is AwaitingRAA, forward a second payment to get it into the + // holding cell. + let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]); + let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(); + nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + + let mut send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0)); + nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap(); + commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], send_event.commitment_msg, false); + + let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1); + match events_1[0] { + Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + }; + + nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now(); + nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0); + assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); + + // Now fail monitor updating. + *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure); + if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap_err() { + assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor"); + } else { panic!(); } + assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); + assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + + // Attempt to forward a third payment but fail due to the second channel being unavailable + // for forwarding. + + let (_, payment_hash_3) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]); + let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(); + nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_3).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + + *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(()); // We succeed in updating the monitor for the first channel + send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0)); + nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap(); + commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], send_event.commitment_msg, false, true); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0); + + let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1); + match events_2.remove(0) { + MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => { + assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1); + assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none()); + + nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap(); + commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false); + + let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + if let Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } = events[0] { + assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3); + assert!(!rejected_by_dest); + } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); } + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"), + }; + + let (payment_preimage_4, payment_hash_4) = if test_ignore_second_cs { + // Try to route another payment backwards from 2 to make sure 1 holds off on responding + let (payment_preimage_4, payment_hash_4) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]); + let route = nodes[2].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(); + nodes[2].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_4).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1); + + send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0)); + nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap(); + if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) }) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.commitment_msg) { + assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA"); + } else { panic!(); } + assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); + assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); + (Some(payment_preimage_4), Some(payment_hash_4)) + } else { (None, None) }; + + // Restore monitor updating, ensuring we immediately get a fail-back update and a + // update_add update. + *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(()); + nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2); + + let mut events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + if test_ignore_second_cs { + assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 3); + } else { + assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 2); + } + + // Note that the ordering of the events for different nodes is non-prescriptive, though the + // ordering of the two events that both go to nodes[2] have to stay in the same order. + let messages_a = match events_3.pop().unwrap() { + MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, mut updates } => { + assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1); + assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none()); + (updates.update_fail_htlcs.remove(0), updates.commitment_signed) + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"), + }; + let raa = if test_ignore_second_cs { + match events_3.remove(1) { + MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, msg } => { + assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()); + Some(msg.clone()) + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + } else { None }; + let send_event_b = SendEvent::from_event(events_3.remove(0)); + assert_eq!(send_event_b.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()); + + // Now deliver the new messages... + + nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &messages_a.0).unwrap(); + commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], messages_a.1, false); + let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1); + if let Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } = events_4[0] { + assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_1); + assert!(rejected_by_dest); + } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); } + + nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event_b.msgs[0]).unwrap(); + if test_ignore_second_cs { + nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event_b.commitment_msg).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1); + let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa.unwrap()).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1); + let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + assert!(bs_cs.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(bs_cs.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(bs_cs.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(bs_cs.update_fee.is_none()); + + nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()); + assert!(as_cs.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(as_cs.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(as_cs.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(as_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(as_cs.update_fee.is_none()); + + nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()); + + nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1); + let bs_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + + nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1); + assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); + + nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_raa).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); + } else { + commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], send_event_b.commitment_msg, false); + } + + let events_5 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1); + match events_5[0] { + Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + }; + + nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now(); + nodes[2].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards(); + + let events_6 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1); + match events_6[0] { + Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, .. } => { assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2); }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + }; + + if test_ignore_second_cs { + let events_7 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1); + match events_7[0] { + Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + }; + + nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now(); + nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + + send_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]); + assert_eq!(send_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + assert_eq!(send_event.msgs.len(), 1); + nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap(); + commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], send_event.commitment_msg, false); + + let events_8 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1); + match events_8[0] { + Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + }; + + nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now(); + nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards(); + + let events_9 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_9.len(), 1); + match events_9[0] { + Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, .. } => assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_4.unwrap()), + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + }; + claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4.unwrap()); + } + + claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2); + } + + #[test] + fn test_monitor_update_fail_raa() { + do_test_monitor_update_fail_raa(false); + do_test_monitor_update_fail_raa(true); + } + + #[test] + fn test_monitor_update_fail_reestablish() { + // Simple test for message retransmission after monitor update failure on + // channel_reestablish generating a monitor update (which comes from freeing holding cell + // HTLCs). + let mut nodes = create_network(3); + create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); + create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2); + + let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000); + + nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false); + nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false); + + assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage)); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1); + let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none()); + assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1); + nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); + commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false); + + *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure); + nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + + let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + + nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish).unwrap(); + + if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish).unwrap_err() { + assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor"); + } else { panic!(); } + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + + nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false); + nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false); + + nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + + assert!(as_reestablish == get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())); + assert!(bs_reestablish == get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())); + + nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish).unwrap(); + + nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0); + assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); + + *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(()); + nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + + updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none()); + assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1); + nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap(); + commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false); + + let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + match events[0] { + Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, .. } => assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage), + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + } + + #[test] + fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() { + //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs + let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); + let nodes = create_network(2); let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]); @@ -7957,7 +8988,7 @@ mod tests { let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 1 (local commitment tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (1 preimage tx) * 2 (block-rescan) check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone()); assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]); - assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); + assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone()); let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1); // , 0, 0, 1, 1); @@ -8022,10 +9053,12 @@ mod tests { _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); - assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2); + assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3); + assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]); assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1); - assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); + assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone()); + check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone()); // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] }, 1); @@ -8072,9 +9105,10 @@ mod tests { } let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); - assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2); + assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3); + assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]); assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1); - assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 138); + assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone()); // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx @@ -8100,6 +9134,226 @@ mod tests { check_spends!(spend_txn[4], node_txn[3].clone()); // spending justice tx output on htlc success tx } + #[test] + fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() { + // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output thanks to + // ChainWatchInterface and claim HTLC on downstream peer's remote commitment tx. + // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction. + // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B + // channel. + // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction + // gets broadcast. + + let nodes = create_network(3); + + // Create some initial channels + let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); + let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2); + + // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ... + send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000); + send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000); + + let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000); + let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42}; + let commitment_tx = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone(); + check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3.clone()); + nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1); + let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1); + assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); + + nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1); + let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + match events[0] { + MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {}, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + + let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx) + assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3); + assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]); + assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]); + check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3.clone()); + check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1].clone()); + assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71); + assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); + assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output + assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx + + // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor + nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]}, 1); + { + let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 4); + assert_eq!(b_txn[0], b_txn[3]); + check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager + check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1].clone()); // HTLC-Timeout on B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager + assert_eq!(b_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); + assert!(b_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output + assert_ne!(b_txn[2].lock_time, 0); // Timeout tx + check_spends!(b_txn[0], c_txn[1].clone()); // timeout tx on C remote commitment tx, issued by ChannelMonitor, * 2 due to block rescan + assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); + assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment + assert_ne!(b_txn[2].lock_time, 0); // Timeout tx + b_txn.clear(); + } + let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + match msg_events[0] { + MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {}, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + match msg_events[1] { + MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => { + assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1); + assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + }; + // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx + let commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone(); + nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1); + let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3); + check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3); // Local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager + assert_eq!(b_txn[0], b_txn[2]); // HTLC-Success tx, issued by ChannelMonitor, * 2 due to block rescan + check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone()); + assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); + assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment + assert_eq!(b_txn[2].lock_time, 0); // Success tx + let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + match msg_events[0] { + MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {}, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + } + + #[test] + fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() { + // Topology : A --> B --> C + // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim + let mut nodes = create_network(3); + + create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); + let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2); + + let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000); + *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1; + assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000).1, duplicate_payment_hash); + + let commitment_txn = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone(); + assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1); + check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3.clone()); + + let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; + nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_txn[0].clone()] }, 1); + let htlc_timeout_tx; + { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction + let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 7); + assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[5]); + assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[6]); + check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_txn[0].clone()); + assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); + check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0].clone()); + assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1); + assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0], node_txn[1].input[0]); + check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_2.3.clone()); + check_spends!(node_txn[3], node_txn[2].clone()); + check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[2].clone()); + htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone(); + } + + let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + match events[0] { + MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {}, + _ => panic!("Unexepected event"), + } + + nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage); + nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_txn[0].clone()] }, 1); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2); + let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + match events[0] { + MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {}, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + match events[1] { + MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {}, + _ => panic!("Unexepected event"), + } + let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); + assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); + check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[2], chan_2.3.clone()); + assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0], htlc_success_txn[3]); + assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); + assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1], htlc_success_txn[4]); + assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); + assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0], htlc_success_txn[1].input[0]); + check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0].clone()); + check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0].clone()); + + nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout_tx] }, 200); + let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id, 1); + assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + + nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap(); + assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); + { + commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true); + let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + match events[0] { + MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { update: msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { .. } } => { + }, + _ => { panic!("Unexpected event"); } + } + } + let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + match events[0] { + Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => { + assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash); + } + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + + // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C + nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![htlc_success_txn[0].clone()] }, 200); + let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, 0); + assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + + nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap(); + commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false); + + let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + match events[0] { + Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => { + assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage); + } + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + } + #[test] fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() { let nodes = create_network(2); @@ -8128,13 +9382,14 @@ mod tests { } let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); - assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 138); + assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone()); // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1); - assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2); check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone()); + check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[2].clone()); } #[test] @@ -8159,14 +9414,18 @@ mod tests { } let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); - assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); + assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone()); // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 1); - assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 4); + assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 8); assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]); + assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[4]); + assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[6]); assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]); + assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[5]); + assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[7]); check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone()); check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0].clone()); }