X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=src%2Fln%2Fchannelmonitor.rs;h=00b348002dd3faf9a63f4e6c458b088c161eda01;hb=b02176c86bfa991a7c4856e427355d6e034e1eaa;hp=891dac807f8f59109e2c5f7209eb23c8ed903766;hpb=0553945e21539f304bef16e8c5c8939e11ee1363;p=rust-lightning

diff --git a/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs b/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs
index 891dac80..00b34800 100644
--- a/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs
+++ b/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
 const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
 
-#[derive(Clone)]
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
 enum KeyStorage {
 	PrivMode {
 		revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ enum KeyStorage {
 	}
 }
 
-#[derive(Clone)]
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
 struct LocalSignedTx {
 	/// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
 	txid: Sha256dHash,
@@ -215,6 +215,40 @@ impl Clone for ChannelMonitor {
 	}
 }
 
+#[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+/// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
+/// underlying object
+impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor {
+	fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
+		if self.funding_txo != other.funding_txo ||
+			self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
+			self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
+			self.delayed_payment_base_key != other.delayed_payment_base_key ||
+			self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
+			self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
+			self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
+			self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
+			self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
+			self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
+			self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
+			self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
+			self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
+			self.destination_script != other.destination_script
+		{
+			false
+		} else {
+			for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
+				if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
+					return false
+				}
+			}
+			let us = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
+			let them = other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
+			*us == *them
+		}
+	}
+}
+
 impl ChannelMonitor {
 	pub fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script) -> ChannelMonitor {
 		ChannelMonitor {
@@ -603,7 +637,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor {
 		macro_rules! read_bytes {
 			($byte_count: expr) => {
 				{
-					if ($byte_count as usize) + read_pos > data.len() {
+					if ($byte_count as usize) > data.len() - read_pos {
 						return None;
 					}
 					read_pos += $byte_count as usize;
@@ -736,7 +770,14 @@ impl ChannelMonitor {
 			() => {
 				{
 					let tx_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
-					let tx: Transaction = unwrap_obj!(serialize::deserialize(read_bytes!(tx_len)));
+					let tx_ser = read_bytes!(tx_len);
+					let tx: Transaction = unwrap_obj!(serialize::deserialize(tx_ser));
+					if serialize::serialize(&tx).unwrap() != tx_ser {
+						// We check that the tx re-serializes to the same form to ensure there is
+						// no extra data, and as rust-bitcoin doesn't handle the 0-input ambiguity
+						// all that well.
+						return None;
+					}
 
 					let revocation_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
 					let a_htlc_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
@@ -869,7 +910,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor {
 		let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
 		let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
 
-		let commitment_number = (((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
+		let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
 		if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
 			let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
 			let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));