X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=src%2Fln%2Fchannelmonitor.rs;h=15be91c30e760548b1cccaae96a411d6d3d702d1;hb=160d63dba094d5d93c1ee5e8ccfe95c7037187e9;hp=dc390f5ddeba09f455220f99752c75448d0456af;hpb=3518f1f85d8a3daff451b3fe56cc7854b833e2bd;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs b/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs index dc390f5d..15be91c3 100644 --- a/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs +++ b/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs @@ -14,9 +14,10 @@ use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader; use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction}; use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint; -use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script; +use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder}; +use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes; use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{self, Decodable, Encodable}; -use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash,Sha256dHash}; +use bitcoin::util::hash::{Hash160, BitcoinHash,Sha256dHash}; use bitcoin::util::bip143; use crypto::digest::Digest; @@ -25,9 +26,10 @@ use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature}; use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey}; use secp256k1; -use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, HandleError}; +use ln::msgs::DecodeError; use ln::chan_utils; use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment; +use ln::channelmanager::HTLCSource; use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface}; use chain::transaction::OutPoint; use chain::keysinterface::SpendableOutputDescriptor; @@ -70,9 +72,19 @@ pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr { /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question. + /// + /// Should also be used to indicate a failure to update the local copy of the channel monitor. PermanentFailure, } +/// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is +/// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::insert_combine this +/// means you tried to merge two monitors for different channels or for a channel which was +/// restored from a backup and then generated new commitment updates. +/// Contains a human-readable error message. +#[derive(Debug)] +pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str); + /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote @@ -157,25 +169,31 @@ impl SimpleManyChannelMonitor } /// Adds or udpates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key. - pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> { + pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> { let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap(); match monitors.get_mut(&key) { Some(orig_monitor) => { - log_trace!(self, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_option!(monitor.funding_txo)); + log_trace!(self, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(monitor.key_storage)); return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor); }, None => {} }; - match &monitor.funding_txo { - &None => { - log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for no-funding-set channel (monitoring all txn!)"); - self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn() - }, - &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => { - log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(outpoint.to_channel_id()[..])); - self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script); - self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script); + match monitor.key_storage { + Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => { + match funding_info { + &None => { + return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to update a useless monitor without funding_txo !")); + }, + &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => { + log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(outpoint.to_channel_id()[..])); + self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script); + self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script); + }, + } }, + Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { + self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn(); + } } monitors.insert(key, monitor); Ok(()) @@ -214,19 +232,20 @@ pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6; pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS: u32 = 3; #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)] -enum KeyStorage { - PrivMode { +enum Storage { + Local { revocation_base_key: SecretKey, htlc_base_key: SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey, payment_base_key: SecretKey, + shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey, prev_latest_per_commitment_point: Option, latest_per_commitment_point: Option, + funding_info: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>, }, - SigsMode { + Watchtower { revocation_base_key: PublicKey, htlc_base_key: PublicKey, - sigs: HashMap, } } @@ -241,6 +260,7 @@ struct LocalSignedTx { delayed_payment_key: PublicKey, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>, + htlc_sources: Vec<([u8; 32], HTLCSource, Option)>, } const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1; @@ -253,10 +273,9 @@ const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1; /// information and are actively monitoring the chain. #[derive(Clone)] pub struct ChannelMonitor { - funding_txo: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64, - key_storage: KeyStorage, + key_storage: Storage, their_htlc_base_key: Option, their_delayed_payment_base_key: Option, // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points @@ -266,7 +285,7 @@ pub struct ChannelMonitor { their_to_self_delay: Option, old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49], - remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap>, + remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap, Vec<([u8; 32], HTLCSource, Option)>)>, /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain. /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote @@ -309,8 +328,7 @@ pub struct ChannelMonitor { /// underlying object impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor { fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool { - if self.funding_txo != other.funding_txo || - self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor || + if self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor || self.key_storage != other.key_storage || self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key || self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key || @@ -339,18 +357,19 @@ impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor { } impl ChannelMonitor { - pub(super) fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, payment_base_key: &SecretKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script, logger: Arc) -> ChannelMonitor { + pub(super) fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, payment_base_key: &SecretKey, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script, logger: Arc) -> ChannelMonitor { ChannelMonitor { - funding_txo: None, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0, - key_storage: KeyStorage::PrivMode { + key_storage: Storage::Local { revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(), htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(), delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(), payment_base_key: payment_base_key.clone(), + shutdown_pubkey: shutdown_pubkey.clone(), prev_latest_per_commitment_point: None, latest_per_commitment_point: None, + funding_info: None, }, their_htlc_base_key: None, their_delayed_payment_base_key: None, @@ -405,12 +424,12 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key). - pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), HandleError> { + pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> { let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx); for i in 0..pos { let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize]; if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret { - return Err(HandleError{err: "Previous secret did not match new one", action: None}) + return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one")); } } self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx); @@ -450,46 +469,44 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { Ok(()) } - /// Tracks the next revocation point which may be required to claim HTLC outputs which we know - /// the preimage of in case the remote end force-closes using their latest state. When called at - /// channel opening revocation point is the CURRENT one used for first commitment tx. Needed in case of sizeable push_msat. - pub(super) fn provide_their_next_revocation_point(&mut self, their_next_revocation_point: Option<(u64, PublicKey)>) { - if let Some(new_revocation_point) = their_next_revocation_point { - match self.their_cur_revocation_points { - Some(old_points) => { - if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 1 { - self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(new_revocation_point.1))); - } else if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 2 { - if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 { - self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(new_revocation_point.1))); - } else { - self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None)); - } - } else { - self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None)); - } - }, - None => { - self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None)); - } - } - } - } - /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction. /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible. /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers. - pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec, commitment_number: u64) { + pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec, htlc_sources: Vec<([u8; 32], HTLCSource, Option)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) { // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close. // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of // timeouts) - for htlc in &htlc_outputs { + for ref htlc in &htlc_outputs { self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number); } - self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(unsigned_commitment_tx.txid(), htlc_outputs); + // We prune old claimable outpoints, useless to pass backward state when remote commitment + // tx get revoked, optimize for storage + for (_, htlc_data) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter_mut() { + htlc_data.1 = Vec::new(); + } + self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(unsigned_commitment_tx.txid(), (htlc_outputs, htlc_sources)); self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number; + //TODO: Merge this into the other per-remote-transaction output storage stuff + match self.their_cur_revocation_points { + Some(old_points) => { + if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { + self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point))); + } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 { + if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 { + self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point))); + } else { + self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None)); + } + } else { + self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None)); + } + }, + None => { + self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None)); + } + } } /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The @@ -497,9 +514,9 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated. /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called. - /// Also update KeyStorage with latest local per_commitment_point to derive local_delayedkey in + /// Also update Storage with latest local per_commitment_point to derive local_delayedkey in /// case of onchain HTLC tx - pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>) { + pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>, htlc_sources: Vec<([u8; 32], HTLCSource, Option)>) { assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some()); self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take(); self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx { @@ -511,17 +528,14 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs, + htlc_sources, }); - self.key_storage = if let KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } = self.key_storage { - KeyStorage::PrivMode { - revocation_base_key: *revocation_base_key, - htlc_base_key: *htlc_base_key, - delayed_payment_base_key: *delayed_payment_base_key, - payment_base_key: *payment_base_key, - prev_latest_per_commitment_point: *latest_per_commitment_point, - latest_per_commitment_point: Some(local_keys.per_commitment_point), - } - } else { unimplemented!(); }; + + if let Storage::Local { ref mut latest_per_commitment_point, .. } = self.key_storage { + *latest_per_commitment_point = Some(local_keys.per_commitment_point); + } else { + panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?"); + } } /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all @@ -533,21 +547,44 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { /// Combines this ChannelMonitor with the information contained in the other ChannelMonitor. /// After a successful call this ChannelMonitor is up-to-date and is safe to use to monitor the /// chain for new blocks/transactions. - pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> { - if self.funding_txo.is_some() { - // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget its trivially - // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey. - if other.funding_txo.is_some() && other.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0 != self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0 { - return Err(HandleError{err: "Funding transaction outputs are not identical!", action: None}); - } - } else { - self.funding_txo = other.funding_txo.take(); + pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> { + match self.key_storage { + Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => { + if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); } + let our_funding_info = funding_info; + if let Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } = other.key_storage { + if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); } + // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget its trivially + // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey. + if funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 != our_funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 { + return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Funding transaction outputs are not identical!")); + } + } else { + return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor with a Watchtower one !")); + } + }, + Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { + if let Storage::Watchtower { .. } = other.key_storage { + unimplemented!(); + } else { + return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Watchtower monitor with a Local one !")); + } + }, } let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret(); let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret(); if our_min_secret > other_min_secret { self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap())?; } + if let Some(ref local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx { + if let Some(ref other_local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx { + let our_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor); + let other_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((other_local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (other_local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor); + if our_commitment_number >= other_commitment_number { + self.key_storage = other.key_storage; + } + } + } // TODO: We should use current_remote_commitment_number and the commitment number out of // local transactions to decide how to merge if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret { @@ -563,6 +600,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages; } + self.current_remote_commitment_number = cmp::min(self.current_remote_commitment_number, other.current_remote_commitment_number); Ok(()) } @@ -579,8 +617,15 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { /// provides slightly better privacy. /// It's the responsibility of the caller to register outpoint and script with passing the former /// value as key to add_update_monitor. - pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) { - self.funding_txo = Some(funding_info); + pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, new_funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) { + match self.key_storage { + Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => { + *funding_info = Some(new_funding_info); + }, + Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { + panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?"); + } + } } /// We log these base keys at channel opening to being able to rebuild redeemscript in case of leaked revoked commit tx @@ -594,14 +639,28 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) { - self.funding_txo = None; + match self.key_storage { + Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => { + *funding_info = None; + }, + Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { + panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?"); + }, + } } /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for. pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option { - match self.funding_txo { - Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint), - None => None + match self.key_storage { + Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => { + match funding_info { + &Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint), + &None => None + } + }, + Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { + return None; + } } } @@ -626,29 +685,17 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?; writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?; - match &self.funding_txo { - &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => { - writer.write_all(&outpoint.txid[..])?; - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index))?; - script.write(writer)?; - }, - &None => { - // We haven't even been initialized...not sure why anyone is serializing us, but - // not much to give them. - return Ok(()); - }, - } - // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now: U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?; match self.key_storage { - KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point } => { + Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point, ref funding_info } => { writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?; writer.write_all(&revocation_base_key[..])?; writer.write_all(&htlc_base_key[..])?; writer.write_all(&delayed_payment_base_key[..])?; writer.write_all(&payment_base_key[..])?; + writer.write_all(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize())?; if let Some(ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point) = *prev_latest_per_commitment_point { writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?; writer.write_all(&prev_latest_per_commitment_point.serialize())?; @@ -661,9 +708,18 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } else { writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?; } - + match funding_info { + &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => { + writer.write_all(&outpoint.txid[..])?; + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index))?; + script.write(writer)?; + }, + &None => { + debug_assert!(false, "Try to serialize a useless Local monitor !"); + }, + } }, - KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => unimplemented!(), + Storage::Watchtower { .. } => unimplemented!(), } writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?; @@ -705,13 +761,31 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } } + macro_rules! serialize_htlc_source { + ($htlc_source: expr) => { + $htlc_source.0.write(writer)?; + $htlc_source.1.write(writer)?; + if let &Some(ref txo) = &$htlc_source.2 { + writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?; + txo.write(writer)?; + } else { + writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?; + } + } + } + + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?; - for (ref txid, ref htlc_outputs) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() { + for (ref txid, &(ref htlc_infos, ref htlc_sources)) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() { writer.write_all(&txid[..])?; - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?; - for htlc_output in htlc_outputs.iter() { + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?; + for ref htlc_output in htlc_infos.iter() { serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output); } + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_sources.len() as u64))?; + for ref htlc_source in htlc_sources.iter() { + serialize_htlc_source!(htlc_source); + } } writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?; @@ -755,6 +829,10 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?; writer.write_all(&our_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?; } + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_sources.len() as u64))?; + for ref htlc_source in $local_tx.htlc_sources.iter() { + serialize_htlc_source!(htlc_source); + } } } @@ -815,14 +893,14 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { //we want to leave out (eg funding_txo, etc). /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret - pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Result<[u8; 32], HandleError> { + pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> { for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() { if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 { - return Ok(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx)) + return Some(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx)) } } assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret()); - Err(HandleError{err: "idx too low", action: None}) + None } pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 { @@ -873,16 +951,18 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() { let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap(); let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret)); - let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage { - KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => { + let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key, local_payment_key) = match self.key_storage { + Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref payment_base_key, .. } => { let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key); (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))), - ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key)))) + ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))), + Some(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &payment_base_key)))) }, - KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => { + Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => { let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key); (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)), - ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key))) + ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)), + None) }, }; let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.unwrap())); @@ -894,6 +974,13 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key); let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(); + let local_payment_p2wpkh = if let Some(payment_key) = local_payment_key { + // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the + // script_pubkey version. + let payment_hash160 = Hash160::from_data(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &payment_key).serialize()); + Some(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script()) + } else { None }; + let mut total_value = 0; let mut values = Vec::new(); let mut inputs = Vec::new(); @@ -913,23 +1000,12 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { htlc_idxs.push(None); values.push(outp.value); total_value += outp.value; - } else if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() { - match self.key_storage { - KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref payment_base_key, .. } => { - let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key); - if let Ok(local_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &payment_base_key) { - spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH { - outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 }, - key: local_key, - output: outp.clone(), - }); - } - } - KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => { - //TODO: we need to ensure an offline client will generate the event when it - // cames back online after only the watchtower saw the transaction - } - } + } else if Some(&outp.script_pubkey) == local_payment_p2wpkh.as_ref() { + spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH { + outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 }, + key: local_payment_key.unwrap(), + output: outp.clone(), + }); } } @@ -937,16 +1013,16 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => { { let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage { - KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => { + Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => { let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else { - let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()]; + let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap().0[$htlc_idx.unwrap()]; chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey) }; let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..])); let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key)); (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript) }, - KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => { + Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { unimplemented!(); } }; @@ -962,10 +1038,10 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } } - if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option { + if let Some(&(ref per_commitment_data, _)) = per_commitment_option { inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len()); - for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() { + for (idx, ref htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() { let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey); if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 || @@ -1053,11 +1129,11 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } else { None }; if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option { let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage { - KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => { + Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => { (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))), ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key)))) }, - KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => { + Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => { (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)), ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key))) }, @@ -1067,11 +1143,10 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)), }; - for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() { match self.key_storage { - KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref payment_base_key, .. } => { + Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, .. } => { if let Ok(local_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_point, &payment_base_key) { spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH { outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 }, @@ -1079,11 +1154,8 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { output: outp.clone(), }); } - } - KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => { - //TODO: we need to ensure an offline client will generate the event when it - // cames back online after only the watchtower saw the transaction - } + }, + Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {} } break; // Only to_remote ouput is claimable } @@ -1097,14 +1169,14 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => { { let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage { - KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => { - let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize]; + Storage::Local { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => { + let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap().0[$input.sequence as usize]; let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey); let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..])); let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)); (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript) }, - KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => { + Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { unimplemented!(); } }; @@ -1116,7 +1188,13 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } } - for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() { + for (idx, ref htlc) in per_commitment_data.0.iter().enumerate() { + let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey); + if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() || + tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 || + tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() { + return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user + } if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint { @@ -1200,14 +1278,14 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { }; } - let secret = ignore_error!(self.get_secret(commitment_number)); + let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (None, None); }; let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret)); let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key); let revocation_pubkey = match self.key_storage { - KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => { + Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => { ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))) }, - KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => { + Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => { ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)) }, }; @@ -1251,12 +1329,12 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx); let sig = match self.key_storage { - KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => { + Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => { let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &redeemscript, amount)[..])); let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key)); self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key) } - KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => { + Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { unimplemented!(); } }; @@ -1271,9 +1349,10 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } else { (None, None) } } - fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, per_commitment_point: &Option, delayed_payment_base_key: &Option) -> (Vec, Vec) { + fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, per_commitment_point: &Option, delayed_payment_base_key: &Option) -> (Vec, Vec, Vec) { let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len()); let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len()); + let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len()); macro_rules! add_dynamic_output { ($father_tx: expr, $vout: expr) => { @@ -1337,24 +1416,27 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { res.push(htlc_success_tx); } } + watch_outputs.push(local_tx.tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].clone()); } - (res, spendable_outputs) + (res, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) } /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet) /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints. /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds. - fn check_spend_local_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, _height: u32) -> (Vec, Vec) { + fn check_spend_local_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, _height: u32) -> (Vec, Vec, (Sha256dHash, Vec)) { let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx { if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid { match self.key_storage { - KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => { - return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key)); + Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => { + let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key)); + return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); }, - KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => { - return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None); + Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { + let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None); + return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); } } } @@ -1362,16 +1444,43 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx { if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid { match self.key_storage { - KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => { - return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key)); + Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => { + let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key)); + return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); }, - KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => { - return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None); + Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { + let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None); + return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); } } } } - (Vec::new(), Vec::new()) + (Vec::new(), Vec::new(), (commitment_txid, Vec::new())) + } + + /// Generate a spendable output event when closing_transaction get registered onchain. + fn check_spend_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> Option { + if tx.input[0].sequence == 0xFFFFFFFF && !tx.input[0].witness.is_empty() && tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len() == 71 { + match self.key_storage { + Storage::Local { ref shutdown_pubkey, .. } => { + let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::from_data(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize()); + let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script(); + for (idx, output) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { + if shutdown_script == output.script_pubkey { + return Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { + outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: idx as u32 }, + output: output.clone(), + }); + } + } + } + Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { + //TODO: we need to ensure an offline client will generate the event when it + // cames back online after only the watchtower saw the transaction + } + } + } + None } /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest local state if it's copy of @@ -1380,7 +1489,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx { let mut res = vec![local_tx.tx.clone()]; match self.key_storage { - KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => { + Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => { res.append(&mut self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key)).0); }, _ => panic!("Can only broadcast by local channelmonitor"), @@ -1402,7 +1511,15 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { // filters. let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output; let mut txn: Vec = Vec::new(); - if self.funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) { + let funding_txo = match self.key_storage { + Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => { + funding_info.clone() + } + Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { + unimplemented!(); + } + }; + if funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) { let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height); txn = remote_txn; spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output); @@ -1410,9 +1527,17 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { watch_outputs.push(new_outputs); } if txn.is_empty() { - let (remote_txn, mut outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height); - spendable_outputs.append(&mut outputs); - txn = remote_txn; + let (local_txn, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height); + spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output); + txn = local_txn; + if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() { + watch_outputs.push(new_outputs); + } + } + if !funding_txo.is_none() && txn.is_empty() { + if let Some(spendable_output) = self.check_spend_closing_transaction(tx) { + spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output); + } } } else { if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) { @@ -1434,16 +1559,22 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { if self.would_broadcast_at_height(height) { broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx); match self.key_storage { - KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => { - let (txs, mut outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key)); - spendable_outputs.append(&mut outputs); + Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => { + let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key)); + spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output); + if !new_outputs.is_empty() { + watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs)); + } for tx in txs { broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx); } }, - KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => { - let (txs, mut outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, &None, &None); - spendable_outputs.append(&mut outputs); + Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { + let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, &None, &None); + spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output); + if !new_outputs.is_empty() { + watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs)); + } for tx in txs { broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx); } @@ -1508,13 +1639,6 @@ impl ReadableArgs> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelM return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion); } - // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of - // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with. - let outpoint = OutPoint { - txid: Readable::read(reader)?, - index: Readable::read(reader)?, - }; - let funding_txo = Some((outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?)); let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = >::read(reader)?.0; let key_storage = match >::read(reader)? { @@ -1523,6 +1647,7 @@ impl ReadableArgs> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelM let htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?; let delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?; let payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?; + let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?; let prev_latest_per_commitment_point = match >::read(reader)? { 0 => None, 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?), @@ -1533,13 +1658,22 @@ impl ReadableArgs> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelM 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?), _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), }; - KeyStorage::PrivMode { + // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of + // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with. + let outpoint = OutPoint { + txid: Readable::read(reader)?, + index: Readable::read(reader)?, + }; + let funding_info = Some((outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?)); + Storage::Local { revocation_base_key, htlc_base_key, delayed_payment_base_key, payment_base_key, + shutdown_pubkey, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, latest_per_commitment_point, + funding_info, } }, _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), @@ -1588,6 +1722,20 @@ impl ReadableArgs> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelM } } + macro_rules! read_htlc_source { + () => { + { + (Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, + match >::read(reader)? { + 0 => None, + 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?), + _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), + } + ) + } + } + } + let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64)); for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len { @@ -1597,7 +1745,12 @@ impl ReadableArgs> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelM for _ in 0..outputs_count { outputs.push(read_htlc_in_commitment!()); } - if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, outputs) { + let sources_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; + let mut sources = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(sources_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32)); + for _ in 0..sources_count { + sources.push(read_htlc_source!()); + } + if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, (outputs, sources)) { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); } } @@ -1652,12 +1805,20 @@ impl ReadableArgs> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelM let htlc_outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; let mut htlc_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlc_outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128)); for _ in 0..htlc_outputs_len { - htlc_outputs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)); + let out = read_htlc_in_commitment!(); + let sigs = (Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?); + htlc_outputs.push((out, sigs.0, sigs.1)); + } + + let htlc_sources_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; + let mut htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlc_outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128)); + for _ in 0..htlc_sources_len { + htlc_sources.push(read_htlc_source!()); } LocalSignedTx { txid: tx.txid(), - tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs + tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs, htlc_sources } } } @@ -1699,7 +1860,6 @@ impl ReadableArgs> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelM let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?; Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor { - funding_txo, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, key_storage, @@ -1761,13 +1921,13 @@ mod tests { idx -= 1; } assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1); - assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_err()); + assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none()); }; } { // insert_secret correct sequence - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); + monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); secrets.clear(); secrets.push([0; 32]); @@ -1813,7 +1973,7 @@ mod tests { { // insert_secret #1 incorrect - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); + monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); secrets.clear(); secrets.push([0; 32]); @@ -1823,13 +1983,13 @@ mod tests { secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap()); - assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err, + assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0, "Previous secret did not match new one"); } { // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect) - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); + monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); secrets.clear(); secrets.push([0; 32]); @@ -1849,13 +2009,13 @@ mod tests { secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); - assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err, + assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0, "Previous secret did not match new one"); } { // insert_secret #3 incorrect - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); + monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); secrets.clear(); secrets.push([0; 32]); @@ -1875,13 +2035,13 @@ mod tests { secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); - assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err, + assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0, "Previous secret did not match new one"); } { // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect) - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); + monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); secrets.clear(); secrets.push([0; 32]); @@ -1921,13 +2081,13 @@ mod tests { secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap()); - assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err, + assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0, "Previous secret did not match new one"); } { // insert_secret #5 incorrect - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); + monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); secrets.clear(); secrets.push([0; 32]); @@ -1957,13 +2117,13 @@ mod tests { secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap()); - assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err, + assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0, "Previous secret did not match new one"); } { // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect) - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); + monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); secrets.clear(); secrets.push([0; 32]); @@ -2003,13 +2163,13 @@ mod tests { secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap()); - assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err, + assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0, "Previous secret did not match new one"); } { // insert_secret #7 incorrect - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); + monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); secrets.clear(); secrets.push([0; 32]); @@ -2049,13 +2209,13 @@ mod tests { secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap()); - assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err, + assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0, "Previous secret did not match new one"); } { // insert_secret #8 incorrect - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); + monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); secrets.clear(); secrets.push([0; 32]); @@ -2095,7 +2255,7 @@ mod tests { secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap()); - assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err, + assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0, "Previous secret did not match new one"); } } @@ -2106,10 +2266,10 @@ mod tests { let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new()); let dummy_sig = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(); + let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap()); macro_rules! dummy_keys { () => { { - let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap()); TxCreationKeys { per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(), revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(), @@ -2174,14 +2334,14 @@ mod tests { // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the // old state. - let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); + let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(10); - monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])); - monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655); - monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654); - monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653); - monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652); + monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]), Vec::new()); + monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), Vec::new(), 281474976710655, dummy_key); + monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), Vec::new(), 281474976710654, dummy_key); + monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), Vec::new(), 281474976710653, dummy_key); + monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), Vec::new(), 281474976710652, dummy_key); for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() { monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage); } @@ -2203,7 +2363,7 @@ mod tests { // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the // previous commitment tx's preimages too - monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5])); + monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]), Vec::new()); secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap()); monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap(); assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12); @@ -2211,7 +2371,7 @@ mod tests { test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor); // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10 - monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3])); + monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]), Vec::new()); secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap(); assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);