X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=src%2Fln%2Fchannelmonitor.rs;h=3fb1d8ad836e590dd54c6c5f09e34f9c767fdea9;hb=158d0c16dc1a9b8ed0130661331bd07ca48d3c1e;hp=8c3fcc3f0a02ad21dbb838759241e57eec4e70b7;hpb=4f644f225c059e2731d848077adac11edb9cdcca;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs b/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs index 8c3fcc3f..3fb1d8ad 100644 --- a/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs +++ b/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs @@ -92,9 +92,12 @@ impl SimpleManyChannelMonitor Some(orig_monitor) => return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor), None => {} }; - match monitor.funding_txo { - None => self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn(), - Some(outpoint) => self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32)), + match &monitor.funding_txo { + &None => self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn(), + &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => { + self.chain_monitor.install_watch_script(script); + self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script); + }, } monitors.insert(key, monitor); Ok(()) @@ -147,7 +150,7 @@ const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1; const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1; pub struct ChannelMonitor { - funding_txo: Option, + funding_txo: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64, key_storage: KeyStorage, @@ -316,7 +319,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { for i in 0..pos { let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize]; if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret { - return Err(HandleError{err: "Previous secret did not match new one", msg: None}) + return Err(HandleError{err: "Previous secret did not match new one", action: None}) } } self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx); @@ -419,13 +422,12 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> { - match self.funding_txo { - Some(txo) => if other.funding_txo.is_some() && other.funding_txo.unwrap() != txo { - return Err(HandleError{err: "Funding transaction outputs are not identical!", msg: None}); - }, - None => if other.funding_txo.is_some() { - self.funding_txo = other.funding_txo; + if self.funding_txo.is_some() { + if other.funding_txo.is_some() && other.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap() != self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap() { + return Err(HandleError{err: "Funding transaction outputs are not identical!", action: None}); } + } else { + self.funding_txo = other.funding_txo.take(); } let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret(); let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret(); @@ -458,7 +460,8 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it /// provides slightly better privacy. - pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, funding_info: OutPoint) { + pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) { + //TODO: Need to register the given script here with a chain_monitor self.funding_txo = Some(funding_info); } @@ -475,7 +478,10 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option { - self.funding_txo + match self.funding_txo { + Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint), + None => None + } } /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns @@ -484,12 +490,14 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { res.push(SERIALIZATION_VERSION); res.push(MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION); - match self.funding_txo { - Some(outpoint) => { + match &self.funding_txo { + &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => { res.extend_from_slice(&outpoint.txid[..]); res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index)); + res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(script.len() as u64)); + res.extend_from_slice(&script[..]); }, - None => { + &None => { // We haven't even been initialized...not sure why anyone is serializing us, but // not much to give them. return res; @@ -664,10 +672,12 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with. - let funding_txo = Some(OutPoint { + let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32)), index: byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2)), - }); + }; + let script_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8)); + let funding_txo = Some((outpoint, Script::from(read_bytes!(script_len).to_vec()))); let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6)); let key_storage = match read_bytes!(1)[0] { @@ -733,7 +743,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len { let txid = Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32)); let outputs_count = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8)); - if outputs_count > data.len() as u64 * 32 { return None; } + if outputs_count > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return None; } let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(outputs_count as usize); for _ in 0..outputs_count { outputs.push(read_htlc_in_commitment!()); @@ -875,7 +885,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } } assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret()); - Err(HandleError{err: "idx too low", msg: None}) + Err(HandleError{err: "idx too low", action: None}) } pub fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 { @@ -910,7 +920,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers! let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid); - let commitment_number = (((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor; + let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor); if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() { let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap(); let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret)); @@ -1026,7 +1036,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction! - // TODO: Register commitment_txid with the ChainWatchInterface! + // TODO: Register all outputs in commitment_tx with the ChainWatchInterface! self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number); } if inputs.is_empty() { return txn_to_broadcast; } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx @@ -1059,6 +1069,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and // insert it here. + // TODO: Register all outputs in commitment_tx with the ChainWatchInterface! self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number); if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points { @@ -1232,7 +1243,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { fn block_connected(&self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface) { for tx in txn_matched { for txin in tx.input.iter() { - if self.funding_txo.is_none() || (txin.prev_hash == self.funding_txo.unwrap().txid && txin.prev_index == self.funding_txo.unwrap().index as u32) { + if self.funding_txo.is_none() || (txin.prev_hash == self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && txin.prev_index == self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) { let mut txn = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height); if txn.is_empty() { txn = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height);