X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=src%2Fln%2Fchannelmonitor.rs;h=6e1b212ea24c051edaa9f8f9eb4dca4380b3a389;hb=963f002056d86365447dc1ce244251a449df5b6d;hp=458c0dec741035cee06d5c7938779993570e1fd0;hpb=b14baa03ab20911489bee50688785f2631f0d0f1;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs b/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs index 458c0dec..6e1b212e 100644 --- a/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs +++ b/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs @@ -14,37 +14,42 @@ use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader; use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction}; use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint; -use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script; +use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder}; +use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes; use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{self, Decodable, Encodable}; -use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash,Sha256dHash}; +use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash; use bitcoin::util::bip143; -use crypto::digest::Digest; +use bitcoin_hashes::Hash; +use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256; +use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160; +use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash; -use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature}; +use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature}; use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey}; use secp256k1; -use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, HandleError}; +use ln::msgs::DecodeError; use ln::chan_utils; use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment; -use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface}; +use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash}; +use ln::channel::{ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT}; +use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget}; use chain::transaction::OutPoint; use chain::keysinterface::SpendableOutputDescriptor; use util::logger::Logger; use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writer, Writeable, WriterWriteAdaptor, U48}; -use util::sha2::Sha256; use util::{byte_utils, events}; -use std::collections::HashMap; +use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map}; use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex}; use std::{hash,cmp, mem}; /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update. #[derive(Clone)] pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr { - /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower failed, but is expected - /// to succeed at some point in the future). + /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower or remote backup of + /// our state failed, but is expected to succeed at some point in the future). /// /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party. @@ -66,13 +71,35 @@ pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr { /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call /// test_restore_channel_monitor to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal /// channel operation. + /// + /// For deployments where a copy of ChannelMonitors and other local state are backed up in a + /// remote location (with local copies persisted immediately), it is anticipated that all + /// updates will return TemporaryFailure until the remote copies could be updated. TemporaryFailure, /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question. + /// + /// Should also be used to indicate a failure to update the local copy of the channel monitor. PermanentFailure, } +/// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is +/// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::insert_combine this +/// means you tried to merge two monitors for different channels or for a channel which was +/// restored from a backup and then generated new commitment updates. +/// Contains a human-readable error message. +#[derive(Debug)] +pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str); + +/// Simple structure send back by ManyChannelMonitor in case of HTLC detected onchain from a +/// forward channel and from which info are needed to update HTLC in a backward channel. +pub struct HTLCUpdate { + pub(super) payment_hash: PaymentHash, + pub(super) payment_preimage: Option, + pub(super) source: HTLCSource +} + /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote @@ -89,6 +116,10 @@ pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync { /// ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected callbacks with /// any spends of it. fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>; + + /// Used by ChannelManager to get list of HTLC resolved onchain and which needed to be updated + /// with success or failure backward + fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec; } /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a @@ -110,72 +141,119 @@ pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor { chain_monitor: Arc, broadcaster: Arc, pending_events: Mutex>, + pending_htlc_updated: Mutex)>>>, logger: Arc, + fee_estimator: Arc } impl ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor { fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) { let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash(); let mut new_events: Vec = Vec::with_capacity(0); + let mut htlc_updated_infos = Vec::new(); { let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap(); for monitor in monitors.values_mut() { - let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster); + let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs, mut htlc_updated) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator); if spendable_outputs.len() > 0 { new_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs: spendable_outputs, }); } + for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs { for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() { self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey); } } + htlc_updated_infos.append(&mut htlc_updated); + } + } + { + // ChannelManager will just need to fetch pending_htlc_updated and pass state backward + let mut pending_htlc_updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap(); + for htlc in htlc_updated_infos.drain(..) { + match pending_htlc_updated.entry(htlc.2) { + hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => { + // In case of reorg we may have htlc outputs solved in a different way so + // we prefer to keep claims but don't store duplicate updates for a given + // (payment_hash, HTLCSource) pair. + let mut existing_claim = false; + e.get_mut().retain(|htlc_data| { + if htlc.0 == htlc_data.0 { + if htlc_data.1.is_some() { + existing_claim = true; + true + } else { false } + } else { true } + }); + if !existing_claim { + e.get_mut().push((htlc.0, htlc.1)); + } + } + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { + e.insert(vec![(htlc.0, htlc.1)]); + } + } } } let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); pending_events.append(&mut new_events); } - fn block_disconnected(&self, _: &BlockHeader) { } + fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, disconnected_height: u32) { + let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash(); + let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap(); + for monitor in monitors.values_mut() { + monitor.block_disconnected(disconnected_height, &block_hash); + } + } } impl SimpleManyChannelMonitor { /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain /// interface with which to register to receive notifications. - pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc, broadcaster: Arc, logger: Arc) -> Arc> { + pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc, broadcaster: Arc, logger: Arc, feeest: Arc) -> Arc> { let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor { monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()), chain_monitor, broadcaster, pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), + pending_htlc_updated: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()), logger, + fee_estimator: feeest, }); let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res); res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res); res } - /// Adds or udpates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key. - pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> { + /// Adds or updates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key. + pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> { let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap(); match monitors.get_mut(&key) { Some(orig_monitor) => { - log_trace!(self, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_option!(monitor.funding_txo)); + log_trace!(self, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(monitor.key_storage)); return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor); }, None => {} }; - match &monitor.funding_txo { - &None => { - log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for no-funding-set channel (monitoring all txn!)"); - self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn() - }, - &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => { - log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(outpoint.to_channel_id()[..])); - self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script); - self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script); + match monitor.key_storage { + Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => { + match funding_info { + &None => { + return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to update a useless monitor without funding_txo !")); + }, + &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => { + log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(outpoint.to_channel_id()[..])); + self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script); + self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script); + }, + } }, + Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { + self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn(); + } } monitors.insert(key, monitor); Ok(()) @@ -189,6 +267,21 @@ impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor { Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure), } } + + fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec { + let mut updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap(); + let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::with_capacity(updated.len()); + for (k, v) in updated.drain() { + for htlc_data in v { + pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate { + payment_hash: k, + payment_preimage: htlc_data.1, + source: htlc_data.0, + }); + } + } + pending_htlcs_updated + } } impl events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor { @@ -210,22 +303,42 @@ const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12; pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6; /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our -/// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). -pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS: u32 = 3; +/// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing +/// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he +/// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our +/// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures +/// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure. +/// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on +/// accurate block height. +/// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY +/// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also +/// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time. +pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3; +/// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding inbound +/// HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us losing money. +/// We use also this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer. +/// It may cause spurrious generation of bumped claim txn but that's allright given the outpoint is already +/// solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not +/// keeping bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint. +pub(crate) const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6; #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)] -enum KeyStorage { - PrivMode { +enum Storage { + Local { revocation_base_key: SecretKey, htlc_base_key: SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey, + payment_base_key: SecretKey, + shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey, prev_latest_per_commitment_point: Option, latest_per_commitment_point: Option, + funding_info: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>, + current_remote_commitment_txid: Option, + prev_remote_commitment_txid: Option, }, - SigsMode { + Watchtower { revocation_base_key: PublicKey, htlc_base_key: PublicKey, - sigs: HashMap, } } @@ -239,7 +352,33 @@ struct LocalSignedTx { b_htlc_key: PublicKey, delayed_payment_key: PublicKey, feerate_per_kw: u64, - htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>, + htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<(Signature, Signature)>, Option)>, +} + +#[derive(PartialEq)] +enum InputDescriptors { + RevokedOfferedHTLC, + RevokedReceivedHTLC, + OfferedHTLC, + ReceivedHTLC, + RevokedOutput, // either a revoked to_local output on commitment tx, a revoked HTLC-Timeout output or a revoked HTLC-Success output +} + +/// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it +/// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY) +#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)] +enum OnchainEvent { + /// Outpoint under claim process by our own tx, once this one get enough confirmations, we remove it from + /// bump-txn candidate buffer. + Claim { + outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint, + }, + /// HTLC output getting solved by a timeout, at maturation we pass upstream payment source information to solve + /// inbound HTLC in backward channel. Note, in case of preimage, we pass info to upstream without delay as we can + /// only win from it, so it's never an OnchainEvent + HTLCUpdate { + htlc_update: (HTLCSource, PaymentHash), + }, } const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1; @@ -252,10 +391,9 @@ const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1; /// information and are actively monitoring the chain. #[derive(Clone)] pub struct ChannelMonitor { - funding_txo: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64, - key_storage: KeyStorage, + key_storage: Storage, their_htlc_base_key: Option, their_delayed_payment_base_key: Option, // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points @@ -265,7 +403,7 @@ pub struct ChannelMonitor { their_to_self_delay: Option, old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49], - remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap>, + remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap>)>>, /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain. /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote @@ -276,7 +414,7 @@ pub struct ChannelMonitor { /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small). /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers. - remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<[u8; 32], u64>, + remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap, // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the @@ -289,10 +427,15 @@ pub struct ChannelMonitor { // deserialization current_remote_commitment_number: u64, - payment_preimages: HashMap<[u8; 32], [u8; 32]>, + payment_preimages: HashMap, destination_script: Script, + // Used to track onchain events, i.e transactions parts of channels confirmed on chain, on which + // we have to take actions once they reach enough confs. Key is a block height timer, i.e we enforce + // actions when we receive a block with given height. Actions depend on OnchainEvent type. + onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap>, + // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way. // (we do *not*, however, update them in insert_combine to ensure any local user copies keep @@ -303,13 +446,44 @@ pub struct ChannelMonitor { logger: Arc, } +macro_rules! subtract_high_prio_fee { + ($self: ident, $fee_estimator: expr, $value: expr, $predicted_weight: expr, $spent_txid: expr) => { + { + let mut fee = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) * $predicted_weight / 1000; + if $value <= fee { + fee = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal) * $predicted_weight / 1000; + if $value <= fee { + fee = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background) * $predicted_weight / 1000; + if $value <= fee { + log_error!($self, "Failed to generate an on-chain punishment tx spending {} as even low priority fee ({} sat) was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)", + $spent_txid, fee, $value); + false + } else { + log_warn!($self, "Used low priority fee for on-chain punishment tx spending {} as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)", + $spent_txid, $value); + $value -= fee; + true + } + } else { + log_warn!($self, "Used medium priority fee for on-chain punishment tx spending {} as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)", + $spent_txid, $value); + $value -= fee; + true + } + } else { + $value -= fee; + true + } + } + } +} + #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))] /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the /// underlying object impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor { fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool { - if self.funding_txo != other.funding_txo || - self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor || + if self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor || self.key_storage != other.key_storage || self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key || self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key || @@ -323,7 +497,8 @@ impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor { self.current_remote_commitment_number != other.current_remote_commitment_number || self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx || self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages || - self.destination_script != other.destination_script + self.destination_script != other.destination_script || + self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf { false } else { @@ -338,17 +513,21 @@ impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor { } impl ChannelMonitor { - pub(super) fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script, logger: Arc) -> ChannelMonitor { + pub(super) fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, payment_base_key: &SecretKey, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script, logger: Arc) -> ChannelMonitor { ChannelMonitor { - funding_txo: None, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0, - key_storage: KeyStorage::PrivMode { + key_storage: Storage::Local { revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(), htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(), delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(), + payment_base_key: payment_base_key.clone(), + shutdown_pubkey: shutdown_pubkey.clone(), prev_latest_per_commitment_point: None, latest_per_commitment_point: None, + funding_info: None, + current_remote_commitment_txid: None, + prev_remote_commitment_txid: None, }, their_htlc_base_key: None, their_delayed_payment_base_key: None, @@ -369,12 +548,44 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { payment_preimages: HashMap::new(), destination_script: destination_script, + onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap::new(), + last_block_hash: Default::default(), secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(), logger, } } + fn get_witnesses_weight(inputs: &[InputDescriptors]) -> u64 { + let mut tx_weight = 2; // count segwit flags + for inp in inputs { + // We use expected weight (and not actual) as signatures and time lock delays may vary + tx_weight += match inp { + // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script + &InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC => { + 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 133 + }, + // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script + &InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC => { + 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 139 + }, + // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + remotehtlc_sig + preimage_length + preimage + witness_script_length + witness_script + &InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC => { + 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 32 + 1 + 133 + }, + // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script + &InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC => { + 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 139 + }, + // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + true_length + op_true + witness_script_length + witness_script + &InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput => { + 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 77 + }, + }; + } + tx_weight + } + #[inline] fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 { for i in 0..48 { @@ -392,46 +603,35 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { let bitpos = bits - 1 - i; if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) { res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7); - let mut sha = Sha256::new(); - sha.input(&res); - sha.result(&mut res); + res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner(); } } res } - /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Also optionally tracks the next - /// revocation point which may be required to claim HTLC outputs which we know the preimage of - /// in case the remote end force-closes using their latest state. Prunes old preimages if neither + /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key). - pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32], their_next_revocation_point: Option<(u64, PublicKey)>) -> Result<(), HandleError> { + pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> { let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx); for i in 0..pos { let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize]; if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret { - return Err(HandleError{err: "Previous secret did not match new one", action: None}) + return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one")); } } + if self.get_min_seen_secret() <= idx { + return Ok(()); + } self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx); - if let Some(new_revocation_point) = their_next_revocation_point { - match self.their_cur_revocation_points { - Some(old_points) => { - if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 1 { - self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(new_revocation_point.1))); - } else if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 2 { - if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 { - self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(new_revocation_point.1))); - } else { - self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None)); - } - } else { - self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None)); - } - }, - None => { - self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None)); + // Prune HTLCs from the previous remote commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill + // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs. + // TODO: We should probably consider whether we're really getting the next secret here. + if let Storage::Local { ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage { + if let Some(txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid.take() { + for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() { + *source = None; } } } @@ -475,16 +675,43 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible. /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers. - pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec, commitment_number: u64) { + pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) { // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close. // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of // timeouts) - for htlc in &htlc_outputs { + for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs { self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number); } - self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(unsigned_commitment_tx.txid(), htlc_outputs); + + let new_txid = unsigned_commitment_tx.txid(); + log_trace!(self, "Tracking new remote commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", new_txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len()); + log_trace!(self, "New potential remote commitment transaction: {}", encode::serialize_hex(unsigned_commitment_tx)); + if let Storage::Local { ref mut current_remote_commitment_txid, ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage { + *prev_remote_commitment_txid = current_remote_commitment_txid.take(); + *current_remote_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid); + } + self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, htlc_outputs); self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number; + //TODO: Merge this into the other per-remote-transaction output storage stuff + match self.their_cur_revocation_points { + Some(old_points) => { + if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { + self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point))); + } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 { + if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 { + self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point))); + } else { + self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None)); + } + } else { + self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None)); + } + }, + None => { + self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None)); + } + } } /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The @@ -492,9 +719,9 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated. /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called. - /// Also update KeyStorage with latest local per_commitment_point to derive local_delayedkey in + /// Also update Storage with latest local per_commitment_point to derive local_delayedkey in /// case of onchain HTLC tx - pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>) { + pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<(Signature, Signature)>, Option)>) { assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some()); self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take(); self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx { @@ -507,40 +734,60 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs, }); - self.key_storage = if let KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, prev_latest_per_commitment_point: _, ref latest_per_commitment_point } = self.key_storage { - KeyStorage::PrivMode { - revocation_base_key: *revocation_base_key, - htlc_base_key: *htlc_base_key, - delayed_payment_base_key: *delayed_payment_base_key, - prev_latest_per_commitment_point: *latest_per_commitment_point, - latest_per_commitment_point: Some(local_keys.per_commitment_point), - } - } else { unimplemented!(); }; + + if let Storage::Local { ref mut latest_per_commitment_point, .. } = self.key_storage { + *latest_per_commitment_point = Some(local_keys.per_commitment_point); + } else { + panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?"); + } } /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked. - pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], payment_preimage: &[u8; 32]) { + pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage) { self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone()); } /// Combines this ChannelMonitor with the information contained in the other ChannelMonitor. /// After a successful call this ChannelMonitor is up-to-date and is safe to use to monitor the /// chain for new blocks/transactions. - pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> { - if self.funding_txo.is_some() { - // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget its trivially - // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey. - if other.funding_txo.is_some() && other.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0 != self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0 { - return Err(HandleError{err: "Funding transaction outputs are not identical!", action: None}); - } - } else { - self.funding_txo = other.funding_txo.take(); + pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> { + match self.key_storage { + Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => { + if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); } + let our_funding_info = funding_info; + if let Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } = other.key_storage { + if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); } + // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget it's trivially + // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey. + if funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 != our_funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 { + return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Funding transaction outputs are not identical!")); + } + } else { + return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor with a Watchtower one !")); + } + }, + Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { + if let Storage::Watchtower { .. } = other.key_storage { + unimplemented!(); + } else { + return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Watchtower monitor with a Local one !")); + } + }, } let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret(); let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret(); if our_min_secret > other_min_secret { - self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap(), None)?; + self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap())?; + } + if let Some(ref local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx { + if let Some(ref other_local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx { + let our_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor); + let other_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((other_local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (other_local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor); + if our_commitment_number >= other_commitment_number { + self.key_storage = other.key_storage; + } + } } // TODO: We should use current_remote_commitment_number and the commitment number out of // local transactions to decide how to merge @@ -557,6 +804,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages; } + self.current_remote_commitment_number = cmp::min(self.current_remote_commitment_number, other.current_remote_commitment_number); Ok(()) } @@ -573,8 +821,15 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { /// provides slightly better privacy. /// It's the responsibility of the caller to register outpoint and script with passing the former /// value as key to add_update_monitor. - pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) { - self.funding_txo = Some(funding_info); + pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, new_funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) { + match self.key_storage { + Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => { + *funding_info = Some(new_funding_info); + }, + Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { + panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?"); + } + } } /// We log these base keys at channel opening to being able to rebuild redeemscript in case of leaked revoked commit tx @@ -588,14 +843,28 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) { - self.funding_txo = None; + match self.key_storage { + Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => { + *funding_info = None; + }, + Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { + panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?"); + }, + } } /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for. pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option { - match self.funding_txo { - Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint), - None => None + match self.key_storage { + Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => { + match funding_info { + &Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint), + &None => None + } + }, + Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { + return None; + } } } @@ -620,43 +889,45 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?; writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?; - match &self.funding_txo { - &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => { - writer.write_all(&outpoint.txid[..])?; - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index))?; - script.write(writer)?; - }, - &None => { - // We haven't even been initialized...not sure why anyone is serializing us, but - // not much to give them. - return Ok(()); - }, - } - // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now: U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?; + macro_rules! write_option { + ($thing: expr) => { + match $thing { + &Some(ref t) => { + 1u8.write(writer)?; + t.write(writer)?; + }, + &None => 0u8.write(writer)?, + } + } + } + match self.key_storage { - KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point } => { + Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point, ref funding_info, ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid } => { writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?; writer.write_all(&revocation_base_key[..])?; writer.write_all(&htlc_base_key[..])?; writer.write_all(&delayed_payment_base_key[..])?; - if let Some(ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point) = *prev_latest_per_commitment_point { - writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?; - writer.write_all(&prev_latest_per_commitment_point.serialize())?; - } else { - writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?; - } - if let Some(ref latest_per_commitment_point) = *latest_per_commitment_point { - writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?; - writer.write_all(&latest_per_commitment_point.serialize())?; - } else { - writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?; + writer.write_all(&payment_base_key[..])?; + writer.write_all(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize())?; + prev_latest_per_commitment_point.write(writer)?; + latest_per_commitment_point.write(writer)?; + match funding_info { + &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => { + writer.write_all(&outpoint.txid[..])?; + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index))?; + script.write(writer)?; + }, + &None => { + debug_assert!(false, "Try to serialize a useless Local monitor !"); + }, } - + current_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?; + prev_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?; }, - KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => unimplemented!(), + Storage::Watchtower { .. } => unimplemented!(), } writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?; @@ -693,17 +964,18 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?; writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?; writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?; - writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash)?; - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.transaction_output_index))?; + writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?; + $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?; } } writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?; - for (ref txid, ref htlc_outputs) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() { + for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() { writer.write_all(&txid[..])?; - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?; - for htlc_output in htlc_outputs.iter() { + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?; + for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() { serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output); + write_option!(htlc_source); } } @@ -720,7 +992,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { if for_local_storage { writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?; for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() { - writer.write_all(*payment_hash)?; + writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?; writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?; } } else { @@ -743,10 +1015,16 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?; writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?; - for &(ref htlc_output, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() { + for &(ref htlc_output, ref sigs, ref htlc_source) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() { serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output); - writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?; - writer.write_all(&our_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?; + if let &Some((ref their_sig, ref our_sig)) = sigs { + 1u8.write(writer)?; + writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact())?; + writer.write_all(&our_sig.serialize_compact())?; + } else { + 0u8.write(writer)?; + } + write_option!(htlc_source); } } } @@ -773,12 +1051,31 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?; for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() { - writer.write_all(payment_preimage)?; + writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?; } self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?; self.destination_script.write(writer)?; + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?; + for (ref target, ref events) in self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.iter() { + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(**target))?; + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(events.len() as u64))?; + for ev in events.iter() { + match *ev { + OnchainEvent::Claim { ref outpoint } => { + writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?; + outpoint.write(writer)?; + }, + OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => { + writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?; + htlc_update.0.write(writer)?; + htlc_update.1.write(writer)?; + } + } + } + } + Ok(()) } @@ -804,18 +1101,15 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { self.write(writer, false) } - //TODO: Functions to serialize/deserialize (with different forms depending on which information - //we want to leave out (eg funding_txo, etc). - /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret - pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Result<[u8; 32], HandleError> { + pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> { for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() { if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 { - return Ok(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx)) + return Some(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx)) } } assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret()); - Err(HandleError{err: "idx too low", action: None}) + None } pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 { @@ -843,7 +1137,9 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions. - fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec, (Sha256dHash, Vec), Vec) { + /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of + /// revoked remote commitment tx + fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> (Vec, (Sha256dHash, Vec), Vec) { // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new(); @@ -865,17 +1161,19 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor); if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() { let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap(); - let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret)); - let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage { - KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => { + let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret)); + let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key, local_payment_key) = match self.key_storage { + Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref payment_base_key, .. } => { let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key); (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))), - ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key)))) + ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))), + Some(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &payment_base_key)))) }, - KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => { + Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => { let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key); (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)), - ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key))) + ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)), + None) }, }; let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.unwrap())); @@ -887,10 +1185,18 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key); let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(); + let local_payment_p2wpkh = if let Some(payment_key) = local_payment_key { + // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the + // script_pubkey version. + let payment_hash160 = Hash160::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &payment_key).serialize()); + Some(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script()) + } else { None }; + let mut total_value = 0; let mut values = Vec::new(); let mut inputs = Vec::new(); let mut htlc_idxs = Vec::new(); + let mut input_descriptors = Vec::new(); for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { @@ -906,7 +1212,13 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { htlc_idxs.push(None); values.push(outp.value); total_value += outp.value; - break; // There can only be one of these + input_descriptors.push(InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput); + } else if Some(&outp.script_pubkey) == local_payment_p2wpkh.as_ref() { + spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH { + outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 }, + key: local_payment_key.unwrap(), + output: outp.clone(), + }); } } @@ -914,20 +1226,20 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => { { let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage { - KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => { + Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => { let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else { - let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()]; + let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()].0; chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey) }; - let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..])); + let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]); let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key)); (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript) }, - KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => { + Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { unimplemented!(); } }; - $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec()); + $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec()); $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8); if $htlc_idx.is_none() { $input.witness.push(vec!(1)); @@ -939,57 +1251,103 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } } - if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option { + if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option { inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len()); - for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() { - let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey); - if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() || - tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 || - tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() { - return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user - } - let input = TxIn { - previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint { - txid: commitment_txid, - vout: htlc.transaction_output_index, - }, - script_sig: Script::new(), - sequence: 0xfffffffd, - witness: Vec::new(), - }; - if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER { - inputs.push(input); - htlc_idxs.push(Some(idx)); - values.push(tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value); - total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000; - } else { - let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction { - version: 2, - lock_time: 0, - input: vec![input], - output: vec!(TxOut { - script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(), - value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee - }), + for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() { + if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index { + let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey); + if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() || + tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 || + tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() { + return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user + } + let input = TxIn { + previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint { + txid: commitment_txid, + vout: transaction_output_index, + }, + script_sig: Script::new(), + sequence: 0xfffffffd, + witness: Vec::new(), }; - let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx); - sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000); - txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx); + if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER { + inputs.push(input); + htlc_idxs.push(Some(idx)); + values.push(tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value); + total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000; + input_descriptors.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC }); + } else { + let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction { + version: 2, + lock_time: 0, + input: vec![input], + output: vec!(TxOut { + script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(), + value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, + }), + }; + let predicted_weight = single_htlc_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC }]); + if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid()) { + let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx); + sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000); + assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight()); + txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx); + } + } } } } - if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours + if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction! + log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, generating general spend tx with {} inputs and {} other txn to broadcast", inputs.len(), txn_to_broadcast.len()); watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone()); self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect())); + + macro_rules! check_htlc_fails { + ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => { + if let Some(ref outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) { + for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in outpoints.iter() { + if let &Some(ref source) = source_option { + log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); + match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) { + hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => { + let e = entry.get_mut(); + e.retain(|ref event| { + match **event { + OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => { + return htlc_update.0 != **source + }, + _ => return true + } + }); + e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}); + } + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { + entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]); + } + } + } + } + } + } + } + if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage { + if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid { + check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current"); + } + if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid { + check_htlc_fails!(txid, "remote"); + } + } + // No need to check local commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on remote commitment tx } if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx let outputs = vec!(TxOut { script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(), - value: total_value, //TODO: - fee + value: total_value, }); let mut spend_tx = Transaction { version: 2, @@ -997,6 +1355,11 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { input: inputs, output: outputs, }; + let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&input_descriptors[..]); + + if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid()) { + return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); + } let mut values_drain = values.drain(..); let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx); @@ -1005,6 +1368,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { let value = values_drain.next().unwrap(); sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, htlc_idx, value); } + assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight()); spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, @@ -1022,6 +1386,59 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone()); self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect())); + log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of non-revoked remote commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid); + + macro_rules! check_htlc_fails { + ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $id: tt) => { + if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) { + $id: for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() { + if let &Some(ref source) = source_option { + // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was + // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should + // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the + // payment_preimage. + // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between + // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any* + // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it + // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't + // need to here. + for &(ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in per_commitment_data.iter() { + if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(source) == broadcast_source.as_ref() { + continue $id; + } + } + log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx); + match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) { + hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => { + let e = entry.get_mut(); + e.retain(|ref event| { + match **event { + OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => { + return htlc_update.0 != **source + }, + _ => return true + } + }); + e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}); + } + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { + entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]); + } + } + } + } + } + } + } + if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage { + if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid { + check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current", 'current_loop); + } + if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid { + check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", 'prev_loop); + } + } + if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points { let revocation_point_option = if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) } @@ -1030,11 +1447,11 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } else { None }; if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option { let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage { - KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => { + Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => { (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))), ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key)))) }, - KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => { + Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => { (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)), ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key))) }, @@ -1044,26 +1461,45 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)), }; + for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { + if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() { + match self.key_storage { + Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, .. } => { + if let Ok(local_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_point, &payment_base_key) { + spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH { + outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 }, + key: local_key, + output: outp.clone(), + }); + } + }, + Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {} + } + break; // Only to_remote ouput is claimable + } + } + let mut total_value = 0; let mut values = Vec::new(); let mut inputs = Vec::new(); + let mut input_descriptors = Vec::new(); macro_rules! sign_input { ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => { { let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage { - KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => { - let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize]; + Storage::Local { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => { + let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize].0; let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey); - let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..])); + let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]); let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)); (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript) }, - KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => { + Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { unimplemented!(); } }; - $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec()); + $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec()); $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8); $input.witness.push($preimage); $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes()); @@ -1071,38 +1507,76 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } } - for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() { - if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { - let input = TxIn { - previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint { - txid: commitment_txid, - vout: htlc.transaction_output_index, - }, - script_sig: Script::new(), - sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input - witness: Vec::new(), - }; - if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER { - inputs.push(input); - values.push((tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value, payment_preimage)); - total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000; - } else { - let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction { + for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() { + if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index { + let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey); + if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() || + tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 || + tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() { + return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user + } + if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { + let input = TxIn { + previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint { + txid: commitment_txid, + vout: transaction_output_index, + }, + script_sig: Script::new(), + sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input + witness: Vec::new(), + }; + if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER { + inputs.push(input); + values.push((tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, payment_preimage)); + total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000; + input_descriptors.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC }); + } else { + let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction { + version: 2, + lock_time: 0, + input: vec![input], + output: vec!(TxOut { + script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(), + value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, + }), + }; + let predicted_weight = single_htlc_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC }]); + if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid()) { + let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx); + sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.0.to_vec()); + assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight()); + spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { + outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, + output: single_htlc_tx.output[0].clone(), + }); + txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx); + } + } + } + if !htlc.offered { + // TODO: If the HTLC has already expired, potentially merge it with the + // rest of the claim transaction, as above. + let input = TxIn { + previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint { + txid: commitment_txid, + vout: transaction_output_index, + }, + script_sig: Script::new(), + sequence: idx as u32, + witness: Vec::new(), + }; + let mut timeout_tx = Transaction { version: 2, - lock_time: 0, + lock_time: htlc.cltv_expiry, input: vec![input], output: vec!(TxOut { script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(), - value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee + value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, }), }; - let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx); - sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.to_vec()); - spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { - outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, - output: single_htlc_tx.output[0].clone(), - }); - txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx); + let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&timeout_tx); + sign_input!(sighash_parts, timeout_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, vec![0]); + txn_to_broadcast.push(timeout_tx); } } } @@ -1111,7 +1585,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { let outputs = vec!(TxOut { script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(), - value: total_value, //TODO: - fee + value: total_value }); let mut spend_tx = Transaction { version: 2, @@ -1119,15 +1593,20 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { input: inputs, output: outputs, }; + let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&input_descriptors[..]); + if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid()) { + return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); + } let mut values_drain = values.drain(..); let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx); for input in spend_tx.input.iter_mut() { let value = values_drain.next().unwrap(); - sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, value.0, value.1.to_vec()); + sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, value.0, (value.1).0.to_vec()); } + assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight()); spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(), @@ -1140,8 +1619,8 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs) } - /// Attempst to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout s outputs using the revocation key - fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64) -> (Option, Option) { + /// Attempts to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key + fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> (Option, Option) { if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 { return (None, None) } @@ -1155,14 +1634,14 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { }; } - let secret = ignore_error!(self.get_secret(commitment_number)); - let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret)); + let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (None, None); }; + let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret)); let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key); let revocation_pubkey = match self.key_storage { - KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => { + Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => { ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))) }, - KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => { + Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => { ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)) }, }; @@ -1193,7 +1672,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { if !inputs.is_empty() { let outputs = vec!(TxOut { script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(), - value: amount, //TODO: - fee + value: amount }); let mut spend_tx = Transaction { @@ -1202,125 +1681,233 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { input: inputs, output: outputs, }; + let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput]); + if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid()) { + return (None, None); + } let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx); let sig = match self.key_storage { - KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => { - let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &redeemscript, amount)[..])); + Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => { + let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &redeemscript, amount)[..]); let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key)); self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key) } - KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => { + Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { unimplemented!(); } }; - spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec()); + spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec()); spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8); spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(1)); spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes()); + assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight()); let outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }; let output = spend_tx.output[0].clone(); (Some(spend_tx), Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { outpoint, output })) } else { (None, None) } } - fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, per_commitment_point: &Option, delayed_payment_base_key: &Option) -> (Vec, Vec) { + fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, per_commitment_point: &Option, delayed_payment_base_key: &Option) -> (Vec, Vec, Vec) { let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len()); let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len()); + let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len()); - for &(ref htlc, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() { - if htlc.offered { - let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key); - - htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy - - htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec()); - htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8); - htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec()); - htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8); - - htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); - htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes()); - + macro_rules! add_dynamic_output { + ($father_tx: expr, $vout: expr) => { if let Some(ref per_commitment_point) = *per_commitment_point { if let Some(ref delayed_payment_base_key) = *delayed_payment_base_key { if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) { - spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutput { - outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: htlc_timeout_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, - local_delayedkey, + spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH { + outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: $father_tx.txid(), vout: $vout }, + key: local_delayedkey, witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key), - to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay + to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay, + output: $father_tx.output[$vout as usize].clone(), }); } } } - res.push(htlc_timeout_tx); - } else { - if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { - let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key); - - htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy - - htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec()); - htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8); - htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec()); - htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8); - - htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.to_vec()); - htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes()); - - if let Some(ref per_commitment_point) = *per_commitment_point { - if let Some(ref delayed_payment_base_key) = *delayed_payment_base_key { - if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) { - spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutput { - outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: htlc_success_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, - local_delayedkey, - witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key), - to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay - }); - } + } + } + + + let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &local_tx.delayed_payment_key); + let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(); + for (idx, output) in local_tx.tx.output.iter().enumerate() { + if output.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { + add_dynamic_output!(local_tx.tx, idx as u32); + break; + } + } + + for &(ref htlc, ref sigs, _) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() { + if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index { + if let &Some((ref their_sig, ref our_sig)) = sigs { + if htlc.offered { + log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Timeout transaction against local commitment transactions"); + let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key); + + htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy + + htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec()); + htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8); + htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec()); + htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8); + + htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); + htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes()); + + add_dynamic_output!(htlc_timeout_tx, 0); + res.push(htlc_timeout_tx); + } else { + if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { + log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Success transaction against local commitment transactions"); + let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key); + + htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy + + htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec()); + htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8); + htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec()); + htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8); + + htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.0.to_vec()); + htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes()); + + add_dynamic_output!(htlc_success_tx, 0); + res.push(htlc_success_tx); } } - res.push(htlc_success_tx); - } + watch_outputs.push(local_tx.tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone()); + } else { panic!("Should have sigs for non-dust local tx outputs!") } } } - (res, spendable_outputs) + (res, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) } /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet) /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints. /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds. - fn check_spend_local_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, _height: u32) -> (Vec, Vec) { + fn check_spend_local_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec, Vec, (Sha256dHash, Vec)) { let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); + let mut local_txn = Vec::new(); + let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new(); + let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new(); + + macro_rules! wait_threshold_conf { + ($height: expr, $source: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => { + log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} local commitment tx due to broadcast of transaction, waiting confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!($payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); + match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry($height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) { + hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => { + let e = entry.get_mut(); + e.retain(|ref event| { + match **event { + OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => { + return htlc_update.0 != $source + }, + _ => return true + } + }); + e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)}); + } + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { + entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)}]); + } + } + } + } + + macro_rules! append_onchain_update { + ($updates: expr) => { + local_txn.append(&mut $updates.0); + spendable_outputs.append(&mut $updates.1); + watch_outputs.append(&mut $updates.2); + } + } + + // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous local commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward + let mut is_local_tx = false; + if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx { if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid { + is_local_tx = true; + log_trace!(self, "Got latest local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim"); match self.key_storage { - KeyStorage::PrivMode { revocation_base_key: _, htlc_base_key: _, ref delayed_payment_base_key, prev_latest_per_commitment_point: _, ref latest_per_commitment_point } => { - return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key)); + Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => { + append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key))); }, - KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => { - return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None); + Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { + append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None)); } } } } if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx { if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid { + is_local_tx = true; + log_trace!(self, "Got previous local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim"); match self.key_storage { - KeyStorage::PrivMode { revocation_base_key: _, htlc_base_key: _, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => { - return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key)); + Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => { + append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key))); }, - KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => { - return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None); + Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { + append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None)); + } + } + } + } + + macro_rules! fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf { + ($local_tx: expr) => { + for &(ref htlc, _, ref source) in &$local_tx.htlc_outputs { + if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() { + if let &Some(ref source) = source { + wait_threshold_conf!(height, source.clone(), "lastest", htlc.payment_hash.clone()); + } + } + } + } + } + + if is_local_tx { + if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx { + fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(local_tx); + } + if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx { + fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(local_tx); + } + } + + (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)) + } + + /// Generate a spendable output event when closing_transaction get registered onchain. + fn check_spend_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> Option { + if tx.input[0].sequence == 0xFFFFFFFF && !tx.input[0].witness.is_empty() && tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len() == 71 { + match self.key_storage { + Storage::Local { ref shutdown_pubkey, .. } => { + let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::hash(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize()); + let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script(); + for (idx, output) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { + if shutdown_script == output.script_pubkey { + return Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { + outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: idx as u32 }, + output: output.clone(), + }); + } } } + Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { + //TODO: we need to ensure an offline client will generate the event when it + // comes back online after only the watchtower saw the transaction + } } } - (Vec::new(), Vec::new()) + None } /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest local state if it's copy of @@ -1329,7 +1916,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx { let mut res = vec![local_tx.tx.clone()]; match self.key_storage { - KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => { + Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => { res.append(&mut self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key)).0); }, _ => panic!("Can only broadcast by local channelmonitor"), @@ -1340,9 +1927,10 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } } - fn block_connected(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec)>, Vec) { + fn block_connected(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec)>, Vec, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option, PaymentHash)>) { let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new(); let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new(); + let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new(); for tx in txn_matched { if tx.input.len() == 1 { // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what), @@ -1351,21 +1939,37 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { // filters. let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output; let mut txn: Vec = Vec::new(); - if self.funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) { - let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height); + let funding_txo = match self.key_storage { + Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => { + funding_info.clone() + } + Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { + unimplemented!(); + } + }; + if funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) { + let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height, fee_estimator); txn = remote_txn; spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output); if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() { watch_outputs.push(new_outputs); } if txn.is_empty() { - let (remote_txn, mut outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height); - spendable_outputs.append(&mut outputs); - txn = remote_txn; + let (local_txn, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height); + spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output); + txn = local_txn; + if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() { + watch_outputs.push(new_outputs); + } + } + if !funding_txo.is_none() && txn.is_empty() { + if let Some(spendable_output) = self.check_spend_closing_transaction(tx) { + spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output); + } } } else { if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) { - let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(tx, commitment_number); + let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(tx, commitment_number, fee_estimator); if let Some(tx) = tx { txn.push(tx); } @@ -1378,21 +1982,34 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx); } } + // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs + // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus, + // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check. + let mut updated = self.is_resolving_htlc_output(tx, height); + if updated.len() > 0 { + htlc_updated.append(&mut updated); + } } if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx { if self.would_broadcast_at_height(height) { broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx); match self.key_storage { - KeyStorage::PrivMode { revocation_base_key: _, htlc_base_key: _, ref delayed_payment_base_key, prev_latest_per_commitment_point: _, ref latest_per_commitment_point } => { - let (txs, mut outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key)); - spendable_outputs.append(&mut outputs); + Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => { + let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key)); + spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output); + if !new_outputs.is_empty() { + watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs)); + } for tx in txs { broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx); } }, - KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => { - let (txs, mut outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, &None, &None); - spendable_outputs.append(&mut outputs); + Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { + let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, &None, &None); + spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output); + if !new_outputs.is_empty() { + watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs)); + } for tx in txs { broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx); } @@ -1400,41 +2017,230 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } } } + if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&height) { + for ev in events { + match ev { + OnchainEvent::Claim { outpoint: _ } => { + }, + OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => { + log_trace!(self, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!((htlc_update.1).0)); + htlc_updated.push((htlc_update.0, None, htlc_update.1)); + }, + } + } + } + self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone(); + (watch_outputs, spendable_outputs, htlc_updated) + } + + fn block_disconnected(&mut self, height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash) { + if let Some(_) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1)) { + //We may discard: + //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected + //- our claim tx on a commitment tx output + } self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone(); - (watch_outputs, spendable_outputs) } pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool { + // We need to consider all HTLCs which are: + // * in any unrevoked remote commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said + // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or + // * are in our latest local commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will + // broadcast if we go on-chain. + // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't + // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back + // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next + // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably + // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway. + macro_rules! scan_commitment { + ($htlcs: expr, $local_tx: expr) => { + for ref htlc in $htlcs { + // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the + // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to + // time out the HTLC first. + // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary + // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another + // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our + // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we + // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the + // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC + // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going + // on-chain for an expired HTLC. + // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC + // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the + // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at + // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC. + // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv + // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion) + // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA + // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager + // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2. + let htlc_outbound = $local_tx == htlc.offered; + if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) || + (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) { + log_info!(self, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry); + return true; + } + } + } + } + if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx { - for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() { - // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the - // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to - // time out the HTLC first. - // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary - // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another - // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our - // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we - // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the - // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC - // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going - // on-chain for an expired HTLC. - // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC - // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the - // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at - // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC. - // aka outbound_cltv + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - // outbound_cltv + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv - // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA - if ( htlc.offered && htlc.cltv_expiry + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS <= height) || - (!htlc.offered && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) { - return true; + scan_commitment!(cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true); + } + + if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage { + if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid { + if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) { + scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false); + } + } + if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid { + if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) { + scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false); } } } + false } + + /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a local + /// or remote commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC + fn is_resolving_htlc_output(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, Option, PaymentHash)> { + let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new(); + + 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input { + let mut payment_data = None; + let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT && input.witness[1].len() == 33) + || (input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT && input.witness[1].len() == 33); + let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && input.witness[4].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT; + let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT; + + macro_rules! log_claim { + ($tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => { + // We found the output in question, but aren't failing it backwards + // as we have no corresponding source and no valid remote commitment txid + // to try a weak source binding with same-hash, same-value still-valid offered HTLC. + // This implies either it is an inbound HTLC or an outbound HTLC on a revoked transaction. + let outbound_htlc = $local_tx == $htlc.offered; + if ($local_tx && revocation_sig_claim) || + (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) { + log_error!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!", + $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(), + if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), + if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" }); + } else { + log_info!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}", + $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(), + if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), + if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" }); + } + } + } + + macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_remote { + ($remote_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => { + if let &Some(txid) = $remote_txid { + for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() { + if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat { + if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source { + log_claim!("revoked remote commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true); + payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash)); + break; + } + } + } + } + } + } + + macro_rules! scan_commitment { + ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr) => { + for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs { + if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index { + if let Some(ref source) = source_option { + log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, true); + // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest + // local commitment transactions or an unrevoked remote commitment + // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC + // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now + // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender. + payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash)); + } else if !$local_tx { + if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage { + check_htlc_valid_remote!(current_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output); + } + if payment_data.is_none() { + if let Storage::Local { ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage { + check_htlc_valid_remote!(prev_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output); + } + } + } + if payment_data.is_none() { + log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, false); + continue 'outer_loop; + } + } + } + } + } + + if let Some(ref current_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx { + if input.previous_output.txid == current_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid { + scan_commitment!(current_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())), + "our latest local commitment tx", true); + } + } + if let Some(ref prev_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx { + if input.previous_output.txid == prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid { + scan_commitment!(prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())), + "our previous local commitment tx", true); + } + } + if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) { + scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))), + "remote commitment tx", false); + } + + // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an + // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it. + if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data { + let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]); + if accepted_preimage_claim { + payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]); + htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash)); + } else if offered_preimage_claim { + payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]); + htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash)); + } else { + log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); + match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) { + hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => { + let e = entry.get_mut(); + e.retain(|ref event| { + match **event { + OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => { + return htlc_update.0 != source + }, + _ => return true + } + }); + e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)}); + } + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { + entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)}]); + } + } + } + } + } + htlc_updated + } } const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024; @@ -1457,13 +2263,6 @@ impl ReadableArgs> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelM return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion); } - // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of - // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with. - let outpoint = OutPoint { - txid: Readable::read(reader)?, - index: Readable::read(reader)?, - }; - let funding_txo = Some((outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?)); let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = >::read(reader)?.0; let key_storage = match >::read(reader)? { @@ -1471,22 +2270,30 @@ impl ReadableArgs> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelM let revocation_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?; let htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?; let delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?; - let prev_latest_per_commitment_point = match >::read(reader)? { - 0 => None, - 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?), - _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), - }; - let latest_per_commitment_point = match >::read(reader)? { - 0 => None, - 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?), - _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), + let payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?; + let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?; + let prev_latest_per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?; + let latest_per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?; + // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of + // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with. + let outpoint = OutPoint { + txid: Readable::read(reader)?, + index: Readable::read(reader)?, }; - KeyStorage::PrivMode { + let funding_info = Some((outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?)); + let current_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?; + let prev_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?; + Storage::Local { revocation_base_key, htlc_base_key, delayed_payment_base_key, + payment_base_key, + shutdown_pubkey, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, latest_per_commitment_point, + funding_info, + current_remote_commitment_txid, + prev_remote_commitment_txid, } }, _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), @@ -1505,7 +2312,7 @@ impl ReadableArgs> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelM if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 { Some((first_idx, first_point, None)) } else { - Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &second_point_slice))))) + Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice))))) } } }; @@ -1525,8 +2332,8 @@ impl ReadableArgs> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelM let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?; let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; - let payment_hash: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?; - let transaction_output_index: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; + let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?; + let transaction_output_index: Option = Readable::read(reader)?; HTLCOutputInCommitment { offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index @@ -1539,12 +2346,12 @@ impl ReadableArgs> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelM let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64)); for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len { let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?; - let outputs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; - let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32)); - for _ in 0..outputs_count { - outputs.push(read_htlc_in_commitment!()); + let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; + let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32)); + for _ in 0..htlcs_count { + htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), as Readable>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o)))); } - if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, outputs) { + if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); } } @@ -1567,9 +2374,9 @@ impl ReadableArgs> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelM let remote_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32)); for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len { - let txid: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?; + let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?; let commitment_number = >::read(reader)?.0; - if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(txid, commitment_number) { + if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); } } @@ -1596,15 +2403,22 @@ impl ReadableArgs> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelM let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?; let feerate_per_kw: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; - let htlc_outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; - let mut htlc_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlc_outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128)); - for _ in 0..htlc_outputs_len { - htlc_outputs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)); + let htlcs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; + let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128)); + for _ in 0..htlcs_len { + let htlc = read_htlc_in_commitment!(); + let sigs = match >::read(reader)? { + 0 => None, + 1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)), + _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), + }; + htlcs.push((htlc, sigs, Readable::read(reader)?)); } LocalSignedTx { txid: tx.txid(), - tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs + tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw, + htlc_outputs: htlcs } } } @@ -1630,13 +2444,9 @@ impl ReadableArgs> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelM let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32)); - let mut sha = Sha256::new(); for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len { - let preimage: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?; - sha.reset(); - sha.input(&preimage); - let mut hash = [0; 32]; - sha.result(&mut hash); + let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?; + let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner()); if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); } @@ -1645,8 +2455,35 @@ impl ReadableArgs> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelM let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?; let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?; + let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; + let mut onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128)); + for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len { + let height_target = Readable::read(reader)?; + let events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; + let mut events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128)); + for _ in 0..events_len { + let ev = match >::read(reader)? { + 0 => { + let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?; + OnchainEvent::Claim { + outpoint + } + }, + 1 => { + let htlc_source = Readable::read(reader)?; + let hash = Readable::read(reader)?; + OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { + htlc_update: (htlc_source, hash) + } + }, + _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), + }; + events.push(ev); + } + onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.insert(height_target, events); + } + Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor { - funding_txo, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, key_storage, @@ -1669,6 +2506,9 @@ impl ReadableArgs> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelM payment_preimages, destination_script, + + onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf, + last_block_hash, secp_ctx, logger, @@ -1679,16 +2519,23 @@ impl ReadableArgs> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelM #[cfg(test)] mod tests { - use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script; - use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction; - use crypto::digest::Digest; + use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder}; + use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes; + use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType}; + use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint; + use bitcoin::util::bip143; + use bitcoin_hashes::Hash; + use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256; + use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash; + use bitcoin_hashes::hex::FromHex; use hex; - use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor; + use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash}; + use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, InputDescriptors}; + use ln::chan_utils; use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys}; - use util::sha2::Sha256; use util::test_utils::TestLogger; use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey}; - use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature}; + use secp256k1::Secp256k1; use rand::{thread_rng,Rng}; use std::sync::Arc; @@ -1708,341 +2555,341 @@ mod tests { idx -= 1; } assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1); - assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_err()); + assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none()); }; } { // insert_secret correct sequence - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); + monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); secrets.clear(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); } { // insert_secret #1 incorrect - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); + monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); secrets.clear(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap()); - assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err, + assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0, "Previous secret did not match new one"); } { // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect) - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); + monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); secrets.clear(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); - assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err, + assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0, "Previous secret did not match new one"); } { // insert_secret #3 incorrect - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); + monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); secrets.clear(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); - assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err, + assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0, "Previous secret did not match new one"); } { // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect) - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); + monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); secrets.clear(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap()); - assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err, + assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0, "Previous secret did not match new one"); } { // insert_secret #5 incorrect - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); + monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); secrets.clear(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap()); - assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err, + assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0, "Previous secret did not match new one"); } { // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect) - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); + monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); secrets.clear(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap()); - assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err, + assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0, "Previous secret did not match new one"); } { // insert_secret #7 incorrect - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); + monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); secrets.clear(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap()); - assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err, + assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0, "Previous secret did not match new one"); } { // insert_secret #8 incorrect - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); + monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); secrets.clear(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap()); - assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err, + assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0, "Previous secret did not match new one"); } } @@ -2051,12 +2898,11 @@ mod tests { fn test_prune_preimages() { let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new()); - let dummy_sig = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(); + let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()); macro_rules! dummy_keys { () => { { - let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap()); TxCreationKeys { per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(), revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(), @@ -2074,12 +2920,9 @@ mod tests { { let mut rng = thread_rng(); for _ in 0..20 { - let mut preimage = [0; 32]; - rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage); - let mut sha = Sha256::new(); - sha.input(&preimage); - let mut hash = [0; 32]; - sha.result(&mut hash); + let mut preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]); + rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage.0[..]); + let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner()); preimages.push((preimage, hash)); } } @@ -2089,13 +2932,13 @@ mod tests { { let mut res = Vec::new(); for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() { - res.push(HTLCOutputInCommitment { + res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment { offered: true, amount_msat: 0, cltv_expiry: 0, payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(), - transaction_output_index: idx as u32, - }); + transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32), + }, None)); } res } @@ -2105,7 +2948,7 @@ mod tests { ($preimages_slice: expr) => { { let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice); - let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e, dummy_sig.clone(), dummy_sig.clone()) }).collect(); + let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect(); res } } @@ -2121,14 +2964,14 @@ mod tests { // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the // old state. - let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); + let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(10); monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])); - monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655); - monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654); - monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653); - monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652); + monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key); + monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key); + monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key); + monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key); for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() { monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage); } @@ -2136,14 +2979,14 @@ mod tests { // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15 let mut secret = [0; 32]; secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap(); assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15); test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor); test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor); // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap(); assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13); test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor); test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor); @@ -2152,7 +2995,7 @@ mod tests { // previous commitment tx's preimages too monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5])); secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap(); assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12); test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor); test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor); @@ -2160,10 +3003,122 @@ mod tests { // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3])); secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap(); assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5); test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor); } + #[test] + fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() { + // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and + // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances. + + let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); + let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(); + let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey); + let mut sum_actual_sigs: u64 = 0; + + macro_rules! sign_input { + ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $input_type: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr) => { + let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment { + offered: if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC { true } else { false }, + amount_msat: 0, + cltv_expiry: 2 << 16, + payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]), + transaction_output_index: Some($idx), + }; + let redeem_script = if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) }; + let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeem_script, $amount)[..]); + let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &privkey); + $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec()); + $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8); + sum_actual_sigs += $input.witness[0].len() as u64; + if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput { + $input.witness.push(vec!(1)); + } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC { + $input.witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec()); + } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC { + $input.witness.push(vec![0]); + } else { + $input.witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec()); + } + $input.witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes()); + println!("witness[0] {}", $input.witness[0].len()); + println!("witness[1] {}", $input.witness[1].len()); + println!("witness[2] {}", $input.witness[2].len()); + } + } + + let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(); + let txid = Sha256dHash::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap(); + + // Justice tx with 1 to_local, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs + let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() }; + for i in 0..4 { + claim_tx.input.push(TxIn { + previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint { + txid, + vout: i, + }, + script_sig: Script::new(), + sequence: 0xfffffffd, + witness: Vec::new(), + }); + } + claim_tx.output.push(TxOut { + script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(), + value: 0, + }); + let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight(); + let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx); + let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC]; + for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() { + sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs); + } + assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() as u64 - sum_actual_sigs)); + + // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs + claim_tx.input.clear(); + sum_actual_sigs = 0; + for i in 0..4 { + claim_tx.input.push(TxIn { + previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint { + txid, + vout: i, + }, + script_sig: Script::new(), + sequence: 0xfffffffd, + witness: Vec::new(), + }); + } + let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight(); + let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx); + let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC]; + for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() { + sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs); + } + assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() as u64 - sum_actual_sigs)); + + // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output + claim_tx.input.clear(); + sum_actual_sigs = 0; + claim_tx.input.push(TxIn { + previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint { + txid, + vout: 0, + }, + script_sig: Script::new(), + sequence: 0xfffffffd, + witness: Vec::new(), + }); + let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight(); + let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx); + let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput]; + for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() { + sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs); + } + assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_des.len() as u64 - sum_actual_sigs)); + } + // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests. }