X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=src%2Fln%2Fchannelmonitor.rs;h=8c3fcc3f0a02ad21dbb838759241e57eec4e70b7;hb=4f644f225c059e2731d848077adac11edb9cdcca;hp=53440f4361341c7af9d5d441ebca3559030698e4;hpb=f7dd69240afcd3a0087f7796824a9e2697ed85cf;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs b/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs index 53440f43..8c3fcc3f 100644 --- a/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs +++ b/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader; use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction}; use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script; +use bitcoin::network::serialize; use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash; use bitcoin::util::bip143; @@ -13,19 +14,39 @@ use ln::msgs::HandleError; use ln::chan_utils; use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment; use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface}; +use chain::transaction::OutPoint; use util::sha2::Sha256; +use util::byte_utils; use std::collections::HashMap; use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex}; use std::{hash,cmp}; +pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr { + /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower failed, but is expected + /// to succeed at some point in the future). + /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or + /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party. + /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore + /// the channel to an operational state. + TemporaryFailure, + /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a + /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed + /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question. + PermanentFailure, +} + /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote /// server(s). +/// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the +/// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If +/// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions +/// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel! pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync { - /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given funding_txid+funding_output_index. - fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: (Sha256dHash, u16), monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError>; + /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`. + fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>; } /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a @@ -35,7 +56,7 @@ pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync { /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates. /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use -/// (Sha256dHash, u16) as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation. +/// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation. pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor { monitors: Mutex>, chain_monitor: Arc, @@ -73,76 +94,187 @@ impl SimpleManyChannelMonitor }; match monitor.funding_txo { None => self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn(), - Some((funding_txid, funding_output_index)) => self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((funding_txid, funding_output_index as u32)), + Some(outpoint) => self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32)), } monitors.insert(key, monitor); Ok(()) } } -impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<(Sha256dHash, u16)> { - fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: (Sha256dHash, u16), monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> { - self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) +impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor { + fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> { + match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) { + Ok(_) => Ok(()), + Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure), + } } } -/// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it directly, instead broadcast -/// the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transaction and claim the revocation from that. -const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12; +/// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction, +/// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction. +const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12; +/// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the +/// HTLC-Success transaction. +const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6; -#[derive(Clone)] -enum RevocationStorage { +#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)] +enum KeyStorage { PrivMode { revocation_base_key: SecretKey, + htlc_base_key: SecretKey, }, SigsMode { revocation_base_key: PublicKey, + htlc_base_key: PublicKey, sigs: HashMap, } } -#[derive(Clone)] -struct PerCommitmentTransactionData { - revoked_output_index: u32, - htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature)>, +#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)] +struct LocalSignedTx { + /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster + txid: Sha256dHash, + tx: Transaction, + revocation_key: PublicKey, + a_htlc_key: PublicKey, + b_htlc_key: PublicKey, + delayed_payment_key: PublicKey, + feerate_per_kw: u64, + htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>, } -#[derive(Clone)] +const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1; +const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1; + pub struct ChannelMonitor { - funding_txo: Option<(Sha256dHash, u16)>, + funding_txo: Option, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64, - revocation_base_key: RevocationStorage, + key_storage: KeyStorage, delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey, - htlc_base_key: PublicKey, their_htlc_base_key: Option, - to_self_delay: u16, + // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points + their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option)>, + + our_to_self_delay: u16, + their_to_self_delay: Option, old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49], - claimable_outpoints: HashMap, - payment_preimages: Vec<[u8; 32]>, + remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap>, + /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain. + /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are + /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote + /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which + /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions. + remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex>, + /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster. + /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked + /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small). + /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers. + remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<[u8; 32], u64>, + + // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update + // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the + // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local + // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers. + prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option, + current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option, + + payment_preimages: HashMap<[u8; 32], [u8; 32]>, destination_script: Script, secp_ctx: Secp256k1, //TODO: dedup this a bit... } +impl Clone for ChannelMonitor { + fn clone(&self) -> Self { + ChannelMonitor { + funding_txo: self.funding_txo.clone(), + commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor.clone(), + + key_storage: self.key_storage.clone(), + delayed_payment_base_key: self.delayed_payment_base_key.clone(), + their_htlc_base_key: self.their_htlc_base_key.clone(), + their_cur_revocation_points: self.their_cur_revocation_points.clone(), + + our_to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay, + their_to_self_delay: self.their_to_self_delay, + + old_secrets: self.old_secrets.clone(), + remote_claimable_outpoints: self.remote_claimable_outpoints.clone(), + remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new((*self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap()).clone()), + remote_hash_commitment_number: self.remote_hash_commitment_number.clone(), + + prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.clone(), + current_local_signed_commitment_tx: self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.clone(), + + payment_preimages: self.payment_preimages.clone(), + + destination_script: self.destination_script.clone(), + secp_ctx: self.secp_ctx.clone(), + } + } +} + +#[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))] +/// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the +/// underlying object +impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor { + fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool { + if self.funding_txo != other.funding_txo || + self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor || + self.key_storage != other.key_storage || + self.delayed_payment_base_key != other.delayed_payment_base_key || + self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key || + self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points || + self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay || + self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay || + self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints || + self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number || + self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx || + self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx || + self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages || + self.destination_script != other.destination_script + { + false + } else { + for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) { + if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx { + return false + } + } + let us = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap(); + let them = other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap(); + *us == *them + } + } +} impl ChannelMonitor { - pub fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey, htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script) -> ChannelMonitor { + pub fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script) -> ChannelMonitor { ChannelMonitor { funding_txo: None, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0, - revocation_base_key: RevocationStorage::PrivMode { + key_storage: KeyStorage::PrivMode { revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(), + htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(), }, delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(), - htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(), their_htlc_base_key: None, - to_self_delay: to_self_delay, + their_cur_revocation_points: None, + + our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay, + their_to_self_delay: None, old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49], - claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(), - payment_preimages: Vec::new(), + remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(), + remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()), + remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(), + + prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None, + current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None, + + payment_preimages: HashMap::new(), destination_script: destination_script, secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(), @@ -174,10 +306,12 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { res } - /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Requires the revocation_base_key of - /// the node which we are monitoring the channel on behalf of in order to generate signatures - /// over revocation-claim transactions. - pub fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), HandleError> { + /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Also optionally tracks the next + /// revocation point which may be required to claim HTLC outputs which we know the preimage of + /// in case the remote end force-closes using their latest state. Prunes old preimages if neither + /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote + /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key). + pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32], their_next_revocation_point: Option<(u64, PublicKey)>) -> Result<(), HandleError> { let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx); for i in 0..pos { let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize]; @@ -186,25 +320,105 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } } self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx); + + if let Some(new_revocation_point) = their_next_revocation_point { + match self.their_cur_revocation_points { + Some(old_points) => { + if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 1 { + self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(new_revocation_point.1))); + } else if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 2 { + if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 { + self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(new_revocation_point.1))); + } else { + self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None)); + } + } else { + self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None)); + } + }, + None => { + self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None)); + } + } + } + + if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() { + let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !"); + let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref(); + let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret(); + let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number; + + self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| { + for &(ref htlc, _, _) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs { + if k == htlc.payment_hash { + return true + } + } + if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx { + for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() { + if k == htlc.payment_hash { + return true + } + } + } + let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) { + if *cn < min_idx { + return true + } + true + } else { false }; + if contains { + remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k); + } + false + }); + } + Ok(()) } - /// Informs this watcher of the set of HTLC outputs in a commitment transaction which our - /// counterparty may broadcast. This allows us to reconstruct the commitment transaction's - /// outputs fully, claiming revoked, unexpired HTLC outputs as well as revoked refund outputs. - /// TODO: Doc new params! - /// TODO: This seems to be wrong...we should be calling this from commitment_signed, but we - /// should be calling this about remote transactions, ie ones that they can revoke_and_ack... - pub fn provide_tx_info(&mut self, commitment_tx: &Transaction, revokeable_out_index: u32, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature)>) { + /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction. + /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and + /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible. + /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers. + pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec, commitment_number: u64) { // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close. - self.claimable_outpoints.insert(commitment_tx.txid(), PerCommitmentTransactionData{ - revoked_output_index: revokeable_out_index, - htlcs: htlc_outputs + // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of + // timeouts) + for htlc in &htlc_outputs { + self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number); + } + self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(unsigned_commitment_tx.txid(), htlc_outputs); + } + + /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The + /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it + /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept + /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated. + /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called. + pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>) { + assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some()); + self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take(); + self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx { + txid: signed_commitment_tx.txid(), + tx: signed_commitment_tx, + revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key, + a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key, + b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key, + delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key, + feerate_per_kw, + htlc_outputs, }); } - pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> { + /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all + /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked. + pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], payment_preimage: &[u8; 32]) { + self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone()); + } + + pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> { match self.funding_txo { Some(txo) => if other.funding_txo.is_some() && other.funding_txo.unwrap() != txo { return Err(HandleError{err: "Funding transaction outputs are not identical!", msg: None}); @@ -213,14 +427,29 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { self.funding_txo = other.funding_txo; } } - let other_max_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret(); - if self.get_min_seen_secret() > other_max_secret { - self.provide_secret(other_max_secret, other.get_secret(other_max_secret).unwrap()) - } else { Ok(()) } + let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret(); + let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret(); + if our_min_secret > other_min_secret { + self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap(), None)?; + } + if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret { + self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points; + for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() { + self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs); + } + if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx { + self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx); + } + if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx { + self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx); + } + self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages; + } + Ok(()) } /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits - pub fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) { + pub(super) fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) { assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48)); self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor; } @@ -229,22 +458,412 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it /// provides slightly better privacy. - pub fn set_funding_info(&mut self, funding_txid: Sha256dHash, funding_output_index: u16) { - self.funding_txo = Some((funding_txid, funding_output_index)); + pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, funding_info: OutPoint) { + self.funding_txo = Some(funding_info); } - pub fn set_their_htlc_base_key(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey) { + pub(super) fn set_their_htlc_base_key(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey) { self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone()); } - pub fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) { + pub(super) fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) { + self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay); + } + + pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) { self.funding_txo = None; } - pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<(Sha256dHash, u16)> { + pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option { self.funding_txo } + /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns + fn serialize(&self, for_local_storage: bool) -> Vec { + let mut res = Vec::new(); + res.push(SERIALIZATION_VERSION); + res.push(MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION); + + match self.funding_txo { + Some(outpoint) => { + res.extend_from_slice(&outpoint.txid[..]); + res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index)); + }, + None => { + // We haven't even been initialized...not sure why anyone is serializing us, but + // not much to give them. + return res; + }, + } + + // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now: + res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor)); + + match self.key_storage { + KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key } => { + res.push(0); + res.extend_from_slice(&revocation_base_key[..]); + res.extend_from_slice(&htlc_base_key[..]); + }, + KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => unimplemented!(), + } + + res.extend_from_slice(&self.delayed_payment_base_key.serialize()); + res.extend_from_slice(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize()); + + match self.their_cur_revocation_points { + Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => { + res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx)); + res.extend_from_slice(&pubkey.serialize()); + match second_option { + Some(second_pubkey) => { + res.extend_from_slice(&second_pubkey.serialize()); + }, + None => { + res.extend_from_slice(&[0; 33]); + }, + } + }, + None => { + res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0)); + }, + } + + res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay)); + res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap())); + + for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() { + res.extend_from_slice(secret); + res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx)); + } + + macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment { + ($htlc_output: expr) => { + res.push($htlc_output.offered as u8); + res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat)); + res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry)); + res.extend_from_slice(&$htlc_output.payment_hash); + res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.transaction_output_index)); + } + } + + res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64)); + for (txid, htlc_outputs) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() { + res.extend_from_slice(&txid[..]); + res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_outputs.len() as u64)); + for htlc_output in htlc_outputs.iter() { + serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output); + } + } + + { + let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap(); + res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64)); + for (txid, commitment_number) in remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() { + res.extend_from_slice(&txid[..]); + res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number)); + } + } + + if for_local_storage { + res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64)); + for (payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() { + res.extend_from_slice(payment_hash); + res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number)); + } + } else { + res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0)); + } + + macro_rules! serialize_local_tx { + ($local_tx: expr) => { + let tx_ser = serialize::serialize(&$local_tx.tx).unwrap(); + res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(tx_ser.len() as u64)); + res.extend_from_slice(&tx_ser); + + res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize()); + res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize()); + res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize()); + res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize()); + + res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw)); + res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64)); + for &(ref htlc_output, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() { + serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output); + res.extend_from_slice(&their_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx)); + res.extend_from_slice(&our_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx)); + } + } + } + + if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx { + res.push(1); + serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx); + } else { + res.push(0); + } + + if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx { + res.push(1); + serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx); + } else { + res.push(0); + } + + res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64)); + for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() { + res.extend_from_slice(payment_preimage); + } + + res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.destination_script.len() as u64)); + res.extend_from_slice(&self.destination_script[..]); + + res + } + + /// Encodes this monitor into a byte array, suitable for writing to disk. + pub fn serialize_for_disk(&self) -> Vec { + self.serialize(true) + } + + /// Encodes this monitor into a byte array, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower + pub fn serialize_for_watchtower(&self) -> Vec { + self.serialize(false) + } + + /// Attempts to decode a serialized monitor + pub fn deserialize(data: &[u8]) -> Option { + let mut read_pos = 0; + macro_rules! read_bytes { + ($byte_count: expr) => { + { + if ($byte_count as usize) > data.len() - read_pos { + return None; + } + read_pos += $byte_count as usize; + &data[read_pos - $byte_count as usize..read_pos] + } + } + } + + let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); + macro_rules! unwrap_obj { + ($key: expr) => { + match $key { + Ok(res) => res, + Err(_) => return None, + } + } + } + + let _ver = read_bytes!(1)[0]; + let min_ver = read_bytes!(1)[0]; + if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION { + return None; + } + + // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of + // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with. + let funding_txo = Some(OutPoint { + txid: Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32)), + index: byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2)), + }); + let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6)); + + let key_storage = match read_bytes!(1)[0] { + 0 => { + KeyStorage::PrivMode { + revocation_base_key: unwrap_obj!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(32))), + htlc_base_key: unwrap_obj!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(32))), + } + }, + _ => return None, + }; + + let delayed_payment_base_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33))); + let their_htlc_base_key = Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)))); + + let their_cur_revocation_points = { + let first_idx = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6)); + if first_idx == 0 { + None + } else { + let first_point = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33))); + let second_point_slice = read_bytes!(33); + if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 { + Some((first_idx, first_point, None)) + } else { + Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, second_point_slice))))) + } + } + }; + + let our_to_self_delay = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2)); + let their_to_self_delay = Some(byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2))); + + let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49]; + for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() { + secret.copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32)); + *idx = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8)); + } + + macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment { + () => { + { + let offered = match read_bytes!(1)[0] { + 0 => false, 1 => true, + _ => return None, + }; + let amount_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8)); + let cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(read_bytes!(4)); + let mut payment_hash = [0; 32]; + payment_hash[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32)); + let transaction_output_index = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(read_bytes!(4)); + + HTLCOutputInCommitment { + offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index + } + } + } + } + + let remote_claimable_outpoints_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8)); + if remote_claimable_outpoints_len > data.len() as u64 / 64 { return None; } + let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize); + for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len { + let txid = Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32)); + let outputs_count = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8)); + if outputs_count > data.len() as u64 * 32 { return None; } + let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(outputs_count as usize); + for _ in 0..outputs_count { + outputs.push(read_htlc_in_commitment!()); + } + if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, outputs) { + return None; + } + } + + let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8)); + if remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return None; } + let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize); + for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len { + let txid = Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32)); + let commitment_number = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6)); + if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, commitment_number) { + return None; + } + } + + let remote_hash_commitment_number_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8)); + if remote_hash_commitment_number_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return None; } + let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize); + for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len { + let mut txid = [0; 32]; + txid[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32)); + let commitment_number = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6)); + if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(txid, commitment_number) { + return None; + } + } + + macro_rules! read_local_tx { + () => { + { + let tx_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8)); + let tx_ser = read_bytes!(tx_len); + let tx: Transaction = unwrap_obj!(serialize::deserialize(tx_ser)); + if serialize::serialize(&tx).unwrap() != tx_ser { + // We check that the tx re-serializes to the same form to ensure there is + // no extra data, and as rust-bitcoin doesn't handle the 0-input ambiguity + // all that well. + return None; + } + + let revocation_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33))); + let a_htlc_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33))); + let b_htlc_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33))); + let delayed_payment_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33))); + let feerate_per_kw = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8)); + + let htlc_outputs_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8)); + if htlc_outputs_len > data.len() as u64 / 128 { return None; } + let mut htlc_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs_len as usize); + for _ in 0..htlc_outputs_len { + htlc_outputs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), + unwrap_obj!(Signature::from_compact(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(64))), + unwrap_obj!(Signature::from_compact(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(64))))); + } + + LocalSignedTx { + txid: tx.txid(), + tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs + } + } + } + } + + let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match read_bytes!(1)[0] { + 0 => None, + 1 => { + Some(read_local_tx!()) + }, + _ => return None, + }; + + let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match read_bytes!(1)[0] { + 0 => None, + 1 => { + Some(read_local_tx!()) + }, + _ => return None, + }; + + let payment_preimages_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8)); + if payment_preimages_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return None; } + let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(payment_preimages_len as usize); + let mut sha = Sha256::new(); + for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len { + let mut preimage = [0; 32]; + preimage[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32)); + sha.reset(); + sha.input(&preimage); + let mut hash = [0; 32]; + sha.result(&mut hash); + if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) { + return None; + } + } + + let destination_script_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8)); + let destination_script = Script::from(read_bytes!(destination_script_len).to_vec()); + + Some(ChannelMonitor { + funding_txo, + commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, + + key_storage, + delayed_payment_base_key, + their_htlc_base_key, + their_cur_revocation_points, + + our_to_self_delay, + their_to_self_delay, + + old_secrets, + remote_claimable_outpoints, + remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain), + remote_hash_commitment_number, + + prev_local_signed_commitment_tx, + current_local_signed_commitment_tx, + + payment_preimages, + + destination_script, + secp_ctx, + }) + } + //TODO: Functions to serialize/deserialize (with different forms depending on which information //we want to leave out (eg funding_txo, etc). @@ -270,107 +889,147 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { min } - #[inline] - fn check_spend_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> Vec { + /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and + /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a + /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for + /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions, and claim them using the revocation key (if + /// applicable) as well. + fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> Vec { // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast + let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new(); macro_rules! ignore_error { ( $thing : expr ) => { match $thing { Ok(a) => a, - Err(_) => return Vec::new() + Err(_) => return txn_to_broadcast } }; } - let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new(); + let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers! + let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid); let commitment_number = (((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor; if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() { let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap(); let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret)); - let revocation_pubkey = match self.revocation_base_key { - RevocationStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key } => { - ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key)), &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))) + let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage { + KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key } => { + let per_commitment_point = ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key)); + (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))), + ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))) }, - RevocationStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => { - ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key)), &revocation_base_key)) + KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => { + let per_commitment_point = ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key)); + (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)), + ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key))) }, }; let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key)), &self.delayed_payment_base_key)); - let a_htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key)), &self.htlc_base_key)); - let b_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key { - None => return Vec::new(), + let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key { + None => return txn_to_broadcast, Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key)), &their_htlc_base_key)), }; - let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.to_self_delay, &delayed_key); - - let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); + let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key); + let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(); let mut total_value = 0; let mut values = Vec::new(); - let inputs = match self.claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid) { - Some(per_commitment_data) => { - let mut inp = Vec::with_capacity(per_commitment_data.htlcs.len() + 1); + let mut inputs = Vec::new(); + let mut htlc_idxs = Vec::new(); - if per_commitment_data.revoked_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[per_commitment_data.revoked_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh() { - return Vec::new(); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, not much we can do - } - - inp.push(TxIn { + for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { + if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { + inputs.push(TxIn { prev_hash: commitment_txid, - prev_index: per_commitment_data.revoked_output_index, + prev_index: idx as u32, script_sig: Script::new(), - sequence: 0xffffffff, + sequence: 0xfffffffd, witness: Vec::new(), }); - values.push(tx.output[per_commitment_data.revoked_output_index as usize].value); - total_value += tx.output[per_commitment_data.revoked_output_index as usize].value; - - for &(ref htlc, ref _next_tx_sig) in per_commitment_data.htlcs.iter() { - let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey, htlc.offered); - if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() || - tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 || - tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() { - return Vec::new(); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user - } - if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER { - inp.push(TxIn { - prev_hash: commitment_txid, - prev_index: htlc.transaction_output_index, - script_sig: Script::new(), - sequence: 0xffffffff, - witness: Vec::new(), - }); - values.push(tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value); - total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000; + htlc_idxs.push(None); + values.push(outp.value); + total_value += outp.value; + break; // There can only be one of these + } + } + + macro_rules! sign_input { + ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => { + { + let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage { + KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => { + let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else { + let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()]; + chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey) + }; + let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..])); + let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key)); + (ignore_error!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key)), redeemscript) + }, + KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => { + unimplemented!(); + } + }; + $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec()); + $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8); + if $htlc_idx.is_none() { + $input.witness.push(vec!(1)); } else { - //TODO: Mark as "bad" - //then broadcast using next_tx_sig + $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec()); } + $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_vec()); } - inp - }, None => { - let mut inp = Vec::new(); // This is unlikely to succeed - for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { - if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh() { - inp.push(TxIn { - prev_hash: commitment_txid, - prev_index: idx as u32, - script_sig: Script::new(), - sequence: 0xffffffff, - witness: Vec::new(), - }); - values.push(outp.value); - total_value += outp.value; - break; // There can only be one of these - } + } + } + + if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option { + inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len()); + + for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() { + let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey); + if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() || + tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 || + tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() { + return txn_to_broadcast; // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user + } + let input = TxIn { + prev_hash: commitment_txid, + prev_index: htlc.transaction_output_index, + script_sig: Script::new(), + sequence: 0xfffffffd, + witness: Vec::new(), + }; + if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER { + inputs.push(input); + htlc_idxs.push(Some(idx)); + values.push(tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value); + total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000; + } else { + let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction { + version: 2, + lock_time: 0, + input: vec![input], + output: vec!(TxOut { + script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(), + value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee + }), + }; + let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx); + sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000); + txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx); // TODO: This is not yet tested in ChannelManager! } - if inp.is_empty() { return Vec::new(); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive - inp } - }; + } + + if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours + // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction! + // TODO: Register commitment_txid with the ChainWatchInterface! + self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number); + } + if inputs.is_empty() { return txn_to_broadcast; } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx let outputs = vec!(TxOut { script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(), @@ -384,82 +1043,236 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { }; let mut values_drain = values.drain(..); - - // First input is the generic revokeable_redeemscript let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx); - { - let sig = match self.revocation_base_key { - RevocationStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key } => { - let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &revokeable_redeemscript, values_drain.next().unwrap())[..])); - let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key)); - ignore_error!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key)) - }, - RevocationStorage::SigsMode { .. } => { - unimplemented!(); - } - }; - spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec()); - spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8); - spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(1)); // First if branch is revocation_key + for (input, htlc_idx) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(htlc_idxs.iter()) { + let value = values_drain.next().unwrap(); + sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, htlc_idx, value); } - match self.claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid) { - None => {}, - Some(per_commitment_data) => { - let mut htlc_idx = 0; - for (idx, input) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().enumerate() { - if idx == 0 { continue; } // We already signed the first input - - let mut htlc; - while { - htlc = &per_commitment_data.htlcs[htlc_idx].0; - htlc_idx += 1; - htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - } {} - - let sig = match self.revocation_base_key { - RevocationStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key } => { - let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey, htlc.offered); - let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&input, &htlc_redeemscript, values_drain.next().unwrap())[..])); + txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx); + } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option { + // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty + // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is + // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could + // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has + // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry + // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and + // insert it here. + self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number); + + if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points { + let revocation_point_option = + if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) } + else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() { + if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None } + } else { None }; + if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option { + let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage { + KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key } => { + (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))), + ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))) + }, + KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => { + (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)), + ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key))) + }, + }; + let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key { + None => return txn_to_broadcast, + Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)), + }; + + let mut total_value = 0; + let mut values = Vec::new(); + let mut inputs = Vec::new(); + + macro_rules! sign_input { + ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => { + { + let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage { + KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => { + let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize]; + let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey); + let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..])); + let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)); + (ignore_error!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key)), redeemscript) + }, + KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => { + unimplemented!(); + } + }; + $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec()); + $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8); + $input.witness.push($preimage); + $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_vec()); + } + } + } - let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key)); - ignore_error!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key)) - }, - RevocationStorage::SigsMode { .. } => { - unimplemented!(); + for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() { + if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { + let input = TxIn { + prev_hash: commitment_txid, + prev_index: htlc.transaction_output_index, + script_sig: Script::new(), + sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input + witness: Vec::new(), + }; + if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER { + inputs.push(input); + values.push((tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value, payment_preimage)); + total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000; + } else { + let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction { + version: 2, + lock_time: 0, + input: vec![input], + output: vec!(TxOut { + script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(), + value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee + }), + }; + let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx); + sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.to_vec()); + txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx); } - }; + } + } - input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec()); // First if branch is revocation_key - input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec()); - input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8); + if inputs.is_empty() { return txn_to_broadcast; } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx + + let outputs = vec!(TxOut { + script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(), + value: total_value, //TODO: - fee + }); + let mut spend_tx = Transaction { + version: 2, + lock_time: 0, + input: inputs, + output: outputs, + }; + + let mut values_drain = values.drain(..); + let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx); + + for input in spend_tx.input.iter_mut() { + let value = values_drain.next().unwrap(); + sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, value.0, value.1.to_vec()); } + + txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx); } } - - txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx); + } else { + //TODO: For each input check if its in our remote_commitment_txn_on_chain map! } txn_to_broadcast } - fn block_connected(&self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface) { - for tx in txn_matched { - if tx.input.len() != 1 { - // We currently only ever sign something spending a commitment or HTLC - // transaction with 1 input, so we can skip most transactions trivially. - continue; + fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx) -> Vec { + let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len()); + + for &(ref htlc, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() { + if htlc.offered { + let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key); + + htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy + + htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec()); + htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8); + htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec()); + htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8); + + htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); + htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_vec()); + + res.push(htlc_timeout_tx); + } else { + if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { + let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key); + + htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy + + htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec()); + htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8); + htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec()); + htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8); + + htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.to_vec()); + htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_vec()); + + res.push(htlc_success_tx); + } } + } + + res + } + /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet) + /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints. + /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds. + fn check_spend_local_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, _height: u32) -> Vec { + let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); + if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx { + if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid { + return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx); + } + } + if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx { + if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid { + return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx); + } + } + Vec::new() + } + + fn block_connected(&self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface) { + for tx in txn_matched { for txin in tx.input.iter() { - if self.funding_txo.is_none() || (txin.prev_hash == self.funding_txo.unwrap().0 && txin.prev_index == self.funding_txo.unwrap().1 as u32) { - for tx in self.check_spend_transaction(tx, height).iter() { + if self.funding_txo.is_none() || (txin.prev_hash == self.funding_txo.unwrap().txid && txin.prev_index == self.funding_txo.unwrap().index as u32) { + let mut txn = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height); + if txn.is_empty() { + txn = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height); + } + for tx in txn.iter() { broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx); } } } } + if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx { + let mut needs_broadcast = false; + for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() { + if htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER { + if htlc.offered || self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash) { + needs_broadcast = true; + } + } + } + + if needs_broadcast { + broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx); + for tx in self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx) { + broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx); + } + } + } + } + + pub fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool { + if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx { + for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() { + if htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER { + if htlc.offered || self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash) { + return true; + } + } + } + } + false } } @@ -467,9 +1280,14 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { mod tests { use bitcoin::util::misc::hex_bytes; use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script; + use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction; + use crypto::digest::Digest; use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor; + use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys}; + use util::sha2::Sha256; use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey}; - use secp256k1::Secp256k1; + use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature}; + use rand::{thread_rng,Rng}; #[test] fn test_per_commitment_storage() { @@ -492,336 +1310,452 @@ mod tests { { // insert_secret correct sequence - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &PublicKey::new(), 0, Script::new()); + monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new()); secrets.clear(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); } { // insert_secret #1 incorrect - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &PublicKey::new(), 0, Script::new()); + monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new()); secrets.clear(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap()); - assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err, + assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err, "Previous secret did not match new one"); } { // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect) - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &PublicKey::new(), 0, Script::new()); + monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new()); secrets.clear(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); - assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err, + assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err, "Previous secret did not match new one"); } { // insert_secret #3 incorrect - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &PublicKey::new(), 0, Script::new()); + monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new()); secrets.clear(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); - assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err, + assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err, "Previous secret did not match new one"); } { // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect) - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &PublicKey::new(), 0, Script::new()); + monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new()); secrets.clear(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap()); - assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err, + assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err, "Previous secret did not match new one"); } { // insert_secret #5 incorrect - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &PublicKey::new(), 0, Script::new()); + monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new()); secrets.clear(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap()); - assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err, + assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err, "Previous secret did not match new one"); } { // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect) - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &PublicKey::new(), 0, Script::new()); + monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new()); secrets.clear(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap()); - assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err, + assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err, "Previous secret did not match new one"); } { // insert_secret #7 incorrect - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &PublicKey::new(), 0, Script::new()); + monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new()); secrets.clear(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap()); - assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err, + assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err, "Previous secret did not match new one"); } { // insert_secret #8 incorrect - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &PublicKey::new(), 0, Script::new()); + monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new()); secrets.clear(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap()); - assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err, + assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err, "Previous secret did not match new one"); } } + + #[test] + fn test_prune_preimages() { + let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); + let dummy_sig = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(); + + macro_rules! dummy_keys { + () => { + TxCreationKeys { + per_commitment_point: PublicKey::new(), + revocation_key: PublicKey::new(), + a_htlc_key: PublicKey::new(), + b_htlc_key: PublicKey::new(), + a_delayed_payment_key: PublicKey::new(), + b_payment_key: PublicKey::new(), + } + } + } + let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() }; + + let mut preimages = Vec::new(); + { + let mut rng = thread_rng(); + for _ in 0..20 { + let mut preimage = [0; 32]; + rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage); + let mut sha = Sha256::new(); + sha.input(&preimage); + let mut hash = [0; 32]; + sha.result(&mut hash); + preimages.push((preimage, hash)); + } + } + + macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs { + ($preimages_slice: expr) => { + { + let mut res = Vec::new(); + for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() { + res.push(HTLCOutputInCommitment { + offered: true, + amount_msat: 0, + cltv_expiry: 0, + payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(), + transaction_output_index: idx as u32, + }); + } + res + } + } + } + macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs { + ($preimages_slice: expr) => { + { + let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice); + let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e, dummy_sig.clone(), dummy_sig.clone()) }).collect(); + res + } + } + } + + macro_rules! test_preimages_exist { + ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => { + for preimage in $preimages_slice { + assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1)); + } + } + } + + // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the + // old state. + let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new()); + monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(10); + + monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])); + monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655); + monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654); + monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653); + monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652); + for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() { + monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage); + } + + // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15 + let mut secret = [0; 32]; + secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone(), None).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15); + test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor); + test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor); + + // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17 + secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap()); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone(), None).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13); + test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor); + test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor); + + // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the + // previous commitment tx's preimages too + monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5])); + secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap()); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone(), None).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12); + test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor); + test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor); + + // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10 + monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3])); + secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone(), None).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5); + test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor); + } + + // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests. }