X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=src%2Fln%2Fchannelmonitor.rs;h=b1e7df29cddfa5bcd3a2394453310a97dbb1e176;hb=7a483e597c9079a280b1ea31d9762d89300097ce;hp=ae8f4f4a668f2ca007b2e03394a26725fe827d78;hpb=ca6b44b8cce864bac61a38a967284e8128836cbd;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs b/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs index ae8f4f4a..b1e7df29 100644 --- a/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs +++ b/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs @@ -1,103 +1,249 @@ +//! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives +//! here. +//! +//! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant +//! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can +//! be made in responding to certain messages, see ManyChannelMonitor for more. +//! +//! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the +//! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date +//! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other +//! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for +//! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices. + use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader; use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction}; -use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script; -use bitcoin::network::serialize; -use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash; +use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint; +use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder}; +use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes; +use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{self, Decodable, Encodable}; +use bitcoin::util::hash::{Hash160, BitcoinHash,Sha256dHash}; use bitcoin::util::bip143; use crypto::digest::Digest; use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature}; use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey}; +use secp256k1; -use ln::msgs::HandleError; +use ln::msgs::DecodeError; use ln::chan_utils; use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment; +use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash}; +use ln::channel::{ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT}; use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface}; use chain::transaction::OutPoint; +use chain::keysinterface::SpendableOutputDescriptor; +use util::logger::Logger; +use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writer, Writeable, WriterWriteAdaptor, U48}; use util::sha2::Sha256; -use util::byte_utils; +use util::{byte_utils, events}; -use std::collections::HashMap; +use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map}; use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex}; -use std::{hash,cmp}; +use std::{hash,cmp, mem}; +/// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update. +#[derive(Clone)] pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr { /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower failed, but is expected /// to succeed at some point in the future). + /// /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party. /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore /// the channel to an operational state. + /// + /// Note that continuing to operate when no copy of the updated ChannelMonitor could be + /// persisted is unsafe - if you failed to store the update on your own local disk you should + /// instead return PermanentFailure to force closure of the channel ASAP. + /// + /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur + /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting + /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At + /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should + /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to + /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has + /// been "frozen". + /// + /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call + /// test_restore_channel_monitor to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal + /// channel operation. TemporaryFailure, /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question. + /// + /// Should also be used to indicate a failure to update the local copy of the channel monitor. PermanentFailure, } +/// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is +/// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::insert_combine this +/// means you tried to merge two monitors for different channels or for a channel which was +/// restored from a backup and then generated new commitment updates. +/// Contains a human-readable error message. +#[derive(Debug)] +pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str); + +/// Simple structure send back by ManyChannelMonitor in case of HTLC detected onchain from a +/// forward channel and from which info are needed to update HTLC in a backward channel. +pub struct HTLCUpdate { + pub(super) payment_hash: PaymentHash, + pub(super) payment_preimage: Option, + pub(super) source: HTLCSource +} + /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote /// server(s). +/// /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel! pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync { /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`. + /// + /// Implementor must also ensure that the funding_txo outpoint is registered with any relevant + /// ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected callbacks with + /// any spends of it. fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>; + + /// Used by ChannelManager to get list of HTLC resolved onchain and which needed to be updated + /// with success or failure backward + fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec; } /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a /// watchtower or watch our own channels. +/// /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels. +/// /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates. +/// /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation. pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor { + #[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly + pub monitors: Mutex>, + #[cfg(not(test))] monitors: Mutex>, chain_monitor: Arc, - broadcaster: Arc + broadcaster: Arc, + pending_events: Mutex>, + pending_htlc_updated: Mutex)>>>, + logger: Arc, } impl ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor { - fn block_connected(&self, _header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) { - let monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap(); - for monitor in monitors.values() { - monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &*self.broadcaster); + fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) { + let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash(); + let mut new_events: Vec = Vec::with_capacity(0); + let mut htlc_updated_infos = Vec::new(); + { + let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap(); + for monitor in monitors.values_mut() { + let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs, mut htlc_updated) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster); + if spendable_outputs.len() > 0 { + new_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs { + outputs: spendable_outputs, + }); + } + + for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs { + for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() { + self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey); + } + } + htlc_updated_infos.append(&mut htlc_updated); + } + } + { + // ChannelManager will just need to fetch pending_htlc_updated and pass state backward + let mut pending_htlc_updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap(); + for htlc in htlc_updated_infos.drain(..) { + match pending_htlc_updated.entry(htlc.2) { + hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => { + // In case of reorg we may have htlc outputs solved in a different way so + // we prefer to keep claims but don't store duplicate updates for a given + // (payment_hash, HTLCSource) pair. + // TODO: Note that we currently don't really use this as ChannelManager + // will fail/claim backwards after the first block. We really should delay + // a few blocks before failing backwards (but can claim backwards + // immediately) as long as we have a few blocks of headroom. + let mut existing_claim = false; + e.get_mut().retain(|htlc_data| { + if htlc.0 == htlc_data.0 { + if htlc_data.1.is_some() { + existing_claim = true; + true + } else { false } + } else { true } + }); + if !existing_claim { + e.get_mut().push((htlc.0, htlc.1)); + } + } + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { + e.insert(vec![(htlc.0, htlc.1)]); + } + } + } } + let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); + pending_events.append(&mut new_events); } fn block_disconnected(&self, _: &BlockHeader) { } } impl SimpleManyChannelMonitor { - pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc, broadcaster: Arc) -> Arc> { + /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain + /// interface with which to register to receive notifications. + pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc, broadcaster: Arc, logger: Arc) -> Arc> { let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor { monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()), chain_monitor, - broadcaster + broadcaster, + pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), + pending_htlc_updated: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()), + logger, }); let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res); res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res); res } - pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> { + /// Adds or udpates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key. + pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> { let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap(); match monitors.get_mut(&key) { - Some(orig_monitor) => return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor), + Some(orig_monitor) => { + log_trace!(self, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(monitor.key_storage)); + return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor); + }, None => {} }; - match &monitor.funding_txo { - &None => self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn(), - &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => { - self.chain_monitor.install_watch_script(script); - self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script); + match monitor.key_storage { + Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => { + match funding_info { + &None => { + return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to update a useless monitor without funding_txo !")); + }, + &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => { + log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(outpoint.to_channel_id()[..])); + self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script); + self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script); + }, + } }, + Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { + self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn(); + } } monitors.insert(key, monitor); Ok(()) @@ -111,6 +257,30 @@ impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor { Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure), } } + + fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec { + let mut updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap(); + let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::with_capacity(updated.len()); + for (k, v) in updated.drain() { + for htlc_data in v { + pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate { + payment_hash: k, + payment_preimage: htlc_data.1, + source: htlc_data.0, + }); + } + } + pending_htlcs_updated + } +} + +impl events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor { + fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec { + let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); + let mut ret = Vec::new(); + mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events); + ret + } } /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction, @@ -118,18 +288,31 @@ impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor { const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12; /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the /// HTLC-Success transaction. -const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6; +/// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a +/// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places). +pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6; +/// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the +/// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our +/// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). +pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS: u32 = 3; #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)] -enum KeyStorage { - PrivMode { +enum Storage { + Local { revocation_base_key: SecretKey, htlc_base_key: SecretKey, + delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey, + payment_base_key: SecretKey, + shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey, + prev_latest_per_commitment_point: Option, + latest_per_commitment_point: Option, + funding_info: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>, + current_remote_commitment_txid: Option, + prev_remote_commitment_txid: Option, }, - SigsMode { + Watchtower { revocation_base_key: PublicKey, htlc_base_key: PublicKey, - sigs: HashMap, } } @@ -144,18 +327,24 @@ struct LocalSignedTx { delayed_payment_key: PublicKey, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>, + htlc_sources: Vec<(PaymentHash, HTLCSource, Option)>, } const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1; const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1; +/// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates +/// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs. +/// +/// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date +/// information and are actively monitoring the chain. +#[derive(Clone)] pub struct ChannelMonitor { - funding_txo: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64, - key_storage: KeyStorage, - delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey, + key_storage: Storage, their_htlc_base_key: Option, + their_delayed_payment_base_key: Option, // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option)>, @@ -163,18 +352,18 @@ pub struct ChannelMonitor { their_to_self_delay: Option, old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49], - remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap>, + remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap, Vec<(PaymentHash, HTLCSource, Option)>)>, /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain. /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions. - remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex>, + remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap)>, /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster. /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small). /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers. - remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<[u8; 32], u64>, + remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap, // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the @@ -183,39 +372,22 @@ pub struct ChannelMonitor { prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option, current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option, - payment_preimages: HashMap<[u8; 32], [u8; 32]>, - - destination_script: Script, - secp_ctx: Secp256k1, //TODO: dedup this a bit... -} -impl Clone for ChannelMonitor { - fn clone(&self) -> Self { - ChannelMonitor { - funding_txo: self.funding_txo.clone(), - commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor.clone(), - - key_storage: self.key_storage.clone(), - delayed_payment_base_key: self.delayed_payment_base_key.clone(), - their_htlc_base_key: self.their_htlc_base_key.clone(), - their_cur_revocation_points: self.their_cur_revocation_points.clone(), + // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during + // deserialization + current_remote_commitment_number: u64, - our_to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay, - their_to_self_delay: self.their_to_self_delay, + payment_preimages: HashMap, - old_secrets: self.old_secrets.clone(), - remote_claimable_outpoints: self.remote_claimable_outpoints.clone(), - remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new((*self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap()).clone()), - remote_hash_commitment_number: self.remote_hash_commitment_number.clone(), - - prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.clone(), - current_local_signed_commitment_tx: self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.clone(), - - payment_preimages: self.payment_preimages.clone(), + destination_script: Script, - destination_script: self.destination_script.clone(), - secp_ctx: self.secp_ctx.clone(), - } - } + // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is + // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way. + // (we do *not*, however, update them in insert_combine to ensure any local user copies keep + // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through + // the full block_connected). + pub(crate) last_block_hash: Sha256dHash, + secp_ctx: Secp256k1, //TODO: dedup this a bit... + logger: Arc, } #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))] @@ -223,17 +395,18 @@ impl Clone for ChannelMonitor { /// underlying object impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor { fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool { - if self.funding_txo != other.funding_txo || - self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor || + if self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor || self.key_storage != other.key_storage || - self.delayed_payment_base_key != other.delayed_payment_base_key || self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key || + self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key || self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points || self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay || self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay || self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints || + self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain || self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number || self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx || + self.current_remote_commitment_number != other.current_remote_commitment_number || self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx || self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages || self.destination_script != other.destination_script @@ -245,25 +418,30 @@ impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor { return false } } - let us = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap(); - let them = other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap(); - *us == *them + true } } } impl ChannelMonitor { - pub fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script) -> ChannelMonitor { + pub(super) fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, payment_base_key: &SecretKey, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script, logger: Arc) -> ChannelMonitor { ChannelMonitor { - funding_txo: None, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0, - key_storage: KeyStorage::PrivMode { + key_storage: Storage::Local { revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(), htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(), + delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(), + payment_base_key: payment_base_key.clone(), + shutdown_pubkey: shutdown_pubkey.clone(), + prev_latest_per_commitment_point: None, + latest_per_commitment_point: None, + funding_info: None, + current_remote_commitment_txid: None, + prev_remote_commitment_txid: None, }, - delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(), their_htlc_base_key: None, + their_delayed_payment_base_key: None, their_cur_revocation_points: None, our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay, @@ -271,16 +449,19 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49], remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(), - remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()), + remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(), remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(), prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None, current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None, + current_remote_commitment_number: 1 << 48, payment_preimages: HashMap::new(), - destination_script: destination_script, + + last_block_hash: Default::default(), secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(), + logger, } } @@ -309,39 +490,28 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { res } - /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Also optionally tracks the next - /// revocation point which may be required to claim HTLC outputs which we know the preimage of - /// in case the remote end force-closes using their latest state. Prunes old preimages if neither + /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key). - pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32], their_next_revocation_point: Option<(u64, PublicKey)>) -> Result<(), HandleError> { + pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> { let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx); for i in 0..pos { let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize]; if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret { - return Err(HandleError{err: "Previous secret did not match new one", action: None}) + return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one")); } } + if self.get_min_seen_secret() <= idx { + return Ok(()); + } self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx); - if let Some(new_revocation_point) = their_next_revocation_point { - match self.their_cur_revocation_points { - Some(old_points) => { - if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 1 { - self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(new_revocation_point.1))); - } else if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 2 { - if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 { - self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(new_revocation_point.1))); - } else { - self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None)); - } - } else { - self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None)); - } - }, - None => { - self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None)); - } + // Prune HTLCs from the previous remote commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill + // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs. + // TODO: We should probably consider whether we're really getting the next secret here. + if let Storage::Local { ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage { + if let Some(txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid.take() { + self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap().1 = Vec::new(); } } @@ -384,15 +554,41 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible. /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers. - pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec, commitment_number: u64) { + pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec, htlc_sources: Vec<(PaymentHash, HTLCSource, Option)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) { // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close. // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of // timeouts) - for htlc in &htlc_outputs { + for ref htlc in &htlc_outputs { self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number); } - self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(unsigned_commitment_tx.txid(), htlc_outputs); + + let new_txid = unsigned_commitment_tx.txid(); + if let Storage::Local { ref mut current_remote_commitment_txid, ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage { + *prev_remote_commitment_txid = current_remote_commitment_txid.take(); + *current_remote_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid); + } + self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, (htlc_outputs, htlc_sources)); + self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number; + //TODO: Merge this into the other per-remote-transaction output storage stuff + match self.their_cur_revocation_points { + Some(old_points) => { + if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { + self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point))); + } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 { + if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 { + self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point))); + } else { + self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None)); + } + } else { + self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None)); + } + }, + None => { + self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None)); + } + } } /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The @@ -400,7 +596,9 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated. /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called. - pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>) { + /// Also update Storage with latest local per_commitment_point to derive local_delayedkey in + /// case of onchain HTLC tx + pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>, htlc_sources: Vec<(PaymentHash, HTLCSource, Option)>) { assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some()); self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take(); self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx { @@ -412,28 +610,65 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs, + htlc_sources, }); + + if let Storage::Local { ref mut latest_per_commitment_point, .. } = self.key_storage { + *latest_per_commitment_point = Some(local_keys.per_commitment_point); + } else { + panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?"); + } } /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked. - pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], payment_preimage: &[u8; 32]) { + pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage) { self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone()); } - pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> { - if self.funding_txo.is_some() { - if other.funding_txo.is_some() && other.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap() != self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap() { - return Err(HandleError{err: "Funding transaction outputs are not identical!", action: None}); - } - } else { - self.funding_txo = other.funding_txo.take(); + /// Combines this ChannelMonitor with the information contained in the other ChannelMonitor. + /// After a successful call this ChannelMonitor is up-to-date and is safe to use to monitor the + /// chain for new blocks/transactions. + pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> { + match self.key_storage { + Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => { + if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); } + let our_funding_info = funding_info; + if let Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } = other.key_storage { + if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); } + // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget its trivially + // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey. + if funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 != our_funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 { + return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Funding transaction outputs are not identical!")); + } + } else { + return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor with a Watchtower one !")); + } + }, + Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { + if let Storage::Watchtower { .. } = other.key_storage { + unimplemented!(); + } else { + return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Watchtower monitor with a Local one !")); + } + }, } let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret(); let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret(); if our_min_secret > other_min_secret { - self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap(), None)?; + self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap())?; + } + if let Some(ref local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx { + if let Some(ref other_local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx { + let our_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor); + let other_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((other_local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (other_local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor); + if our_commitment_number >= other_commitment_number { + self.key_storage = other.key_storage; + } + } } + // TODO: We should use current_remote_commitment_number and the commitment number out of + // local transactions to decide how to merge if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret { self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points; for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() { @@ -447,6 +682,8 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages; } + + self.current_remote_commitment_number = cmp::min(self.current_remote_commitment_number, other.current_remote_commitment_number); Ok(()) } @@ -460,13 +697,23 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it /// provides slightly better privacy. - pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) { - //TODO: Need to register the given script here with a chain_monitor - self.funding_txo = Some(funding_info); + /// It's the responsibility of the caller to register outpoint and script with passing the former + /// value as key to add_update_monitor. + pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, new_funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) { + match self.key_storage { + Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => { + *funding_info = Some(new_funding_info); + }, + Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { + panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?"); + } + } } - pub(super) fn set_their_htlc_base_key(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey) { + /// We log these base keys at channel opening to being able to rebuild redeemscript in case of leaked revoked commit tx + pub(super) fn set_their_base_keys(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey) { self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone()); + self.their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone()); } pub(super) fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) { @@ -474,540 +721,435 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) { - self.funding_txo = None; + match self.key_storage { + Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => { + *funding_info = None; + }, + Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { + panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?"); + }, + } } + /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for. pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option { - match self.funding_txo { - Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint), - None => None + match self.key_storage { + Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => { + match funding_info { + &Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint), + &None => None + } + }, + Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { + return None; + } } } - /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns - fn serialize(&self, for_local_storage: bool) -> Vec { - let mut res = Vec::new(); - res.push(SERIALIZATION_VERSION); - res.push(MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION); - - match &self.funding_txo { - &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => { - res.extend_from_slice(&outpoint.txid[..]); - res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index)); - res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(script.len() as u64)); - res.extend_from_slice(&script[..]); - }, - &None => { - // We haven't even been initialized...not sure why anyone is serializing us, but - // not much to give them. - return res; - }, + /// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of. + /// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of + /// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note + /// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!). + pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Sha256dHash, u32, &Script)> { + let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2); + for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() { + for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() { + res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output)); + } } + res + } + + /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns + fn write(&self, writer: &mut W, for_local_storage: bool) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> { + //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy + //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it. + writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?; + writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?; // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now: - res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor)); + U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?; match self.key_storage { - KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key } => { - res.push(0); - res.extend_from_slice(&revocation_base_key[..]); - res.extend_from_slice(&htlc_base_key[..]); + Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point, ref funding_info, current_remote_commitment_txid, prev_remote_commitment_txid } => { + writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?; + writer.write_all(&revocation_base_key[..])?; + writer.write_all(&htlc_base_key[..])?; + writer.write_all(&delayed_payment_base_key[..])?; + writer.write_all(&payment_base_key[..])?; + writer.write_all(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize())?; + if let Some(ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point) = *prev_latest_per_commitment_point { + writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?; + writer.write_all(&prev_latest_per_commitment_point.serialize())?; + } else { + writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?; + } + if let Some(ref latest_per_commitment_point) = *latest_per_commitment_point { + writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?; + writer.write_all(&latest_per_commitment_point.serialize())?; + } else { + writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?; + } + match funding_info { + &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => { + writer.write_all(&outpoint.txid[..])?; + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index))?; + script.write(writer)?; + }, + &None => { + debug_assert!(false, "Try to serialize a useless Local monitor !"); + }, + } + if let Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid { + writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?; + writer.write_all(&txid[..])?; + } else { + writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?; + } + if let Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid { + writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?; + writer.write_all(&txid[..])?; + } else { + writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?; + } }, - KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => unimplemented!(), + Storage::Watchtower { .. } => unimplemented!(), } - res.extend_from_slice(&self.delayed_payment_base_key.serialize()); - res.extend_from_slice(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize()); + writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?; + writer.write_all(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?; match self.their_cur_revocation_points { Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => { - res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx)); - res.extend_from_slice(&pubkey.serialize()); + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?; + writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?; match second_option { Some(second_pubkey) => { - res.extend_from_slice(&second_pubkey.serialize()); + writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?; }, None => { - res.extend_from_slice(&[0; 33]); + writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?; }, } }, None => { - res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0)); + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?; }, } - res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay)); - res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap())); + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay))?; + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()))?; for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() { - res.extend_from_slice(secret); - res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx)); + writer.write_all(secret)?; + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?; } macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment { ($htlc_output: expr) => { - res.push($htlc_output.offered as u8); - res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat)); - res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry)); - res.extend_from_slice(&$htlc_output.payment_hash); - res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.transaction_output_index)); + writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?; + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?; + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?; + writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?; + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.transaction_output_index))?; + } + } + + macro_rules! serialize_htlc_source { + ($htlc_source: expr) => { + $htlc_source.0.write(writer)?; + $htlc_source.1.write(writer)?; + if let &Some(ref txo) = &$htlc_source.2 { + writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?; + txo.write(writer)?; + } else { + writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?; + } } } - res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64)); - for (txid, htlc_outputs) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() { - res.extend_from_slice(&txid[..]); - res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_outputs.len() as u64)); - for htlc_output in htlc_outputs.iter() { + + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?; + for (ref txid, &(ref htlc_infos, ref htlc_sources)) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() { + writer.write_all(&txid[..])?; + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?; + for ref htlc_output in htlc_infos.iter() { serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output); } + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_sources.len() as u64))?; + for ref htlc_source in htlc_sources.iter() { + serialize_htlc_source!(htlc_source); + } } - { - let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap(); - res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64)); - for (txid, commitment_number) in remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() { - res.extend_from_slice(&txid[..]); - res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number)); + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?; + for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() { + writer.write_all(&txid[..])?; + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?; + (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?; + for script in txouts.iter() { + script.write(writer)?; } } if for_local_storage { - res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64)); - for (payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() { - res.extend_from_slice(payment_hash); - res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number)); + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?; + for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() { + writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?; + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?; } } else { - res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0)); + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?; } macro_rules! serialize_local_tx { ($local_tx: expr) => { - let tx_ser = serialize::serialize(&$local_tx.tx).unwrap(); - res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(tx_ser.len() as u64)); - res.extend_from_slice(&tx_ser); + if let Err(e) = $local_tx.tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) { + match e { + encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e), + _ => panic!("local tx must have been well-formed!"), + } + } - res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize()); - res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize()); - res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize()); - res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize()); + writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?; + writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?; + writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?; + writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?; - res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw)); - res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64)); + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?; + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?; for &(ref htlc_output, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() { serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output); - res.extend_from_slice(&their_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx)); - res.extend_from_slice(&our_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx)); + writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?; + writer.write_all(&our_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?; + } + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_sources.len() as u64))?; + for ref htlc_source in $local_tx.htlc_sources.iter() { + serialize_htlc_source!(htlc_source); } } } if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx { - res.push(1); + writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?; serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx); } else { - res.push(0); + writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?; } if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx { - res.push(1); + writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?; serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx); } else { - res.push(0); + writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?; } - res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64)); + if for_local_storage { + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_remote_commitment_number))?; + } else { + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?; + } + + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?; for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() { - res.extend_from_slice(payment_preimage); + writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?; } - res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.destination_script.len() as u64)); - res.extend_from_slice(&self.destination_script[..]); + self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?; + self.destination_script.write(writer)?; - res + Ok(()) } - /// Encodes this monitor into a byte array, suitable for writing to disk. - pub fn serialize_for_disk(&self) -> Vec { - self.serialize(true) + /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk. + /// + /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which + /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along + /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest + /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the + /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object! + pub fn write_for_disk(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> { + self.write(writer, true) } - /// Encodes this monitor into a byte array, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower - pub fn serialize_for_watchtower(&self) -> Vec { - self.serialize(false) + /// Encodes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower + /// + /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which + /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along + /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest + /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the + /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object! + pub fn write_for_watchtower(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> { + self.write(writer, false) } - /// Attempts to decode a serialized monitor - pub fn deserialize(data: &[u8]) -> Option { - let mut read_pos = 0; - macro_rules! read_bytes { - ($byte_count: expr) => { - { - if ($byte_count as usize) > data.len() - read_pos { - return None; - } - read_pos += $byte_count as usize; - &data[read_pos - $byte_count as usize..read_pos] - } + //TODO: Functions to serialize/deserialize (with different forms depending on which information + //we want to leave out (eg funding_txo, etc). + + /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret + pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> { + for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() { + if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 { + return Some(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx)) } } + assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret()); + None + } - let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); - macro_rules! unwrap_obj { - ($key: expr) => { - match $key { - Ok(res) => res, - Err(_) => return None, - } + pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 { + //TODO This can be optimized? + let mut min = 1 << 48; + for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() { + if idx < min { + min = idx; } } + min + } - let _ver = read_bytes!(1)[0]; - let min_ver = read_bytes!(1)[0]; - if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION { - return None; - } + pub(super) fn get_cur_remote_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 { + self.current_remote_commitment_number + } - // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of - // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with. - let outpoint = OutPoint { - txid: Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32)), - index: byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2)), - }; - let script_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8)); - let funding_txo = Some((outpoint, Script::from(read_bytes!(script_len).to_vec()))); - let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6)); + pub(super) fn get_cur_local_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 { + if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx { + 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor) + } else { 0xffff_ffff_ffff } + } - let key_storage = match read_bytes!(1)[0] { - 0 => { - KeyStorage::PrivMode { - revocation_base_key: unwrap_obj!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(32))), - htlc_base_key: unwrap_obj!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(32))), - } - }, - _ => return None, - }; + /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and + /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a + /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for + /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions. + /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of + /// revoked remote commitment tx + fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec, (Sha256dHash, Vec), Vec, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option, PaymentHash)>) { + // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing + // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast + let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new(); + let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new(); + let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new(); + let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new(); - let delayed_payment_base_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33))); - let their_htlc_base_key = Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)))); + let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers! + let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid); - let their_cur_revocation_points = { - let first_idx = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6)); - if first_idx == 0 { - None - } else { - let first_point = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33))); - let second_point_slice = read_bytes!(33); - if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 { - Some((first_idx, first_point, None)) - } else { - Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, second_point_slice))))) + macro_rules! ignore_error { + ( $thing : expr ) => { + match $thing { + Ok(a) => a, + Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated) } - } - }; + }; + } + + let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor); + if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() { + let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap(); + let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret)); + let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key, local_payment_key) = match self.key_storage { + Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref payment_base_key, .. } => { + let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key); + (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))), + ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))), + Some(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &payment_base_key)))) + }, + Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => { + let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key); + (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)), + ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)), + None) + }, + }; + let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.unwrap())); + let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key { + None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated), + Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)), + }; - let our_to_self_delay = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2)); - let their_to_self_delay = Some(byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2))); + let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key); + let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(); - let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49]; - for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() { - secret.copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32)); - *idx = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8)); - } + let local_payment_p2wpkh = if let Some(payment_key) = local_payment_key { + // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the + // script_pubkey version. + let payment_hash160 = Hash160::from_data(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &payment_key).serialize()); + Some(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script()) + } else { None }; - macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment { - () => { - { - let offered = match read_bytes!(1)[0] { - 0 => false, 1 => true, - _ => return None, - }; - let amount_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8)); - let cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(read_bytes!(4)); - let mut payment_hash = [0; 32]; - payment_hash[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32)); - let transaction_output_index = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(read_bytes!(4)); + let mut total_value = 0; + let mut values = Vec::new(); + let mut inputs = Vec::new(); + let mut htlc_idxs = Vec::new(); - HTLCOutputInCommitment { - offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index - } + for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { + if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { + inputs.push(TxIn { + previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint { + txid: commitment_txid, + vout: idx as u32, + }, + script_sig: Script::new(), + sequence: 0xfffffffd, + witness: Vec::new(), + }); + htlc_idxs.push(None); + values.push(outp.value); + total_value += outp.value; + } else if Some(&outp.script_pubkey) == local_payment_p2wpkh.as_ref() { + spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH { + outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 }, + key: local_payment_key.unwrap(), + output: outp.clone(), + }); } } - } - let remote_claimable_outpoints_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8)); - if remote_claimable_outpoints_len > data.len() as u64 / 64 { return None; } - let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize); - for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len { - let txid = Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32)); - let outputs_count = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8)); - if outputs_count > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return None; } - let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(outputs_count as usize); - for _ in 0..outputs_count { - outputs.push(read_htlc_in_commitment!()); - } - if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, outputs) { - return None; + macro_rules! sign_input { + ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => { + { + let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage { + Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => { + let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else { + let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap().0[$htlc_idx.unwrap()]; + chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey) + }; + let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..])); + let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key)); + (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript) + }, + Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { + unimplemented!(); + } + }; + $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec()); + $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8); + if $htlc_idx.is_none() { + $input.witness.push(vec!(1)); + } else { + $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec()); + } + $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes()); + } + } } - } - let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8)); - if remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return None; } - let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize); - for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len { - let txid = Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32)); - let commitment_number = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6)); - if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, commitment_number) { - return None; - } - } + if let Some(&(ref per_commitment_data, _)) = per_commitment_option { + inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len()); - let remote_hash_commitment_number_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8)); - if remote_hash_commitment_number_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return None; } - let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize); - for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len { - let mut txid = [0; 32]; - txid[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32)); - let commitment_number = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6)); - if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(txid, commitment_number) { - return None; - } - } - - macro_rules! read_local_tx { - () => { - { - let tx_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8)); - let tx_ser = read_bytes!(tx_len); - let tx: Transaction = unwrap_obj!(serialize::deserialize(tx_ser)); - if serialize::serialize(&tx).unwrap() != tx_ser { - // We check that the tx re-serializes to the same form to ensure there is - // no extra data, and as rust-bitcoin doesn't handle the 0-input ambiguity - // all that well. - return None; - } - - let revocation_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33))); - let a_htlc_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33))); - let b_htlc_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33))); - let delayed_payment_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33))); - let feerate_per_kw = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8)); - - let htlc_outputs_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8)); - if htlc_outputs_len > data.len() as u64 / 128 { return None; } - let mut htlc_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs_len as usize); - for _ in 0..htlc_outputs_len { - htlc_outputs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), - unwrap_obj!(Signature::from_compact(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(64))), - unwrap_obj!(Signature::from_compact(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(64))))); - } - - LocalSignedTx { - txid: tx.txid(), - tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs - } - } - } - } - - let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match read_bytes!(1)[0] { - 0 => None, - 1 => { - Some(read_local_tx!()) - }, - _ => return None, - }; - - let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match read_bytes!(1)[0] { - 0 => None, - 1 => { - Some(read_local_tx!()) - }, - _ => return None, - }; - - let payment_preimages_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8)); - if payment_preimages_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return None; } - let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(payment_preimages_len as usize); - let mut sha = Sha256::new(); - for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len { - let mut preimage = [0; 32]; - preimage[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32)); - sha.reset(); - sha.input(&preimage); - let mut hash = [0; 32]; - sha.result(&mut hash); - if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) { - return None; - } - } - - let destination_script_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8)); - let destination_script = Script::from(read_bytes!(destination_script_len).to_vec()); - - Some(ChannelMonitor { - funding_txo, - commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, - - key_storage, - delayed_payment_base_key, - their_htlc_base_key, - their_cur_revocation_points, - - our_to_self_delay, - their_to_self_delay, - - old_secrets, - remote_claimable_outpoints, - remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain), - remote_hash_commitment_number, - - prev_local_signed_commitment_tx, - current_local_signed_commitment_tx, - - payment_preimages, - - destination_script, - secp_ctx, - }) - } - - //TODO: Functions to serialize/deserialize (with different forms depending on which information - //we want to leave out (eg funding_txo, etc). - - /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret - pub fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Result<[u8; 32], HandleError> { - for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() { - if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 { - return Ok(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx)) - } - } - assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret()); - Err(HandleError{err: "idx too low", action: None}) - } - - pub fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 { - //TODO This can be optimized? - let mut min = 1 << 48; - for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() { - if idx < min { - min = idx; - } - } - min - } - - /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and - /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a - /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for - /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions, and claim them using the revocation key (if - /// applicable) as well. - fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> Vec { - // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing - // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast - let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new(); - macro_rules! ignore_error { - ( $thing : expr ) => { - match $thing { - Ok(a) => a, - Err(_) => return txn_to_broadcast - } - }; - } - - let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers! - let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid); - - let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor); - if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() { - let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap(); - let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret)); - let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage { - KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key } => { - let per_commitment_point = ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key)); - (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))), - ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))) - }, - KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => { - let per_commitment_point = ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key)); - (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)), - ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key))) - }, - }; - let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key)), &self.delayed_payment_base_key)); - let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key { - None => return txn_to_broadcast, - Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key)), &their_htlc_base_key)), - }; - - let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key); - let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(); - - let mut total_value = 0; - let mut values = Vec::new(); - let mut inputs = Vec::new(); - let mut htlc_idxs = Vec::new(); - - for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { - if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { - inputs.push(TxIn { - prev_hash: commitment_txid, - prev_index: idx as u32, - script_sig: Script::new(), - sequence: 0xfffffffd, - witness: Vec::new(), - }); - htlc_idxs.push(None); - values.push(outp.value); - total_value += outp.value; - break; // There can only be one of these - } - } - - macro_rules! sign_input { - ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => { - { - let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage { - KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => { - let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else { - let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()]; - chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey) - }; - let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..])); - let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key)); - (ignore_error!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key)), redeemscript) - }, - KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => { - unimplemented!(); - } - }; - $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec()); - $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8); - if $htlc_idx.is_none() { - $input.witness.push(vec!(1)); - } else { - $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec()); - } - $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_vec()); - } - } - } - - if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option { - inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len()); - - for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() { + for (idx, ref htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() { let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey); if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 || tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() { - return txn_to_broadcast; // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user + return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user } let input = TxIn { - prev_hash: commitment_txid, - prev_index: htlc.transaction_output_index, + previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint { + txid: commitment_txid, + vout: htlc.transaction_output_index, + }, script_sig: Script::new(), sequence: 0xfffffffd, witness: Vec::new(), @@ -1029,17 +1171,17 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { }; let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx); sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000); - txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx); // TODO: This is not yet tested in ChannelManager! + txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx); } } } if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction! - // TODO: Register all outputs in commitment_tx with the ChainWatchInterface! - self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number); + watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone()); + self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect())); } - if inputs.is_empty() { return txn_to_broadcast; } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx + if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx let outputs = vec!(TxOut { script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(), @@ -1060,7 +1202,32 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, htlc_idx, value); } + spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { + outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, + output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(), + }); txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx); + + // TODO: We really should only fail backwards after our revocation claims have been + // confirmed, but we also need to do more other tracking of in-flight pre-confirm + // on-chain claims, so we can do that at the same time. + if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage { + if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid { + if let Some(&(_, ref latest_outpoints)) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid) { + for &(ref payment_hash, ref source, _) in latest_outpoints.iter() { + htlc_updated.push(((*source).clone(), None, payment_hash.clone())); + } + } + } + if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid { + if let Some(&(_, ref prev_outpoint)) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid) { + for &(ref payment_hash, ref source, _) in prev_outpoint.iter() { + htlc_updated.push(((*source).clone(), None, payment_hash.clone())); + } + } + } + } + // No need to check local commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on remote commitment tx } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option { // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is @@ -1069,8 +1236,8 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and // insert it here. - // TODO: Register all outputs in commitment_tx with the ChainWatchInterface! - self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number); + watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone()); + self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect())); if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points { let revocation_point_option = @@ -1080,20 +1247,38 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } else { None }; if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option { let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage { - KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key } => { - (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))), - ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))) + Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => { + (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))), + ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key)))) }, - KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => { + Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => { (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)), ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key))) }, }; let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key { - None => return txn_to_broadcast, + None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated), Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)), }; + for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { + if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() { + match self.key_storage { + Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, .. } => { + if let Ok(local_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_point, &payment_base_key) { + spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH { + outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 }, + key: local_key, + output: outp.clone(), + }); + } + }, + Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {} + } + break; // Only to_remote ouput is claimable + } + } + let mut total_value = 0; let mut values = Vec::new(); let mut inputs = Vec::new(); @@ -1102,30 +1287,38 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => { { let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage { - KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => { - let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize]; + Storage::Local { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => { + let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap().0[$input.sequence as usize]; let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey); let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..])); let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)); - (ignore_error!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key)), redeemscript) + (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript) }, - KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => { + Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { unimplemented!(); } }; $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec()); $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8); $input.witness.push($preimage); - $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_vec()); + $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes()); } } } - for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() { + for (idx, ref htlc) in per_commitment_data.0.iter().enumerate() { + let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey); + if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() || + tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 || + tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() { + return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user + } if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { let input = TxIn { - prev_hash: commitment_txid, - prev_index: htlc.transaction_output_index, + previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint { + txid: commitment_txid, + vout: htlc.transaction_output_index, + }, script_sig: Script::new(), sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input witness: Vec::new(), @@ -1145,13 +1338,42 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { }), }; let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx); - sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.to_vec()); + sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.0.to_vec()); + spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { + outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, + output: single_htlc_tx.output[0].clone(), + }); txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx); } } + if !htlc.offered { + // TODO: If the HTLC has already expired, potentially merge it with the + // rest of the claim transaction, as above. + let input = TxIn { + previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint { + txid: commitment_txid, + vout: htlc.transaction_output_index, + }, + script_sig: Script::new(), + sequence: idx as u32, + witness: Vec::new(), + }; + let mut timeout_tx = Transaction { + version: 2, + lock_time: htlc.cltv_expiry, + input: vec![input], + output: vec!(TxOut { + script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(), + value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, + }), + }; + let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&timeout_tx); + sign_input!(sighash_parts, timeout_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, vec![0]); + txn_to_broadcast.push(timeout_tx); + } } - if inputs.is_empty() { return txn_to_broadcast; } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx + if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx let outputs = vec!(TxOut { script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(), @@ -1169,21 +1391,139 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { for input in spend_tx.input.iter_mut() { let value = values_drain.next().unwrap(); - sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, value.0, value.1.to_vec()); + sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, value.0, (value.1).0.to_vec()); } + spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { + outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, + output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(), + }); txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx); } } - } else { - //TODO: For each input check if its in our remote_commitment_txn_on_chain map! } - txn_to_broadcast + (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated) } - fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx) -> Vec { + /// Attempst to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout s outputs using the revocation key + fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64) -> (Option, Option) { + if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 { + return (None, None) + } + + macro_rules! ignore_error { + ( $thing : expr ) => { + match $thing { + Ok(a) => a, + Err(_) => return (None, None) + } + }; + } + + let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (None, None); }; + let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret)); + let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key); + let revocation_pubkey = match self.key_storage { + Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => { + ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))) + }, + Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => { + ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)) + }, + }; + let delayed_key = match self.their_delayed_payment_base_key { + None => return (None, None), + Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &their_delayed_payment_base_key)), + }; + let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &delayed_key); + let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(); + let htlc_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers! + + let mut inputs = Vec::new(); + let mut amount = 0; + + if tx.output[0].script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { //HTLC transactions have one txin, one txout + inputs.push(TxIn { + previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint { + txid: htlc_txid, + vout: 0, + }, + script_sig: Script::new(), + sequence: 0xfffffffd, + witness: Vec::new(), + }); + amount = tx.output[0].value; + } + + if !inputs.is_empty() { + let outputs = vec!(TxOut { + script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(), + value: amount, //TODO: - fee + }); + + let mut spend_tx = Transaction { + version: 2, + lock_time: 0, + input: inputs, + output: outputs, + }; + + let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx); + + let sig = match self.key_storage { + Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => { + let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &redeemscript, amount)[..])); + let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key)); + self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key) + } + Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { + unimplemented!(); + } + }; + spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec()); + spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8); + spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(1)); + spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes()); + + let outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }; + let output = spend_tx.output[0].clone(); + (Some(spend_tx), Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { outpoint, output })) + } else { (None, None) } + } + + fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, per_commitment_point: &Option, delayed_payment_base_key: &Option) -> (Vec, Vec, Vec) { let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len()); + let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len()); + let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len()); + + macro_rules! add_dynamic_output { + ($father_tx: expr, $vout: expr) => { + if let Some(ref per_commitment_point) = *per_commitment_point { + if let Some(ref delayed_payment_base_key) = *delayed_payment_base_key { + if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) { + spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH { + outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: $father_tx.txid(), vout: $vout }, + key: local_delayedkey, + witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key), + to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay, + output: $father_tx.output[$vout as usize].clone(), + }); + } + } + } + } + } + + + let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &local_tx.delayed_payment_key); + let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(); + for (idx, output) in local_tx.tx.output.iter().enumerate() { + if output.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { + add_dynamic_output!(local_tx.tx, idx as u32); + break; + } + } for &(ref htlc, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() { if htlc.offered { @@ -1197,8 +1537,9 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8); htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); - htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_vec()); + htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes()); + add_dynamic_output!(htlc_timeout_tx, 0); res.push(htlc_timeout_tx); } else { if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { @@ -1211,80 +1552,563 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec()); htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8); - htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.to_vec()); - htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_vec()); + htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.0.to_vec()); + htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes()); + add_dynamic_output!(htlc_success_tx, 0); res.push(htlc_success_tx); } } + watch_outputs.push(local_tx.tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].clone()); } - res + (res, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) } /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet) /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints. /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds. - fn check_spend_local_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, _height: u32) -> Vec { + fn check_spend_local_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, _height: u32) -> (Vec, Vec, (Sha256dHash, Vec)) { let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx { if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid { - return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx); + match self.key_storage { + Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => { + let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key)); + return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); + }, + Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { + let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None); + return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); + } + } } } if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx { if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid { - return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx); + match self.key_storage { + Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => { + let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key)); + return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); + }, + Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { + let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None); + return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); + } + } + } + } + (Vec::new(), Vec::new(), (commitment_txid, Vec::new())) + } + + /// Generate a spendable output event when closing_transaction get registered onchain. + fn check_spend_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> Option { + if tx.input[0].sequence == 0xFFFFFFFF && !tx.input[0].witness.is_empty() && tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len() == 71 { + match self.key_storage { + Storage::Local { ref shutdown_pubkey, .. } => { + let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::from_data(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize()); + let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script(); + for (idx, output) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { + if shutdown_script == output.script_pubkey { + return Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { + outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: idx as u32 }, + output: output.clone(), + }); + } + } + } + Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { + //TODO: we need to ensure an offline client will generate the event when it + // cames back online after only the watchtower saw the transaction + } } } - Vec::new() + None } - fn block_connected(&self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface) { + /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest local state if it's copy of + /// the Channel was out-of-date. + pub(super) fn get_latest_local_commitment_txn(&self) -> Vec { + if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx { + let mut res = vec![local_tx.tx.clone()]; + match self.key_storage { + Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => { + res.append(&mut self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key)).0); + }, + _ => panic!("Can only broadcast by local channelmonitor"), + }; + res + } else { + Vec::new() + } + } + + fn block_connected(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec)>, Vec, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option, PaymentHash)>) { + let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new(); + let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new(); + let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new(); for tx in txn_matched { - for txin in tx.input.iter() { - if self.funding_txo.is_none() || (txin.prev_hash == self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && txin.prev_index == self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) { - let mut txn = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height); + if tx.input.len() == 1 { + // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what), + // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input, + // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy + // filters. + let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output; + let mut txn: Vec = Vec::new(); + let funding_txo = match self.key_storage { + Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => { + funding_info.clone() + } + Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { + unimplemented!(); + } + }; + if funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) { + let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output, mut updated) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height); + txn = remote_txn; + spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output); + if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() { + watch_outputs.push(new_outputs); + } if txn.is_empty() { - txn = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height); + let (local_txn, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height); + spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output); + txn = local_txn; + if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() { + watch_outputs.push(new_outputs); + } + } + if !funding_txo.is_none() && txn.is_empty() { + if let Some(spendable_output) = self.check_spend_closing_transaction(tx) { + spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output); + } + } + if updated.len() > 0 { + htlc_updated.append(&mut updated); } - for tx in txn.iter() { - broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx); + } else { + if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) { + let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(tx, commitment_number); + if let Some(tx) = tx { + txn.push(tx); + } + if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output { + spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output); + } + } + } + for tx in txn.iter() { + broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx); + } + let mut updated = self.is_resolving_htlc_output(tx); + if updated.len() > 0 { + htlc_updated.append(&mut updated); + } + } + } + if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx { + if self.would_broadcast_at_height(height) { + broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx); + match self.key_storage { + Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => { + let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key)); + spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output); + if !new_outputs.is_empty() { + watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs)); + } + for tx in txs { + broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx); + } + }, + Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { + let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, &None, &None); + spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output); + if !new_outputs.is_empty() { + watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs)); + } + for tx in txs { + broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx); + } } } } } + self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone(); + (watch_outputs, spendable_outputs, htlc_updated) + } + + pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool { if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx { - let mut needs_broadcast = false; for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() { - if htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER { - if htlc.offered || self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash) { - needs_broadcast = true; + // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the + // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to + // time out the HTLC first. + // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary + // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another + // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our + // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we + // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the + // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC + // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going + // on-chain for an expired HTLC. + // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC + // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the + // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at + // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC. + // aka outbound_cltv + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + // outbound_cltv + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv + // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA + if ( htlc.offered && htlc.cltv_expiry + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS <= height) || + (!htlc.offered && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) { + return true; + } + } + } + false + } + + /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a local + /// or remote commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC + fn is_resolving_htlc_output(&mut self, tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, Option, PaymentHash)> { + let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new(); + + 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input { + let mut payment_data = None; + + macro_rules! scan_commitment { + ($htlc_outputs: expr, $htlc_sources: expr) => { + for &(ref payment_hash, ref source, ref vout) in $htlc_sources.iter() { + if &Some(input.previous_output.vout) == vout { + payment_data = Some((source.clone(), *payment_hash)); + } + } + if payment_data.is_none() { + for htlc_output in $htlc_outputs { + if input.previous_output.vout == htlc_output.transaction_output_index { + log_info!(self, "Inbound HTLC timeout at {} from {} resolved by {}", input.previous_output.vout, input.previous_output.txid, tx.txid()); + continue 'outer_loop; + } + } } } } - if needs_broadcast { - broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx); - for tx in self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx) { - broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx); + if let Some(ref current_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx { + if input.previous_output.txid == current_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid { + scan_commitment!(current_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), current_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_sources); + } + } + if let Some(ref prev_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx { + if input.previous_output.txid == prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid { + scan_commitment!(prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_sources); + } + } + if let Some(&(ref htlc_outputs, ref htlc_sources)) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) { + scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs, htlc_sources); + } + + // If tx isn't solving htlc output from local/remote commitment tx and htlc isn't outbound we don't need + // to broadcast solving backward + if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data { + let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]); + if input.witness.len() == 5 && input.witness[4].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT { + payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&tx.input[0].witness[3]); + htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash)); + } else if input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT { + payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&tx.input[0].witness[1]); + htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash)); + } else { + htlc_updated.push((source, None, payment_hash)); } } } + htlc_updated } +} - pub fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool { - if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx { - for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() { - if htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER { - if htlc.offered || self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash) { - return true; +const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024; + +impl ReadableArgs> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor) { + fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc) -> Result { + let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); + macro_rules! unwrap_obj { + ($key: expr) => { + match $key { + Ok(res) => res, + Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), + } + } + } + + let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?; + let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?; + if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION { + return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion); + } + + let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = >::read(reader)?.0; + + let key_storage = match >::read(reader)? { + 0 => { + let revocation_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?; + let htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?; + let delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?; + let payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?; + let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?; + let prev_latest_per_commitment_point = match >::read(reader)? { + 0 => None, + 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?), + _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), + }; + let latest_per_commitment_point = match >::read(reader)? { + 0 => None, + 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?), + _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), + }; + // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of + // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with. + let outpoint = OutPoint { + txid: Readable::read(reader)?, + index: Readable::read(reader)?, + }; + let funding_info = Some((outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?)); + let current_remote_commitment_txid = match >::read(reader)? { + 0 => None, + 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?), + _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), + }; + let prev_remote_commitment_txid = match >::read(reader)? { + 0 => None, + 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?), + _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), + }; + Storage::Local { + revocation_base_key, + htlc_base_key, + delayed_payment_base_key, + payment_base_key, + shutdown_pubkey, + prev_latest_per_commitment_point, + latest_per_commitment_point, + funding_info, + current_remote_commitment_txid, + prev_remote_commitment_txid, + } + }, + _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), + }; + + let their_htlc_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?); + let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?); + + let their_cur_revocation_points = { + let first_idx = >::read(reader)?.0; + if first_idx == 0 { + None + } else { + let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?; + let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?; + if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 { + Some((first_idx, first_point, None)) + } else { + Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &second_point_slice))))) + } + } + }; + + let our_to_self_delay: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?; + let their_to_self_delay: Option = Some(Readable::read(reader)?); + + let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49]; + for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() { + *secret = Readable::read(reader)?; + *idx = Readable::read(reader)?; + } + + macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment { + () => { + { + let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?; + let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; + let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; + let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?; + let transaction_output_index: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; + + HTLCOutputInCommitment { + offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index } } } } - false + + macro_rules! read_htlc_source { + () => { + { + (Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, + match >::read(reader)? { + 0 => None, + 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?), + _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), + } + ) + } + } + } + + let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; + let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64)); + for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len { + let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?; + let outputs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; + let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32)); + for _ in 0..outputs_count { + outputs.push(read_htlc_in_commitment!()); + } + let sources_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; + let mut sources = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(sources_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32)); + for _ in 0..sources_count { + sources.push(read_htlc_source!()); + } + if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, (outputs, sources)) { + return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); + } + } + + let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; + let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32)); + for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len { + let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?; + let commitment_number = >::read(reader)?.0; + let outputs_count = >::read(reader)?; + let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8)); + for _ in 0..outputs_count { + outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?); + } + if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) { + return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); + } + } + + let remote_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; + let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32)); + for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len { + let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?; + let commitment_number = >::read(reader)?.0; + if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) { + return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); + } + } + + macro_rules! read_local_tx { + () => { + { + let tx = match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) { + Ok(tx) => tx, + Err(e) => match e { + encode::Error::Io(ioe) => return Err(DecodeError::Io(ioe)), + _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), + }, + }; + + if tx.input.is_empty() { + // Ensure tx didn't hit the 0-input ambiguity case. + return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); + } + + let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?; + let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?; + let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?; + let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?; + let feerate_per_kw: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; + + let htlc_outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; + let mut htlc_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlc_outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128)); + for _ in 0..htlc_outputs_len { + let out = read_htlc_in_commitment!(); + let sigs = (Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?); + htlc_outputs.push((out, sigs.0, sigs.1)); + } + + let htlc_sources_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; + let mut htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlc_outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128)); + for _ in 0..htlc_sources_len { + htlc_sources.push(read_htlc_source!()); + } + + LocalSignedTx { + txid: tx.txid(), + tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs, htlc_sources + } + } + } + } + + let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match >::read(reader)? { + 0 => None, + 1 => { + Some(read_local_tx!()) + }, + _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), + }; + + let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match >::read(reader)? { + 0 => None, + 1 => { + Some(read_local_tx!()) + }, + _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), + }; + + let current_remote_commitment_number = >::read(reader)?.0; + + let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; + let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32)); + let mut sha = Sha256::new(); + for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len { + let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?; + sha.reset(); + sha.input(&preimage.0[..]); + let mut hash = PaymentHash([0; 32]); + sha.result(&mut hash.0[..]); + if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) { + return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); + } + } + + let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?; + let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?; + + Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor { + commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, + + key_storage, + their_htlc_base_key, + their_delayed_payment_base_key, + their_cur_revocation_points, + + our_to_self_delay, + their_to_self_delay, + + old_secrets, + remote_claimable_outpoints, + remote_commitment_txn_on_chain, + remote_hash_commitment_number, + + prev_local_signed_commitment_tx, + current_local_signed_commitment_tx, + current_remote_commitment_number, + + payment_preimages, + + destination_script, + last_block_hash, + secp_ctx, + logger, + })) } + } #[cfg(test)] @@ -1293,12 +2117,15 @@ mod tests { use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction; use crypto::digest::Digest; use hex; + use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash}; use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor; use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys}; use util::sha2::Sha256; + use util::test_utils::TestLogger; use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey}; use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature}; use rand::{thread_rng,Rng}; + use std::sync::Arc; #[test] fn test_per_commitment_storage() { @@ -1306,6 +2133,7 @@ mod tests { let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new(); let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor; let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); + let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new()); macro_rules! test_secrets { () => { @@ -1315,341 +2143,341 @@ mod tests { idx -= 1; } assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1); - assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_err()); + assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none()); }; } { // insert_secret correct sequence - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new()); + monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); secrets.clear(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); } { // insert_secret #1 incorrect - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new()); + monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); secrets.clear(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap()); - assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err, + assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0, "Previous secret did not match new one"); } { // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect) - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new()); + monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); secrets.clear(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); - assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err, + assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0, "Previous secret did not match new one"); } { // insert_secret #3 incorrect - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new()); + monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); secrets.clear(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); - assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err, + assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0, "Previous secret did not match new one"); } { // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect) - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new()); + monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); secrets.clear(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap()); - assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err, + assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0, "Previous secret did not match new one"); } { // insert_secret #5 incorrect - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new()); + monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); secrets.clear(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap()); - assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err, + assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0, "Previous secret did not match new one"); } { // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect) - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new()); + monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); secrets.clear(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap()); - assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err, + assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0, "Previous secret did not match new one"); } { // insert_secret #7 incorrect - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new()); + monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); secrets.clear(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap()); - assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err, + assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0, "Previous secret did not match new one"); } { // insert_secret #8 incorrect - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new()); + monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); secrets.clear(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap()); - assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err, + assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0, "Previous secret did not match new one"); } } @@ -1657,17 +2485,21 @@ mod tests { #[test] fn test_prune_preimages() { let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); + let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new()); let dummy_sig = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(); + let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap()); macro_rules! dummy_keys { () => { - TxCreationKeys { - per_commitment_point: PublicKey::new(), - revocation_key: PublicKey::new(), - a_htlc_key: PublicKey::new(), - b_htlc_key: PublicKey::new(), - a_delayed_payment_key: PublicKey::new(), - b_payment_key: PublicKey::new(), + { + TxCreationKeys { + per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(), + revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(), + a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(), + b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(), + a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(), + b_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(), + } } } } @@ -1677,12 +2509,12 @@ mod tests { { let mut rng = thread_rng(); for _ in 0..20 { - let mut preimage = [0; 32]; - rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage); + let mut preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]); + rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage.0[..]); let mut sha = Sha256::new(); - sha.input(&preimage); - let mut hash = [0; 32]; - sha.result(&mut hash); + sha.input(&preimage.0[..]); + let mut hash = PaymentHash([0; 32]); + sha.result(&mut hash.0[..]); preimages.push((preimage, hash)); } } @@ -1724,14 +2556,14 @@ mod tests { // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the // old state. - let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new()); + let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(10); - monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])); - monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655); - monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654); - monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653); - monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652); + monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]), Vec::new()); + monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), Vec::new(), 281474976710655, dummy_key); + monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), Vec::new(), 281474976710654, dummy_key); + monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), Vec::new(), 281474976710653, dummy_key); + monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), Vec::new(), 281474976710652, dummy_key); for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() { monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage); } @@ -1739,31 +2571,31 @@ mod tests { // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15 let mut secret = [0; 32]; secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap(); assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15); test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor); test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor); // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap(); assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13); test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor); test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor); // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the // previous commitment tx's preimages too - monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5])); + monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]), Vec::new()); secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap(); assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12); test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor); test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor); // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10 - monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3])); + monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]), Vec::new()); secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap(); assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5); test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor); }