X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=src%2Fln%2Fchannelmonitor.rs;h=d212a3fdbe43b960ffd2a0fe4e46fd366522aae3;hb=0b82f5584f31e45ef2c176041c1121181c061bc9;hp=2b4d28e14d48aa5549d5c12dff2c509e32e3e44b;hpb=f9ec0a76d4a1bb6a1eee62b8775b2c239b4672e8;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs b/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs index 2b4d28e1..d212a3fd 100644 --- a/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs +++ b/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader; use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction}; use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script; +use bitcoin::network::serialize; use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash; use bitcoin::util::bip143; @@ -13,7 +14,9 @@ use ln::msgs::HandleError; use ln::chan_utils; use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment; use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface}; +use chain::transaction::OutPoint; use util::sha2::Sha256; +use util::byte_utils; use std::collections::HashMap; use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex}; @@ -42,8 +45,8 @@ pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr { /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel! pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync { - /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given funding_txid+funding_output_index. - fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: (Sha256dHash, u16), monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>; + /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`. + fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>; } /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a @@ -53,7 +56,7 @@ pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync { /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates. /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use -/// (Sha256dHash, u16) as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation. +/// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation. pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor { monitors: Mutex>, chain_monitor: Arc, @@ -91,15 +94,15 @@ impl SimpleManyChannelMonitor }; match monitor.funding_txo { None => self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn(), - Some((funding_txid, funding_output_index)) => self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((funding_txid, funding_output_index as u32)), + Some(outpoint) => self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32)), } monitors.insert(key, monitor); Ok(()) } } -impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<(Sha256dHash, u16)> { - fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: (Sha256dHash, u16), monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> { +impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor { + fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> { match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) { Ok(_) => Ok(()), Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure), @@ -114,7 +117,7 @@ const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12; /// HTLC-Success transaction. const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6; -#[derive(Clone)] +#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)] enum KeyStorage { PrivMode { revocation_base_key: SecretKey, @@ -127,8 +130,9 @@ enum KeyStorage { } } -#[derive(Clone)] +#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)] struct LocalSignedTx { + /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster txid: Sha256dHash, tx: Transaction, revocation_key: PublicKey, @@ -139,8 +143,11 @@ struct LocalSignedTx { htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>, } +const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1; +const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1; + pub struct ChannelMonitor { - funding_txo: Option<(Sha256dHash, u16)>, + funding_txo: Option, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64, key_storage: KeyStorage, @@ -154,9 +161,16 @@ pub struct ChannelMonitor { old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49], remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap>, - remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain: Mutex>, - //hash to commitment number mapping use to determine the state of transaction owning it - // (revoked/non-revoked) and so lightnen pruning + /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain. + /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are + /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote + /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which + /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions. + remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex>, + /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster. + /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked + /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small). + /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers. remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<[u8; 32], u64>, // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update @@ -187,7 +201,7 @@ impl Clone for ChannelMonitor { old_secrets: self.old_secrets.clone(), remote_claimable_outpoints: self.remote_claimable_outpoints.clone(), - remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain: Mutex::new((*self.remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain.lock().unwrap()).clone()), + remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new((*self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap()).clone()), remote_hash_commitment_number: self.remote_hash_commitment_number.clone(), prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.clone(), @@ -201,6 +215,40 @@ impl Clone for ChannelMonitor { } } +#[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))] +/// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the +/// underlying object +impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor { + fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool { + if self.funding_txo != other.funding_txo || + self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor || + self.key_storage != other.key_storage || + self.delayed_payment_base_key != other.delayed_payment_base_key || + self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key || + self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points || + self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay || + self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay || + self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints || + self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number || + self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx || + self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx || + self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages || + self.destination_script != other.destination_script + { + false + } else { + for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) { + if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx { + return false + } + } + let us = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap(); + let them = other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap(); + *us == *them + } + } +} + impl ChannelMonitor { pub fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script) -> ChannelMonitor { ChannelMonitor { @@ -220,7 +268,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49], remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(), - remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()), + remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()), remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(), prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None, @@ -263,7 +311,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { /// in case the remote end force-closes using their latest state. Prunes old preimages if neither /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key). - pub fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32], their_next_revocation_point: Option<(u64, PublicKey)>) -> Result<(), HandleError> { + pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32], their_next_revocation_point: Option<(u64, PublicKey)>) -> Result<(), HandleError> { let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx); for i in 0..pos { let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize]; @@ -294,28 +342,36 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } } - let mut waste_hash_state : Vec<[u8;32]> = Vec::new(); - { - let local_signed_commitment_tx = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx; - let remote_hash_commitment_number = &self.remote_hash_commitment_number; + if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() { + let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !"); + let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref(); let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret(); + let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number; + self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| { - for &(ref htlc, _s1, _s2) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !").htlc_outputs { + for &(ref htlc, _, _) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs { + if k == htlc.payment_hash { + return true + } + } + if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx { + for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() { if k == htlc.payment_hash { return true } } - if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) { - if *cn < min_idx { - return true - } + } + let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) { + if *cn < min_idx { + return true } - waste_hash_state.push(k); - false - }); - } - for h in waste_hash_state { - self.remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&h); + true + } else { false }; + if contains { + remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k); + } + false + }); } Ok(()) @@ -325,7 +381,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible. /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers. - pub fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec, commitment_number: u64) { + pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec, commitment_number: u64) { // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close. // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of @@ -341,7 +397,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated. /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called. - pub fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>) { + pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>) { assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some()); self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take(); self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx { @@ -358,7 +414,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked. - pub fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], payment_preimage: &[u8; 32]) { + pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], payment_preimage: &[u8; 32]) { self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone()); } @@ -393,7 +449,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits - pub fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) { + pub(super) fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) { assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48)); self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor; } @@ -402,26 +458,405 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it /// provides slightly better privacy. - pub fn set_funding_info(&mut self, funding_txid: Sha256dHash, funding_output_index: u16) { - self.funding_txo = Some((funding_txid, funding_output_index)); + pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, funding_info: OutPoint) { + self.funding_txo = Some(funding_info); } - pub fn set_their_htlc_base_key(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey) { + pub(super) fn set_their_htlc_base_key(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey) { self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone()); } - pub fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) { + pub(super) fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) { self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay); } - pub fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) { + pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) { self.funding_txo = None; } - pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<(Sha256dHash, u16)> { + pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option { self.funding_txo } + /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns + fn serialize(&self, for_local_storage: bool) -> Vec { + let mut res = Vec::new(); + res.push(SERIALIZATION_VERSION); + res.push(MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION); + + match self.funding_txo { + Some(outpoint) => { + res.extend_from_slice(&outpoint.txid[..]); + res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index)); + }, + None => { + // We haven't even been initialized...not sure why anyone is serializing us, but + // not much to give them. + return res; + }, + } + + // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now: + res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor)); + + match self.key_storage { + KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key } => { + res.push(0); + res.extend_from_slice(&revocation_base_key[..]); + res.extend_from_slice(&htlc_base_key[..]); + }, + KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => unimplemented!(), + } + + res.extend_from_slice(&self.delayed_payment_base_key.serialize()); + res.extend_from_slice(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize()); + + match self.their_cur_revocation_points { + Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => { + res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx)); + res.extend_from_slice(&pubkey.serialize()); + match second_option { + Some(second_pubkey) => { + res.extend_from_slice(&second_pubkey.serialize()); + }, + None => { + res.extend_from_slice(&[0; 33]); + }, + } + }, + None => { + res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0)); + }, + } + + res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay)); + res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap())); + + for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() { + res.extend_from_slice(secret); + res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx)); + } + + macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment { + ($htlc_output: expr) => { + res.push($htlc_output.offered as u8); + res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat)); + res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry)); + res.extend_from_slice(&$htlc_output.payment_hash); + res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.transaction_output_index)); + } + } + + res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64)); + for (txid, htlc_outputs) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() { + res.extend_from_slice(&txid[..]); + res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_outputs.len() as u64)); + for htlc_output in htlc_outputs.iter() { + serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output); + } + } + + { + let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap(); + res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64)); + for (txid, commitment_number) in remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() { + res.extend_from_slice(&txid[..]); + res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number)); + } + } + + if for_local_storage { + res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64)); + for (payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() { + res.extend_from_slice(payment_hash); + res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number)); + } + } else { + res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0)); + } + + macro_rules! serialize_local_tx { + ($local_tx: expr) => { + let tx_ser = serialize::serialize(&$local_tx.tx).unwrap(); + res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(tx_ser.len() as u64)); + res.extend_from_slice(&tx_ser); + + res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize()); + res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize()); + res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize()); + res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize()); + + res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw)); + res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64)); + for &(ref htlc_output, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() { + serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output); + res.extend_from_slice(&their_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx)); + res.extend_from_slice(&our_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx)); + } + } + } + + if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx { + res.push(1); + serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx); + } else { + res.push(0); + } + + if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx { + res.push(1); + serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx); + } else { + res.push(0); + } + + res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64)); + for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() { + res.extend_from_slice(payment_preimage); + } + + res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.destination_script.len() as u64)); + res.extend_from_slice(&self.destination_script[..]); + + res + } + + /// Encodes this monitor into a byte array, suitable for writing to disk. + pub fn serialize_for_disk(&self) -> Vec { + self.serialize(true) + } + + /// Encodes this monitor into a byte array, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower + pub fn serialize_for_watchtower(&self) -> Vec { + self.serialize(false) + } + + /// Attempts to decode a serialized monitor + pub fn deserialize(data: &[u8]) -> Option { + let mut read_pos = 0; + macro_rules! read_bytes { + ($byte_count: expr) => { + { + if ($byte_count as usize) > data.len() - read_pos { + return None; + } + read_pos += $byte_count as usize; + &data[read_pos - $byte_count as usize..read_pos] + } + } + } + + let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); + macro_rules! unwrap_obj { + ($key: expr) => { + match $key { + Ok(res) => res, + Err(_) => return None, + } + } + } + + let _ver = read_bytes!(1)[0]; + let min_ver = read_bytes!(1)[0]; + if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION { + return None; + } + + // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of + // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with. + let funding_txo = Some(OutPoint { + txid: Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32)), + index: byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2)), + }); + let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6)); + + let key_storage = match read_bytes!(1)[0] { + 0 => { + KeyStorage::PrivMode { + revocation_base_key: unwrap_obj!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(32))), + htlc_base_key: unwrap_obj!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(32))), + } + }, + _ => return None, + }; + + let delayed_payment_base_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33))); + let their_htlc_base_key = Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)))); + + let their_cur_revocation_points = { + let first_idx = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6)); + if first_idx == 0 { + None + } else { + let first_point = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33))); + let second_point_slice = read_bytes!(33); + if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 { + Some((first_idx, first_point, None)) + } else { + Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, second_point_slice))))) + } + } + }; + + let our_to_self_delay = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2)); + let their_to_self_delay = Some(byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2))); + + let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49]; + for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() { + secret.copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32)); + *idx = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8)); + } + + macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment { + () => { + { + let offered = match read_bytes!(1)[0] { + 0 => false, 1 => true, + _ => return None, + }; + let amount_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8)); + let cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(read_bytes!(4)); + let mut payment_hash = [0; 32]; + payment_hash[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32)); + let transaction_output_index = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(read_bytes!(4)); + + HTLCOutputInCommitment { + offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index + } + } + } + } + + let remote_claimable_outpoints_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8)); + if remote_claimable_outpoints_len > data.len() as u64 / 64 { return None; } + let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize); + for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len { + let txid = Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32)); + let outputs_count = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8)); + if outputs_count > data.len() as u64 * 32 { return None; } + let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(outputs_count as usize); + for _ in 0..outputs_count { + outputs.push(read_htlc_in_commitment!()); + } + if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, outputs) { + return None; + } + } + + let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8)); + if remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return None; } + let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize); + for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len { + let txid = Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32)); + let commitment_number = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6)); + if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, commitment_number) { + return None; + } + } + + let remote_hash_commitment_number_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8)); + if remote_hash_commitment_number_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return None; } + let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize); + for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len { + let mut txid = [0; 32]; + txid[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32)); + let commitment_number = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6)); + if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(txid, commitment_number) { + return None; + } + } + + macro_rules! read_local_tx { + () => { + { + let tx_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8)); + let tx: Transaction = unwrap_obj!(serialize::deserialize(read_bytes!(tx_len))); + + let revocation_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33))); + let a_htlc_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33))); + let b_htlc_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33))); + let delayed_payment_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33))); + let feerate_per_kw = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8)); + + let htlc_outputs_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8)); + if htlc_outputs_len > data.len() as u64 / 128 { return None; } + let mut htlc_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs_len as usize); + for _ in 0..htlc_outputs_len { + htlc_outputs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), + unwrap_obj!(Signature::from_compact(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(64))), + unwrap_obj!(Signature::from_compact(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(64))))); + } + + LocalSignedTx { + txid: tx.txid(), + tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs + } + } + } + } + + let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match read_bytes!(1)[0] { + 0 => None, + 1 => { + Some(read_local_tx!()) + }, + _ => return None, + }; + + let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match read_bytes!(1)[0] { + 0 => None, + 1 => { + Some(read_local_tx!()) + }, + _ => return None, + }; + + let payment_preimages_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8)); + if payment_preimages_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return None; } + let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(payment_preimages_len as usize); + let mut sha = Sha256::new(); + for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len { + let mut preimage = [0; 32]; + preimage[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32)); + sha.reset(); + sha.input(&preimage); + let mut hash = [0; 32]; + sha.result(&mut hash); + if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) { + return None; + } + } + + let destination_script_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8)); + let destination_script = Script::from(read_bytes!(destination_script_len).to_vec()); + + Some(ChannelMonitor { + funding_txo, + commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, + + key_storage, + delayed_payment_base_key, + their_htlc_base_key, + their_cur_revocation_points, + + our_to_self_delay, + their_to_self_delay, + + old_secrets, + remote_claimable_outpoints, + remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain), + remote_hash_commitment_number, + + prev_local_signed_commitment_tx, + current_local_signed_commitment_tx, + + payment_preimages, + + destination_script, + secp_ctx, + }) + } + //TODO: Functions to serialize/deserialize (with different forms depending on which information //we want to leave out (eg funding_txo, etc). @@ -582,10 +1017,10 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } } - if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() { + if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction! // TODO: Register commitment_txid with the ChainWatchInterface! - self.remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number); + self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number); } if inputs.is_empty() { return txn_to_broadcast; } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx @@ -610,6 +1045,15 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx); } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option { + // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty + // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is + // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could + // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has + // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry + // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and + // insert it here. + self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number); + if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points { let revocation_point_option = if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) } @@ -714,7 +1158,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } } } else { - //TODO: For each input check if its in our remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain map! + //TODO: For each input check if its in our remote_commitment_txn_on_chain map! } txn_to_broadcast @@ -781,7 +1225,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { fn block_connected(&self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface) { for tx in txn_matched { for txin in tx.input.iter() { - if self.funding_txo.is_none() || (txin.prev_hash == self.funding_txo.unwrap().0 && txin.prev_index == self.funding_txo.unwrap().1 as u32) { + if self.funding_txo.is_none() || (txin.prev_hash == self.funding_txo.unwrap().txid && txin.prev_index == self.funding_txo.unwrap().index as u32) { let mut txn = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height); if txn.is_empty() { txn = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height); @@ -829,15 +1273,14 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { mod tests { use bitcoin::util::misc::hex_bytes; use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script; - use bitcoin::util::hash::{Hash160,Sha256dHash}; use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction; + use crypto::digest::Digest; use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor; - use ln::channelmonitor::LocalSignedTx; - use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment; + use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys}; + use util::sha2::Sha256; use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey}; use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature}; use rand::{thread_rng,Rng}; - use std::collections::HashMap; #[test] fn test_per_commitment_storage() { @@ -1193,162 +1636,118 @@ mod tests { } } - macro_rules! gen_local_tx { - ($hex : expr, $monitor : expr, $htlcs : expr, $rng : expr, $preimage : expr, $hash : expr) => { - { - - let mut htlcs = Vec::new(); - - for _i in 0..$htlcs { - $rng.fill_bytes(&mut $preimage); - $hash[0..20].clone_from_slice(&Hash160::from_data(&$preimage)[0..20]); - $monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&$hash, &$preimage); - htlcs.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment { - offered : true, - amount_msat : 0, - cltv_expiry : 0, - payment_hash : $hash.clone(), - transaction_output_index : 0, - }, Signature::from_der(&Secp256k1::new(), $hex).unwrap(), - Signature::from_der(&Secp256k1::new(), $hex).unwrap())) - } + #[test] + fn test_prune_preimages() { + let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); + let dummy_sig = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(); - Some(LocalSignedTx { - txid: Sha256dHash::from_data(&[]), - tx: Transaction { - version: 0, - lock_time: 0, - input: Vec::new(), - output: Vec::new(), - }, + macro_rules! dummy_keys { + () => { + TxCreationKeys { + per_commitment_point: PublicKey::new(), revocation_key: PublicKey::new(), a_htlc_key: PublicKey::new(), b_htlc_key: PublicKey::new(), - delayed_payment_key: PublicKey::new(), - feerate_per_kw: 0, - htlc_outputs: htlcs, - }) + a_delayed_payment_key: PublicKey::new(), + b_payment_key: PublicKey::new(), + } } } - } + let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() }; - macro_rules! gen_remote_outpoints { - ($monitor : expr, $tx : expr, $htlcs : expr, $rng : expr, $preimage : expr, $hash: expr, $number : expr) => { - { - let mut commitment_number = $number; - - for i in 0..$tx { - - let tx_zero = Transaction { - version : 0, - lock_time : i, - input : Vec::new(), - output: Vec::new(), - }; + let mut preimages = Vec::new(); + { + let mut rng = thread_rng(); + for _ in 0..20 { + let mut preimage = [0; 32]; + rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage); + let mut sha = Sha256::new(); + sha.input(&preimage); + let mut hash = [0; 32]; + sha.result(&mut hash); + preimages.push((preimage, hash)); + } + } - let mut htlcs = Vec::new(); - - for _i in 0..$htlcs { - $rng.fill_bytes(&mut $preimage); - $hash[0..20].clone_from_slice(&Hash160::from_data(&$preimage)[0..20]); - $monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&$hash, &$preimage); - htlcs.push(HTLCOutputInCommitment { - offered : true, - amount_msat : 0, - cltv_expiry : 0, - payment_hash : $hash.clone(), - transaction_output_index : 0, + macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs { + ($preimages_slice: expr) => { + { + let mut res = Vec::new(); + for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() { + res.push(HTLCOutputInCommitment { + offered: true, + amount_msat: 0, + cltv_expiry: 0, + payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(), + transaction_output_index: idx as u32, }); } - commitment_number -= 1; - $monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&tx_zero, htlcs, commitment_number); + res } } } - } - - #[test] - fn test_prune_preimages() { - - let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor; - let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new(); - let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); - let mut preimage: [u8;32] = [0;32]; - let mut hash: [u8;32] = [0;32]; - let mut rng = thread_rng(); - - { - // insert 30 random hash, 10 from local, 10 from remote, prune 30/50 - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new()); - - for _i in 0..30 { - rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage); - hash[0..20].clone_from_slice(&Hash160::from_data(&preimage)[0..20]); - monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&hash, &preimage); + macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs { + ($preimages_slice: expr) => { + { + let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice); + let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e, dummy_sig.clone(), dummy_sig.clone()) }).collect(); + res + } } - monitor.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = gen_local_tx!(&hex_bytes("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..], monitor, 10, rng, preimage, hash); - gen_remote_outpoints!(monitor, 1, 10, rng, preimage, hash, 281474976710654); - secrets.clear(); - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None); - assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 20); } - - { - // insert 30 random hash, prune 30/30 - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new()); - - for _i in 0..30 { - rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage); - hash[0..20].clone_from_slice(&Hash160::from_data(&preimage)[0..20]); - monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&hash, &preimage); + macro_rules! test_preimages_exist { + ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => { + for preimage in $preimages_slice { + assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1)); + } } - monitor.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = gen_local_tx!(&hex_bytes("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..], monitor, 0, rng, preimage, hash); - gen_remote_outpoints!(monitor, 0, 0, rng, preimage, hash, 281474976710655); - secrets.clear(); - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None); - assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 0); } - { - // insert 30 random hash, 25 on 5 remotes, prune 30/55 - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new()); - - for _i in 0..30 { - rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage); - hash[0..20].clone_from_slice(&Hash160::from_data(&preimage)[0..20]); - monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&hash, &preimage); - } - monitor.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = gen_local_tx!(&hex_bytes("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..], monitor, 0, rng, preimage, hash); - gen_remote_outpoints!(monitor, 5, 5, rng, preimage, hash, 281474976710654); - secrets.clear(); - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None); - assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 25); + // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the + // old state. + let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new()); + monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(10); + + monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])); + monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655); + monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654); + monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653); + monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652); + for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() { + monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage); } - { - // insert 30 random hash, 25 from local, prune 30/55 - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new()); - - for _i in 0..30 { - rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage); - hash[0..20].clone_from_slice(&Hash160::from_data(&preimage)[0..20]); - monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&hash, &preimage); - } - monitor.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = gen_local_tx!(&hex_bytes("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..], monitor, 25, rng, preimage, hash); - gen_remote_outpoints!(monitor, 0, 0, rng, preimage, hash, 281474976710655); - secrets.clear(); - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None); - assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 25); - } + // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15 + let mut secret = [0; 32]; + secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone(), None).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15); + test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor); + test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor); + + // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17 + secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap()); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone(), None).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13); + test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor); + test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor); + + // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the + // previous commitment tx's preimages too + monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5])); + secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap()); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone(), None).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12); + test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor); + test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor); + + // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10 + monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3])); + secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone(), None).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5); + test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor); } // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.