X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=src%2Fln%2Fchannelmonitor.rs;h=d50c73f6dcd5de61da0b82093188e722c1f39460;hb=315589076609d574c4367046d7270f18957cad1b;hp=5adfe926ce278f8d7c9858f00c13823354340714;hpb=8c235d9e28da0bcdb1d68166fc771e0c83a7b2fc;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs b/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs index 5adfe926..d50c73f6 100644 --- a/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs +++ b/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs @@ -14,9 +14,10 @@ use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader; use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction}; use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint; -use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script; -use bitcoin::network::serialize; -use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash; +use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder}; +use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes; +use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{self, Decodable, Encodable}; +use bitcoin::util::hash::{Hash160, BitcoinHash,Sha256dHash}; use bitcoin::util::bip143; use crypto::digest::Digest; @@ -25,13 +26,14 @@ use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature}; use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey}; use secp256k1; -use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, HandleError}; +use ln::msgs::DecodeError; use ln::chan_utils; use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment; use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface}; use chain::transaction::OutPoint; use chain::keysinterface::SpendableOutputDescriptor; -use util::ser::{Readable, Writer}; +use util::logger::Logger; +use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writer, Writeable, WriterWriteAdaptor, U48}; use util::sha2::Sha256; use util::{byte_utils, events}; @@ -72,6 +74,14 @@ pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr { PermanentFailure, } +/// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is +/// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::insert_combine this +/// means you tried to merge two monitors for different channels or for a channel which was +/// restored from a backup and then generated new commitment updates. +/// Contains a human-readable error message. +#[derive(Debug)] +pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str); + /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote @@ -109,15 +119,17 @@ pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor { chain_monitor: Arc, broadcaster: Arc, pending_events: Mutex>, + logger: Arc, } impl ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor { - fn block_connected(&self, _header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) { + fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) { + let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash(); let mut new_events: Vec = Vec::with_capacity(0); { - let monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap(); - for monitor in monitors.values() { - let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &*self.broadcaster); + let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap(); + for monitor in monitors.values_mut() { + let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster); if spendable_outputs.len() > 0 { new_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs: spendable_outputs, @@ -140,12 +152,13 @@ impl ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonit impl SimpleManyChannelMonitor { /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain /// interface with which to register to receive notifications. - pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc, broadcaster: Arc) -> Arc> { + pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc, broadcaster: Arc, logger: Arc) -> Arc> { let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor { monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()), chain_monitor, broadcaster, pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), + logger, }); let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res); res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res); @@ -153,15 +166,22 @@ impl SimpleManyChannelMonitor } /// Adds or udpates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key. - pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> { + pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> { let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap(); match monitors.get_mut(&key) { - Some(orig_monitor) => return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor), + Some(orig_monitor) => { + log_trace!(self, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_option!(monitor.funding_txo)); + return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor); + }, None => {} }; match &monitor.funding_txo { - &None => self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn(), + &None => { + log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for no-funding-set channel (monitoring all txn!)"); + self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn() + }, &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => { + log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(outpoint.to_channel_id()[..])); self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script); self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script); }, @@ -208,6 +228,8 @@ enum KeyStorage { revocation_base_key: SecretKey, htlc_base_key: SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey, + payment_base_key: SecretKey, + shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey, prev_latest_per_commitment_point: Option, latest_per_commitment_point: Option, }, @@ -239,6 +261,7 @@ const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1; /// /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date /// information and are actively monitoring the chain. +#[derive(Clone)] pub struct ChannelMonitor { funding_txo: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64, @@ -259,7 +282,7 @@ pub struct ChannelMonitor { /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions. - remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex>, + remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap)>, /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster. /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small). @@ -273,39 +296,22 @@ pub struct ChannelMonitor { prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option, current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option, + // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during + // deserialization + current_remote_commitment_number: u64, + payment_preimages: HashMap<[u8; 32], [u8; 32]>, destination_script: Script, - secp_ctx: Secp256k1, //TODO: dedup this a bit... -} -impl Clone for ChannelMonitor { - fn clone(&self) -> Self { - ChannelMonitor { - funding_txo: self.funding_txo.clone(), - commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor.clone(), - - key_storage: self.key_storage.clone(), - their_htlc_base_key: self.their_htlc_base_key.clone(), - their_delayed_payment_base_key: self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone(), - their_cur_revocation_points: self.their_cur_revocation_points.clone(), - our_to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay, - their_to_self_delay: self.their_to_self_delay, - - old_secrets: self.old_secrets.clone(), - remote_claimable_outpoints: self.remote_claimable_outpoints.clone(), - remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new((*self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap()).clone()), - remote_hash_commitment_number: self.remote_hash_commitment_number.clone(), - - prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.clone(), - current_local_signed_commitment_tx: self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.clone(), - - payment_preimages: self.payment_preimages.clone(), - - destination_script: self.destination_script.clone(), - secp_ctx: self.secp_ctx.clone(), - } - } + // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is + // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way. + // (we do *not*, however, update them in insert_combine to ensure any local user copies keep + // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through + // the full block_connected). + pub(crate) last_block_hash: Sha256dHash, + secp_ctx: Secp256k1, //TODO: dedup this a bit... + logger: Arc, } #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))] @@ -322,8 +328,10 @@ impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor { self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay || self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay || self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints || + self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain || self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number || self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx || + self.current_remote_commitment_number != other.current_remote_commitment_number || self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx || self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages || self.destination_script != other.destination_script @@ -335,15 +343,13 @@ impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor { return false } } - let us = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap(); - let them = other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap(); - *us == *them + true } } } impl ChannelMonitor { - pub(super) fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script) -> ChannelMonitor { + pub(super) fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, payment_base_key: &SecretKey, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script, logger: Arc) -> ChannelMonitor { ChannelMonitor { funding_txo: None, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0, @@ -352,6 +358,8 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(), htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(), delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(), + payment_base_key: payment_base_key.clone(), + shutdown_pubkey: shutdown_pubkey.clone(), prev_latest_per_commitment_point: None, latest_per_commitment_point: None, }, @@ -364,16 +372,19 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49], remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(), - remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()), + remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(), remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(), prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None, current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None, + current_remote_commitment_number: 1 << 48, payment_preimages: HashMap::new(), - destination_script: destination_script, + + last_block_hash: Default::default(), secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(), + logger, } } @@ -402,42 +413,19 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { res } - /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Also optionally tracks the next - /// revocation point which may be required to claim HTLC outputs which we know the preimage of - /// in case the remote end force-closes using their latest state. Prunes old preimages if neither + /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key). - pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32], their_next_revocation_point: Option<(u64, PublicKey)>) -> Result<(), HandleError> { + pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> { let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx); for i in 0..pos { let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize]; if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret { - return Err(HandleError{err: "Previous secret did not match new one", action: None}) + return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one")); } } self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx); - if let Some(new_revocation_point) = their_next_revocation_point { - match self.their_cur_revocation_points { - Some(old_points) => { - if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 1 { - self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(new_revocation_point.1))); - } else if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 2 { - if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 { - self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(new_revocation_point.1))); - } else { - self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None)); - } - } else { - self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None)); - } - }, - None => { - self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None)); - } - } - } - if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() { let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !"); let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref(); @@ -473,6 +461,32 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { Ok(()) } + /// Tracks the next revocation point which may be required to claim HTLC outputs which we know + /// the preimage of in case the remote end force-closes using their latest state. When called at + /// channel opening revocation point is the CURRENT one used for first commitment tx. Needed in case of sizeable push_msat. + pub(super) fn provide_their_next_revocation_point(&mut self, their_next_revocation_point: Option<(u64, PublicKey)>) { + if let Some(new_revocation_point) = their_next_revocation_point { + match self.their_cur_revocation_points { + Some(old_points) => { + if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 1 { + self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(new_revocation_point.1))); + } else if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 2 { + if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 { + self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(new_revocation_point.1))); + } else { + self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None)); + } + } else { + self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None)); + } + }, + None => { + self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None)); + } + } + } + } + /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction. /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible. @@ -486,6 +500,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number); } self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(unsigned_commitment_tx.txid(), htlc_outputs); + self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number; } /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The @@ -508,11 +523,13 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs, }); - self.key_storage = if let KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, prev_latest_per_commitment_point: _, ref latest_per_commitment_point } = self.key_storage { + self.key_storage = if let KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } = self.key_storage { KeyStorage::PrivMode { revocation_base_key: *revocation_base_key, htlc_base_key: *htlc_base_key, delayed_payment_base_key: *delayed_payment_base_key, + payment_base_key: *payment_base_key, + shutdown_pubkey: *shutdown_pubkey, prev_latest_per_commitment_point: *latest_per_commitment_point, latest_per_commitment_point: Some(local_keys.per_commitment_point), } @@ -528,12 +545,12 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { /// Combines this ChannelMonitor with the information contained in the other ChannelMonitor. /// After a successful call this ChannelMonitor is up-to-date and is safe to use to monitor the /// chain for new blocks/transactions. - pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> { + pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> { if self.funding_txo.is_some() { // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget its trivially // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey. if other.funding_txo.is_some() && other.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0 != self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0 { - return Err(HandleError{err: "Funding transaction outputs are not identical!", action: None}); + return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Funding transaction outputs are not identical!")); } } else { self.funding_txo = other.funding_txo.take(); @@ -541,8 +558,19 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret(); let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret(); if our_min_secret > other_min_secret { - self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap(), None)?; + self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap())?; + } + if let Some(ref local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx { + if let Some(ref other_local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx { + let our_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor); + let other_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((other_local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (other_local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor); + if our_commitment_number >= other_commitment_number { + self.key_storage = other.key_storage; + } + } } + // TODO: We should use current_remote_commitment_number and the commitment number out of + // local transactions to decide how to merge if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret { self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points; for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() { @@ -556,6 +584,8 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages; } + + self.current_remote_commitment_number = cmp::min(self.current_remote_commitment_number, other.current_remote_commitment_number); Ok(()) } @@ -597,6 +627,20 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } } + /// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of. + /// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of + /// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note + /// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!). + pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Sha256dHash, u32, &Script)> { + let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2); + for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() { + for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() { + res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output)); + } + } + res + } + /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns fn write(&self, writer: &mut W, for_local_storage: bool) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> { //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy @@ -608,8 +652,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => { writer.write_all(&outpoint.txid[..])?; writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index))?; - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(script.len() as u64))?; - writer.write_all(&script[..])?; + script.write(writer)?; }, &None => { // We haven't even been initialized...not sure why anyone is serializing us, but @@ -619,14 +662,16 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now: - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor))?; + U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?; match self.key_storage { - KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point } => { + KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point } => { writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?; writer.write_all(&revocation_base_key[..])?; writer.write_all(&htlc_base_key[..])?; writer.write_all(&delayed_payment_base_key[..])?; + writer.write_all(&payment_base_key[..])?; + writer.write_all(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize())?; if let Some(ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point) = *prev_latest_per_commitment_point { writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?; writer.write_all(&prev_latest_per_commitment_point.serialize())?; @@ -684,7 +729,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?; - for (txid, htlc_outputs) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() { + for (ref txid, ref htlc_outputs) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() { writer.write_all(&txid[..])?; writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?; for htlc_output in htlc_outputs.iter() { @@ -692,19 +737,20 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } } - { - let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap(); - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?; - for (txid, commitment_number) in remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() { - writer.write_all(&txid[..])?; - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?; + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?; + for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() { + writer.write_all(&txid[..])?; + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?; + (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?; + for script in txouts.iter() { + script.write(writer)?; } } if for_local_storage { writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?; - for (payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() { - writer.write_all(payment_hash)?; + for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() { + writer.write_all(*payment_hash)?; writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?; } } else { @@ -713,9 +759,12 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { macro_rules! serialize_local_tx { ($local_tx: expr) => { - let tx_ser = serialize::serialize(&$local_tx.tx).unwrap(); - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(tx_ser.len() as u64))?; - writer.write_all(&tx_ser)?; + if let Err(e) = $local_tx.tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) { + match e { + encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e), + _ => panic!("local tx must have been well-formed!"), + } + } writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?; writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?; @@ -746,23 +795,41 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?; } + if for_local_storage { + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_remote_commitment_number))?; + } else { + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?; + } + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?; for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() { writer.write_all(payment_preimage)?; } - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.destination_script.len() as u64))?; - writer.write_all(&self.destination_script[..])?; + self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?; + self.destination_script.write(writer)?; Ok(()) } /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk. + /// + /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which + /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along + /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest + /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the + /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object! pub fn write_for_disk(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> { self.write(writer, true) } /// Encodes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower + /// + /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which + /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along + /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest + /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the + /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object! pub fn write_for_watchtower(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> { self.write(writer, false) } @@ -771,14 +838,14 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { //we want to leave out (eg funding_txo, etc). /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret - pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Result<[u8; 32], HandleError> { + pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> { for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() { if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 { - return Ok(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx)) + return Some(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx)) } } assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret()); - Err(HandleError{err: "idx too low", action: None}) + None } pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 { @@ -792,11 +859,21 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { min } + pub(super) fn get_cur_remote_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 { + self.current_remote_commitment_number + } + + pub(super) fn get_cur_local_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 { + if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx { + 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor) + } else { 0xffff_ffff_ffff } + } + /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions. - fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec, (Sha256dHash, Vec), Vec) { + fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec, (Sha256dHash, Vec), Vec) { // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new(); @@ -859,7 +936,23 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { htlc_idxs.push(None); values.push(outp.value); total_value += outp.value; - break; // There can only be one of these + } else if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() { + match self.key_storage { + KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref payment_base_key, .. } => { + let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key); + if let Ok(local_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &payment_base_key) { + spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH { + outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 }, + key: local_key, + output: outp.clone(), + }); + } + } + KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => { + //TODO: we need to ensure an offline client will generate the event when it + // cames back online after only the watchtower saw the transaction + } + } } } @@ -936,7 +1029,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction! watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone()); - self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number); + self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect())); } if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx @@ -973,7 +1066,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and // insert it here. watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone()); - self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number); + self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect())); if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points { let revocation_point_option = @@ -997,6 +1090,28 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)), }; + + for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { + if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() { + match self.key_storage { + KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref payment_base_key, .. } => { + if let Ok(local_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_point, &payment_base_key) { + spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH { + outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 }, + key: local_key, + output: outp.clone(), + }); + } + } + KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => { + //TODO: we need to ensure an offline client will generate the event when it + // cames back online after only the watchtower saw the transaction + } + } + break; // Only to_remote ouput is claimable + } + } + let mut total_value = 0; let mut values = Vec::new(); let mut inputs = Vec::new(); @@ -1108,7 +1223,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { }; } - let secret = ignore_error!(self.get_secret(commitment_number)); + let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (None, None); }; let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret)); let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key); let revocation_pubkey = match self.key_storage { @@ -1183,6 +1298,34 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len()); let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len()); + macro_rules! add_dynamic_output { + ($father_tx: expr, $vout: expr) => { + if let Some(ref per_commitment_point) = *per_commitment_point { + if let Some(ref delayed_payment_base_key) = *delayed_payment_base_key { + if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) { + spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH { + outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: $father_tx.txid(), vout: $vout }, + key: local_delayedkey, + witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key), + to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay, + output: $father_tx.output[$vout as usize].clone(), + }); + } + } + } + } + } + + + let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &local_tx.delayed_payment_key); + let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(); + for (idx, output) in local_tx.tx.output.iter().enumerate() { + if output.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { + add_dynamic_output!(local_tx.tx, idx as u32); + break; + } + } + for &(ref htlc, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() { if htlc.offered { let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key); @@ -1197,18 +1340,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes()); - if let Some(ref per_commitment_point) = *per_commitment_point { - if let Some(ref delayed_payment_base_key) = *delayed_payment_base_key { - if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) { - spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutput { - outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: htlc_timeout_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, - local_delayedkey, - witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key), - to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay - }); - } - } - } + add_dynamic_output!(htlc_timeout_tx, 0); res.push(htlc_timeout_tx); } else { if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { @@ -1224,18 +1356,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.to_vec()); htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes()); - if let Some(ref per_commitment_point) = *per_commitment_point { - if let Some(ref delayed_payment_base_key) = *delayed_payment_base_key { - if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) { - spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutput { - outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: htlc_success_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, - local_delayedkey, - witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key), - to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay - }); - } - } - } + add_dynamic_output!(htlc_success_tx, 0); res.push(htlc_success_tx); } } @@ -1252,7 +1373,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx { if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid { match self.key_storage { - KeyStorage::PrivMode { revocation_base_key: _, htlc_base_key: _, ref delayed_payment_base_key, prev_latest_per_commitment_point: _, ref latest_per_commitment_point } => { + KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => { return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key)); }, KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => { @@ -1264,7 +1385,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx { if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid { match self.key_storage { - KeyStorage::PrivMode { revocation_base_key: _, htlc_base_key: _, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => { + KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => { return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key)); }, KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => { @@ -1276,7 +1397,49 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { (Vec::new(), Vec::new()) } - fn block_connected(&self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec)>, Vec) { + /// Generate a spendable output event when closing_transaction get registered onchain. + fn check_spend_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> Option { + if tx.input[0].sequence == 0xFFFFFFFF && tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len() == 71 { + match self.key_storage { + KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref shutdown_pubkey, .. } => { + let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::from_data(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize()); + let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script(); + for (idx, output) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { + if shutdown_script == output.script_pubkey { + return Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { + outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: idx as u32 }, + output: output.clone(), + }); + } + } + } + KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => { + //TODO: we need to ensure an offline client will generate the event when it + // cames back online after only the watchtower saw the transaction + } + } + } + None + } + + /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest local state if it's copy of + /// the Channel was out-of-date. + pub(super) fn get_latest_local_commitment_txn(&self) -> Vec { + if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx { + let mut res = vec![local_tx.tx.clone()]; + match self.key_storage { + KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => { + res.append(&mut self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key)).0); + }, + _ => panic!("Can only broadcast by local channelmonitor"), + }; + res + } else { + Vec::new() + } + } + + fn block_connected(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec)>, Vec) { let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new(); let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new(); for tx in txn_matched { @@ -1299,10 +1462,14 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { spendable_outputs.append(&mut outputs); txn = remote_txn; } + if !self.funding_txo.is_none() && txn.is_empty() { + if let Some(spendable_output) = self.check_spend_closing_transaction(tx) { + spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output); + } + } } else { - let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap(); - if let Some(commitment_number) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) { - let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(tx, *commitment_number); + if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) { + let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(tx, commitment_number); if let Some(tx) = tx { txn.push(tx); } @@ -1320,7 +1487,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { if self.would_broadcast_at_height(height) { broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx); match self.key_storage { - KeyStorage::PrivMode { revocation_base_key: _, htlc_base_key: _, ref delayed_payment_base_key, prev_latest_per_commitment_point: _, ref latest_per_commitment_point } => { + KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => { let (txs, mut outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key)); spendable_outputs.append(&mut outputs); for tx in txs { @@ -1337,6 +1504,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } } } + self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone(); (watch_outputs, spendable_outputs) } @@ -1373,27 +1541,10 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } } -impl Readable for ChannelMonitor { - fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result { - // TODO: read_to_end and then deserializing from that vector is really dumb, we should - // actually use the fancy serialization framework we have instead of hacking around it. - let mut datavec = Vec::new(); - reader.read_to_end(&mut datavec)?; - let data = &datavec; - - let mut read_pos = 0; - macro_rules! read_bytes { - ($byte_count: expr) => { - { - if ($byte_count as usize) > data.len() - read_pos { - return Err(DecodeError::ShortRead); - } - read_pos += $byte_count as usize; - &data[read_pos - $byte_count as usize..read_pos] - } - } - } +const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024; +impl ReadableArgs> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor) { + fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc) -> Result { let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); macro_rules! unwrap_obj { ($key: expr) => { @@ -1404,8 +1555,8 @@ impl Readable for ChannelMonitor { } } - let _ver = read_bytes!(1)[0]; - let min_ver = read_bytes!(1)[0]; + let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?; + let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?; if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION { return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion); } @@ -1413,36 +1564,35 @@ impl Readable for ChannelMonitor { // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with. let outpoint = OutPoint { - txid: Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32)), - index: byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2)), + txid: Readable::read(reader)?, + index: Readable::read(reader)?, }; - let script_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8)); - let funding_txo = Some((outpoint, Script::from(read_bytes!(script_len).to_vec()))); - let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6)); + let funding_txo = Some((outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?)); + let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = >::read(reader)?.0; - let key_storage = match read_bytes!(1)[0] { + let key_storage = match >::read(reader)? { 0 => { - let revocation_base_key = unwrap_obj!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(32))); - let htlc_base_key = unwrap_obj!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(32))); - let delayed_payment_base_key = unwrap_obj!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(32))); - let prev_latest_per_commitment_point = match read_bytes!(1)[0] { - 0 => None, - 1 => { - Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)))) - }, - _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), + let revocation_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?; + let htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?; + let delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?; + let payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?; + let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?; + let prev_latest_per_commitment_point = match >::read(reader)? { + 0 => None, + 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?), + _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), }; - let latest_per_commitment_point = match read_bytes!(1)[0] { - 0 => None, - 1 => { - Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)))) - }, - _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), + let latest_per_commitment_point = match >::read(reader)? { + 0 => None, + 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?), + _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), }; KeyStorage::PrivMode { revocation_base_key, htlc_base_key, delayed_payment_base_key, + payment_base_key, + shutdown_pubkey, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, latest_per_commitment_point, } @@ -1450,45 +1600,41 @@ impl Readable for ChannelMonitor { _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), }; - let their_htlc_base_key = Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)))); - let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)))); + let their_htlc_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?); + let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?); let their_cur_revocation_points = { - let first_idx = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6)); + let first_idx = >::read(reader)?.0; if first_idx == 0 { None } else { - let first_point = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33))); - let second_point_slice = read_bytes!(33); + let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?; + let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?; if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 { Some((first_idx, first_point, None)) } else { - Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, second_point_slice))))) + Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &second_point_slice))))) } } }; - let our_to_self_delay = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2)); - let their_to_self_delay = Some(byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2))); + let our_to_self_delay: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?; + let their_to_self_delay: Option = Some(Readable::read(reader)?); let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49]; for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() { - secret.copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32)); - *idx = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8)); + *secret = Readable::read(reader)?; + *idx = Readable::read(reader)?; } macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment { () => { { - let offered = match read_bytes!(1)[0] { - 0 => false, 1 => true, - _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), - }; - let amount_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8)); - let cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(read_bytes!(4)); - let mut payment_hash = [0; 32]; - payment_hash[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32)); - let transaction_output_index = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(read_bytes!(4)); + let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?; + let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; + let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; + let payment_hash: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?; + let transaction_output_index: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; HTLCOutputInCommitment { offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index @@ -1497,14 +1643,12 @@ impl Readable for ChannelMonitor { } } - let remote_claimable_outpoints_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8)); - if remote_claimable_outpoints_len > data.len() as u64 / 64 { return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor); } - let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize); + let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; + let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64)); for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len { - let txid = Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32)); - let outputs_count = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8)); - if outputs_count > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor); } - let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(outputs_count as usize); + let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?; + let outputs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; + let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32)); for _ in 0..outputs_count { outputs.push(read_htlc_in_commitment!()); } @@ -1513,24 +1657,26 @@ impl Readable for ChannelMonitor { } } - let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8)); - if remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor); } - let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize); + let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; + let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32)); for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len { - let txid = Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32)); - let commitment_number = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6)); - if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, commitment_number) { + let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?; + let commitment_number = >::read(reader)?.0; + let outputs_count = >::read(reader)?; + let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8)); + for _ in 0..outputs_count { + outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?); + } + if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); } } - let remote_hash_commitment_number_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8)); - if remote_hash_commitment_number_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor); } - let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize); + let remote_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; + let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32)); for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len { - let mut txid = [0; 32]; - txid[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32)); - let commitment_number = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6)); + let txid: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?; + let commitment_number = >::read(reader)?.0; if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(txid, commitment_number) { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); } @@ -1539,29 +1685,29 @@ impl Readable for ChannelMonitor { macro_rules! read_local_tx { () => { { - let tx_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8)); - let tx_ser = read_bytes!(tx_len); - let tx: Transaction = unwrap_obj!(serialize::deserialize(tx_ser)); - if serialize::serialize(&tx).unwrap() != tx_ser { - // We check that the tx re-serializes to the same form to ensure there is - // no extra data, and as rust-bitcoin doesn't handle the 0-input ambiguity - // all that well. + let tx = match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) { + Ok(tx) => tx, + Err(e) => match e { + encode::Error::Io(ioe) => return Err(DecodeError::Io(ioe)), + _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), + }, + }; + + if tx.input.is_empty() { + // Ensure tx didn't hit the 0-input ambiguity case. return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); } - let revocation_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33))); - let a_htlc_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33))); - let b_htlc_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33))); - let delayed_payment_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33))); - let feerate_per_kw = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8)); + let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?; + let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?; + let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?; + let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?; + let feerate_per_kw: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; - let htlc_outputs_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8)); - if htlc_outputs_len > data.len() as u64 / 128 { return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor); } - let mut htlc_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs_len as usize); + let htlc_outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; + let mut htlc_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlc_outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128)); for _ in 0..htlc_outputs_len { - htlc_outputs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), - unwrap_obj!(Signature::from_compact(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(64))), - unwrap_obj!(Signature::from_compact(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(64))))); + htlc_outputs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)); } LocalSignedTx { @@ -1572,7 +1718,7 @@ impl Readable for ChannelMonitor { } } - let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match read_bytes!(1)[0] { + let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match >::read(reader)? { 0 => None, 1 => { Some(read_local_tx!()) @@ -1580,7 +1726,7 @@ impl Readable for ChannelMonitor { _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), }; - let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match read_bytes!(1)[0] { + let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match >::read(reader)? { 0 => None, 1 => { Some(read_local_tx!()) @@ -1588,13 +1734,13 @@ impl Readable for ChannelMonitor { _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), }; - let payment_preimages_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8)); - if payment_preimages_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); } - let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(payment_preimages_len as usize); + let current_remote_commitment_number = >::read(reader)?.0; + + let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; + let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32)); let mut sha = Sha256::new(); for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len { - let mut preimage = [0; 32]; - preimage[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32)); + let preimage: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?; sha.reset(); sha.input(&preimage); let mut hash = [0; 32]; @@ -1604,10 +1750,10 @@ impl Readable for ChannelMonitor { } } - let destination_script_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8)); - let destination_script = Script::from(read_bytes!(destination_script_len).to_vec()); + let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?; + let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?; - Ok(ChannelMonitor { + Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor { funding_txo, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, @@ -1621,17 +1767,20 @@ impl Readable for ChannelMonitor { old_secrets, remote_claimable_outpoints, - remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain), + remote_commitment_txn_on_chain, remote_hash_commitment_number, prev_local_signed_commitment_tx, current_local_signed_commitment_tx, + current_remote_commitment_number, payment_preimages, destination_script, + last_block_hash, secp_ctx, - }) + logger, + })) } } @@ -1645,9 +1794,11 @@ mod tests { use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor; use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys}; use util::sha2::Sha256; + use util::test_utils::TestLogger; use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey}; use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature}; use rand::{thread_rng,Rng}; + use std::sync::Arc; #[test] fn test_per_commitment_storage() { @@ -1655,6 +1806,7 @@ mod tests { let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new(); let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor; let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); + let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new()); macro_rules! test_secrets { () => { @@ -1664,341 +1816,341 @@ mod tests { idx -= 1; } assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1); - assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_err()); + assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none()); }; } { // insert_secret correct sequence - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new()); + monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); secrets.clear(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); } { // insert_secret #1 incorrect - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new()); + monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); secrets.clear(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap()); - assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err, + assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0, "Previous secret did not match new one"); } { // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect) - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new()); + monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); secrets.clear(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); - assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err, + assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0, "Previous secret did not match new one"); } { // insert_secret #3 incorrect - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new()); + monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); secrets.clear(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); - assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err, + assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0, "Previous secret did not match new one"); } { // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect) - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new()); + monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); secrets.clear(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap()); - assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err, + assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0, "Previous secret did not match new one"); } { // insert_secret #5 incorrect - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new()); + monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); secrets.clear(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap()); - assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err, + assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0, "Previous secret did not match new one"); } { // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect) - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new()); + monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); secrets.clear(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap()); - assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err, + assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0, "Previous secret did not match new one"); } { // insert_secret #7 incorrect - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new()); + monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); secrets.clear(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap()); - assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err, + assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0, "Previous secret did not match new one"); } { // insert_secret #8 incorrect - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new()); + monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); secrets.clear(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap()); - assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err, + assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0, "Previous secret did not match new one"); } } @@ -2006,6 +2158,7 @@ mod tests { #[test] fn test_prune_preimages() { let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); + let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new()); let dummy_sig = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(); macro_rules! dummy_keys { @@ -2076,7 +2229,7 @@ mod tests { // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the // old state. - let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new()); + let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(10); monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])); @@ -2091,14 +2244,14 @@ mod tests { // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15 let mut secret = [0; 32]; secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap(); assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15); test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor); test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor); // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap(); assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13); test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor); test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor); @@ -2107,7 +2260,7 @@ mod tests { // previous commitment tx's preimages too monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5])); secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap(); assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12); test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor); test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor); @@ -2115,7 +2268,7 @@ mod tests { // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3])); secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone(), None).unwrap(); + monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap(); assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5); test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor); }