X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=src%2Fln%2Fchannelmonitor.rs;h=ea3e279213c88cca40a7e3fa5c800828fbc20f12;hb=90ce97198cf37c589c11eb2091d09c7805b2c026;hp=9fed550982177f1d7433ddddd4e36cd98b8cd1c2;hpb=8e07259326eb240b3a483db34eb66d7b204397f3;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs b/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs index 9fed5509..ea3e2792 100644 --- a/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs +++ b/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs @@ -568,6 +568,8 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } let new_txid = unsigned_commitment_tx.txid(); + log_trace!(self, "Tracking new remote commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", new_txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len()); + log_trace!(self, "New potential remote commitment transaction: {}", encode::serialize_hex(unsigned_commitment_tx)); if let Storage::Local { ref mut current_remote_commitment_txid, ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage { *prev_remote_commitment_txid = current_remote_commitment_txid.take(); *current_remote_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid); @@ -987,9 +989,6 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { self.write(writer, false) } - //TODO: Functions to serialize/deserialize (with different forms depending on which information - //we want to leave out (eg funding_txo, etc). - /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> { for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() { @@ -1180,11 +1179,34 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } } - if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours + if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction! log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, generating general spend tx with {} inputs and {} other txn to broadcast", inputs.len(), txn_to_broadcast.len()); watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone()); self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect())); + + // TODO: We really should only fail backwards after our revocation claims have been + // confirmed, but we also need to do more other tracking of in-flight pre-confirm + // on-chain claims, so we can do that at the same time. + macro_rules! check_htlc_fails { + ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => { + if let Some(&(_, ref outpoints)) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&$txid) { + for &(ref payment_hash, ref source, _) in outpoints.iter() { + log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx); + htlc_updated.push(((*source).clone(), None, payment_hash.clone())); + } + } + } + } + if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage { + if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid { + check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current"); + } + if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid { + check_htlc_fails!(txid, "remote"); + } + } + // No need to check local commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on remote commitment tx } if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx @@ -1212,39 +1234,54 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(), }); txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx); + } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option { + // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty + // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is + // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could + // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has + // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry + // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and + // insert it here. + watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone()); + self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect())); + + log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of non-revoked remote commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid); // TODO: We really should only fail backwards after our revocation claims have been // confirmed, but we also need to do more other tracking of in-flight pre-confirm // on-chain claims, so we can do that at the same time. - if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage { - if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid { - if let Some(&(_, ref latest_outpoints)) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid) { - for &(ref payment_hash, ref source, _) in latest_outpoints.iter() { - log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from current remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0)); + macro_rules! check_htlc_fails { + ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $id: tt) => { + if let Some(&(_, ref latest_outpoints)) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&$txid) { + $id: for &(ref payment_hash, ref source, _) in latest_outpoints.iter() { + // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was + // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should + // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the + // payment_preimage. + // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between + // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any* + // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it + // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't + // need to here. + for &(_, ref broadcast_source, ref output_idx) in per_commitment_data.1.iter() { + if output_idx.is_some() && source == broadcast_source { + continue $id; + } + } + log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx); htlc_updated.push(((*source).clone(), None, payment_hash.clone())); } } } + } + if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage { + if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid { + check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current", 'current_loop); + } if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid { - if let Some(&(_, ref prev_outpoint)) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid) { - for &(ref payment_hash, ref source, _) in prev_outpoint.iter() { - log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from previous remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0)); - htlc_updated.push(((*source).clone(), None, payment_hash.clone())); - } - } + check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", 'prev_loop); } } - // No need to check local commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on remote commitment tx - } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option { - // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty - // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is - // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could - // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has - // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry - // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and - // insert it here. - watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone()); - self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect())); if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points { let revocation_point_option = @@ -1406,10 +1443,6 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(), }); txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx); - - // TODO: We need to fail back HTLCs that were't included in the broadcast - // commitment transaction, either because they didn't meet dust or because a - // stale (but not yet revoked) commitment transaction was broadcast! } } } @@ -1714,10 +1747,13 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { for tx in txn.iter() { broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx); } - let mut updated = self.is_resolving_htlc_output(tx); - if updated.len() > 0 { - htlc_updated.append(&mut updated); - } + } + // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs + // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus, + // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check. + let mut updated = self.is_resolving_htlc_output(tx); + if updated.len() > 0 { + htlc_updated.append(&mut updated); } } if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx { @@ -1800,19 +1836,48 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input { let mut payment_data = None; + let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT && input.witness[1].len() == 33) + || (input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT && input.witness[1].len() == 33); + let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && input.witness[4].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT; + let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT; + + macro_rules! log_claim { + ($source: expr, $local_tx: expr, $outbound_htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr, $source_avail: expr) => { + // We found the output in question, but aren't failing it backwards + // as we have no corresponding source. This implies either it is an + // inbound HTLC or an outbound HTLC on a revoked transaction. + if ($local_tx && revocation_sig_claim) || + ($outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) { + log_error!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!", + $source, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(), + if $outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($payment_hash.0), + if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" }); + } else { + log_info!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}", + $source, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(), + if $outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($payment_hash.0), + if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" }); + } + } + } macro_rules! scan_commitment { - ($htlc_outputs: expr, $htlc_sources: expr, $source: expr) => { + ($htlc_outputs: expr, $htlc_sources: expr, $source: expr, $local_tx: expr) => { for &(ref payment_hash, ref source, ref vout) in $htlc_sources.iter() { if &Some(input.previous_output.vout) == vout { - log_trace!(self, "Input spending {}:{} resolves HTLC with payment hash {} from {}", input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $source); + log_claim!($source, $local_tx, true, payment_hash, true); + // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest + // local commitment transactions or an unrevoked remote commitment + // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC + // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now + // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender. payment_data = Some((source.clone(), *payment_hash)); } } if payment_data.is_none() { for htlc_output in $htlc_outputs { if input.previous_output.vout == htlc_output.transaction_output_index { - log_info!(self, "Input spending {}:{} in {} resolves inbound HTLC with timeout from {}", input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(), $source); + log_claim!($source, $local_tx, $local_tx == htlc_output.offered, htlc_output.payment_hash, false); continue 'outer_loop; } } @@ -1824,32 +1889,29 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { if input.previous_output.txid == current_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid { scan_commitment!(current_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), current_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_sources, - "our latest local commitment tx"); + "our latest local commitment tx", true); } } if let Some(ref prev_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx { if input.previous_output.txid == prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid { scan_commitment!(prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_sources, - "our latest local commitment tx"); + "our previous local commitment tx", true); } } if let Some(&(ref htlc_outputs, ref htlc_sources)) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) { - scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs, htlc_sources, "remote commitment tx"); + scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs, htlc_sources, "remote commitment tx", false); } - // If tx isn't solving htlc output from local/remote commitment tx and htlc isn't outbound we don't need - // to broadcast solving backward + // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an + // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it. if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data { let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]); - if (input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT && input.witness[1].len() == 33) - || (input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT && input.witness[1].len() == 33) { - log_error!(self, "Remote used revocation sig to take a {} HTLC output at index {} from commitment_tx {}", if input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT { "offered" } else { "accepted" }, input.previous_output.vout, input.previous_output.txid); - } else if input.witness.len() == 5 && input.witness[4].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT { - payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&tx.input[0].witness[3]); + if accepted_preimage_claim { + payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]); htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash)); - } else if input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT { - payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&tx.input[0].witness[1]); + } else if offered_preimage_claim { + payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]); htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash)); } else { htlc_updated.push((source, None, payment_hash));