X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=src%2Fln%2Ffunctional_tests.rs;h=084b6bc5c61a0f63301b840f95929b656d5c5e44;hb=963f002056d86365447dc1ce244251a449df5b6d;hp=71d2a2544746f4e1e26f87fdd2d0e682c4dd924e;hpb=f99acc6d35ba30f37f772dbaaf15711889fc6563;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/src/ln/functional_tests.rs b/src/ln/functional_tests.rs index 71d2a254..084b6bc5 100644 --- a/src/ln/functional_tests.rs +++ b/src/ln/functional_tests.rs @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ use chain::keysinterface::{KeysInterface, SpendableOutputDescriptor}; use chain::keysinterface; use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT}; use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,ChannelManagerReadArgs,HTLCForwardInfo,RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash}; -use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ManyChannelMonitor}; +use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ManyChannelMonitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY}; use ln::channel::{ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT}; use ln::onion_utils; use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop}; @@ -21,12 +21,13 @@ use util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs}; use util::config::UserConfig; use util::rng; -use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash, Sha256dHash}; +use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash; +use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash; use bitcoin::util::bip143; use bitcoin::util::address::Address; use bitcoin::util::bip32::{ChildNumber, ExtendedPubKey, ExtendedPrivKey}; use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader}; -use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, TxIn, SigHashType}; +use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, TxIn, SigHashType, OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint}; use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script}; use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes; use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block; @@ -1449,6 +1450,153 @@ fn channel_reserve_test() { do_channel_reserve_test(true); } +#[test] +fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() { + // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it + // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have + // considered those HTLCs fully removed. + // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote + // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction + // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value). + // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test. + // To test this we: + // * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when + // you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if + // you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not), + // * start routing a third HTLC from A to B, + // * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put + // the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA), + // * deliver the first fulfill from B + // * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell + // claim, + // * deliver A's response CS and RAA. + // This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having + // removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value. + // * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point + // of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC). + let mut nodes = create_network(2); + let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); + + let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2); + // Route the first two HTLCs. + let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000); + let (payment_preimage_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20000); + + // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state). + let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]); + let send_1 = { + let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(); + nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_3).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0)) + }; + + // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an + // initial fulfill/CS. + assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1)); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + + // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not + // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A. + assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2)); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); + + nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap(); + nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1); + + nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]).unwrap(); + nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here + let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + + nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + + nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + + nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + + // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the + // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view. + // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A + // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go + // on-chain as necessary). + nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap(); + nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2); + + nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); + + expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]); + expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, 100000); + + // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't + // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view. + nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + + // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back + // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing. + let (payment_preimage_4, payment_hash_4) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]); + let send_2 = { + let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 10000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(); + nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_4).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0)) + }; + + nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]).unwrap(); + nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + + // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness... + + nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + + nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + + nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + + nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + + nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + + expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]); + expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, 10000); + + claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4); + claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3); +} + #[test] fn channel_monitor_network_test() { // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and @@ -1547,7 +1695,7 @@ fn channel_monitor_network_test() { { let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]); - for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1 { + for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1 { header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]); } @@ -1723,6 +1871,7 @@ fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() { let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1); nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1); + connect_blocks(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash()); let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); @@ -1790,6 +1939,7 @@ fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() { let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200); nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200); + connect_blocks(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 200, true, header.bitcoin_hash()); let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); @@ -1801,7 +1951,7 @@ fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() { } let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); - assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 12); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan) + assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 22); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan) + 5 * (1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[7]); assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[8]); @@ -1811,6 +1961,10 @@ fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() { assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcasted by ChannelManger assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]); + for i in 12..22 { + if i % 2 == 0 { assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[i]); } else { assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[i]); } + } + assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1); assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1); @@ -2087,6 +2241,7 @@ fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() { } nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![timeout_tx]}, 1); + connect_blocks(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash()); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]); @@ -2145,6 +2300,7 @@ fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() { let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42}; nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1); + connect_blocks(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash()); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]); @@ -2297,6 +2453,7 @@ fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42}; nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1); + connect_blocks(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash()); let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 2 }); @@ -2486,7 +2643,7 @@ fn test_force_close_fail_back() { // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success.. { let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap(); - monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]), 0)).unwrap() + monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_slice(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]).unwrap(), 0)).unwrap() .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage); } nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]); @@ -2518,8 +2675,10 @@ fn test_unconf_chan() { header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; headers.push(header.clone()); } + let mut height = 99; while !headers.is_empty() { - nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap()); + nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap(), height); + height -= 1; } check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]); let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); @@ -3018,7 +3177,7 @@ fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() { macro_rules! sign_msg { ($unsigned_msg: expr) => { - let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap(); + let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::hash(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap(); let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key); let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key); let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].keys_manager.get_node_secret()); @@ -3045,7 +3204,7 @@ fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() { assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err()); let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!(); - unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]); + unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]); sign_msg!(unsigned_msg); assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err()); } @@ -3062,7 +3221,7 @@ fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() { let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new()); nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap(); - nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()))); + nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()), Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }))); let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..]; let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap(); assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty()); @@ -3128,7 +3287,7 @@ fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() { let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new()); nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap(); - nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()))); + nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()), Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }))); let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..]; let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap(); assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty()); @@ -3188,7 +3347,7 @@ fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() { node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0); } - nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()))); + nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()), Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }))); let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new(); for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() { let mut read = &serialized[..]; @@ -3267,7 +3426,7 @@ macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs { }; let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); let remotepubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &key); - let witness_script = Address::p2pkh(&remotepubkey, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey(); + let witness_script = Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, key: remotepubkey}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey(); let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap(); let remotesig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, key); spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(remotesig.serialize_der().to_vec()); @@ -3322,7 +3481,7 @@ macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs { let secret = { match ExtendedPrivKey::new_master(Network::Testnet, &$node.node_seed) { Ok(master_key) => { - match master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx($der_idx)) { + match master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx($der_idx).expect("key space exhausted")) { Ok(key) => key, Err(_) => panic!("Your RNG is busted"), } @@ -3333,10 +3492,10 @@ macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs { let pubkey = ExtendedPubKey::from_private(&secp_ctx, &secret).public_key; let witness_script = Address::p2pkh(&pubkey, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey(); let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap(); - let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &secret.secret_key); + let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &secret.private_key.key); spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec()); spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8); - spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(pubkey.serialize().to_vec()); + spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(pubkey.key.serialize().to_vec()); txn.push(spend_tx); }, } @@ -3740,6 +3899,7 @@ fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() { check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0].clone()); nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout_tx] }, 200); + connect_blocks(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 200, true, header.bitcoin_hash()); expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]); let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); @@ -3958,6 +4118,7 @@ fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, anno } else { nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]], &[1; 1]); } + connect_blocks(&nodes[2].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash()); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2]); expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]); check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2); @@ -4187,7 +4348,7 @@ fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) { // to "time out" the HTLC. let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; - for i in 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 { + for i in 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 { nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new(), &Vec::new()); header.prev_blockhash = header.bitcoin_hash(); } @@ -4226,7 +4387,7 @@ fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no } let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; - for i in 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 { + for i in 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 { nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new(), &Vec::new()); header.prev_blockhash = header.bitcoin_hash(); } @@ -4456,7 +4617,7 @@ impl msgs::ChannelUpdate { msgs::ChannelUpdate { signature: Signature::from(FFISignature::new()), contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { - chain_hash: Sha256dHash::from_data(&vec![0u8][..]), + chain_hash: Sha256dHash::hash(&vec![0u8][..]), short_channel_id: 0, timestamp: 0, flags: 0, @@ -4630,7 +4791,7 @@ fn test_onion_failure() { }, || {}, true, Some(UPDATE|13), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id: channels[0].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true})); run_onion_failure_test("expiry_too_soon", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| { - let height = msg.cltv_expiry - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1; + let height = msg.cltv_expiry - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1; let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, height, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]); }, ||{}, true, Some(UPDATE|14), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage{msg: ChannelUpdate::dummy()})); @@ -4640,7 +4801,7 @@ fn test_onion_failure() { }, false, Some(PERM|15), None); run_onion_failure_test("final_expiry_too_soon", 1, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| { - let height = msg.cltv_expiry - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1; + let height = msg.cltv_expiry - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1; let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, height, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]); }, || {}, true, Some(17), None); @@ -4806,7 +4967,7 @@ fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs { let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(); let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]); - let mut payment_event = { + let payment_event = { nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); @@ -5052,3 +5213,572 @@ fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() { assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty()); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]); } + +#[test] +fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() { + //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc. + + let mut nodes = create_network(2); + let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); + + let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(); + let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]); + nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap(); + + let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{ + channel_id: chan.2, + htlc_id: 0, + payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage, + }; + + let err = nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg); + + if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {..})}) = err { + assert_eq!(err, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC before it had been committed"); + } else { + assert!(false); + } + + assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty()); + check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]); +} + +#[test] +fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() { + //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc. + + let mut nodes = create_network(2); + let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); + + let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(); + let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]); + nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap(); + + let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{ + channel_id: chan.2, + htlc_id: 0, + reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()}, + }; + + let err = nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg); + + if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {..})}) = err { + assert_eq!(err, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC before it had been committed"); + } else { + assert!(false); + } + + assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty()); + check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]); +} + +#[test] +fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() { + //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc. + + let mut nodes = create_network(2); + let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); + + let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(); + let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]); + nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap(); + + let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{ + channel_id: chan.2, + htlc_id: 0, + sha256_of_onion: [1; 32], + failure_code: 0x8000, + }; + + let err = nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg); + + if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {..})}) = err { + assert_eq!(err, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC before it had been committed"); + } else { + assert!(false); + } + + assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty()); + check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]); +} + +#[test] +fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() { + //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel. + + let nodes = create_network(2); + create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); + + let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0; + + nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + + let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = { + match events[0] { + MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => { + assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1); + assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(update_fee.is_none()); + update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone() + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + }; + + update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1; + + let err = nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg); + if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {..})}) = err { + assert_eq!(err, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find"); + } else { + assert!(false); + } + + assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty()); + check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]); +} + +#[test] +fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() { + //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel. + + let nodes = create_network(2); + create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); + + let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0; + + nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + + let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = { + match events[0] { + MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => { + assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1); + assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(update_fee.is_none()); + update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone() + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + }; + + update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]); + + let err = nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg); + if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {..})}) = err { + assert_eq!(err, "Remote tried to fulfill HTLC with an incorrect preimage"); + } else { + assert!(false); + } + + assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty()); + check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]); +} + + +#[test] +fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() { + //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel. + + let mut nodes = create_network(2); + create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000); + let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(); + let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]); + nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + + let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message + + nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0); + commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true); + + let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + + let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = { + match events[0] { + MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => { + assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1); + assert!(update_fee.is_none()); + update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone() + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + }; + update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000; + let err = nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg); + if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {..})}) = err { + assert_eq!(err, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set"); + } else { + assert!(false); + } + + assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty()); + check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]); +} + +#[test] +fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() { + //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc: + // * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion. + + let mut nodes = create_network(3); + create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000); + create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000); + + let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(); + let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]); + + //First hop + let mut payment_event = { + nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0)) + }; + nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0); + commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false); + expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]); + let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0)); + assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1); + + //Second Hop + payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message + nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0); + commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true); + + let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1); + let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = { + match events_3[0] { + MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => { + assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1); + assert!(update_fee.is_none()); + (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()) + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + }; + + nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0).unwrap(); + + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0); + commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true); + expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]); + let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1); + + //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route + match events_4[0] { + MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => { + assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1); + assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(update_fee.is_none()); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + }; + + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); +} + +fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) { + // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY + // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as + // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA + + let nodes = create_network(2); + let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); + + let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().our_dust_limit_satoshis; + + // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B + let (_, payment_hash_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000); + let (_, payment_hash_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000); + route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000); + + // Cache one local commitment tx as previous + let as_prev_commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone(); + + // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx + assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2)); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0); + expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + + let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap(); + nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + + // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest + let as_last_commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone(); + + let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + match events[0] { + MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => { + assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + match events[1] { + MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => { + assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + + assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx); + // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf) + let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; + if announce_latest { + nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&as_last_commitment_tx[0]], &[1; 1]); + } else { + nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&as_prev_commitment_tx[0]], &[1; 1]); + } + + let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + match events[0] { + MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {}, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + + assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0); + connect_blocks(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash()); + let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + // Only 2 PaymentFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx + assert_eq!(events.len(), 2); + let mut first_failed = false; + for event in events { + match event { + Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => { + if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 { + assert!(!first_failed); + first_failed = true; + } else { + assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2); + } + } + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + } +} + +#[test] +fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() { + do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true); + do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false); +} + +#[test] +fn test_no_failure_dust_htlc_local_commitment() { + // Transaction filters for failing back dust htlc based on local commitment txn infos has been + // prone to error, we test here that a dummy transaction don't fail them. + + let nodes = create_network(2); + let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); + + // Rebalance a bit + send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000); + + let as_dust_limit = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().our_dust_limit_satoshis; + let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().our_dust_limit_satoshis; + + // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B + let (preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000); + let (preimage_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], as_dust_limit*1000); + + // Build a dummy invalid transaction trying to spend a commitment tx + let input = TxIn { + previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), vout: 0 }, + script_sig: Script::new(), + sequence: 0, + witness: Vec::new(), + }; + + let outp = TxOut { + script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), + value: 10000, + }; + + let dummy_tx = Transaction { + version: 2, + lock_time: 0, + input: vec![input], + output: vec![outp] + }; + + let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; + nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.block_connected(&header, 1, &[&dummy_tx], &[1;1]); + assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0); + assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 0); + // We broadcast a few more block to check everything is all right + connect_blocks(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, 20, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash()); + assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0); + assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 0); + + claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], preimage_1); + claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], preimage_2); +} + +fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) { + // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY. + // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs + // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs + // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs + // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs + // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs + + let nodes = create_network(3); + let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); + + let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().our_dust_limit_satoshis; + + let (payment_preimage_1, dust_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000); + let (payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000); + + let as_commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone(); + let bs_commitment_tx = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone(); + + // We revoked bs_commitment_tx + if revoked { + let (payment_preimage_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000); + claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3); + } + + let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; + let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new(); + if local { + // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx + nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&as_commitment_tx[0]], &[1; 1]); + let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + match events[0] { + MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {}, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0); + timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].clone()); + let parent_hash = connect_blocks(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 2, true, header.bitcoin_hash()); + let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + match events[0] { + Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => { + assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); + // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx + let header_2 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: parent_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; + assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0); + nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header_2, 7, &[&timeout_tx[0]], &[1; 1]); + let header_3 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_2.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; + connect_blocks(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 8, true, header_3.bitcoin_hash()); + let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + match events[0] { + Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => { + assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + } else { + // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC + nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&bs_commitment_tx[0]], &[1; 1]); + assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0); + let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + match events[0] { + MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {}, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].clone()); + let parent_hash = connect_blocks(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 2, true, header.bitcoin_hash()); + let header_2 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: parent_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; + if !revoked { + let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + match events[0] { + Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => { + assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); + // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout tx on remote commitment tx + nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header_2, 7, &[&timeout_tx[0]], &[1; 1]); + assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0); + let header_3 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_2.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; + connect_blocks(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 8, true, header_3.bitcoin_hash()); + let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + match events[0] { + Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => { + assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + } else { + // If revoked, both dust & non-dust HTLCs should have been failed after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confs of revoked + // commitment tx + let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 2); + let first; + match events[0] { + Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => { + if payment_hash == dust_hash { first = true; } + else { first = false; } + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + match events[1] { + Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => { + if first { assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash); } + else { assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash); } + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + } + } +} + +#[test] +fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() { + do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true); + do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false); + do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false); +}