X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=src%2Fmain%2Fjava%2Forg%2Fldk%2Fstructs%2FChannelConfig.java;h=3ec121ff1f514943e230b268c6a68ecaa1bf9943;hb=ffdd56c967087cba7548599934585b8a9a3102e2;hp=9cc8ff3fe2d641924d01401adc5034a45a9271d3;hpb=a9b82019e7ffa7d32d44943133bb64e1197bd2f1;p=ldk-java diff --git a/src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/ChannelConfig.java b/src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/ChannelConfig.java index 9cc8ff3f..3ec121ff 100644 --- a/src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/ChannelConfig.java +++ b/src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/ChannelConfig.java @@ -4,7 +4,14 @@ import org.ldk.impl.bindings; import org.ldk.enums.*; import org.ldk.util.*; import java.util.Arrays; +import java.lang.ref.Reference; +import javax.annotation.Nullable; + +/** + * Options which apply on a per-channel basis and may change at runtime or based on negotiation + * with our counterparty. + */ @SuppressWarnings("unchecked") // We correctly assign various generic arrays public class ChannelConfig extends CommonBase { ChannelConfig(Object _dummy, long ptr) { super(ptr); } @@ -14,59 +21,485 @@ public class ChannelConfig extends CommonBase { if (ptr != 0) { bindings.ChannelConfig_free(ptr); } } - public ChannelConfig clone() { - long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_clone(this.ptr); - ChannelConfig ret_hu_conv = new ChannelConfig(null, ret); - return ret_hu_conv; + /** + * Amount (in millionths of a satoshi) charged per satoshi for payments forwarded outbound + * over the channel. + * This may be allowed to change at runtime in a later update, however doing so must result in + * update messages sent to notify all nodes of our updated relay fee. + * + * Default value: 0. + */ + public int get_forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths() { + int ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths(this.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + return ret; + } + + /** + * Amount (in millionths of a satoshi) charged per satoshi for payments forwarded outbound + * over the channel. + * This may be allowed to change at runtime in a later update, however doing so must result in + * update messages sent to notify all nodes of our updated relay fee. + * + * Default value: 0. + */ + public void set_forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths(int val) { + bindings.ChannelConfig_set_forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths(this.ptr, val); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(val); } - public int get_fee_proportional_millionths() { - int ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_fee_proportional_millionths(this.ptr); + /** + * Amount (in milli-satoshi) charged for payments forwarded outbound over the channel, in + * excess of [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]. + * This may be allowed to change at runtime in a later update, however doing so must result in + * update messages sent to notify all nodes of our updated relay fee. + * + * The default value of a single satoshi roughly matches the market rate on many routing nodes + * as of July 2021. Adjusting it upwards or downwards may change whether nodes route through + * this node. + * + * Default value: 1000. + * + * [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + */ + public int get_forwarding_fee_base_msat() { + int ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_forwarding_fee_base_msat(this.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); return ret; } - public void set_fee_proportional_millionths(int val) { - bindings.ChannelConfig_set_fee_proportional_millionths(this.ptr, val); + /** + * Amount (in milli-satoshi) charged for payments forwarded outbound over the channel, in + * excess of [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]. + * This may be allowed to change at runtime in a later update, however doing so must result in + * update messages sent to notify all nodes of our updated relay fee. + * + * The default value of a single satoshi roughly matches the market rate on many routing nodes + * as of July 2021. Adjusting it upwards or downwards may change whether nodes route through + * this node. + * + * Default value: 1000. + * + * [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + */ + public void set_forwarding_fee_base_msat(int val) { + bindings.ChannelConfig_set_forwarding_fee_base_msat(this.ptr, val); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(val); } - public boolean get_announced_channel() { - boolean ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_announced_channel(this.ptr); + /** + * The difference in the CLTV value between incoming HTLCs and an outbound HTLC forwarded over + * the channel this config applies to. + * + * This is analogous to [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`] but applies to in-flight + * HTLC balance when a channel appears on-chain whereas + * [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`] applies to the remaining + * (non-HTLC-encumbered) balance. + * + * Thus, for HTLC-encumbered balances to be enforced on-chain when a channel is force-closed, + * we (or one of our watchtowers) MUST be online to check for broadcast of the current + * commitment transaction at least once per this many blocks (minus some margin to allow us + * enough time to broadcast and confirm a transaction, possibly with time in between to RBF + * the spending transaction). + * + * Default value: 72 (12 hours at an average of 6 blocks/hour). + * Minimum value: [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`], any values less than this will be treated as + * [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`] instead. + * + * [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA + */ + public short get_cltv_expiry_delta() { + short ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_cltv_expiry_delta(this.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); return ret; } - public void set_announced_channel(boolean val) { - bindings.ChannelConfig_set_announced_channel(this.ptr, val); + /** + * The difference in the CLTV value between incoming HTLCs and an outbound HTLC forwarded over + * the channel this config applies to. + * + * This is analogous to [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`] but applies to in-flight + * HTLC balance when a channel appears on-chain whereas + * [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`] applies to the remaining + * (non-HTLC-encumbered) balance. + * + * Thus, for HTLC-encumbered balances to be enforced on-chain when a channel is force-closed, + * we (or one of our watchtowers) MUST be online to check for broadcast of the current + * commitment transaction at least once per this many blocks (minus some margin to allow us + * enough time to broadcast and confirm a transaction, possibly with time in between to RBF + * the spending transaction). + * + * Default value: 72 (12 hours at an average of 6 blocks/hour). + * Minimum value: [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`], any values less than this will be treated as + * [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`] instead. + * + * [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA + */ + public void set_cltv_expiry_delta(short val) { + bindings.ChannelConfig_set_cltv_expiry_delta(this.ptr, val); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(val); + } + + /** + * Limit our total exposure to potential loss to on-chain fees on close, including in-flight + * HTLCs which are burned to fees as they are too small to claim on-chain and fees on + * commitment transaction(s) broadcasted by our counterparty in excess of our own fee estimate. + * + * # HTLC-based Dust Exposure + * + * When an HTLC present in one of our channels is below a \"dust\" threshold, the HTLC will + * not be claimable on-chain, instead being turned into additional miner fees if either + * party force-closes the channel. Because the threshold is per-HTLC, our total exposure + * to such payments may be substantial if there are many dust HTLCs present when the + * channel is force-closed. + * + * The dust threshold for each HTLC is based on the `dust_limit_satoshis` for each party in a + * channel negotiated throughout the channel open process, along with the fees required to have + * a broadcastable HTLC spending transaction. When a channel supports anchor outputs + * (specifically the zero fee HTLC transaction variant), this threshold no longer takes into + * account the HTLC transaction fee as it is zero. Because of this, you may want to set this + * value to a fixed limit for channels using anchor outputs, while the fee rate multiplier + * variant is primarily intended for use with pre-anchor channels. + * + * The selected limit is applied for sent, forwarded, and received HTLCs and limits the total + * exposure across all three types per-channel. + * + * # Transaction Fee Dust Exposure + * + * Further, counterparties broadcasting a commitment transaction in a force-close may result + * in other balance being burned to fees, and thus all fees on commitment and HTLC + * transactions in excess of our local fee estimates are included in the dust calculation. + * + * Because of this, another way to look at this limit is to divide it by 43,000 (or 218,750 + * for non-anchor channels) and see it as the maximum feerate disagreement (in sats/vB) per + * non-dust HTLC we're allowed to have with our peers before risking a force-closure for + * inbound channels. + * + * Thus, for the default value of 10_000 * a current feerate estimate of 10 sat/vB (or 2,500 + * sat/KW), we risk force-closure if we disagree with our peer by: + * `10_000 * 2_500 / 43_000 / (483*2)` = 0.6 sat/vB for anchor channels with 483 HTLCs in + * both directions (the maximum), + * `10_000 * 2_500 / 43_000 / (50*2)` = 5.8 sat/vB for anchor channels with 50 HTLCs in both + * directions (the LDK default max from [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_max_accepted_htlcs`]) + * `10_000 * 2_500 / 218_750 / (483*2)` = 0.1 sat/vB for non-anchor channels with 483 HTLCs + * in both directions (the maximum), + * `10_000 * 2_500 / 218_750 / (50*2)` = 1.1 sat/vB for non-anchor channels with 50 HTLCs + * in both (the LDK default maximum from [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_max_accepted_htlcs`]) + * + * Note that when using [`MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier`] this maximum disagreement + * will scale linearly with increases (or decreases) in the our feerate estimates. Further, + * for anchor channels we expect our counterparty to use a relatively low feerate estimate + * while we use [`ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep`] (which should be relatively high) and + * feerate disagreement force-closures should only occur when theirs is higher than ours. + * + * Default value: [`MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier`] with a multiplier of 10_000. + * + * [`ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep + */ + public MaxDustHTLCExposure get_max_dust_htlc_exposure() { + long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_max_dust_htlc_exposure(this.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + org.ldk.structs.MaxDustHTLCExposure ret_hu_conv = org.ldk.structs.MaxDustHTLCExposure.constr_from_ptr(ret); + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); }; + return ret_hu_conv; + } + + /** + * Limit our total exposure to potential loss to on-chain fees on close, including in-flight + * HTLCs which are burned to fees as they are too small to claim on-chain and fees on + * commitment transaction(s) broadcasted by our counterparty in excess of our own fee estimate. + * + * # HTLC-based Dust Exposure + * + * When an HTLC present in one of our channels is below a \"dust\" threshold, the HTLC will + * not be claimable on-chain, instead being turned into additional miner fees if either + * party force-closes the channel. Because the threshold is per-HTLC, our total exposure + * to such payments may be substantial if there are many dust HTLCs present when the + * channel is force-closed. + * + * The dust threshold for each HTLC is based on the `dust_limit_satoshis` for each party in a + * channel negotiated throughout the channel open process, along with the fees required to have + * a broadcastable HTLC spending transaction. When a channel supports anchor outputs + * (specifically the zero fee HTLC transaction variant), this threshold no longer takes into + * account the HTLC transaction fee as it is zero. Because of this, you may want to set this + * value to a fixed limit for channels using anchor outputs, while the fee rate multiplier + * variant is primarily intended for use with pre-anchor channels. + * + * The selected limit is applied for sent, forwarded, and received HTLCs and limits the total + * exposure across all three types per-channel. + * + * # Transaction Fee Dust Exposure + * + * Further, counterparties broadcasting a commitment transaction in a force-close may result + * in other balance being burned to fees, and thus all fees on commitment and HTLC + * transactions in excess of our local fee estimates are included in the dust calculation. + * + * Because of this, another way to look at this limit is to divide it by 43,000 (or 218,750 + * for non-anchor channels) and see it as the maximum feerate disagreement (in sats/vB) per + * non-dust HTLC we're allowed to have with our peers before risking a force-closure for + * inbound channels. + * + * Thus, for the default value of 10_000 * a current feerate estimate of 10 sat/vB (or 2,500 + * sat/KW), we risk force-closure if we disagree with our peer by: + * `10_000 * 2_500 / 43_000 / (483*2)` = 0.6 sat/vB for anchor channels with 483 HTLCs in + * both directions (the maximum), + * `10_000 * 2_500 / 43_000 / (50*2)` = 5.8 sat/vB for anchor channels with 50 HTLCs in both + * directions (the LDK default max from [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_max_accepted_htlcs`]) + * `10_000 * 2_500 / 218_750 / (483*2)` = 0.1 sat/vB for non-anchor channels with 483 HTLCs + * in both directions (the maximum), + * `10_000 * 2_500 / 218_750 / (50*2)` = 1.1 sat/vB for non-anchor channels with 50 HTLCs + * in both (the LDK default maximum from [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_max_accepted_htlcs`]) + * + * Note that when using [`MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier`] this maximum disagreement + * will scale linearly with increases (or decreases) in the our feerate estimates. Further, + * for anchor channels we expect our counterparty to use a relatively low feerate estimate + * while we use [`ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep`] (which should be relatively high) and + * feerate disagreement force-closures should only occur when theirs is higher than ours. + * + * Default value: [`MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier`] with a multiplier of 10_000. + * + * [`ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep + */ + public void set_max_dust_htlc_exposure(org.ldk.structs.MaxDustHTLCExposure val) { + bindings.ChannelConfig_set_max_dust_htlc_exposure(this.ptr, val.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(val); + if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(val); }; } - public boolean get_commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey() { - boolean ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey(this.ptr); + /** + * The additional fee we're willing to pay to avoid waiting for the counterparty's + * `to_self_delay` to reclaim funds. + * + * When we close a channel cooperatively with our counterparty, we negotiate a fee for the + * closing transaction which both sides find acceptable, ultimately paid by the channel + * funder/initiator. + * + * When we are the funder, because we have to pay the channel closing fee, we bound the + * acceptable fee by our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and [`NonAnchorChannelFee`] fees, with the upper bound increased by + * this value. Because the on-chain fee we'd pay to force-close the channel is kept near our + * [`NonAnchorChannelFee`] feerate during normal operation, this value represents the additional fee we're + * willing to pay in order to avoid waiting for our counterparty's to_self_delay to reclaim our + * funds. + * + * When we are not the funder, we require the closing transaction fee pay at least our + * [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] fee estimate, but allow our counterparty to pay as much fee as they like. + * Thus, this value is ignored when we are not the funder. + * + * Default value: 1000 satoshis. + * + * [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee + * [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum + */ + public long get_force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis() { + long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis(this.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); return ret; } - public void set_commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey(boolean val) { - bindings.ChannelConfig_set_commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey(this.ptr, val); + /** + * The additional fee we're willing to pay to avoid waiting for the counterparty's + * `to_self_delay` to reclaim funds. + * + * When we close a channel cooperatively with our counterparty, we negotiate a fee for the + * closing transaction which both sides find acceptable, ultimately paid by the channel + * funder/initiator. + * + * When we are the funder, because we have to pay the channel closing fee, we bound the + * acceptable fee by our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and [`NonAnchorChannelFee`] fees, with the upper bound increased by + * this value. Because the on-chain fee we'd pay to force-close the channel is kept near our + * [`NonAnchorChannelFee`] feerate during normal operation, this value represents the additional fee we're + * willing to pay in order to avoid waiting for our counterparty's to_self_delay to reclaim our + * funds. + * + * When we are not the funder, we require the closing transaction fee pay at least our + * [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] fee estimate, but allow our counterparty to pay as much fee as they like. + * Thus, this value is ignored when we are not the funder. + * + * Default value: 1000 satoshis. + * + * [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee + * [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum + */ + public void set_force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis(long val) { + bindings.ChannelConfig_set_force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis(this.ptr, val); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(val); } - public static ChannelConfig constructor_new(int fee_proportional_millionths_arg, boolean announced_channel_arg, boolean commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey_arg) { - long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_new(fee_proportional_millionths_arg, announced_channel_arg, commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey_arg); - ChannelConfig ret_hu_conv = new ChannelConfig(null, ret); + /** + * If set, allows this channel's counterparty to skim an additional fee off this node's inbound + * HTLCs. Useful for liquidity providers to offload on-chain channel costs to end users. + * + * Usage: + * - The payee will set this option and set its invoice route hints to use [intercept scids] + * generated by this channel's counterparty. + * - The counterparty will get an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event upon payment forward, and call + * [`forward_intercepted_htlc`] with less than the amount provided in + * [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]. The difference between the expected and + * actual forward amounts is their fee. See + * + * for how this feature may be used in the LSP use case. + * + * # Note + * It's important for payee wallet software to verify that [`PaymentClaimable::amount_msat`] is + * as-expected if this feature is activated, otherwise they may lose money! + * [`PaymentClaimable::counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat`] provides the fee taken by the + * counterparty. + * + * # Note + * Switching this config flag on may break compatibility with versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116. + * Unsetting this flag between restarts may lead to payment receive failures. + * + * Default value: false. + * + * [intercept scids]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid + * [`forward_intercepted_htlc`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc + * [`HTLCIntercepted`]: crate::events::Event::HTLCIntercepted + * [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: crate::events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat + * [`PaymentClaimable::amount_msat`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::amount_msat + * [`PaymentClaimable::counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat + */ + public boolean get_accept_underpaying_htlcs() { + boolean ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_accept_underpaying_htlcs(this.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + return ret; + } + + /** + * If set, allows this channel's counterparty to skim an additional fee off this node's inbound + * HTLCs. Useful for liquidity providers to offload on-chain channel costs to end users. + * + * Usage: + * - The payee will set this option and set its invoice route hints to use [intercept scids] + * generated by this channel's counterparty. + * - The counterparty will get an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event upon payment forward, and call + * [`forward_intercepted_htlc`] with less than the amount provided in + * [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]. The difference between the expected and + * actual forward amounts is their fee. See + * + * for how this feature may be used in the LSP use case. + * + * # Note + * It's important for payee wallet software to verify that [`PaymentClaimable::amount_msat`] is + * as-expected if this feature is activated, otherwise they may lose money! + * [`PaymentClaimable::counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat`] provides the fee taken by the + * counterparty. + * + * # Note + * Switching this config flag on may break compatibility with versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116. + * Unsetting this flag between restarts may lead to payment receive failures. + * + * Default value: false. + * + * [intercept scids]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid + * [`forward_intercepted_htlc`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc + * [`HTLCIntercepted`]: crate::events::Event::HTLCIntercepted + * [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: crate::events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat + * [`PaymentClaimable::amount_msat`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::amount_msat + * [`PaymentClaimable::counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat + */ + public void set_accept_underpaying_htlcs(boolean val) { + bindings.ChannelConfig_set_accept_underpaying_htlcs(this.ptr, val); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(val); + } + + /** + * Constructs a new ChannelConfig given each field + */ + public static ChannelConfig of(int forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths_arg, int forwarding_fee_base_msat_arg, short cltv_expiry_delta_arg, org.ldk.structs.MaxDustHTLCExposure max_dust_htlc_exposure_arg, long force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis_arg, boolean accept_underpaying_htlcs_arg) { + long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_new(forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths_arg, forwarding_fee_base_msat_arg, cltv_expiry_delta_arg, max_dust_htlc_exposure_arg.ptr, force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis_arg, accept_underpaying_htlcs_arg); + Reference.reachabilityFence(forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths_arg); + Reference.reachabilityFence(forwarding_fee_base_msat_arg); + Reference.reachabilityFence(cltv_expiry_delta_arg); + Reference.reachabilityFence(max_dust_htlc_exposure_arg); + Reference.reachabilityFence(force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis_arg); + Reference.reachabilityFence(accept_underpaying_htlcs_arg); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig(null, ret); } + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(max_dust_htlc_exposure_arg); }; return ret_hu_conv; } - public static ChannelConfig constructor_default() { + long clone_ptr() { + long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_clone_ptr(this.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + return ret; + } + + /** + * Creates a copy of the ChannelConfig + */ + public ChannelConfig clone() { + long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_clone(this.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig(null, ret); } + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); }; + return ret_hu_conv; + } + + /** + * Checks if two ChannelConfigs contain equal inner contents. + * This ignores pointers and is_owned flags and looks at the values in fields. + * Two objects with NULL inner values will be considered "equal" here. + */ + public boolean eq(org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig b) { + boolean ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_eq(this.ptr, b.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(b); + if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(b); }; + return ret; + } + + @Override public boolean equals(Object o) { + if (!(o instanceof ChannelConfig)) return false; + return this.eq((ChannelConfig)o); + } + /** + * Applies the given [`ChannelConfigUpdate`] as a partial update to the [`ChannelConfig`]. + */ + public void apply(org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfigUpdate update) { + bindings.ChannelConfig_apply(this.ptr, update.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(update); + if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(update); }; + } + + /** + * Creates a "default" ChannelConfig. See struct and individual field documentaiton for details on which values are used. + */ + public static ChannelConfig with_default() { long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_default(); - ChannelConfig ret_hu_conv = new ChannelConfig(null, ret); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig(null, ret); } + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv); }; return ret_hu_conv; } + /** + * Serialize the ChannelConfig object into a byte array which can be read by ChannelConfig_read + */ public byte[] write() { byte[] ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_write(this.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); return ret; } - public static ChannelConfig constructor_read(byte[] ser) { + /** + * Read a ChannelConfig from a byte array, created by ChannelConfig_write + */ + public static Result_ChannelConfigDecodeErrorZ read(byte[] ser) { long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_read(ser); - ChannelConfig ret_hu_conv = new ChannelConfig(null, ret); + Reference.reachabilityFence(ser); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + Result_ChannelConfigDecodeErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ChannelConfigDecodeErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); return ret_hu_conv; }