X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=src%2Fmain%2Fjava%2Forg%2Fldk%2Fstructs%2FChannelConfig.java;h=64bed6ed6d83f9d528258ecb88692bffde53cbd0;hb=2bb592fb946e316dba9f4d1123f8ac72ff4e9bf8;hp=26bcff3daf654ddf507c8ef8b124b630c9cf4dbb;hpb=1d0c372339e4d0148449728072c95964088412c4;p=ldk-java diff --git a/src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/ChannelConfig.java b/src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/ChannelConfig.java index 26bcff3d..64bed6ed 100644 --- a/src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/ChannelConfig.java +++ b/src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/ChannelConfig.java @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import org.ldk.impl.bindings; import org.ldk.enums.*; import org.ldk.util.*; import java.util.Arrays; +import java.lang.ref.Reference; import javax.annotation.Nullable; @@ -30,6 +31,7 @@ public class ChannelConfig extends CommonBase { */ public int get_forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths() { int ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths(this.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); return ret; } @@ -43,6 +45,8 @@ public class ChannelConfig extends CommonBase { */ public void set_forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths(int val) { bindings.ChannelConfig_set_forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths(this.ptr, val); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(val); } /** @@ -61,6 +65,7 @@ public class ChannelConfig extends CommonBase { */ public int get_forwarding_fee_base_msat() { int ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_forwarding_fee_base_msat(this.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); return ret; } @@ -80,6 +85,8 @@ public class ChannelConfig extends CommonBase { */ public void set_forwarding_fee_base_msat(int val) { bindings.ChannelConfig_set_forwarding_fee_base_msat(this.ptr, val); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(val); } /** @@ -105,6 +112,7 @@ public class ChannelConfig extends CommonBase { */ public short get_cltv_expiry_delta() { short ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_cltv_expiry_delta(this.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); return ret; } @@ -131,76 +139,8 @@ public class ChannelConfig extends CommonBase { */ public void set_cltv_expiry_delta(short val) { bindings.ChannelConfig_set_cltv_expiry_delta(this.ptr, val); - } - - /** - * Set to announce the channel publicly and notify all nodes that they can route via this - * channel. - * - * This should only be set to true for nodes which expect to be online reliably. - * - * As the node which funds a channel picks this value this will only apply for new outbound - * channels unless [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preference`] is set. - * - * This cannot be changed after the initial channel handshake. - * - * Default value: false. - */ - public boolean get_announced_channel() { - boolean ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_announced_channel(this.ptr); - return ret; - } - - /** - * Set to announce the channel publicly and notify all nodes that they can route via this - * channel. - * - * This should only be set to true for nodes which expect to be online reliably. - * - * As the node which funds a channel picks this value this will only apply for new outbound - * channels unless [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preference`] is set. - * - * This cannot be changed after the initial channel handshake. - * - * Default value: false. - */ - public void set_announced_channel(boolean val) { - bindings.ChannelConfig_set_announced_channel(this.ptr, val); - } - - /** - * When set, we commit to an upfront shutdown_pubkey at channel open. If our counterparty - * supports it, they will then enforce the mutual-close output to us matches what we provided - * at intialization, preventing us from closing to an alternate pubkey. - * - * This is set to true by default to provide a slight increase in security, though ultimately - * any attacker who is able to take control of a channel can just as easily send the funds via - * lightning payments, so we never require that our counterparties support this option. - * - * This cannot be changed after a channel has been initialized. - * - * Default value: true. - */ - public boolean get_commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey() { - boolean ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey(this.ptr); - return ret; - } - - /** - * When set, we commit to an upfront shutdown_pubkey at channel open. If our counterparty - * supports it, they will then enforce the mutual-close output to us matches what we provided - * at intialization, preventing us from closing to an alternate pubkey. - * - * This is set to true by default to provide a slight increase in security, though ultimately - * any attacker who is able to take control of a channel can just as easily send the funds via - * lightning payments, so we never require that our counterparties support this option. - * - * This cannot be changed after a channel has been initialized. - * - * Default value: true. - */ - public void set_commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey(boolean val) { - bindings.ChannelConfig_set_commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey(this.ptr, val); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(val); } /** @@ -213,16 +153,26 @@ public class ChannelConfig extends CommonBase { * to such payments may be sustantial if there are many dust HTLCs present when the * channel is force-closed. * - * This limit is applied for sent, forwarded, and received HTLCs and limits the total - * exposure across all three types per-channel. Setting this too low may prevent the - * sending or receipt of low-value HTLCs on high-traffic nodes, and this limit is very - * important to prevent stealing of dust HTLCs by miners. + * The dust threshold for each HTLC is based on the `dust_limit_satoshis` for each party in a + * channel negotiated throughout the channel open process, along with the fees required to have + * a broadcastable HTLC spending transaction. When a channel supports anchor outputs + * (specifically the zero fee HTLC transaction variant), this threshold no longer takes into + * account the HTLC transaction fee as it is zero. Because of this, you may want to set this + * value to a fixed limit for channels using anchor outputs, while the fee rate multiplier + * variant is primarily intended for use with pre-anchor channels. + * + * The selected limit is applied for sent, forwarded, and received HTLCs and limits the total + * exposure across all three types per-channel. * - * Default value: 5_000_000 msat. + * Default value: [`MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier`] with a multiplier of 5000. */ - public long get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() { - long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(this.ptr); - return ret; + public MaxDustHTLCExposure get_max_dust_htlc_exposure() { + long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_max_dust_htlc_exposure(this.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + org.ldk.structs.MaxDustHTLCExposure ret_hu_conv = org.ldk.structs.MaxDustHTLCExposure.constr_from_ptr(ret); + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); }; + return ret_hu_conv; } /** @@ -235,15 +185,24 @@ public class ChannelConfig extends CommonBase { * to such payments may be sustantial if there are many dust HTLCs present when the * channel is force-closed. * - * This limit is applied for sent, forwarded, and received HTLCs and limits the total - * exposure across all three types per-channel. Setting this too low may prevent the - * sending or receipt of low-value HTLCs on high-traffic nodes, and this limit is very - * important to prevent stealing of dust HTLCs by miners. + * The dust threshold for each HTLC is based on the `dust_limit_satoshis` for each party in a + * channel negotiated throughout the channel open process, along with the fees required to have + * a broadcastable HTLC spending transaction. When a channel supports anchor outputs + * (specifically the zero fee HTLC transaction variant), this threshold no longer takes into + * account the HTLC transaction fee as it is zero. Because of this, you may want to set this + * value to a fixed limit for channels using anchor outputs, while the fee rate multiplier + * variant is primarily intended for use with pre-anchor channels. + * + * The selected limit is applied for sent, forwarded, and received HTLCs and limits the total + * exposure across all three types per-channel. * - * Default value: 5_000_000 msat. + * Default value: [`MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier`] with a multiplier of 5000. */ - public void set_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(long val) { - bindings.ChannelConfig_set_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(this.ptr, val); + public void set_max_dust_htlc_exposure(org.ldk.structs.MaxDustHTLCExposure val) { + bindings.ChannelConfig_set_max_dust_htlc_exposure(this.ptr, val.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(val); + if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(val); }; } /** @@ -255,23 +214,24 @@ public class ChannelConfig extends CommonBase { * funder/initiator. * * When we are the funder, because we have to pay the channel closing fee, we bound the - * acceptable fee by our [`Background`] and [`Normal`] fees, with the upper bound increased by + * acceptable fee by our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and [`NonAnchorChannelFee`] fees, with the upper bound increased by * this value. Because the on-chain fee we'd pay to force-close the channel is kept near our - * [`Normal`] feerate during normal operation, this value represents the additional fee we're + * [`NonAnchorChannelFee`] feerate during normal operation, this value represents the additional fee we're * willing to pay in order to avoid waiting for our counterparty's to_self_delay to reclaim our * funds. * * When we are not the funder, we require the closing transaction fee pay at least our - * [`Background`] fee estimate, but allow our counterparty to pay as much fee as they like. + * [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] fee estimate, but allow our counterparty to pay as much fee as they like. * Thus, this value is ignored when we are not the funder. * * Default value: 1000 satoshis. * - * [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal - * [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background + * [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee + * [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum */ public long get_force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis() { long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis(this.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); return ret; } @@ -284,55 +244,176 @@ public class ChannelConfig extends CommonBase { * funder/initiator. * * When we are the funder, because we have to pay the channel closing fee, we bound the - * acceptable fee by our [`Background`] and [`Normal`] fees, with the upper bound increased by + * acceptable fee by our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and [`NonAnchorChannelFee`] fees, with the upper bound increased by * this value. Because the on-chain fee we'd pay to force-close the channel is kept near our - * [`Normal`] feerate during normal operation, this value represents the additional fee we're + * [`NonAnchorChannelFee`] feerate during normal operation, this value represents the additional fee we're * willing to pay in order to avoid waiting for our counterparty's to_self_delay to reclaim our * funds. * * When we are not the funder, we require the closing transaction fee pay at least our - * [`Background`] fee estimate, but allow our counterparty to pay as much fee as they like. + * [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] fee estimate, but allow our counterparty to pay as much fee as they like. * Thus, this value is ignored when we are not the funder. * * Default value: 1000 satoshis. * - * [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal - * [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background + * [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee + * [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum */ public void set_force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis(long val) { bindings.ChannelConfig_set_force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis(this.ptr, val); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(val); + } + + /** + * If set, allows this channel's counterparty to skim an additional fee off this node's inbound + * HTLCs. Useful for liquidity providers to offload on-chain channel costs to end users. + * + * Usage: + * - The payee will set this option and set its invoice route hints to use [intercept scids] + * generated by this channel's counterparty. + * - The counterparty will get an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event upon payment forward, and call + * [`forward_intercepted_htlc`] with less than the amount provided in + * [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]. The difference between the expected and + * actual forward amounts is their fee. See + * + * for how this feature may be used in the LSP use case. + * + * # Note + * It's important for payee wallet software to verify that [`PaymentClaimable::amount_msat`] is + * as-expected if this feature is activated, otherwise they may lose money! + * [`PaymentClaimable::counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat`] provides the fee taken by the + * counterparty. + * + * # Note + * Switching this config flag on may break compatibility with versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116. + * Unsetting this flag between restarts may lead to payment receive failures. + * + * Default value: false. + * + * [intercept scids]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid + * [`forward_intercepted_htlc`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc + * [`HTLCIntercepted`]: crate::events::Event::HTLCIntercepted + * [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: crate::events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat + * [`PaymentClaimable::amount_msat`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::amount_msat + * [`PaymentClaimable::counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat + */ + public boolean get_accept_underpaying_htlcs() { + boolean ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_accept_underpaying_htlcs(this.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + return ret; + } + + /** + * If set, allows this channel's counterparty to skim an additional fee off this node's inbound + * HTLCs. Useful for liquidity providers to offload on-chain channel costs to end users. + * + * Usage: + * - The payee will set this option and set its invoice route hints to use [intercept scids] + * generated by this channel's counterparty. + * - The counterparty will get an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event upon payment forward, and call + * [`forward_intercepted_htlc`] with less than the amount provided in + * [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]. The difference between the expected and + * actual forward amounts is their fee. See + * + * for how this feature may be used in the LSP use case. + * + * # Note + * It's important for payee wallet software to verify that [`PaymentClaimable::amount_msat`] is + * as-expected if this feature is activated, otherwise they may lose money! + * [`PaymentClaimable::counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat`] provides the fee taken by the + * counterparty. + * + * # Note + * Switching this config flag on may break compatibility with versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116. + * Unsetting this flag between restarts may lead to payment receive failures. + * + * Default value: false. + * + * [intercept scids]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid + * [`forward_intercepted_htlc`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc + * [`HTLCIntercepted`]: crate::events::Event::HTLCIntercepted + * [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: crate::events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat + * [`PaymentClaimable::amount_msat`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::amount_msat + * [`PaymentClaimable::counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat + */ + public void set_accept_underpaying_htlcs(boolean val) { + bindings.ChannelConfig_set_accept_underpaying_htlcs(this.ptr, val); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(val); } /** * Constructs a new ChannelConfig given each field */ - public static ChannelConfig of(int forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths_arg, int forwarding_fee_base_msat_arg, short cltv_expiry_delta_arg, boolean announced_channel_arg, boolean commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey_arg, long max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat_arg, long force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis_arg) { - long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_new(forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths_arg, forwarding_fee_base_msat_arg, cltv_expiry_delta_arg, announced_channel_arg, commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey_arg, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat_arg, force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis_arg); - if (ret < 1024) { return null; } - ChannelConfig ret_hu_conv = new ChannelConfig(null, ret); - ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv); + public static ChannelConfig of(int forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths_arg, int forwarding_fee_base_msat_arg, short cltv_expiry_delta_arg, org.ldk.structs.MaxDustHTLCExposure max_dust_htlc_exposure_arg, long force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis_arg, boolean accept_underpaying_htlcs_arg) { + long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_new(forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths_arg, forwarding_fee_base_msat_arg, cltv_expiry_delta_arg, max_dust_htlc_exposure_arg.ptr, force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis_arg, accept_underpaying_htlcs_arg); + Reference.reachabilityFence(forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths_arg); + Reference.reachabilityFence(forwarding_fee_base_msat_arg); + Reference.reachabilityFence(cltv_expiry_delta_arg); + Reference.reachabilityFence(max_dust_htlc_exposure_arg); + Reference.reachabilityFence(force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis_arg); + Reference.reachabilityFence(accept_underpaying_htlcs_arg); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig(null, ret); } + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv); }; + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(max_dust_htlc_exposure_arg); }; return ret_hu_conv; } + long clone_ptr() { + long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_clone_ptr(this.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + return ret; + } + /** * Creates a copy of the ChannelConfig */ public ChannelConfig clone() { long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_clone(this.ptr); - if (ret < 1024) { return null; } - ChannelConfig ret_hu_conv = new ChannelConfig(null, ret); - ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig(null, ret); } + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); }; return ret_hu_conv; } + /** + * Checks if two ChannelConfigs contain equal inner contents. + * This ignores pointers and is_owned flags and looks at the values in fields. + * Two objects with NULL inner values will be considered "equal" here. + */ + public boolean eq(org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig b) { + boolean ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_eq(this.ptr, b == null ? 0 : b.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(b); + if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(b); }; + return ret; + } + + @Override public boolean equals(Object o) { + if (!(o instanceof ChannelConfig)) return false; + return this.eq((ChannelConfig)o); + } + /** + * Applies the given [`ChannelConfigUpdate`] as a partial update to the [`ChannelConfig`]. + */ + public void apply(org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfigUpdate update) { + bindings.ChannelConfig_apply(this.ptr, update == null ? 0 : update.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(update); + if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(update); }; + } + /** * Creates a "default" ChannelConfig. See struct and individual field documentaiton for details on which values are used. */ public static ChannelConfig with_default() { long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_default(); - if (ret < 1024) { return null; } - ChannelConfig ret_hu_conv = new ChannelConfig(null, ret); - ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig(null, ret); } + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv); }; return ret_hu_conv; } @@ -341,6 +422,7 @@ public class ChannelConfig extends CommonBase { */ public byte[] write() { byte[] ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_write(this.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); return ret; } @@ -349,7 +431,8 @@ public class ChannelConfig extends CommonBase { */ public static Result_ChannelConfigDecodeErrorZ read(byte[] ser) { long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_read(ser); - if (ret < 1024) { return null; } + Reference.reachabilityFence(ser); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } Result_ChannelConfigDecodeErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ChannelConfigDecodeErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); return ret_hu_conv; }