X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=src%2Fmain%2Fjava%2Forg%2Fldk%2Fstructs%2FChannelHandshakeConfig.java;h=9162f1c10d27694fd49860236bcc97410d4756a5;hb=HEAD;hp=cea0ccc54fe02fa8f76462796e13c0a4ac7bb429;hpb=2a8741cb87eb2b82381a6220a98f80f741147837;p=ldk-java diff --git a/src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/ChannelHandshakeConfig.java b/src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/ChannelHandshakeConfig.java index cea0ccc5..9162f1c1 100644 --- a/src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/ChannelHandshakeConfig.java +++ b/src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/ChannelHandshakeConfig.java @@ -210,20 +210,20 @@ public class ChannelHandshakeConfig extends CommonBase { * * If this option is set, channels may be created that will not be readable by LDK versions * prior to 0.0.106, causing [`ChannelManager`]'s read method to return a - * [`DecodeError:InvalidValue`]. + * [`DecodeError::InvalidValue`]. * * Note that setting this to true does *not* prevent us from opening channels with * counterparties that do not support the `scid_alias` option; we will simply fall back to a * private channel without that option. * * Ignored if the channel is negotiated to be announced, see - * [`ChannelConfig::announced_channel`] and + * [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::announced_channel`] and * [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preference`] for more. * * Default value: false. This value is likely to change to true in the future. * * [`ChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager - * [`DecodeError:InvalidValue`]: crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue + * [`DecodeError::InvalidValue`]: crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue */ public boolean get_negotiate_scid_privacy() { boolean ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_negotiate_scid_privacy(this.ptr); @@ -239,20 +239,20 @@ public class ChannelHandshakeConfig extends CommonBase { * * If this option is set, channels may be created that will not be readable by LDK versions * prior to 0.0.106, causing [`ChannelManager`]'s read method to return a - * [`DecodeError:InvalidValue`]. + * [`DecodeError::InvalidValue`]. * * Note that setting this to true does *not* prevent us from opening channels with * counterparties that do not support the `scid_alias` option; we will simply fall back to a * private channel without that option. * * Ignored if the channel is negotiated to be announced, see - * [`ChannelConfig::announced_channel`] and + * [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::announced_channel`] and * [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preference`] for more. * * Default value: false. This value is likely to change to true in the future. * * [`ChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager - * [`DecodeError:InvalidValue`]: crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue + * [`DecodeError::InvalidValue`]: crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue */ public void set_negotiate_scid_privacy(boolean val) { bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_negotiate_scid_privacy(this.ptr, val); @@ -260,19 +260,270 @@ public class ChannelHandshakeConfig extends CommonBase { Reference.reachabilityFence(val); } + /** + * Set to announce the channel publicly and notify all nodes that they can route via this + * channel. + * + * This should only be set to true for nodes which expect to be online reliably. + * + * As the node which funds a channel picks this value this will only apply for new outbound + * channels unless [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preference`] is set. + * + * Default value: false. + */ + public boolean get_announced_channel() { + boolean ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_announced_channel(this.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + return ret; + } + + /** + * Set to announce the channel publicly and notify all nodes that they can route via this + * channel. + * + * This should only be set to true for nodes which expect to be online reliably. + * + * As the node which funds a channel picks this value this will only apply for new outbound + * channels unless [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preference`] is set. + * + * Default value: false. + */ + public void set_announced_channel(boolean val) { + bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_announced_channel(this.ptr, val); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(val); + } + + /** + * When set, we commit to an upfront shutdown_pubkey at channel open. If our counterparty + * supports it, they will then enforce the mutual-close output to us matches what we provided + * at intialization, preventing us from closing to an alternate pubkey. + * + * This is set to true by default to provide a slight increase in security, though ultimately + * any attacker who is able to take control of a channel can just as easily send the funds via + * lightning payments, so we never require that our counterparties support this option. + * + * The upfront key committed is provided from [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. + * + * Default value: true. + * + * [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]: crate::sign::SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey + */ + public boolean get_commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey() { + boolean ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey(this.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + return ret; + } + + /** + * When set, we commit to an upfront shutdown_pubkey at channel open. If our counterparty + * supports it, they will then enforce the mutual-close output to us matches what we provided + * at intialization, preventing us from closing to an alternate pubkey. + * + * This is set to true by default to provide a slight increase in security, though ultimately + * any attacker who is able to take control of a channel can just as easily send the funds via + * lightning payments, so we never require that our counterparties support this option. + * + * The upfront key committed is provided from [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. + * + * Default value: true. + * + * [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]: crate::sign::SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey + */ + public void set_commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey(boolean val) { + bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey(this.ptr, val); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(val); + } + + /** + * The Proportion of the channel value to configure as counterparty's channel reserve, + * i.e., `their_channel_reserve_satoshis` for both outbound and inbound channels. + * + * `their_channel_reserve_satoshis` is the minimum balance that the other node has to maintain + * on their side, at all times. + * This ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by + * claiming at least this value on chain. + * + * Channel reserve values greater than 30% could be considered highly unreasonable, since that + * amount can never be used for payments. + * Also, if our selected channel reserve for counterparty and counterparty's selected + * channel reserve for us sum up to equal or greater than channel value, channel negotiations + * will fail. + * + * Note: Versions of LDK earlier than v0.0.104 will fail to read channels with any channel reserve + * other than the default value. + * + * Default value: 1% of channel value, i.e., configured as 10,000 millionths. + * Minimum value: If the calculated proportional value is less than 1000 sats, it will be treated + * as 1000 sats instead, which is a safe implementation-specific lower bound. + * Maximum value: 1,000,000, any values larger than 1 Million will be treated as 1 Million (or 100%) + * instead, although channel negotiations will fail in that case. + */ + public int get_their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths() { + int ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths(this.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + return ret; + } + + /** + * The Proportion of the channel value to configure as counterparty's channel reserve, + * i.e., `their_channel_reserve_satoshis` for both outbound and inbound channels. + * + * `their_channel_reserve_satoshis` is the minimum balance that the other node has to maintain + * on their side, at all times. + * This ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by + * claiming at least this value on chain. + * + * Channel reserve values greater than 30% could be considered highly unreasonable, since that + * amount can never be used for payments. + * Also, if our selected channel reserve for counterparty and counterparty's selected + * channel reserve for us sum up to equal or greater than channel value, channel negotiations + * will fail. + * + * Note: Versions of LDK earlier than v0.0.104 will fail to read channels with any channel reserve + * other than the default value. + * + * Default value: 1% of channel value, i.e., configured as 10,000 millionths. + * Minimum value: If the calculated proportional value is less than 1000 sats, it will be treated + * as 1000 sats instead, which is a safe implementation-specific lower bound. + * Maximum value: 1,000,000, any values larger than 1 Million will be treated as 1 Million (or 100%) + * instead, although channel negotiations will fail in that case. + */ + public void set_their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths(int val) { + bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths(this.ptr, val); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(val); + } + + /** + * If set, we attempt to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`option for all future + * channels. This feature requires having a reserve of onchain funds readily available to bump + * transactions in the event of a channel force close to avoid the possibility of losing funds. + * + * Note that if you wish accept inbound channels with anchor outputs, you must enable + * [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] and manually accept them with + * [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]. This is done to give you the chance to check + * whether your reserve of onchain funds is enough to cover the fees for all existing and new + * channels featuring anchor outputs in the event of a force close. + * + * If this option is set, channels may be created that will not be readable by LDK versions + * prior to 0.0.116, causing [`ChannelManager`]'s read method to return a + * [`DecodeError::InvalidValue`]. + * + * Note that setting this to true does *not* prevent us from opening channels with + * counterparties that do not support the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option; we will simply + * fall back to a `static_remote_key` channel. + * + * LDK will not support the legacy `option_anchors` commitment version due to a discovered + * vulnerability after its deployment. For more context, see the [`SIGHASH_SINGLE + update_fee + * Considered Harmful`] mailing list post. + * + * Default value: false. This value is likely to change to true in the future. + * + * [`ChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager + * [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel + * [`DecodeError::InvalidValue`]: crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue + * [`SIGHASH_SINGLE + update_fee Considered Harmful`]: https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2020-September/002796.html + */ + public boolean get_negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { + boolean ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx(this.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + return ret; + } + + /** + * If set, we attempt to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`option for all future + * channels. This feature requires having a reserve of onchain funds readily available to bump + * transactions in the event of a channel force close to avoid the possibility of losing funds. + * + * Note that if you wish accept inbound channels with anchor outputs, you must enable + * [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] and manually accept them with + * [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]. This is done to give you the chance to check + * whether your reserve of onchain funds is enough to cover the fees for all existing and new + * channels featuring anchor outputs in the event of a force close. + * + * If this option is set, channels may be created that will not be readable by LDK versions + * prior to 0.0.116, causing [`ChannelManager`]'s read method to return a + * [`DecodeError::InvalidValue`]. + * + * Note that setting this to true does *not* prevent us from opening channels with + * counterparties that do not support the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option; we will simply + * fall back to a `static_remote_key` channel. + * + * LDK will not support the legacy `option_anchors` commitment version due to a discovered + * vulnerability after its deployment. For more context, see the [`SIGHASH_SINGLE + update_fee + * Considered Harmful`] mailing list post. + * + * Default value: false. This value is likely to change to true in the future. + * + * [`ChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager + * [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel + * [`DecodeError::InvalidValue`]: crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue + * [`SIGHASH_SINGLE + update_fee Considered Harmful`]: https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2020-September/002796.html + */ + public void set_negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx(boolean val) { + bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx(this.ptr, val); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(val); + } + + /** + * The maximum number of HTLCs in-flight from our counterparty towards us at the same time. + * + * Increasing the value can help improve liquidity and stability in + * routing at the cost of higher long term disk / DB usage. + * + * Note: Versions of LDK earlier than v0.0.115 will fail to read channels with a configuration + * other than the default value. + * + * Default value: 50 + * Maximum value: 483, any values larger will be treated as 483. + * This is the BOLT #2 spec limit on `max_accepted_htlcs`. + */ + public short get_our_max_accepted_htlcs() { + short ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_our_max_accepted_htlcs(this.ptr); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + return ret; + } + + /** + * The maximum number of HTLCs in-flight from our counterparty towards us at the same time. + * + * Increasing the value can help improve liquidity and stability in + * routing at the cost of higher long term disk / DB usage. + * + * Note: Versions of LDK earlier than v0.0.115 will fail to read channels with a configuration + * other than the default value. + * + * Default value: 50 + * Maximum value: 483, any values larger will be treated as 483. + * This is the BOLT #2 spec limit on `max_accepted_htlcs`. + */ + public void set_our_max_accepted_htlcs(short val) { + bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_our_max_accepted_htlcs(this.ptr, val); + Reference.reachabilityFence(this); + Reference.reachabilityFence(val); + } + /** * Constructs a new ChannelHandshakeConfig given each field */ - public static ChannelHandshakeConfig of(int minimum_depth_arg, short our_to_self_delay_arg, long our_htlc_minimum_msat_arg, byte max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel_arg, boolean negotiate_scid_privacy_arg) { - long ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_new(minimum_depth_arg, our_to_self_delay_arg, our_htlc_minimum_msat_arg, max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel_arg, negotiate_scid_privacy_arg); + public static ChannelHandshakeConfig of(int minimum_depth_arg, short our_to_self_delay_arg, long our_htlc_minimum_msat_arg, byte max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel_arg, boolean negotiate_scid_privacy_arg, boolean announced_channel_arg, boolean commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey_arg, int their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths_arg, boolean negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_arg, short our_max_accepted_htlcs_arg) { + long ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_new(minimum_depth_arg, our_to_self_delay_arg, our_htlc_minimum_msat_arg, max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel_arg, negotiate_scid_privacy_arg, announced_channel_arg, commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey_arg, their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths_arg, negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_arg, our_max_accepted_htlcs_arg); Reference.reachabilityFence(minimum_depth_arg); Reference.reachabilityFence(our_to_self_delay_arg); Reference.reachabilityFence(our_htlc_minimum_msat_arg); Reference.reachabilityFence(max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel_arg); Reference.reachabilityFence(negotiate_scid_privacy_arg); + Reference.reachabilityFence(announced_channel_arg); + Reference.reachabilityFence(commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey_arg); + Reference.reachabilityFence(their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths_arg); + Reference.reachabilityFence(negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_arg); + Reference.reachabilityFence(our_max_accepted_htlcs_arg); if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } org.ldk.structs.ChannelHandshakeConfig ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelHandshakeConfig(null, ret); } - ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv); + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv); }; return ret_hu_conv; } @@ -290,7 +541,7 @@ public class ChannelHandshakeConfig extends CommonBase { Reference.reachabilityFence(this); if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } org.ldk.structs.ChannelHandshakeConfig ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelHandshakeConfig(null, ret); } - ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); }; return ret_hu_conv; } @@ -301,7 +552,7 @@ public class ChannelHandshakeConfig extends CommonBase { long ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_default(); if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } org.ldk.structs.ChannelHandshakeConfig ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelHandshakeConfig(null, ret); } - ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv); + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv); }; return ret_hu_conv; }