X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=src%2Fmain%2Fjava%2Forg%2Fldk%2Fstructs%2FChannelHandshakeConfig.java;h=f6a3bfb625d6a0f0c8b6a12fc1bf3f169df915c9;hb=ff3dacec3be60f870d81f6df11bd9fff92aa6047;hp=3bab616c0c8c5990e23fcc475dbb8850c2757465;hpb=1b870a3ffab1c0024411e30102bc6d198300f095;p=ldk-java

diff --git a/src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/ChannelHandshakeConfig.java b/src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/ChannelHandshakeConfig.java
index 3bab616c..f6a3bfb6 100644
--- a/src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/ChannelHandshakeConfig.java
+++ b/src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/ChannelHandshakeConfig.java
@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ import org.ldk.impl.bindings;
 import org.ldk.enums.*;
 import org.ldk.util.*;
 import java.util.Arrays;
+import java.lang.ref.Reference;
+import javax.annotation.Nullable;
 
 
 /**
@@ -29,6 +31,7 @@ public class ChannelHandshakeConfig extends CommonBase {
 	 */
 	public int get_minimum_depth() {
 		int ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_minimum_depth(this.ptr);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 		return ret;
 	}
 
@@ -41,43 +44,54 @@ public class ChannelHandshakeConfig extends CommonBase {
 	 */
 	public void set_minimum_depth(int val) {
 		bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_minimum_depth(this.ptr, val);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
 	}
 
 	/**
-	 * Set to the amount of time we require our counterparty to wait to claim their money.
+	 * Set to the number of blocks we require our counterparty to wait to claim their money (ie
+	 * the number of blocks we have to punish our counterparty if they broadcast a revoked
+	 * transaction).
 	 * 
-	 * It's one of the main parameter of our security model. We (or one of our watchtowers) MUST
-	 * be online to check for peer having broadcast a revoked transaction to steal our funds
-	 * at least once every our_to_self_delay blocks.
+	 * This is one of the main parameters of our security model. We (or one of our watchtowers) MUST
+	 * be online to check for revoked transactions on-chain at least once every our_to_self_delay
+	 * blocks (minus some margin to allow us enough time to broadcast and confirm a transaction,
+	 * possibly with time in between to RBF the spending transaction).
 	 * 
 	 * Meanwhile, asking for a too high delay, we bother peer to freeze funds for nothing in
 	 * case of an honest unilateral channel close, which implicitly decrease the economic value of
 	 * our channel.
 	 * 
-	 * Default value: BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT (currently 144), we enforce it as a minimum at channel
-	 * opening so you can tweak config to ask for more security, not less.
+	 * Default value: [`BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT`], we enforce it as a minimum at channel opening so you
+	 * can tweak config to ask for more security, not less.
 	 */
 	public short get_our_to_self_delay() {
 		short ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_our_to_self_delay(this.ptr);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 		return ret;
 	}
 
 	/**
-	 * Set to the amount of time we require our counterparty to wait to claim their money.
+	 * Set to the number of blocks we require our counterparty to wait to claim their money (ie
+	 * the number of blocks we have to punish our counterparty if they broadcast a revoked
+	 * transaction).
 	 * 
-	 * It's one of the main parameter of our security model. We (or one of our watchtowers) MUST
-	 * be online to check for peer having broadcast a revoked transaction to steal our funds
-	 * at least once every our_to_self_delay blocks.
+	 * This is one of the main parameters of our security model. We (or one of our watchtowers) MUST
+	 * be online to check for revoked transactions on-chain at least once every our_to_self_delay
+	 * blocks (minus some margin to allow us enough time to broadcast and confirm a transaction,
+	 * possibly with time in between to RBF the spending transaction).
 	 * 
 	 * Meanwhile, asking for a too high delay, we bother peer to freeze funds for nothing in
 	 * case of an honest unilateral channel close, which implicitly decrease the economic value of
 	 * our channel.
 	 * 
-	 * Default value: BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT (currently 144), we enforce it as a minimum at channel
-	 * opening so you can tweak config to ask for more security, not less.
+	 * Default value: [`BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT`], we enforce it as a minimum at channel opening so you
+	 * can tweak config to ask for more security, not less.
 	 */
 	public void set_our_to_self_delay(short val) {
 		bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_our_to_self_delay(this.ptr, val);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
 	}
 
 	/**
@@ -91,6 +105,7 @@ public class ChannelHandshakeConfig extends CommonBase {
 	 */
 	public long get_our_htlc_minimum_msat() {
 		long ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(this.ptr);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 		return ret;
 	}
 
@@ -105,34 +120,108 @@ public class ChannelHandshakeConfig extends CommonBase {
 	 */
 	public void set_our_htlc_minimum_msat(long val) {
 		bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_our_htlc_minimum_msat(this.ptr, val);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * If set, we attempt to negotiate the `scid_privacy` (referred to as `scid_alias` in the
+	 * BOLTs) option for outbound private channels. This provides better privacy by not including
+	 * our real on-chain channel UTXO in each invoice and requiring that our counterparty only
+	 * relay HTLCs to us using the channel's SCID alias.
+	 * 
+	 * If this option is set, channels may be created that will not be readable by LDK versions
+	 * prior to 0.0.106, causing [`ChannelManager`]'s read method to return a
+	 * [`DecodeError:InvalidValue`].
+	 * 
+	 * Note that setting this to true does *not* prevent us from opening channels with
+	 * counterparties that do not support the `scid_alias` option; we will simply fall back to a
+	 * private channel without that option.
+	 * 
+	 * Ignored if the channel is negotiated to be announced, see
+	 * [`ChannelConfig::announced_channel`] and
+	 * [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preference`] for more.
+	 * 
+	 * Default value: false. This value is likely to change to true in the future.
+	 * 
+	 * [`ChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager
+	 * [`DecodeError:InvalidValue`]: crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue
+	 */
+	public boolean get_negotiate_scid_privacy() {
+		boolean ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_negotiate_scid_privacy(this.ptr);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * If set, we attempt to negotiate the `scid_privacy` (referred to as `scid_alias` in the
+	 * BOLTs) option for outbound private channels. This provides better privacy by not including
+	 * our real on-chain channel UTXO in each invoice and requiring that our counterparty only
+	 * relay HTLCs to us using the channel's SCID alias.
+	 * 
+	 * If this option is set, channels may be created that will not be readable by LDK versions
+	 * prior to 0.0.106, causing [`ChannelManager`]'s read method to return a
+	 * [`DecodeError:InvalidValue`].
+	 * 
+	 * Note that setting this to true does *not* prevent us from opening channels with
+	 * counterparties that do not support the `scid_alias` option; we will simply fall back to a
+	 * private channel without that option.
+	 * 
+	 * Ignored if the channel is negotiated to be announced, see
+	 * [`ChannelConfig::announced_channel`] and
+	 * [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preference`] for more.
+	 * 
+	 * Default value: false. This value is likely to change to true in the future.
+	 * 
+	 * [`ChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager
+	 * [`DecodeError:InvalidValue`]: crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue
+	 */
+	public void set_negotiate_scid_privacy(boolean val) {
+		bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_negotiate_scid_privacy(this.ptr, val);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
 	}
 
 	/**
 	 * Constructs a new ChannelHandshakeConfig given each field
 	 */
-	public static ChannelHandshakeConfig constructor_new(int minimum_depth_arg, short our_to_self_delay_arg, long our_htlc_minimum_msat_arg) {
-		long ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_new(minimum_depth_arg, our_to_self_delay_arg, our_htlc_minimum_msat_arg);
-		ChannelHandshakeConfig ret_hu_conv = new ChannelHandshakeConfig(null, ret);
+	public static ChannelHandshakeConfig of(int minimum_depth_arg, short our_to_self_delay_arg, long our_htlc_minimum_msat_arg, boolean negotiate_scid_privacy_arg) {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_new(minimum_depth_arg, our_to_self_delay_arg, our_htlc_minimum_msat_arg, negotiate_scid_privacy_arg);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(minimum_depth_arg);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(our_to_self_delay_arg);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(our_htlc_minimum_msat_arg);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(negotiate_scid_privacy_arg);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		ChannelHandshakeConfig ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new ChannelHandshakeConfig(null, ret); }
 		ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv);
 		return ret_hu_conv;
 	}
 
+	long clone_ptr() {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_clone_ptr(this.ptr);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		return ret;
+	}
+
 	/**
 	 * Creates a copy of the ChannelHandshakeConfig
 	 */
 	public ChannelHandshakeConfig clone() {
 		long ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_clone(this.ptr);
-		ChannelHandshakeConfig ret_hu_conv = new ChannelHandshakeConfig(null, ret);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		ChannelHandshakeConfig ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new ChannelHandshakeConfig(null, ret); }
 		ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
 		return ret_hu_conv;
 	}
 
 	/**
-	 * Creates a "default" ChannelHandshakeConfig. See other documentaiton for details on what this implies.
+	 * Creates a "default" ChannelHandshakeConfig. See struct and individual field documentaiton for details on which values are used.
 	 */
-	public static ChannelHandshakeConfig constructor_default() {
+	public static ChannelHandshakeConfig with_default() {
 		long ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_default();
-		ChannelHandshakeConfig ret_hu_conv = new ChannelHandshakeConfig(null, ret);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		ChannelHandshakeConfig ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new ChannelHandshakeConfig(null, ret); }
 		ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv);
 		return ret_hu_conv;
 	}