X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=src%2Fmain%2Fjava%2Forg%2Fldk%2Fstructs%2FChannelHandshakeConfig.java;h=f6a3bfb625d6a0f0c8b6a12fc1bf3f169df915c9;hb=ff3dacec3be60f870d81f6df11bd9fff92aa6047;hp=a543225aae77eaab633c7aa3badf45581c666763;hpb=ad15b3a4dbf3fbc7f08ef22d656bae79e8182008;p=ldk-java

diff --git a/src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/ChannelHandshakeConfig.java b/src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/ChannelHandshakeConfig.java
index a543225a..f6a3bfb6 100644
--- a/src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/ChannelHandshakeConfig.java
+++ b/src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/ChannelHandshakeConfig.java
@@ -2,59 +2,228 @@ package org.ldk.structs;
 
 import org.ldk.impl.bindings;
 import org.ldk.enums.*;
+import org.ldk.util.*;
+import java.util.Arrays;
+import java.lang.ref.Reference;
+import javax.annotation.Nullable;
 
+
+/**
+ * Configuration we set when applicable.
+ * 
+ * Default::default() provides sane defaults.
+ */
+@SuppressWarnings("unchecked") // We correctly assign various generic arrays
 public class ChannelHandshakeConfig extends CommonBase {
 	ChannelHandshakeConfig(Object _dummy, long ptr) { super(ptr); }
 	@Override @SuppressWarnings("deprecation")
 	protected void finalize() throws Throwable {
 		super.finalize();
-		bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_free(ptr);
+		if (ptr != 0) { bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_free(ptr); }
 	}
 
-	public ChannelHandshakeConfig(ChannelHandshakeConfig orig) {
-		super(bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_clone(orig == null ? 0 : orig.ptr & ~1));
-		this.ptrs_to.add(orig);
+	/**
+	 * Confirmations we will wait for before considering the channel locked in.
+	 * Applied only for inbound channels (see ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth for the
+	 * equivalent limit applied to outbound channels).
+	 * 
+	 * Default value: 6.
+	 */
+	public int get_minimum_depth() {
+		int ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_minimum_depth(this.ptr);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		return ret;
 	}
 
-	public int get_minimum_depth(ChannelHandshakeConfig this_ptr) {
-		int ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_minimum_depth(this_ptr == null ? 0 : this_ptr.ptr & ~1);
-		this.ptrs_to.add(this_ptr);
+	/**
+	 * Confirmations we will wait for before considering the channel locked in.
+	 * Applied only for inbound channels (see ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth for the
+	 * equivalent limit applied to outbound channels).
+	 * 
+	 * Default value: 6.
+	 */
+	public void set_minimum_depth(int val) {
+		bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_minimum_depth(this.ptr, val);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Set to the number of blocks we require our counterparty to wait to claim their money (ie
+	 * the number of blocks we have to punish our counterparty if they broadcast a revoked
+	 * transaction).
+	 * 
+	 * This is one of the main parameters of our security model. We (or one of our watchtowers) MUST
+	 * be online to check for revoked transactions on-chain at least once every our_to_self_delay
+	 * blocks (minus some margin to allow us enough time to broadcast and confirm a transaction,
+	 * possibly with time in between to RBF the spending transaction).
+	 * 
+	 * Meanwhile, asking for a too high delay, we bother peer to freeze funds for nothing in
+	 * case of an honest unilateral channel close, which implicitly decrease the economic value of
+	 * our channel.
+	 * 
+	 * Default value: [`BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT`], we enforce it as a minimum at channel opening so you
+	 * can tweak config to ask for more security, not less.
+	 */
+	public short get_our_to_self_delay() {
+		short ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_our_to_self_delay(this.ptr);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 		return ret;
 	}
 
-	public void set_minimum_depth(ChannelHandshakeConfig this_ptr, int val) {
-		bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_minimum_depth(this_ptr == null ? 0 : this_ptr.ptr & ~1, val);
-		this.ptrs_to.add(this_ptr);
+	/**
+	 * Set to the number of blocks we require our counterparty to wait to claim their money (ie
+	 * the number of blocks we have to punish our counterparty if they broadcast a revoked
+	 * transaction).
+	 * 
+	 * This is one of the main parameters of our security model. We (or one of our watchtowers) MUST
+	 * be online to check for revoked transactions on-chain at least once every our_to_self_delay
+	 * blocks (minus some margin to allow us enough time to broadcast and confirm a transaction,
+	 * possibly with time in between to RBF the spending transaction).
+	 * 
+	 * Meanwhile, asking for a too high delay, we bother peer to freeze funds for nothing in
+	 * case of an honest unilateral channel close, which implicitly decrease the economic value of
+	 * our channel.
+	 * 
+	 * Default value: [`BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT`], we enforce it as a minimum at channel opening so you
+	 * can tweak config to ask for more security, not less.
+	 */
+	public void set_our_to_self_delay(short val) {
+		bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_our_to_self_delay(this.ptr, val);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
 	}
 
-	public short get_our_to_self_delay(ChannelHandshakeConfig this_ptr) {
-		short ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_our_to_self_delay(this_ptr == null ? 0 : this_ptr.ptr & ~1);
-		this.ptrs_to.add(this_ptr);
+	/**
+	 * Set to the smallest value HTLC we will accept to process.
+	 * 
+	 * This value is sent to our counterparty on channel-open and we close the channel any time
+	 * our counterparty misbehaves by sending us an HTLC with a value smaller than this.
+	 * 
+	 * Default value: 1. If the value is less than 1, it is ignored and set to 1, as is required
+	 * by the protocol.
+	 */
+	public long get_our_htlc_minimum_msat() {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(this.ptr);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 		return ret;
 	}
 
-	public void set_our_to_self_delay(ChannelHandshakeConfig this_ptr, short val) {
-		bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_our_to_self_delay(this_ptr == null ? 0 : this_ptr.ptr & ~1, val);
-		this.ptrs_to.add(this_ptr);
+	/**
+	 * Set to the smallest value HTLC we will accept to process.
+	 * 
+	 * This value is sent to our counterparty on channel-open and we close the channel any time
+	 * our counterparty misbehaves by sending us an HTLC with a value smaller than this.
+	 * 
+	 * Default value: 1. If the value is less than 1, it is ignored and set to 1, as is required
+	 * by the protocol.
+	 */
+	public void set_our_htlc_minimum_msat(long val) {
+		bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_our_htlc_minimum_msat(this.ptr, val);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
 	}
 
-	public long get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(ChannelHandshakeConfig this_ptr) {
-		long ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(this_ptr == null ? 0 : this_ptr.ptr & ~1);
-		this.ptrs_to.add(this_ptr);
+	/**
+	 * If set, we attempt to negotiate the `scid_privacy` (referred to as `scid_alias` in the
+	 * BOLTs) option for outbound private channels. This provides better privacy by not including
+	 * our real on-chain channel UTXO in each invoice and requiring that our counterparty only
+	 * relay HTLCs to us using the channel's SCID alias.
+	 * 
+	 * If this option is set, channels may be created that will not be readable by LDK versions
+	 * prior to 0.0.106, causing [`ChannelManager`]'s read method to return a
+	 * [`DecodeError:InvalidValue`].
+	 * 
+	 * Note that setting this to true does *not* prevent us from opening channels with
+	 * counterparties that do not support the `scid_alias` option; we will simply fall back to a
+	 * private channel without that option.
+	 * 
+	 * Ignored if the channel is negotiated to be announced, see
+	 * [`ChannelConfig::announced_channel`] and
+	 * [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preference`] for more.
+	 * 
+	 * Default value: false. This value is likely to change to true in the future.
+	 * 
+	 * [`ChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager
+	 * [`DecodeError:InvalidValue`]: crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue
+	 */
+	public boolean get_negotiate_scid_privacy() {
+		boolean ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_negotiate_scid_privacy(this.ptr);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 		return ret;
 	}
 
-	public void set_our_htlc_minimum_msat(ChannelHandshakeConfig this_ptr, long val) {
-		bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_our_htlc_minimum_msat(this_ptr == null ? 0 : this_ptr.ptr & ~1, val);
-		this.ptrs_to.add(this_ptr);
+	/**
+	 * If set, we attempt to negotiate the `scid_privacy` (referred to as `scid_alias` in the
+	 * BOLTs) option for outbound private channels. This provides better privacy by not including
+	 * our real on-chain channel UTXO in each invoice and requiring that our counterparty only
+	 * relay HTLCs to us using the channel's SCID alias.
+	 * 
+	 * If this option is set, channels may be created that will not be readable by LDK versions
+	 * prior to 0.0.106, causing [`ChannelManager`]'s read method to return a
+	 * [`DecodeError:InvalidValue`].
+	 * 
+	 * Note that setting this to true does *not* prevent us from opening channels with
+	 * counterparties that do not support the `scid_alias` option; we will simply fall back to a
+	 * private channel without that option.
+	 * 
+	 * Ignored if the channel is negotiated to be announced, see
+	 * [`ChannelConfig::announced_channel`] and
+	 * [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preference`] for more.
+	 * 
+	 * Default value: false. This value is likely to change to true in the future.
+	 * 
+	 * [`ChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager
+	 * [`DecodeError:InvalidValue`]: crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue
+	 */
+	public void set_negotiate_scid_privacy(boolean val) {
+		bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_negotiate_scid_privacy(this.ptr, val);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Constructs a new ChannelHandshakeConfig given each field
+	 */
+	public static ChannelHandshakeConfig of(int minimum_depth_arg, short our_to_self_delay_arg, long our_htlc_minimum_msat_arg, boolean negotiate_scid_privacy_arg) {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_new(minimum_depth_arg, our_to_self_delay_arg, our_htlc_minimum_msat_arg, negotiate_scid_privacy_arg);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(minimum_depth_arg);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(our_to_self_delay_arg);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(our_htlc_minimum_msat_arg);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(negotiate_scid_privacy_arg);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		ChannelHandshakeConfig ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new ChannelHandshakeConfig(null, ret); }
+		ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv);
+		return ret_hu_conv;
+	}
+
+	long clone_ptr() {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_clone_ptr(this.ptr);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		return ret;
 	}
 
-	public ChannelHandshakeConfig(int minimum_depth_arg, short our_to_self_delay_arg, long our_htlc_minimum_msat_arg) {
-		super(bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_new(minimum_depth_arg, our_to_self_delay_arg, our_htlc_minimum_msat_arg));
+	/**
+	 * Creates a copy of the ChannelHandshakeConfig
+	 */
+	public ChannelHandshakeConfig clone() {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_clone(this.ptr);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		ChannelHandshakeConfig ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new ChannelHandshakeConfig(null, ret); }
+		ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
+		return ret_hu_conv;
 	}
 
-	public ChannelHandshakeConfig() {
-		super(bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_default());
+	/**
+	 * Creates a "default" ChannelHandshakeConfig. See struct and individual field documentaiton for details on which values are used.
+	 */
+	public static ChannelHandshakeConfig with_default() {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_default();
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		ChannelHandshakeConfig ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new ChannelHandshakeConfig(null, ret); }
+		ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv);
+		return ret_hu_conv;
 	}
 
 }