X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=src%2Fmain%2Fjava%2Forg%2Fldk%2Fstructs%2FChannelManager.java;h=6be766d4da2ad44824abb822aeefec39cfb4bdfe;hb=07d5d868dfe064aadb28a7f7ca6002c16be9723d;hp=56198363c4804ac1551d6db38989dcceed41b3e3;hpb=f70bcf067b290c88dc9dc26f4aca86475e5f6ed7;p=ldk-java

diff --git a/src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/ChannelManager.java b/src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/ChannelManager.java
index 56198363..6be766d4 100644
--- a/src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/ChannelManager.java
+++ b/src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/ChannelManager.java
@@ -4,147 +4,1352 @@ import org.ldk.impl.bindings;
 import org.ldk.enums.*;
 import org.ldk.util.*;
 import java.util.Arrays;
+import java.lang.ref.Reference;
+import javax.annotation.Nullable;
 
+
+/**
+ * Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
+ * channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
+ * 
+ * Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
+ * to individual Channels.
+ * 
+ * Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
+ * all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
+ * serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
+ * called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
+ * 
+ * Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
+ * [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
+ * [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
+ * [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
+ * `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
+ * `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
+ * deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
+ * [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
+ * will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
+ * 
+ * Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
+ * tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
+ * See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
+ * 
+ * Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
+ * [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
+ * spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
+ * offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
+ * [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
+ * 
+ * To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
+ * inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
+ * not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
+ * many peers with unfunded channels.
+ * 
+ * Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
+ * exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
+ * never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
+ * 
+ * Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
+ * a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
+ * essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
+ * [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
+ * you're using lightning-net-tokio.
+ * 
+ * [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
+ * [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
+ * [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
+ * [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
+ * [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
+ * [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
+ * [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
+ * [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
+ */
 @SuppressWarnings("unchecked") // We correctly assign various generic arrays
 public class ChannelManager extends CommonBase {
 	ChannelManager(Object _dummy, long ptr) { super(ptr); }
 	@Override @SuppressWarnings("deprecation")
 	protected void finalize() throws Throwable {
 		super.finalize();
-		bindings.ChannelManager_free(ptr);
+		if (ptr != 0) { bindings.ChannelManager_free(ptr); }
 	}
 
-	public static ChannelManager constructor_new(LDKNetwork network, FeeEstimator fee_est, Watch chain_monitor, BroadcasterInterface tx_broadcaster, Logger logger, KeysInterface keys_manager, UserConfig config, long current_blockchain_height) {
-		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_new(network, fee_est == null ? 0 : fee_est.ptr, chain_monitor == null ? 0 : chain_monitor.ptr, tx_broadcaster == null ? 0 : tx_broadcaster.ptr, logger == null ? 0 : logger.ptr, keys_manager == null ? 0 : keys_manager.ptr, config == null ? 0 : config.ptr & ~1, current_blockchain_height);
-		ChannelManager ret_hu_conv = new ChannelManager(null, ret);
-		ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(fee_est);
-		ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(chain_monitor);
-		ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(tx_broadcaster);
-		ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(logger);
-		ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(keys_manager);
-		ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(config);
+	/**
+	 * Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
+	 * 
+	 * The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
+	 * 
+	 * This is the main \"logic hub\" for all channel-related actions, and implements
+	 * [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
+	 * 
+	 * Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
+	 * 
+	 * Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
+	 * disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
+	 * from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
+	 * more details.
+	 * 
+	 * [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
+	 * [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
+	 * [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
+	 */
+	public static ChannelManager of(org.ldk.structs.FeeEstimator fee_est, org.ldk.structs.Watch chain_monitor, org.ldk.structs.BroadcasterInterface tx_broadcaster, org.ldk.structs.Router router, org.ldk.structs.Logger logger, org.ldk.structs.EntropySource entropy_source, org.ldk.structs.NodeSigner node_signer, org.ldk.structs.SignerProvider signer_provider, org.ldk.structs.UserConfig config, org.ldk.structs.ChainParameters params, int current_timestamp) {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_new(fee_est.ptr, chain_monitor.ptr, tx_broadcaster.ptr, router.ptr, logger.ptr, entropy_source.ptr, node_signer.ptr, signer_provider.ptr, config == null ? 0 : config.ptr, params == null ? 0 : params.ptr, current_timestamp);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(fee_est);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(chain_monitor);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(tx_broadcaster);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(router);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(logger);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(entropy_source);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(node_signer);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(signer_provider);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(config);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(params);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(current_timestamp);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		org.ldk.structs.ChannelManager ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelManager(null, ret); }
+		if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv); };
+		if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(fee_est); };
+		if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(chain_monitor); };
+		if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(tx_broadcaster); };
+		if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(router); };
+		if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(logger); };
+		if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(entropy_source); };
+		if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(node_signer); };
+		if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(signer_provider); };
+		if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(config); };
+		if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(params); };
 		return ret_hu_conv;
 	}
 
-	public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ create_channel(byte[] their_network_key, long channel_value_satoshis, long push_msat, long user_id, UserConfig override_config) {
-		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_create_channel(this.ptr, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, override_config == null ? 0 : override_config.ptr & ~1);
-		Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
-		ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
-		this.ptrs_to.add(override_config);
+	/**
+	 * Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
+	 */
+	public UserConfig get_current_default_configuration() {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_get_current_default_configuration(this.ptr);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		org.ldk.structs.UserConfig ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.UserConfig(null, ret); }
+		if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
+		return ret_hu_conv;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
+	 * 
+	 * `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
+	 * [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
+	 * correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
+	 * randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
+	 * is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
+	 * 
+	 * Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
+	 * greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
+	 * 
+	 * Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
+	 * generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
+	 * [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
+	 * 
+	 * Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
+	 * connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
+	 * the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
+	 * 
+	 * Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
+	 * [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
+	 * [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
+	 * [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
+	 * one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
+	 * immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
+	 * 
+	 * [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
+	 * [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
+	 * [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
+	 * 
+	 * Note that override_config (or a relevant inner pointer) may be NULL or all-0s to represent None
+	 */
+	public Result_ThirtyTwoBytesAPIErrorZ create_channel(byte[] their_network_key, long channel_value_satoshis, long push_msat, org.ldk.util.UInt128 user_channel_id, @Nullable org.ldk.structs.UserConfig override_config) {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_create_channel(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(their_network_key, 33), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id.getLEBytes(), override_config == null ? 0 : override_config.ptr);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(their_network_key);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(channel_value_satoshis);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(push_msat);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(user_channel_id);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(override_config);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		Result_ThirtyTwoBytesAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ThirtyTwoBytesAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+		if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(override_config); };
 		return ret_hu_conv;
 	}
 
+	/**
+	 * Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
+	 * more information.
+	 */
 	public ChannelDetails[] list_channels() {
 		long[] ret = bindings.ChannelManager_list_channels(this.ptr);
-		ChannelDetails[] arr_conv_16_arr = new ChannelDetails[ret.length];
-		for (int q = 0; q < ret.length; q++) {
-			long arr_conv_16 = ret[q];
-			ChannelDetails arr_conv_16_hu_conv = new ChannelDetails(null, arr_conv_16);
-			arr_conv_16_arr[q] = arr_conv_16_hu_conv;
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		int ret_conv_16_len = ret.length;
+		ChannelDetails[] ret_conv_16_arr = new ChannelDetails[ret_conv_16_len];
+		for (int q = 0; q < ret_conv_16_len; q++) {
+			long ret_conv_16 = ret[q];
+			org.ldk.structs.ChannelDetails ret_conv_16_hu_conv = null; if (ret_conv_16 < 0 || ret_conv_16 > 4096) { ret_conv_16_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelDetails(null, ret_conv_16); }
+			if (ret_conv_16_hu_conv != null) { ret_conv_16_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
+			ret_conv_16_arr[q] = ret_conv_16_hu_conv;
 		}
-		return arr_conv_16_arr;
+		return ret_conv_16_arr;
 	}
 
+	/**
+	 * Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
+	 * [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
+	 * 
+	 * These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
+	 * documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
+	 * are.
+	 */
 	public ChannelDetails[] list_usable_channels() {
 		long[] ret = bindings.ChannelManager_list_usable_channels(this.ptr);
-		ChannelDetails[] arr_conv_16_arr = new ChannelDetails[ret.length];
-		for (int q = 0; q < ret.length; q++) {
-			long arr_conv_16 = ret[q];
-			ChannelDetails arr_conv_16_hu_conv = new ChannelDetails(null, arr_conv_16);
-			arr_conv_16_arr[q] = arr_conv_16_hu_conv;
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		int ret_conv_16_len = ret.length;
+		ChannelDetails[] ret_conv_16_arr = new ChannelDetails[ret_conv_16_len];
+		for (int q = 0; q < ret_conv_16_len; q++) {
+			long ret_conv_16 = ret[q];
+			org.ldk.structs.ChannelDetails ret_conv_16_hu_conv = null; if (ret_conv_16 < 0 || ret_conv_16 > 4096) { ret_conv_16_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelDetails(null, ret_conv_16); }
+			if (ret_conv_16_hu_conv != null) { ret_conv_16_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
+			ret_conv_16_arr[q] = ret_conv_16_hu_conv;
+		}
+		return ret_conv_16_arr;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
+	 */
+	public ChannelDetails[] list_channels_with_counterparty(byte[] counterparty_node_id) {
+		long[] ret = bindings.ChannelManager_list_channels_with_counterparty(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(counterparty_node_id, 33));
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(counterparty_node_id);
+		int ret_conv_16_len = ret.length;
+		ChannelDetails[] ret_conv_16_arr = new ChannelDetails[ret_conv_16_len];
+		for (int q = 0; q < ret_conv_16_len; q++) {
+			long ret_conv_16 = ret[q];
+			org.ldk.structs.ChannelDetails ret_conv_16_hu_conv = null; if (ret_conv_16 < 0 || ret_conv_16 > 4096) { ret_conv_16_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelDetails(null, ret_conv_16); }
+			if (ret_conv_16_hu_conv != null) { ret_conv_16_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
+			ret_conv_16_arr[q] = ret_conv_16_hu_conv;
 		}
-		return arr_conv_16_arr;
+		return ret_conv_16_arr;
 	}
 
-	public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ close_channel(byte[] channel_id) {
-		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_close_channel(this.ptr, channel_id);
+	/**
+	 * Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
+	 * successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
+	 * 
+	 * This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
+	 * result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
+	 * [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
+	 * 
+	 * [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
+	 */
+	public RecentPaymentDetails[] list_recent_payments() {
+		long[] ret = bindings.ChannelManager_list_recent_payments(this.ptr);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		int ret_conv_22_len = ret.length;
+		RecentPaymentDetails[] ret_conv_22_arr = new RecentPaymentDetails[ret_conv_22_len];
+		for (int w = 0; w < ret_conv_22_len; w++) {
+			long ret_conv_22 = ret[w];
+			org.ldk.structs.RecentPaymentDetails ret_conv_22_hu_conv = org.ldk.structs.RecentPaymentDetails.constr_from_ptr(ret_conv_22);
+			if (ret_conv_22_hu_conv != null) { ret_conv_22_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
+			ret_conv_22_arr[w] = ret_conv_22_hu_conv;
+		}
+		return ret_conv_22_arr;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
+	 * will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
+	 * pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
+	 * 
+	 * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
+	 * [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
+	 * estimate.
+	 * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
+	 * transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
+	 * would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
+	 * counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
+	 * 
+	 * May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
+	 * 
+	 * Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
+	 * generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
+	 * [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
+	 * channel.
+	 * 
+	 * [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
+	 * [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
+	 * [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
+	 * [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
+	 */
+	public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ close_channel(byte[] channel_id, byte[] counterparty_node_id) {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_close_channel(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(channel_id, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(counterparty_node_id, 33));
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(channel_id);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(counterparty_node_id);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 		Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
-		ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
 		return ret_hu_conv;
 	}
 
-	public void force_close_channel(byte[] channel_id) {
-		bindings.ChannelManager_force_close_channel(this.ptr, channel_id);
+	/**
+	 * Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
+	 * will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
+	 * pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
+	 * 
+	 * `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
+	 * the channel being closed or not:
+	 * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
+	 * transaction. The upper-bound is set by
+	 * [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
+	 * estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
+	 * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
+	 * transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
+	 * will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
+	 * 
+	 * The `shutdown_script` provided  will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
+	 * Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
+	 * ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
+	 * also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
+	 * 
+	 * May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
+	 * 
+	 * Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
+	 * generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
+	 * [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
+	 * channel.
+	 * 
+	 * [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
+	 * [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
+	 * [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
+	 * [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
+	 * 
+	 * Note that shutdown_script (or a relevant inner pointer) may be NULL or all-0s to represent None
+	 */
+	public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(byte[] channel_id, byte[] counterparty_node_id, org.ldk.structs.Option_u32Z target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, @Nullable org.ldk.structs.ShutdownScript shutdown_script) {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(channel_id, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(counterparty_node_id, 33), target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight.ptr, shutdown_script == null ? 0 : shutdown_script.ptr);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(channel_id);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(counterparty_node_id);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(shutdown_script);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+		if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight); };
+		if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(shutdown_script); };
+		return ret_hu_conv;
 	}
 
-	public void force_close_all_channels() {
-		bindings.ChannelManager_force_close_all_channels(this.ptr);
+	/**
+	 * Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
+	 * rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
+	 * the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
+	 * channel.
+	 */
+	public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(byte[] channel_id, byte[] counterparty_node_id) {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(channel_id, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(counterparty_node_id, 33));
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(channel_id);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(counterparty_node_id);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+		return ret_hu_conv;
 	}
 
-	public Result_NonePaymentSendFailureZ send_payment(Route route, byte[] payment_hash, byte[] payment_secret) {
-		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_send_payment(this.ptr, route == null ? 0 : route.ptr & ~1, payment_hash, payment_secret);
+	/**
+	 * Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
+	 * the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
+	 * `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
+	 * 
+	 * You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
+	 * [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
+	 */
+	public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(byte[] channel_id, byte[] counterparty_node_id) {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(channel_id, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(counterparty_node_id, 33));
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(channel_id);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(counterparty_node_id);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+		return ret_hu_conv;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
+	 * for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
+	 */
+	public void force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn() {
+		bindings.ChannelManager_force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(this.ptr);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
+	 * local transaction(s).
+	 */
+	public void force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn() {
+		bindings.ChannelManager_force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(this.ptr);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Sends a payment along a given route.
+	 * 
+	 * Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
+	 * fields for more info.
+	 * 
+	 * May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
+	 * [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
+	 * 
+	 * # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
+	 * 
+	 * If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
+	 * method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
+	 * is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
+	 * [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
+	 * second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
+	 * 
+	 * Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
+	 * tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
+	 * should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
+	 * consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
+	 * [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
+	 * 
+	 * Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
+	 * before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
+	 * using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
+	 * [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
+	 * 
+	 * # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
+	 * 
+	 * Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
+	 * each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
+	 * [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
+	 * 
+	 * In general, a path may raise:
+	 * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
+	 * node public key) is specified.
+	 * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
+	 * closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
+	 * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
+	 * relevant updates.
+	 * 
+	 * Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
+	 * irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
+	 * different route unless you intend to pay twice!
+	 * 
+	 * [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
+	 * [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
+	 * [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
+	 * [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
+	 * [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
+	 * [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
+	 */
+	public Result_NonePaymentSendFailureZ send_payment_with_route(org.ldk.structs.Route route, byte[] payment_hash, org.ldk.structs.RecipientOnionFields recipient_onion, byte[] payment_id) {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_send_payment_with_route(this.ptr, route == null ? 0 : route.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_hash, 32), recipient_onion == null ? 0 : recipient_onion.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_id, 32));
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(route);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_hash);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(recipient_onion);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_id);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 		Result_NonePaymentSendFailureZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NonePaymentSendFailureZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
-		ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
-		this.ptrs_to.add(route);
+		if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(route); };
+		if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(recipient_onion); };
+		return ret_hu_conv;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
+	 * `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
+	 */
+	public Result_NoneRetryableSendFailureZ send_payment(byte[] payment_hash, org.ldk.structs.RecipientOnionFields recipient_onion, byte[] payment_id, org.ldk.structs.RouteParameters route_params, org.ldk.structs.Retry retry_strategy) {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_send_payment(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_hash, 32), recipient_onion == null ? 0 : recipient_onion.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_id, 32), route_params == null ? 0 : route_params.ptr, retry_strategy.ptr);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_hash);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(recipient_onion);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_id);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(route_params);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(retry_strategy);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		Result_NoneRetryableSendFailureZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneRetryableSendFailureZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+		if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(recipient_onion); };
+		if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(route_params); };
+		if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(retry_strategy); };
+		return ret_hu_conv;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
+	 * pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
+	 * retries are exhausted.
+	 * 
+	 * # Event Generation
+	 * 
+	 * If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
+	 * as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
+	 * 
+	 * Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
+	 * wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
+	 * determine the ultimate status of a payment.
+	 * 
+	 * # Restart Behavior
+	 * 
+	 * If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
+	 * [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
+	 */
+	public void abandon_payment(byte[] payment_id) {
+		bindings.ChannelManager_abandon_payment(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_id, 32));
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_id);
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
+	 * generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
+	 * the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
+	 * would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
+	 * never reach the recipient.
+	 * 
+	 * See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
+	 * and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
+	 * 
+	 * Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
+	 * [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
+	 * 
+	 * [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
+	 */
+	public Result_ThirtyTwoBytesPaymentSendFailureZ send_spontaneous_payment(org.ldk.structs.Route route, org.ldk.structs.Option_ThirtyTwoBytesZ payment_preimage, org.ldk.structs.RecipientOnionFields recipient_onion, byte[] payment_id) {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_send_spontaneous_payment(this.ptr, route == null ? 0 : route.ptr, payment_preimage.ptr, recipient_onion == null ? 0 : recipient_onion.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_id, 32));
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(route);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_preimage);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(recipient_onion);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_id);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		Result_ThirtyTwoBytesPaymentSendFailureZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ThirtyTwoBytesPaymentSendFailureZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+		if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(route); };
+		if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(payment_preimage); };
+		if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(recipient_onion); };
 		return ret_hu_conv;
 	}
 
-	public void funding_transaction_generated(byte[] temporary_channel_id, OutPoint funding_txo) {
-		bindings.ChannelManager_funding_transaction_generated(this.ptr, temporary_channel_id, funding_txo == null ? 0 : funding_txo.ptr & ~1);
-		this.ptrs_to.add(funding_txo);
+	/**
+	 * Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
+	 * based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
+	 * 
+	 * See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
+	 * payments.
+	 * 
+	 * [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
+	 */
+	public Result_ThirtyTwoBytesRetryableSendFailureZ send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(org.ldk.structs.Option_ThirtyTwoBytesZ payment_preimage, org.ldk.structs.RecipientOnionFields recipient_onion, byte[] payment_id, org.ldk.structs.RouteParameters route_params, org.ldk.structs.Retry retry_strategy) {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(this.ptr, payment_preimage.ptr, recipient_onion == null ? 0 : recipient_onion.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_id, 32), route_params == null ? 0 : route_params.ptr, retry_strategy.ptr);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_preimage);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(recipient_onion);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_id);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(route_params);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(retry_strategy);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		Result_ThirtyTwoBytesRetryableSendFailureZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ThirtyTwoBytesRetryableSendFailureZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+		if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(payment_preimage); };
+		if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(recipient_onion); };
+		if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(route_params); };
+		if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(retry_strategy); };
+		return ret_hu_conv;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
+	 * [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
+	 * us to easily discern them from real payments.
+	 */
+	public Result_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesThirtyTwoBytesZPaymentSendFailureZ send_probe(org.ldk.structs.Path path) {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_send_probe(this.ptr, path == null ? 0 : path.ptr);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(path);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		Result_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesThirtyTwoBytesZPaymentSendFailureZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesThirtyTwoBytesZPaymentSendFailureZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+		if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(path); };
+		return ret_hu_conv;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
+	 * amount to the given `node_id`.
+	 * 
+	 * See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
+	 */
+	public Result_CVec_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesThirtyTwoBytesZZProbeSendFailureZ send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(byte[] node_id, long amount_msat, int final_cltv_expiry_delta, org.ldk.structs.Option_u64Z liquidity_limit_multiplier) {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(node_id, 33), amount_msat, final_cltv_expiry_delta, liquidity_limit_multiplier.ptr);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(node_id);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(amount_msat);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(final_cltv_expiry_delta);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(liquidity_limit_multiplier);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		Result_CVec_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesThirtyTwoBytesZZProbeSendFailureZ ret_hu_conv = Result_CVec_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesThirtyTwoBytesZZProbeSendFailureZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+		if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(liquidity_limit_multiplier); };
+		return ret_hu_conv;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
+	 * according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
+	 * 
+	 * This may be used to send \"pre-flight\" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
+	 * the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
+	 * probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
+	 * confirmation in a wallet UI.
+	 * 
+	 * Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
+	 * actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
+	 * liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
+	 * payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
+	 * amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
+	 * probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
+	 */
+	public Result_CVec_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesThirtyTwoBytesZZProbeSendFailureZ send_preflight_probes(org.ldk.structs.RouteParameters route_params, org.ldk.structs.Option_u64Z liquidity_limit_multiplier) {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_send_preflight_probes(this.ptr, route_params == null ? 0 : route_params.ptr, liquidity_limit_multiplier.ptr);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(route_params);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(liquidity_limit_multiplier);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		Result_CVec_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesThirtyTwoBytesZZProbeSendFailureZ ret_hu_conv = Result_CVec_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesThirtyTwoBytesZZProbeSendFailureZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+		if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(route_params); };
+		if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(liquidity_limit_multiplier); };
+		return ret_hu_conv;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
+	 * 
+	 * Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
+	 * or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
+	 * 
+	 * Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
+	 * across the p2p network.
+	 * 
+	 * Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
+	 * for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
+	 * 
+	 * May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
+	 * channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
+	 * keys per-channel).
+	 * 
+	 * Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
+	 * counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
+	 * [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
+	 * 
+	 * Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
+	 * not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
+	 * create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
+	 * 
+	 * Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
+	 * the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
+	 * implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
+	 * for more details.
+	 * 
+	 * [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
+	 * [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
+	 */
+	public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ funding_transaction_generated(byte[] temporary_channel_id, byte[] counterparty_node_id, byte[] funding_transaction) {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_funding_transaction_generated(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(temporary_channel_id, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(counterparty_node_id, 33), funding_transaction);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(temporary_channel_id);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(counterparty_node_id);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(funding_transaction);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+		return ret_hu_conv;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
+	 * 
+	 * Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
+	 * each individual channel and transaction output.
+	 * 
+	 * Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transcaction
+	 * will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
+	 * signature for each channel.
+	 * 
+	 * If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
+	 */
+	public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ batch_funding_transaction_generated(TwoTuple_ThirtyTwoBytesPublicKeyZ[] temporary_channels, byte[] funding_transaction) {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_batch_funding_transaction_generated(this.ptr, temporary_channels != null ? Arrays.stream(temporary_channels).mapToLong(temporary_channels_conv_35 -> temporary_channels_conv_35 != null ? temporary_channels_conv_35.ptr : 0).toArray() : null, funding_transaction);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(temporary_channels);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(funding_transaction);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+		return ret_hu_conv;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
+	 * 
+	 * Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
+	 * ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
+	 * or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
+	 * containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
+	 * 
+	 * Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
+	 * `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
+	 * 
+	 * Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
+	 * below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
+	 * 
+	 * If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
+	 * 
+	 * [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
+	 * [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
+	 * [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
+	 * [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
+	 * [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
+	 * [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
+	 * [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
+	 */
+	public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ update_partial_channel_config(byte[] counterparty_node_id, byte[][] channel_ids, org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfigUpdate config_update) {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_update_partial_channel_config(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(counterparty_node_id, 33), channel_ids != null ? Arrays.stream(channel_ids).map(channel_ids_conv_8 -> InternalUtils.check_arr_len(channel_ids_conv_8, 32)).toArray(byte[][]::new) : null, config_update == null ? 0 : config_update.ptr);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(counterparty_node_id);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(channel_ids);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(config_update);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+		if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(config_update); };
+		return ret_hu_conv;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
+	 * 
+	 * Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
+	 * ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
+	 * or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
+	 * containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
+	 * 
+	 * Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
+	 * `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
+	 * 
+	 * Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
+	 * below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
+	 * 
+	 * If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
+	 * 
+	 * [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
+	 * [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
+	 * [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
+	 * [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
+	 * [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
+	 * [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
+	 * [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
+	 */
+	public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ update_channel_config(byte[] counterparty_node_id, byte[][] channel_ids, org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig config) {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_update_channel_config(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(counterparty_node_id, 33), channel_ids != null ? Arrays.stream(channel_ids).map(channel_ids_conv_8 -> InternalUtils.check_arr_len(channel_ids_conv_8, 32)).toArray(byte[][]::new) : null, config == null ? 0 : config.ptr);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(counterparty_node_id);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(channel_ids);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(config);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+		if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(config); };
+		return ret_hu_conv;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
+	 * amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
+	 * 
+	 * Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
+	 * channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
+	 * 
+	 * To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
+	 * [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
+	 * receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
+	 * [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
+	 * [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
+	 * 
+	 * Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
+	 * you from forwarding more than you received. See
+	 * [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
+	 * than expected.
+	 * 
+	 * Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
+	 * backwards.
+	 * 
+	 * [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
+	 * [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
+	 * [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
+	 */
+	public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ forward_intercepted_htlc(byte[] intercept_id, byte[] next_hop_channel_id, byte[] next_node_id, long amt_to_forward_msat) {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_forward_intercepted_htlc(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(intercept_id, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(next_hop_channel_id, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(next_node_id, 33), amt_to_forward_msat);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(intercept_id);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(next_hop_channel_id);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(next_node_id);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(amt_to_forward_msat);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+		return ret_hu_conv;
 	}
 
-	public void broadcast_node_announcement(byte[] rgb, byte[] alias, NetAddress[] addresses) {
-		bindings.ChannelManager_broadcast_node_announcement(this.ptr, rgb, alias, Arrays.stream(addresses).mapToLong(arr_conv_12 -> arr_conv_12.conv_to_c()).toArray());
-		/* TODO 2 NetAddress  */;
+	/**
+	 * Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
+	 * an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
+	 * 
+	 * Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
+	 * backwards.
+	 * 
+	 * [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
+	 */
+	public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ fail_intercepted_htlc(byte[] intercept_id) {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_fail_intercepted_htlc(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(intercept_id, 32));
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(intercept_id);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+		return ret_hu_conv;
 	}
 
+	/**
+	 * Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
+	 * 
+	 * Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
+	 * Will likely generate further events.
+	 */
 	public void process_pending_htlc_forwards() {
 		bindings.ChannelManager_process_pending_htlc_forwards(this.ptr);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 	}
 
-	public void timer_chan_freshness_every_min() {
-		bindings.ChannelManager_timer_chan_freshness_every_min(this.ptr);
+	/**
+	 * Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
+	 * 
+	 * This currently includes:
+	 * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
+	 * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
+	 * than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
+	 * the channel.
+	 * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
+	 * with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
+	 * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
+	 * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
+	 * 
+	 * Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
+	 * estimate fetches.
+	 * 
+	 * [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
+	 * [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
+	 */
+	public void timer_tick_occurred() {
+		bindings.ChannelManager_timer_tick_occurred(this.ptr);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 	}
 
-	public boolean fail_htlc_backwards(byte[] payment_hash, byte[] payment_secret) {
-		boolean ret = bindings.ChannelManager_fail_htlc_backwards(this.ptr, payment_hash, payment_secret);
-		return ret;
+	/**
+	 * Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
+	 * after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
+	 * along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
+	 * 
+	 * Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
+	 * already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
+	 * second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
+	 * may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
+	 * 
+	 * While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
+	 * [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
+	 * [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
+	 * startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
+	 */
+	public void fail_htlc_backwards(byte[] payment_hash) {
+		bindings.ChannelManager_fail_htlc_backwards(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_hash, 32));
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_hash);
 	}
 
-	public boolean claim_funds(byte[] payment_preimage, byte[] payment_secret, long expected_amount) {
-		boolean ret = bindings.ChannelManager_claim_funds(this.ptr, payment_preimage, payment_secret, expected_amount);
-		return ret;
+	/**
+	 * This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
+	 * reason for the failure.
+	 * 
+	 * See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
+	 */
+	public void fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(byte[] payment_hash, org.ldk.structs.FailureCode failure_code) {
+		bindings.ChannelManager_fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_hash, 32), failure_code.ptr);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_hash);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(failure_code);
+		if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(failure_code); };
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
+	 * [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
+	 * 
+	 * This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
+	 * height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
+	 * conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
+	 * successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
+	 * 
+	 * Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
+	 * [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
+	 * event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
+	 * the sender \"proof-of-payment\" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
+	 * 
+	 * This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
+	 * will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
+	 * [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
+	 * 
+	 * [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
+	 * [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
+	 * [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
+	 * [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
+	 * [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
+	 * [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
+	 * [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
+	 */
+	public void claim_funds(byte[] payment_preimage) {
+		bindings.ChannelManager_claim_funds(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_preimage, 32));
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_preimage);
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
+	 * even type numbers.
+	 * 
+	 * # Note
+	 * 
+	 * You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
+	 * claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
+	 * 
+	 * [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
+	 */
+	public void claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(byte[] payment_preimage) {
+		bindings.ChannelManager_claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_preimage, 32));
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_preimage);
 	}
 
+	/**
+	 * Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
+	 */
 	public byte[] get_our_node_id() {
 		byte[] ret = bindings.ChannelManager_get_our_node_id(this.ptr);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
 		return ret;
 	}
 
-	public void channel_monitor_updated(OutPoint funding_txo, long highest_applied_update_id) {
-		bindings.ChannelManager_channel_monitor_updated(this.ptr, funding_txo == null ? 0 : funding_txo.ptr & ~1, highest_applied_update_id);
-		this.ptrs_to.add(funding_txo);
+	/**
+	 * Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
+	 * 
+	 * The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
+	 * and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
+	 * the channel.
+	 * 
+	 * The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
+	 * [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
+	 * with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
+	 * 
+	 * Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
+	 * for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
+	 * used to accept such channels.
+	 * 
+	 * [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
+	 * [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
+	 */
+	public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ accept_inbound_channel(byte[] temporary_channel_id, byte[] counterparty_node_id, org.ldk.util.UInt128 user_channel_id) {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_accept_inbound_channel(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(temporary_channel_id, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(counterparty_node_id, 33), user_channel_id.getLEBytes());
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(temporary_channel_id);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(counterparty_node_id);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(user_channel_id);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+		return ret_hu_conv;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
+	 * it as confirmed immediately.
+	 * 
+	 * The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
+	 * [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
+	 * with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
+	 * 
+	 * Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
+	 * and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
+	 * 
+	 * This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
+	 * transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
+	 * 
+	 * If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
+	 * does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
+	 * 
+	 * [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
+	 * [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
+	 */
+	public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(byte[] temporary_channel_id, byte[] counterparty_node_id, org.ldk.util.UInt128 user_channel_id) {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(temporary_channel_id, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(counterparty_node_id, 33), user_channel_id.getLEBytes());
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(temporary_channel_id);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(counterparty_node_id);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(user_channel_id);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+		return ret_hu_conv;
 	}
 
+	/**
+	 * Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
+	 * to pay us.
+	 * 
+	 * This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
+	 * [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
+	 * 
+	 * The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
+	 * will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
+	 * its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
+	 * passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
+	 * 
+	 * See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
+	 * 
+	 * Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
+	 * `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
+	 * 
+	 * # Note
+	 * 
+	 * If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
+	 * deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
+	 * 
+	 * Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
+	 * 
+	 * If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
+	 * on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
+	 * 
+	 * [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
+	 * [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
+	 * [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
+	 * [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
+	 * [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
+	 * [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
+	 */
+	public Result_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesThirtyTwoBytesZNoneZ create_inbound_payment(org.ldk.structs.Option_u64Z min_value_msat, int invoice_expiry_delta_secs, org.ldk.structs.Option_u16Z min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_create_inbound_payment(this.ptr, min_value_msat.ptr, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta.ptr);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(min_value_msat);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(invoice_expiry_delta_secs);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		Result_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesThirtyTwoBytesZNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesThirtyTwoBytesZNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+		if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(min_value_msat); };
+		if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta); };
+		return ret_hu_conv;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
+	 * stored external to LDK.
+	 * 
+	 * A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
+	 * payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
+	 * the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
+	 * 
+	 * The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
+	 * note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
+	 * payments.
+	 * 
+	 * `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
+	 * received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
+	 * before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
+	 * sender \"proof-of-payment\" unless they have paid the required amount.
+	 * 
+	 * `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
+	 * in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
+	 * After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
+	 * pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
+	 * invoices when no timeout is set.
+	 * 
+	 * Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
+	 * to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
+	 * accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
+	 * If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
+	 * [`PaymentClaimable`].
+	 * 
+	 * Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
+	 * set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
+	 * 
+	 * Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
+	 * `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
+	 * 
+	 * # Note
+	 * 
+	 * If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
+	 * deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
+	 * 
+	 * Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
+	 * 
+	 * If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
+	 * on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
+	 * 
+	 * [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
+	 * [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
+	 */
+	public Result_ThirtyTwoBytesNoneZ create_inbound_payment_for_hash(byte[] payment_hash, org.ldk.structs.Option_u64Z min_value_msat, int invoice_expiry_delta_secs, org.ldk.structs.Option_u16Z min_final_cltv_expiry) {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_create_inbound_payment_for_hash(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_hash, 32), min_value_msat.ptr, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, min_final_cltv_expiry.ptr);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_hash);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(min_value_msat);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(invoice_expiry_delta_secs);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(min_final_cltv_expiry);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		Result_ThirtyTwoBytesNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ThirtyTwoBytesNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+		if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(min_value_msat); };
+		if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(min_final_cltv_expiry); };
+		return ret_hu_conv;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
+	 * previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
+	 * 
+	 * [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
+	 */
+	public Result_ThirtyTwoBytesAPIErrorZ get_payment_preimage(byte[] payment_hash, byte[] payment_secret) {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_get_payment_preimage(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_hash, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_secret, 32));
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_hash);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_secret);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		Result_ThirtyTwoBytesAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ThirtyTwoBytesAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+		return ret_hu_conv;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
+	 * are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
+	 * 
+	 * [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
+	 */
+	public long get_phantom_scid() {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_get_phantom_scid(this.ptr);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
+	 * 
+	 * [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
+	 */
+	public PhantomRouteHints get_phantom_route_hints() {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_get_phantom_route_hints(this.ptr);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		org.ldk.structs.PhantomRouteHints ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.PhantomRouteHints(null, ret); }
+		if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
+		return ret_hu_conv;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
+	 * used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
+	 * [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
+	 * 
+	 * Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
+	 * times to get a unique scid.
+	 */
+	public long get_intercept_scid() {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_get_intercept_scid(this.ptr);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
+	 * our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
+	 */
+	public InFlightHtlcs compute_inflight_htlcs() {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_compute_inflight_htlcs(this.ptr);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		org.ldk.structs.InFlightHtlcs ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.InFlightHtlcs(null, ret); }
+		if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
+		return ret_hu_conv;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Constructs a new MessageSendEventsProvider which calls the relevant methods on this_arg.
+	 * This copies the `inner` pointer in this_arg and thus the returned MessageSendEventsProvider must be freed before this_arg is
+	 */
 	public MessageSendEventsProvider as_MessageSendEventsProvider() {
 		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_as_MessageSendEventsProvider(this.ptr);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 		MessageSendEventsProvider ret_hu_conv = new MessageSendEventsProvider(null, ret);
-		ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
+		if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
 		return ret_hu_conv;
 	}
 
+	/**
+	 * Constructs a new EventsProvider which calls the relevant methods on this_arg.
+	 * This copies the `inner` pointer in this_arg and thus the returned EventsProvider must be freed before this_arg is
+	 */
 	public EventsProvider as_EventsProvider() {
 		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_as_EventsProvider(this.ptr);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 		EventsProvider ret_hu_conv = new EventsProvider(null, ret);
-		ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
+		if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
+		return ret_hu_conv;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Constructs a new Listen which calls the relevant methods on this_arg.
+	 * This copies the `inner` pointer in this_arg and thus the returned Listen must be freed before this_arg is
+	 */
+	public Listen as_Listen() {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_as_Listen(this.ptr);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		Listen ret_hu_conv = new Listen(null, ret);
+		if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
+		return ret_hu_conv;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Constructs a new Confirm which calls the relevant methods on this_arg.
+	 * This copies the `inner` pointer in this_arg and thus the returned Confirm must be freed before this_arg is
+	 */
+	public Confirm as_Confirm() {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_as_Confirm(this.ptr);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		Confirm ret_hu_conv = new Confirm(null, ret);
+		if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
+		return ret_hu_conv;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
+	 * may have events that need processing.
+	 * 
+	 * In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
+	 * [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
+	 * 
+	 * Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
+	 * [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
+	 */
+	public Future get_event_or_persistence_needed_future() {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(this.ptr);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		org.ldk.structs.Future ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.Future(null, ret); }
+		if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
+		return ret_hu_conv;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
+	 */
+	public boolean get_and_clear_needs_persistence() {
+		boolean ret = bindings.ChannelManager_get_and_clear_needs_persistence(this.ptr);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
+	 * [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
+	 */
+	public BestBlock current_best_block() {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_current_best_block(this.ptr);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		org.ldk.structs.BestBlock ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.BestBlock(null, ret); }
+		if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
 		return ret_hu_conv;
 	}
 
-	public void block_connected(byte[] header, TwoTuple<Long, Transaction>[] txdata, int height) {
-		bindings.ChannelManager_block_connected(this.ptr, header, Arrays.stream(txdata).mapToLong(arr_conv_29 -> /*TODO b*/0).toArray(), height);
-		/* TODO 2 TwoTuple<Long, Transaction>  */;
+	/**
+	 * Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
+	 * [`ChannelManager`].
+	 */
+	public NodeFeatures node_features() {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_node_features(this.ptr);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		org.ldk.structs.NodeFeatures ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.NodeFeatures(null, ret); }
+		if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
+		return ret_hu_conv;
 	}
 
-	public void block_disconnected(byte[] header) {
-		bindings.ChannelManager_block_disconnected(this.ptr, header);
+	/**
+	 * Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
+	 * [`ChannelManager`].
+	 */
+	public ChannelFeatures channel_features() {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_channel_features(this.ptr);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		org.ldk.structs.ChannelFeatures ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelFeatures(null, ret); }
+		if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
+		return ret_hu_conv;
 	}
 
+	/**
+	 * Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
+	 * [`ChannelManager`].
+	 */
+	public ChannelTypeFeatures channel_type_features() {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_channel_type_features(this.ptr);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		org.ldk.structs.ChannelTypeFeatures ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelTypeFeatures(null, ret); }
+		if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
+		return ret_hu_conv;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
+	 * [`ChannelManager`].
+	 */
+	public InitFeatures init_features() {
+		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_init_features(this.ptr);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		org.ldk.structs.InitFeatures ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.InitFeatures(null, ret); }
+		if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
+		return ret_hu_conv;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Constructs a new ChannelMessageHandler which calls the relevant methods on this_arg.
+	 * This copies the `inner` pointer in this_arg and thus the returned ChannelMessageHandler must be freed before this_arg is
+	 */
 	public ChannelMessageHandler as_ChannelMessageHandler() {
 		long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_as_ChannelMessageHandler(this.ptr);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 		ChannelMessageHandler ret_hu_conv = new ChannelMessageHandler(null, ret);
-		ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);
+		if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
 		return ret_hu_conv;
 	}
 
+	/**
+	 * Serialize the ChannelManager object into a byte array which can be read by ChannelManager_read
+	 */
+	public byte[] write() {
+		byte[] ret = bindings.ChannelManager_write(this.ptr);
+		Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+		return ret;
+	}
+
 }